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Executive Summary
.,
.~
The motivation for this report had its origins in the mutual interests sur-
rounding future non-lethal weapon science and technology (S&T) by the Joint
Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the Office of Naval Research
(ONR). The Committee for an Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and
Technology was asked to assess current and potential areas for S&T investment
in non-lethal weapons (NLWs) to support naval expeditionary forces; it found
several areas that deserve such investment. In reviewing the program of record
for the JNLWD, as also directed by the terms of reference, the committee evalu-
ated the spectrum of activities that turn S&T advances into fieldable and fielded
systems. As it explored the many dimensions associated with the transition of
NLWs from research and development (R&D) to the field, the committee uncov-
ered a number of areas of concern in the current JNLWD and U.S. Navy efforts
related to NLWs. These concerns must be addressed by the Joint Non-Lethal
Weapons Directorate, the Navy Secretariat, and the Chief of Naval Operations-
or the risk is high that added investments by ONR in non-lethal weapons R&D
will be of little value.
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS FOR
NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
The potential for non-lethal weapons to help meet the overall demands on
naval expeditionary forces in the 21st century is clear. As discussed in subse-
quent chapters, the experiences of the U.S. Marine Corps in the peacekeeping and
urban engagement conflicts in the past decade and the challenges to the Navy in
sanctions enforcement and port protection offer compelling case studies for the
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2 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
importance of having non-lethal weapons options. The Marines have assumed
leadership for developing requirements for clearing facilities and incapacitating
personnel via non-lethal means to meet the constraints of rules of engagement in
mixed combatant/non-combatant environments.
The Navy's needs for non-lethal weapons options are emerging in several
different areas. One of these developed in the aftermath of the USS Cole incident
of October 2000: comprehensive assessments of force protection measures are
starting to generate a notional three-layer architecture for ship protection an
outer zone for assessing and warning of approaching vehicles and personnel
(pierside and outboard; above, on, and below the surface); a middle zone for
initial engagement to turn away a threat if it is still approaching, at which point
non-lethal means may offer the only reasonable alternative to deterring the threat;
and a third, inner zone in which lethal force could be employed. In a second area,
sanctions enforcement in the Persian Gulf has highlighted the challenges of inter-
cepting and boarding suspect vessels in the midst of heavy commercial traffic and
in the face of unknown crew makeup. Non-lethal weapons options could offer a
valuable means for interdiction if needed in such environments. A third compelling
area of need has been identified by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic
Studies Group XVIII: that is, NLWs are needed to fully enable the Sea Strike
concept by filling important gaps in the spectrum of effects-based targeting. A
prime example would be engagements in littoral environments where urban
centers are prevalent and minimization of collateral damage is required.
After a decade of successful, but limited, operational experience with NLWs
and 5 years of progress by the JNLW~the directorate was established in 1996 to
introduce non-lethal weapons more quickly in response to warfighting needs—the
future of NLWs is at a crossroads. NLWs with limited capabilities for individual,
highly localized self-defense or combatant isolation are available. Because counter-
measures for these capabilities may not be difficult, the demand is growing for more
capable systems with wider-ranging effects. The research, development, and acqui-
sition of these more robust capabilities will be well beyond the scope of the current
joint program and will have to be integrated into the normal development and
acquisition cycle of each of the Services. At the present time, the Department of the
Navy is not prepared to carry out these responsibilities.
ADDRESSING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE
The terms of reference chartered the committee to take an extensive look at
the area of non-lethal weapons and also asked for an assessment of the impact of
prior studies and initiatives as well as an assessment of the capabilities that turn a
promising non-lethal weapons technology into a viable operational system. Be-
cause the story is complex and the issues called out in the terms of reference are
highly interdependent, pointers to key sections of the report addressing each
aspect of the committee's charge are provided below for the reader's use.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.
3
Review and assessment of previous non-lethal weapons studies and initia-
tives. Sections 1.1, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 provide background on policy and
directives, operational experience, programs and initiatives outside the Depart-
ment of the Navy, and studies and conferences. Results accumulated since the
establishment of the JNLWD in 1996 are highlighted.
