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The Polygraph and Lie Detection
graph. None shows any promise of supplanting the polygraph for screening purposes in the near term.
The polygraph is only one of many possible techniques for identifying national security risks among federal employees. Other techniques attempt to detect deception from facial expressions, voice quality, and other aspects of demeanor; from measurements of brain activity and other physiological indicators; and from background investigations or questionnaires. Computerized analysis of polygraph records has the potential to improve the accuracy of test results by using more information from polygraph records than is used in traditional scoring methods. This potential has yet to be realized, however, either in research or in practice.
We considered the potential to increase the capability to identify security risks by combining polygraph information with information from other screening techniques, for example, in serial screening protocols such as are used in medical diagnosis. There are good theoretical reasons to think appropriate procedures of this sort would improve detection of deception, but we found no serious investigations of such multicomponent screening approaches.
RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
There has been no serious effort in the U.S. government to develop the scientific basis for the psychophysiological detection of deception by any technique, even though criticisms of the scientific grounding of polygraph testing have been raised prominently for decades. Given the heavy reliance of government on the polygraph, especially for screening for espionage and sabotage, the lack of a serious investment in such research is striking.
The limitations of the polygraph, especially for security screening, justify efforts to look more broadly for effective tools for deterring and detecting security violations. These might include modifications in the overall security strategies used in federal agencies, such as have been recommended by the Hamre Commission for DOE, as well as improved techniques for deterring and detecting security violations focused on individuals. Research offers one promising strategy for developing the needed tools.
We recommend an expanded research effort directed at methods for detecting and deterring major security threats, including efforts to improve techniques for security screening.
This effort should pursue two major objectives: (1) to provide federal agencies with methods of the highest possible scientific validity for pro-