The Navy and Marine Corps
in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for this report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.

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The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Harold Liebowitz is president of the National Academy of Engineering.

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COMMITTEE ON THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
IN REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

David R. Heebner, Science Applications International Corporation (retired), Study Chair
Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Chair
Coordination and Integration Group
(composed of Task Group Chairs and Vice Chairs)

Advisory Council

Robert J. Hermann, United Technologies Corporation, Chair
C. Albert Fowler, Sudbury, Massachusetts
Robert A. Frosch, JFK School of Government, Harvard University
Alfred M. Gray, Alexandria, Virginia
Robert L.J. Long, Long Associates, Inc.
Eberhart Rechtin, Palos Verdes, California

Task Group 1, Combat Power

Alan Berman, Center for Naval Analyses, Chair
Ronald L. Atkins, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Robert E. Conley, Conley Technologies, Inc.
Victor C.D. Dawson, Center for Naval Analyses
Gary A. Federici, Center for Naval Analyses
Ray "M" Franklin, Port Angeles, Washington
S. James Gates, Jr., University of Maryland
Paul T. Gillcrist, Los Angeles, California
Lynn G. Gref, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Alfred B. Gschwendtner, Lincoln Laboratory,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ross R. Hatch, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
Willis M. Hawkins, Woodland Hills, California
Robert E. Kenney, Sikorsky Aircraft
Robert A. Moore, Defense Systems and Technology
Daniel M. Nosenchuck, Princeton University
Julie JCH Ryan, Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Basil I. Swanson, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Juma M. Thorpe, Center for Naval Analyses
Verena Vomastic, Institute for Defense Analyses
Duane Wills, Alexandria, Virginia

Task Group 2, Resources

Robert L. Silverstein, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Chair

Sub-Group 1, Deployment and Logistics

Norman E. Betaque, Logistics Management Institute, Chair
Robert H. Gormley, The Oceanus Company
Stanley A. Horowitz, Institute for Defense Analyses
Irwin Mendelson, Singer Island, Florida
Alan Powell, University of Houston
Daniel Savitsky, Davidson Laboratory, Stevens Institute of Technology
Philip D. Shutler, Annandale, Virginia
Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington
James J. Turner, ABS Americas

Sub-Group 2, Length and Cost of Campaigns

Donald N. Fredericksen, Hicks and Associates, Chair
Maurice Eisenstein, Rand Corporation
Michael W. Ellis, BDM Federal, Inc.
James P. Laughlin, Loral Vought Systems Corporation
L. Dean Simmons, Institute for Defense Analyses

Task Group 3, Joint and Combined Operations

Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., The Baciocco Group, Inc., Chair
Keith A. Smith, Vienna, Virginia, Vice Chair
Ruth M. Davis, Pymatuning Group, Inc.
Ivan A. Getting, Coronado, California
Everett D. Greinke, Annandale, Virginia
Ray L. Leadabrand, Leadabrand and Associates
R. Kenneth Lobb, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University
Joseph Metcalf III, Washington, D.C.
David R. Oliver, Westinghouse Electric Systems Company
Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington
Michael A. Stankosky, Burke, Virginia

Invited Participants

John W. Asher III, Global Associates, Ltd.
Lee Hieb, Tucson, Arizona
John W. Pauly, Los Altos, California

Task Group 4, Precision-Guided Munition Design and Cost

John Egan, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Chair
George S. Sebestyen, Defense Systems, Inc., Vice Chair
(Acting Chair as of April 20, 1995)
Anthony D. DeMaria, DeMaria ElectroOptics, Inc.
Herbert M. Federhen, Arlington, Virginia
Robert A. Hummel, Hummel Enterprises
Jack L. Keltner, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc.
Sherra E. Kerns, Vanderbilt University
Franklin H. Knemeyer, Ridgecrest, California
Robert F. McGurrin, Raytheon Company
William J. Moran, Redwood City, California
Steven D. Roemerman, Texas Instruments, Inc.
Richard L. Rowley, Martin Marietta Technology, Inc.
William Schroer, Hughes Aerospace and Electronics Co.
Charles F. Sharn, McLean, Virginia
James R. Tedeschi, Hercules Defense Electronics Systems, Inc.

Invited Participants

James T. Bober, Institute for Defense Analyses
David C. Hazen, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Nat Kobitz, American Vector Corporation

Task Group 5, Space Inputs

Vincent Vitto, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair
Ivan Bekey, NASA Headquarters
Charles E. Boehmer, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc.
Norval L. Broome, Mitre Corporation
Philip M. Diamond, Palos Verdes Estates, California
Robert K. Geiger, RKG Associates
Peter Hoch, Loral Federal Systems-Gaithersburg
Ken K. Kobayashi, Hughes Space and Communications Company
Richard P. Mathison, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Herbert Rabin, University of Maryland
Robert A. Shuchman, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan
H. Gregory Tornatore, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
Bruce Wald, Arlington Education Consultants
Dell P. Williams III, Deskin Research Group, Inc.