· Review of the JNLWD program of record.
Section 2.3 describes the
directorate's short history, accomplishments, and current programs. The opening
paragraphs of Chapter 3 and Section 3.1 discuss the committee's observations
and findings based on its review of the current program. Its conclusions and
recommendations for the JNLWD program are provided in Sections 4.1 and 5.1,
respectively.
.
Review of Department of the Navy S&T programs that do, or might,
contribute to the development of non-lethal weapons capabilities. This issue
presented the committee with a challenge. The U.S. Marine Corps has well-
established and articulated needs for NLWs, but the Navy had not given much
attention to their use until the aftermath of the USS Cole incident. As such, the
committee spent some time studying the mission needs of the Navy in order to
evaluate relevant S&T within the department. Those needs are described in
Section 1.2, and current programs that are relevant to them are discussed in
Sections 2.4 and 2.5. U.S. Marine Corps programs relevant to non-lethal weap-
ons capabilities are described in Section 2.6. The committee's assessment of
needs versus existing S&T programs led to the concerns expressed in its findings
on the department's organizational interest (Section 3.4) and its related recom-
mendation (Section 5.4~.
· Identification of technology developments that show promise for enhanc-
ing existing non-lethal weapons capabilities or for enabling new ones. Respond-
ing to this task broadened the fact finding of the committee to include the means
by which a promising technology is turned into an operational reality. In the
process, the committee came to realize that sensor and platform capabilities had
to be addressed hand in hand with non-lethal weapons technology development.
These considerations are discussed in Sections 2.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 5.3. In looking
beyond the technologies themselves, the committee also discovered the short-
comings in current understanding of non-lethal weapons effects and effective-
ness. The impact of this issue on warfighter acceptance of NLWs as a useful and
integral operational capability is so profound that the committee devoted two of
its four recommendations to the issue. These topics are addressed in Sections 2.2,
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, Chapter 4, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
· Identification of programs that duplicate efforts or could benefit from
leveraging. The committee found nothing that raised concerns regarding dupli-
cation of effort; the JNLWD has done a good job of ensuring that resources are
wisely spent. The principal opportunities for leveraging are presented by sensors
and platforms as critical system enablers; related observations and recommenda-
tions are provided in Sections 2.1, 3.2, and 5.3.
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4 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY
.
Recommendations for S&T program actions by ONR. Section 5.3 recom-
mends specific actions to strengthen S&T in four general areas. The recommen-
dations include focused investment and expansion of current programs within
ONR (e.g., high-power microwave), leveraging of relevant programs in sensors
and platforms, and partnering with the Army for chemical non-lethal weapons
development.
STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES:
SYNOPSIS OF FINDINGS
The committee undertook a careful survey and assessment of non-lethal
weapons technologies across a wide spectrum of phenomenologies—chemical
and physical, to physiological and psychological. This survey included a number
of classified programs as well as the areas discussed in this unclassified report.
The committee identified several S&T areas worthy of ONR's attention:
1. Calmatives and malodorants for controlling crowds and clearing facili-
ties, developed and applied in accordance with U.S. treaty obligations in the
Chemical Weapons Convention;
2. Directed-energy systems beyond the vehicle-mounted active denial sys-
tem (VMADS): high-power microwave (HPM) for stopping vehicles or vessels
and solid-state lasers for advanced non-lethal weapons applications;
3. Novel and rapidly deployable marine barrier systems; and
4. Adaptation of unmanned or remotely piloted platforms and targeting/real-
time battle damage assessment (BDA) sensors for non-lethal weapons applica-
tions.
