Executive Summary
Acknowledging that the main threats in the realm of undersea warfare, both currently and in the future, are mines and submarines, the Panel on Undersea Warfare focused on those technologies that support antisubmarine warfare (ASW); mine countermeasures (MCM); offensive mining; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that support ASW and MCM.
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
The Navy's "...From the Sea"1 and "Forward...From the Sea"2 documents mark a sea change in Navy strategy by emphasizing battle space dominance and shifting focus from open-ocean, blue water operations to support of joint operations in the littorals. The littorals as an operating area, however, cannot be generalized, because virtually every variety of operating conditions can be found there, from deep (blue) water to shallow (brown) water. Whatever the conditions, it is clear that the undersea environment is an extremely complex and dynamic medium, and naval forces must be able to surveil and control (i.e., dominate) this battle space to the degree necessary to accomplish their mission.
Antisubmarine warfare is one of the Navy's most fundamental core competencies, and it must remain so in the face of a submarine threat that will increase significantly-perhaps even dramatically-in the 21st century. This increase, which is being fueled by the proliferation of advanced submarine quieting, sensors, and processing techniques and technologies, could result in the submarine becoming the dominant threat to the accomplishment of naval missions. The psychology of both submarine and mine warfare enhances the effectiveness of the threat, since the adversary has only to possess these weapons to cause arriving forces to operate as if the threat were present and active. The presence of submarines in an adversary's inventory means that effective ASW is needed early on to provide intelligence, prepare the battle space, clear the area for operations, monitor choke points, and protect surface units. The primary weakness in ASW is the detection of quiet submarines. There are also shortfalls in the areas of effective weapons, fire control, and self-defense, but each of these problems generally follows from detection limitations.
Robust technological opportunities exist by which U.S. ASW capabilities can be enhanced to deal with future submarine threats. These advances and the capabilities possible from combinations of them are shown in Figure ES.1. However, resources and proper focusing of research are required to exploit these opportunities. In particular, significant gains in passive sonar appear possible based on larger multidimensional arrays of lightweight, smaller, cheaper sensors and telemetry; multichannel processing exploiting the advancing massively parallel computing technology; and robust characterization or incorporation of the ocean environment. These gains can be applied directly to active acoustics as well.

FIGURE ES.1 Technology advances and capabilities possible by combining them.
For tactical passive sonars, it is estimated that current programmed improvements will achieve a 10- to 15-decibel improvement in the near term, with an additional 10 to 20 dB being possible over the time frame of this study if the technological advances shown in Figure ES.1 are exploited. These gains would more than offset the anticipated quieting of future submarines. Passive surveillance sensors should gain 15 to 20 dB from these same technologies, which will support enhanced search capability in both deep- and shallow-water environments.
Historically, advances in ASW come about only as a result of dedicated, long-term research and development projects centered on at-sea operations, testing, measurements, and experimentation. It is precisely these types of R&D projects and operations that are largely absent from current Navy programs and plans.
Future ASW operations will likely evolve in a cooperative engagement context using, simultaneously, the capabilities of multiple assets and sensors on widely dispersed platforms, including those that are space based. In developing the new generations of ASW weapons, strong emphasis should be placed on those technologies that permit rapid attack from submarine, surface, and air platforms. Except for the general advances in information processing, positioning, communications networking, and some sensor materials, there are no specific commercial or alternative military developments that will yield ASW improvements.
MINE WARFARE
As with submarines, mines are a primary option for an enemy who wishes to interfere with or prevent the free movement of joint forces. With the continuing worldwide proliferation of mines and technology, mines will become more sophisticated while remaining a cheap and very effective weapon system. A widespread and/or sophisticated mine threat can readily thwart, halt, or forestall many naval operations, and technology will continue to favor those who deploy mines over those who attempt to detect and destroy them. Nevertheless, the United States must provide the spectrum of MCM tools that allow our forces to move with battle group speed, maneuver in any theater of operations, and operate in support of national objectives.
Since it is highly unlikely that a technology will emerge that can render the mine threat harmless, MCM will continue to be based on a number of discrete systems and techniques arranged in a balanced system of systems. This would include appropriate technologies that range from brute force methods to smart weapons and systems that can be either tethered or autonomous.
The panel believes that MCM systems, concepts, and technologies that are available in the near term, when integrated with present capabilities, will provide the Navy and Marine Corps team with the ability to clear mines in stride. The following major categories of MCM efforts should receive the highest priority:
Although the Navy's current MCM force may be the most capable in the world, it is inadequate for the challenges of the future. This is a result of the refocusing of the Navy's strategy on the littorals, the lack of a sufficiently aggressive and focused R&D program, and the failure to view MCM as a complete system and provide it with sufficient sustained support from R&D through fleet introduction and operations.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
The Panel on Undersea Warfare considers efforts in the following research and development areas to be particularly important because of the potential improvements they offer to the ASW and MCM capabilities of U.S. forces.
Antisubmarine Warfare Recommendations
Mine Warfare Recommendations
Near Term
Far Term
1. Department of the Navy. 1992. "...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
2. Department of the Navy. 1994. "Forward...From the Sea," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.