Navy and Marine Corps Liaison Representative

Col Michael L. Patrow, USMC, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N858

Consultants

Sidney G. Reed, Jr.
James G. Wilson

Staff

Ronald D. Taylor
Lee M. Hunt (through September 29, 1995)

NAVAL STUDIES BOARD

David R. Heebner, Science Applications International Corporation (retired), Chair
George M. Whitesides, Harvard University, Vice Chair
Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., The Baciocco Group, Inc.
Alan Berman, Center for Naval Analyses
Norman E. Betaque, Logistics Management Institute
Norval L. Broome, Mitre Corporation
Gerald A. Cann, Rockville, Maryland
Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Special Advisor
Anthony J. DeMaria, DeMaria ElectroOptics Systems, Inc.
John F. Egan, Lockheed Martin Corporation
Ralph R. Goodman, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University (through December 31, 1995)
Robert Hummel, Hummel Enterprises (as of January 1, 1996)
Sherra E. Kerns, Vanderbilt University (through December 31, 1995)
David W. McCall, Far Hills, New Jersey
Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University
William J. Phillips, Northstar Associates, Inc. (as of January 1, 1996)
Alan Powell, University of Houston (through December 31, 1995)
Mara G. Prentiss, Jefferson Laboratory, Harvard University
Herbert Rabin, University of Maryland
Julie JCH Ryan, Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Harrison Shull, Monterey, California (as of January 1, 1996)
Keith A. Smith, Vienna, Virginia
Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington
David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation
H. Gregory Tornatore, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
J. Pace VanDevender, Sandia National Laboratories
Vincent Vitto, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Bruce Wald, Arlington Education Consultants

Navy Liaison Representatives

Paul G. Blatch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N911T1
Ronald N. Kostoff, Office of Naval Research

Ronald D. Taylor, Director (as of October 2, 1995)
Associate Director (July 1, 1994, through September 29, 1995)
Lee M. Hunt, Director (through September 29, 1995)
Susan G. Campbell, Administrative Assistant
Mary (Dixie) Gordon, Information Officer
Angela C. Logan, Project Assistant

COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS

Robert J. Hermann, United Technologies Corporation, Chair
Stephen L. Adler, Institute for Advanced Study
Peter M. Banks, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan
Sylvia T. Ceyer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
L. Louis Hegedus, W.R. Grace and Co.
John E. Hopcroft, Cornell University
Rhonda J. Hughes, Bryn Mawr College
Shirley A. Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Kenneth I. Kellermann, National Radio Astronomy Observatory
Ken Kennedy, Rice University
Thomas A. Prince, California Institute of Technology
Jerome Sacks, National Institute of Statistical Sciences
L.E. Scriven, University of Minnesota
Leon T. Silver, California Institute of Technology
Charles P. Slichter, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Alvin W. Trivelpiece, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Shmuel Winograd, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Charles A. Zraket, Mitre Corporation (retired)

Norman Metzger, Executive Director

Preface

This study was the result of a Naval Studies Board meeting held on June 9-10, 1993, at the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). At that meeting, the Board was briefed on technical and operational problems the Marine Corps expects to face in the post-Cold War future. Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy and Marine Corps have been redefining their missions and concepts of operation, in recognition of the new military challenges presented by the post-Cold War international political situation. The new definitions of strategy, embodied in two Navy-Marine Corps white papers entitled ". . . From the Sea" (1992) and "Forward . . . From the Sea," do not replace the older ones, which have evolved in keeping with operational needs and technological advances throughout the Services' history. Rather, they offer new interpretations and emphases, based on revised strategic and military operational needs for regional conflicts in the world's littoral zones, and on new technological capabilities for current and future use. This evolution of strategy and its significance for the equipment and joint operation of the Navy and the Marine Corps in regional conflicts were the subjects of the briefings and discussions at the June 1993 meeting.

The terms of reference for this study were crafted during a series of conversations with Gen C.C. Krulak, USMC,¹ and ADM W.A. Owens, USN,² and were transmitted formally to the Naval Studies Board in a letter signed by General Krulak and Admiral Owens on December 14, 1993. The terms of reference³ called on the committee to review technologies that will be pertinent to the new warfare conditions that the Navy and Marine Corps expect to face during the time period covered by the study and to assess operational implications of these technologies. Specifically, the terms of reference called for examination of the following areas of concern:

Near-term, affordable technological possibilities for increasing the firepower of air-ground combat forces without a corresponding increase in their weight; all aspects of the combat power of the forces, including armored combat vehicles and artillery, air mobility, precision missilery, tactical air support, advanced targeting and C³I capabilities, and the logistics implications, must be considered.
Impact of the potential changes in force technology on strategic mobility of the air and surface forces, with special attention to the time for them to deploy to potential crisis areas, the cost of reconfiguring forces, and the compatibility among the forces of the different services.
Compatibility and interoperability among U.S. and potential allied forces, including necessary anticipatory steps to establish effective and timely military cooperation with potential allies in advance of the need for crisis deployment.
The applicability of precision-guided weapons and foreseeable derivatives to various kinds, densities, and quantities of targets; fixed, movable, and mobile targets in numbers typical of a theater of warfare should be considered, including those that might be designated both "strategic" and "tactical" in the theater context.
The implications of large-scale use of the systems for the methods and duration of military campaigns, in comparison with use of more traditional systems.
The implications of reduced campaign times for the cost of campaigns, considering the differences in costs of the traditional and the "smart" systems.
The prospects for significantly reducing the costs of the "smart" weapon systems, and the implications of potential achievements in this direction for the other issues noted above.
From analysis of the above areas, recommend technological developments, innovations, and changes which hold promise of significantly improving the Navy and Marine Corps' ability to carry out their missions as described in the "From the Sea" strategy.

In meeting this charge, the Committee on the Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century included in the definition of a "technology" its embodiment in weapons and other military systems considered in their operational context. Thus, for example, while guidance and seeker technologies are essential elements of guided weapons, the study concentrated on those technologies per se only when the feasibility of their development and application was at issue. Otherwise, the actual or potential existence of the technologies was accepted, and the technical issues considered were extended to include the performance and utility of the weapons and other military systems that would use the technologies. This approach was believed essential to answer the questions set forth in the terms of reference about the operational implications and costs of the technologies.

As usually happens in the study of a topic as broad as this, when the elements of the topic were considered in all their complexity and interrelationships, the committee found that some technical capabilities that were of concern initially, such as armored combat vehicles, appeared to be either already in routine use or not amenable to significant change that would deeply affect the outcomes of operations over the time period for which the study results apply. Others, such as mine warfare or training and equipment for operations other than war, required attention not foreseen initially. Beyond this, some aspects of the topic, such as intertheater strategic mobility, appeared, on deeper examination after the study began, to be so broad and to cover so many matters outside the scope of regional conflict alone that they could not be explored in as much detail as had originally been anticipated.

To keep the scope of the study within manageable bounds while remaining consistent with the emphasis on expeditionary warfare contained in the letter from General Krulak and Admiral Owens, the study was focused on the time from arrival of an amphibious force at a crisis area on the ocean littoral to the establishment of a secure lodgment ashore. This is a very broad topic in itself and one that profoundly affects the Navy and Marine Corps systems, organizations, and functions. Some areas that were found to be important to the central topic but big enough to require separate study include the size and structure of strategic sealift and airlift forces (beyond the changes in the logistic system needed to support amphibious operations in-theater), antitactical missile defense, electronic warfare as a general matter, deep-ocean antisubmarine warfare, structure and use of reserve forces, and special operations forces' equipment and operations. The importance of these subjects is noted in context, but examining them in detail was considered to be beyond the scope of this study.

The committee was organized into task groups to treat closely related aspects of the major subdivisions of the main topic as follows: Combat Power, including weapon systems and platforms as outlined in item 4 above; Resources, which was addressed by sub-groups on Deployment and Logistics (embedded in item 1, and the topic in item 2) and on Length and Cost of Campaigns (the subject of items 5 and 6); Joint and Combined Operations as outlined in item 3; and Precision-Guided Munition Design and Cost, embedded in item 7. In addition, a task group composed of members of the Naval Studies Board's Space Panel contributed assessments of command, control, communications, intelligence, targeting, and related matters to all the task groups and to the Coordination and Integration Group that was constituted to weave together all the task group outputs. The task group assignments were, of course, interrelated, and overlapping topics and concerns were treated at several meetings of the task group chairs and vice chairs under the auspices of the Coordination and Integration Group.

During the 6 months of concentrated study effort, the guiding philosophy established by the study leadership allowed the individual task groups wide latitude in interpreting their tasks and in setting their own pace. The purpose of this approach was to stimulate innovative thinking and to allow each group to follow any lead it considered profitable. Communication among the task groups was sustained by the Coordination and Integration Group and by many conversations between meetings when a task group encountered problems or needed information that another task group or some of the Navy or Marine Corps participants could best address. The final sorting and interrelating of ideas and results was accomplished at a May 1995 plenary session and at the subsequent Advisory Council meeting.

A separately constituted Advisory Council was assigned to evaluate the committee's findings and conclusions at the end of the study. The report was subsequently reviewed in accordance with guidelines of the NRC's review process.