The committee's review identified positive accomplishments during the past
5 years as well as areas of concern. The following advances are particularly
noteworthy:
· Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. The JNLWD, with the U.S. Marine
Corps serving as executive agent, was established in 1996. It has achieved notewor-
thy progress in spite of operating under the combined pressures of high visibility and
very modest funding ($20 million to $30 million per year). Examples of its accom-
plishments include the qualification and transition to acquisition of non-lethal weap-
ons capability sets for deployment by Marines and soldiers; the establishment, in
principle, of the process and capabilities for assessing antipersonnel non-lethal weap-
ons effects through the Human Effects Review Board and the Human Effects Center
As noted in the preface, the committee recognizes that it is of paramount importance that the
Department of Defense and the Department of State clarify the legal interpretations of the Chemical
Weapons Convention so that both the operational and technical communities can move forward
under consistent guidelines.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
, ~
of Excellence; the recent maturing to demonstration of VMADS; and the validation
of the first-ever non-lethal weapons joint mission area analysis by the Joint Require-
ments Oversight Council.
· Operational experience. NLWs have had limited operational use. Com-
manding officers who have used them, for example, in Somalia and in an ongoing
operation such as Kosovo, have become highly vocal advocates along with
some who needed them but did not have them at the time.
· Experiments and training. Experiments at the U.S. Marine Corps War-
fighting Laboratory have matured the concept of operations (CONOPS) for many
individual tactical uses of NLWs, and joint training curricula at the U.S. Army's
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, have been established.
· Continued widespread interest and discussion. A continuum of high-
level studies and conferences has reinforced- indeed expanded the roles in
which NLWs could contribute.
· Navy interest. The Marine Corps has been the leading Service proponent
for NLWs throughout the past decade. When this study began, Navy interest in
NLWs was difficult to identify, but the findings and recommendations of the
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Task Force led by the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV) N34 are building a strong case for NLWs as an
important element for protecting ships in port.
Despite these advances and in spite of the expressed wishes of many com-
manders in chief and Service leaders, the following troublesome issues could
preclude NLWs from becoming an integral force option:
· Lack of new ideas. The combined factors of high visibility and small
budgets appropriately focused the JNLWD at its inception on relatively mature
technologies. The most promising have moved, or are nearing transition, to
acquisition and are finding interesting but limited application. Little investment
has been made in new ideas requiring further research, with the result that the
JNLWD now has little in the pipeline ready for development investment.
· Little Service investment in R&D. The Marine Corps and Army, as the
primary initial sources for reallocation of funds to the JNLWD at its inception,
have drawn down their own investments in R&D. Air Force investments for
explicit non-lethal weapons research have always been low, although promising
directed-energy concepts, funded principally for their lethal potential, have found
cofunding from the directorate and other agencies for specific non-lethal weap-
ons applications. Navy interest and actions regarding NLWs in compliance with
the 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) had been very limited until re-
cently. As a result, the Service pipelines are "dry" as well.
· Perceived treaty constraints. The program for chemical antimateriel and
antipersonnel NLWs, after many years of Army R&D investment and the identi-
fication of a number of promising technologies, was canceled with the adoption
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6 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY
of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the early 1990s. That program has not
been started up again, in spite of legal interpretations of the treaty indicating that
it does not preclude such work or the employment of such agents in specified and
increasingly important military situations, such as civilian crowd control in peace-
keeping or humanitarian relief operations.
· Poor understanding of the effects and electiveness of NLWs. The effec-
tiveness of NLWs is poorly understood in almost every dimension. While the
process for assessing health and human effects has been established, as com-
mended above, the funding levels and the overall philosophy leave much to be
done in key areas, such as research into the fundamental biomechanical and
physiological response mechanisms; translation of effects on individuals into
effects on groups and/or effects associated with repeated exposure; development
of effects models; and implementation of the models in experiments, testing, and
wargaming environments. The parallel process for antimateriel NLWs, while
somewhat easier to implement, is not formalized. Moreover, efforts to quantify
military operational advantages and improvements in capabilities with NLWs,
understanding of both U.S. vulnerabilities and enemy countermeasures to non-
lethal weapons use, and development of a CONOPS have been very limited. In
addition, the warfighter must understand and be able to adapt to the inherently
variable effects of NLWs as a specific engagement unfolds, it is essential that
the warrior have the ability to obtain and act on immediate feedback to be able to
"dial an effect" for re-engagement should that prove necessary. Well-characterized
effects and effectiveness are probably the most convincing means of gaining
widespread acceptance and integration of NLWs into warfighting capabilities,
yet such characterization is currently the weakest aspect of the overall non-lethal
weapons program.
· Lack of systems concepts. Given that the effectiveness of non-lethal
weapons options is not well understood, it comes as no surprise that systems
concepts and assessments are generally immature. Complete systems concepts,
including delivery vehicles and sensors for targeting and effects assessment (i.e.,
the non-lethal equivalent of BDA), are few. Logistics and maintenance consider-
ations are limited to ensuring compatibility with whatever exists. Fully inte-
grated lethal and non-lethal weapons capabilities remain to be assessed, although
such force mixes are essential to implementing effects-based targeting.
· Overhead for entering the normal acquisition process. The JNLWD
funding is largely budget category 6.3, that is, funding allocated for exploratory
development. The directorate's leadership has taken on the role of entering new
concepts into the formal milestone acquisition process which was designed to
provide the scrutiny needed for large acquisitions but is ill-suited for the small
levels of funding involved in JNLWD initiatives. Moreover, as a joint office, the
directorate must work to find a Service partner for transition, a task that is made
more difficult for the directorate because it is not part of the normal procurement
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
planning cycle of any of the Services. On the other end, the "color" and total
amount of JNLWD money make investment in research difficult. In short, fol-
lowing the normal Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process does not
serve the directorate, the Services, or DOD efficiently for a program that is so
small and constrained yet is viewed as filling a much-needed role.
· Organizational support within the Department of the Navy. In contrast to
the long-standing emphasis by the Marine Corps on expanding its non-lethal
weapons capabilities, formal Navy interest, as evidenced by assessment, require-
ments, acquisition, or actions consistent with the 1997 MOA (see Box 1.1), has
been practically nonexistent. Within OPNAV N757 only a single person has
sole, and limited, responsibility for coordination of non-lethal weapons issues
with the JNLWD. This approach has probably been adequate, given the focus to
date on acquisition of individual warfighter tool kits, but it will not suffice as
more complex and more capable non-lethal weapons systems (such as VMADS)
mature. It will also not suffice for introducing NLWs as an integrated part of
naval expeditionary force capabilities.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
.,
Because of the range of effects introduced by NLWs, it is readily apparent
that the issues associated with their development and use are more complex than
issues associated with the development and use of their lethal counterparts. The
committee agrees that, while progress since the establishment of the JNLWD has
been laudable, important areas of concern remain. These concerns led the com-
mittee to the following conclusions:
· Without compelling new ideas, NLWs will remain a specialty item in the
warfighter's tool kit and will never become the effective element of warfighting
that countless studies and limited operational experience have affirmed NLWs
can be.
· Without a different process for introducing new non-lethal weapons capa-
bilities one more integrated into each Service's normal development and acqui-
sition cycle the current scope of the program offers only a low probability of
moving even the best ideas to the field in the future.
· Without a much stronger overall program to understand and characterize
the effects and effectiveness of non-lethal weapons, commanders will remain
reluctant to request or employ them.
· Without concepts for the use of non-lethal weapons, developers will not
be successful in focusing ideas and programs.
In short, major changes in approach are needed to achieve the potential of
NLWs for U.S. forces in general and naval forces in particular.
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8 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY
RECOMMENDATIONS
in developing its recommendations, the committee recognized that the terms of
reference for the study had been written prior to the USS Cole incident, yet the study
was conducted in the post-Cole environment in which a more urgent need for non-
lethal options emerged for the Navy. Moreover, the critical gap in the technical
understanding of non-lethal effects added to the committee's concerns that "business
as usual" would not allow important S&T ideas to make the transition to acquisition
and deployment in a reasonable timeframe. The terms of reference directed the
committee to review the JNLWD program of record. In doing so, the committee
concluded that organizational as well as technical recommendations were required.
While no formal analysis of organizational alternatives was made, the committee did
consider and reject the extreme alternatives of the JNLWD being shut down and that
of the JNLWD continuing on as it is, and accepted instead the alternative that the
JNLWD needs to change its present focus.
The committee's recommendations are made in order that any S&T invest-
ment on the part of ONR will have a reasonable probability of successful transi-
tion to the warfighter. The recommendations identify a pragmatic approach (i.e.,
mindful of resource constraints), principally through significant shifts in the em-
phasis of the currently available resources to the JNLWD and the assumption of
research, development, and acquisition (RDA) responsibilities by the Navy and
Marine Corps. This section provides an overview of the committee's recommen-
dations. Chapter 5 presents detailed recommendations for their implementation.
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate: As the Department of Defense's focal
point for non-lethal weapons, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate
should focus its resources on stimulating and exploring new ideas, and on
strengthening the DOD's ability to characterize the effects and effectiveness of
non-lethal weapons.
At this juncture in the maturing of the JNLWD, the committee recommends
that the directorate declare success in its initial phase of meeting the demand for
quickly fielded capabilities and, for the future, move to a new and more robust
role that is much better aligned with its joint status. This next phase for the
JNLWD should focus on two principal roles: (1) advocacy backed by funding
and expertise to support joint experimentation, systems modeling and analysis,
functional concept exploration programs, and advanced concept technology dem-
onstrations (ACTDs), along with stimulating new ideas from the S&T commu-
nity while the Services build up their own programs; and (2) establishing, matur-
ing, and overseeing multiple centers of excellence (COEs) for the study of human
and materiel effects. With the COEs to support it, the directorate should be
assigned the role of independent assessor of any new non-lethal weapons con-
cept, to affirm that effects are properly characterized and understood. This refo-
cusing of the directorate away from non-lethal weapons development and toward
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
9
a transition to acquisition roles would allow it to address the critical limiting
factor for widespread integration of NLWs: namely, the lack of a clear under-
standing of the effects and effectiveness of NLWs.
In parallel with the refocusing of the JNLWD's roles, the Services must
assume their full range of responsibilities for the research, development, and
acquisition of non-lethal weapons systems to meet their own specific needs in-
stead of continuing with the current process whereby the directorate awkwardly
picks up interim steps at the 6.3 budget stage. Given that the Marine Corps has
both the most mature understanding of and experience with NLWs, and that the
Navy is motivated by needed improvements in port protection and expanded
strike capabilities, ONR should have ample justification to invest in non-lethal
weapons R&D as a part of an overall transition within the Department of the
Navy toward assuming end-to-end responsibilities for non-lethal weapons devel-
opment, acquisition, and deployment.
Implementing these changes in roles and responsibilities across the JNLWD
and the Services will require a revision to the Joint Service Memorandum of
Agreement on Non-Lethal Weapons. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services, in addition to the JNLWD, will have to
agree to the changes proposed above. Moreover, the Services' assumption of
end-to-end development and acquisition responsibilities will require the commit-
ment of their own resources (funding and personnel) to establish their in-house
programs.
Centers of excellence: The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate should
establish and sustain human and materiel effects-focused centers of excellence
to support a "seal of approval" process for non-lethal weapons systems.
.*'
The program dimension involving COEs should remain with the JNLWD, as
noted above. It is emphasized here, regardless of the future direction and focus of
the directorate, because the human effects issue is critical for expanded NEW
use. The scope of the COEs should be comprehensive and should include respon-
sibilities for the following:
· Developing and implementing a focused research agenda to advance the
state of fundamental understanding;
· Creating and sustaining effects databases, and identifying shortfalls in the
knowledge base;
· Prioritizing and executing research to fill knowledge gaps;
· Developing, validating, and integrating effects models;
· Serving as a consultant to the development community to define test regimes
and protocols for developmental systems and transition to acquisition; and
· Providing expertise to support JNLWD independent assessment function.
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10 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY
The directorate has recognized the utility of the COE approach with the
establishment of the Human Effects Center of Excellence at Brooks Air Force
Base, San Antonio, Texas. Additional COEs are needed, however, because of the
unique expertise required to understand each of the effects associated with the
wide variety of NLWs (e.g., blunt trauma with kinetic energy non-lethal weap-
ons, penetration of skin and effects on the retina of the eye with millimeter and
microwave radiation, chemical effects of calmatives and malodorants, effects of
antimateriel NLWs, and so on). Research within or supported by each COE
should encompass the determination of thresholds for permanent damage or in-
jury. The committee estimates that about five or six COEs would be needed, each
focused on a particular class of NLW, examples of which are noted above. Each
COE should be funded initially by the JNLWD at a sustaining "foundation" level
of a minimum of $1.5 million per year to support the critical mass of expertise
required to maintain the knowledge base, set the research agenda, and model
fundamental effects. Service funding and cooperative funding should be devel-
oped at this initial stage.
Funding for the research agenda is not included in this foundation level, nor
is funding to accomplish the integration and accreditation of models needed to
support the seal of approval process. The JNLWD must develop a prioritized
research agenda that integrates the agendas from the individual COEs, and it must
then augment COE funding to support research priorities. After the initial stage,
Service funding should bear the majority of the COE funding; however, the
JNLWD should also augment COE funding to support integration and accredita-
tion of effects models, with DOD program managers funding system-specific
models and tests.
Science and technology: In cooperation with the JNLWD and the other Services,
ONR should invest in a richer portfolio of NLW-specific R&D activities in the
areas of chemicals; directed energy; barriers and entanglements; underwater
defensive systems; and platform, sensor, and command and control system
enablers.
Areas for ONR emphasis include HPM research and development as planned
by the Naval Research Laboratory, barrier and entanglement deployment systems
for stopping vessels, accelerated research on solid-state lasers for operational
non-lethal weapons applications, weaponization of antimateriel chemical NLWs
for use in stopping engines and as antipersonnel calmatives, and use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles
as delivery platforms. In the chemicals area, the committee recommends a strong
partnership with the Army's Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command,
which has expertise in and a history of screening chemicals for such applications.
ONR should also support platform and sensor development to address the Navy's
unique needs for remote deployment and effects assessment of non-lethal weapons
technologies, for example in port underwater, surface, and air defense non-lethal
5
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
11
weapons systems. Particularly stressing is the time line for the BDA equivalent
function of effects assessment with non-lethal weapons systems, which places
more stringent requirements on the sensor systems) associated with their use.
A second specific recommendation concerns the VMADS, recently demon-
strated as a potentially effective antipersonnel NLW and envisioned for mounting
on a ground vehicle. Suggestions have been made within the Navy about its
deployment shipboard for port protection, but the idea should be fully assessed
within the Department of the Navy to establish the cost-effectiveness of such a
system before development resources are committed. A final recommendation
related to S&T is made to the JNLWD, which is currently supporting two chemi-
cal laser programs, the advanced tactical laser (ATL) and the pulsed-energy
projectile (PEP). The evidence presented to the committee supporting claims of
the viability of both these concepts for non-lethal weapons use was not convinc-
ing. The directorate is urged to reassess its investments in these programs.
Department of the Navy: The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should establish a senior-level
working group to actively oversee the integration of non-lethal weapons into
naval warfighting requirements, research and development programs, acquisi-
tion plans, and operations.
Non-lethal weapons represent a new capability that must compete in a re-
source-constrained environment with traditional capabilities that already have
well-established requirements and proponents. Without the attention of senior
leadership for some period of time, integration of NLWs into the naval forces will
most likely proceed at a glacial pace or may never happen. The broad range of
non-lethal weapons applications compounds the problem in that there are many
potential candidates (and corresponding proponents) for maturation rather than a
single logical one, so that in the end, no one "owns" (i.e., is responsible for) the
requirements and development process for the area.
The committee believes it is imperative that senior officials and officers
within the Department of the Navy, acting on behalf of naval force (i.e., Navy and
Marine Corps) requirements, become knowledgeable about and take responsibil-
ity for the development and integration of non-lethal weapons systems into naval
mission readiness. The recommended mechanism is a working group chartered
to develop a naval non-lethal weapons master plan for naval expeditionary forces.
Such a plan should establish mechanisms to ensure that non-lethal weapons will
become fully integrated into, and can compete fairly in, the requirement and
development process for all naval systems.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
weapons capabilities