In all, the committee and task groups, composed of 82 members and 6 invited participants with its support staff and liaisons, held over 40 meetings, site visits, and tours, and received over 230 briefings from some 360 military, civilian, and contractor personnel. Information was provided by Department of Defense (DOD) elements, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and defense agencies; the Joint Staff; unified and specified commands (i.e., United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM)); military component commands (i.e., U.S. Atlantic Fleet Command (LANTFLT) and Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)); other military commands, including the Navy Doctrine Command (NAVDOCCOM) and Joint Warfighting Center (JWC); individual Service headquarters; and selected DOD technical centers and laboratories. The committee benefited from visits and tours of six amphibious-class ships at Norfolk and Little Creek, Virginia, and from observation of amphibious exercises (KB-95) at Coronado and Camp Pendleton, California.

The up-to-date technical and operational information underlying the committee's deliberations, beyond the knowledge that the committee members themselves brought to the study, was contained in the dozens of briefings to the task groups and to the committee in plenary sessions. Together with technical analysis of the material presented, the committee's judgments about the material's soundness and operational implications constitute the main value that the committee was able to add to the developing warfare concepts of the Services. The synthesis of the committee's technical knowledge with the Services' data and operational inputs was the key ingredient in developing such judgments. The recommendations presented in this report represent the committee's judgments about the preferred or essential courses of action needed for the Services to gain the greatest benefit from the technologies they are incorporating, or could incorporate, into their organizations and doctrines. The committee has tried to distinguish between Service positions and inputs and the committee's reasoning, findings, and judgments, wherever ambiguity might exist.

This report presents the committee's observations and recommendations according to the logic imposed by the subject matter. The background to the study—its key underlying assumptions about the future environment that will affect the Navy and Marine Corps, the missions of those Services in warfare along the littoral, how the Services are planning to carry out those missions, and problems the committee believes they will face in doing so—is presented first. The committee's assessments of those problem areas and how to resolve the specific problems identified, and the committee's views on the significance of the final outcome for the Services, constitute the remainder of the report. Problems of the command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (C⁴I) systems that tie all the operations together and enable their execution are dealt with first. An examination of relevant combat systems follows, including responses to the questions about guided munitions and their costs contained in the terms of reference, and extending to other topics that came to the fore as the study developed. The next chapter presents an assessment of the logistic system to deploy and support the combat forces. The need for attention to joint (multiservice) and combined (U.S. and allied) operations pervades the results of all the above explorations; the implications of this need are reviewed in a chapter that follows the discussions of combat and logistic systems, countermine warfare, and other related problem areas. Sections in that chapter deal also with the issues of costs and resources, and the significance of the results in terms of the gains to be expected from all planned and recommended changes, including consideration of the length and cost of campaigns. Subsequently, a brief statement is presented summarizing the priorities the committee believes are implicit in the study's results. Because of the complexity of the topic, recommended actions are presented at the close of the discussion of each subtopic in the report, rather than as a collection of recommendations in a separate section.

Ordinarily, a report such as this opens with a brief "executive summary" that presents the findings and recommendations of the study. In this case, a brief executive summary could not have done justice to material of the scope and complexity needed to describe an entire field of warfare, with its technology, doctrines, and operational methods, and how it might or must evolve in the future. Part 1 of this report, a synopsis, should be viewed as a compendium of interrelated executive summaries of each of the areas addressed in the study. Part 1 represents a much shortened report designed to inform the busy reader of the results of the entire study. Those results, and their derivation, are elaborated on in Part 2, the main body of the report.

The study committee and the Naval Studies Board wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to the Navy and the Marine Corps for their outstanding information inputs and support during the course of this study. In addition to the many briefings and visits provided and arranged, they encouraged the committee and its task groups to pursue technical and operational arguments to their logical conclusions. No area, no matter how sensitive, was placed out of bounds to such investigation. Finally, our gratitude is due to MajGen J.M. Myatt, USMC, and his successor, MajGen J.L. Jones, USMC, in the Expeditionary Warfare Division, N85, and their staffs, for the many arrangements and other activities they undertook to facilitate this study.

¹Gen C.C. Krulak, USMC, now Commandant of the Marine Corps, was Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), when this study was initiated.
²ADM W.A. Owens, USN, now Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8), when this study was initiated.
³The terms of reference and the letter conveying them are presented in their entirety in Appendix A of this report.

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The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century

Contents

COMMITTEE ON THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS IN REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Advisory Council

Task Group 1, Combat Power

Task Group 2, Resources

Sub-Group 1, Deployment and Logistics

Sub-Group 2, Length and Cost of Campaigns

Task Group 3, Joint and Combined Operations

Invited Participants

Task Group 4, Precision-Guided Munition Design and Cost

Invited Participants

Task Group 5, Space Inputs

NAVAL STUDIES BOARD

COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS

Preface

The Navy and Marine Corps
in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century

COMMITTEE ON THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
IN REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY