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Preface

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     American military forces have been struggling with the issue of chemical and biological warfare for decades--a 1917 National Research Council Committee laid the groundwork for the Army Chemical Warfare Service--but it was the attack of the Tokyo subway with the nerve gas sarin in March 1995 that suddenly put the spotlight on the danger to civilians from chemical and biological attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), which is responsible for medical services, have an admirable record of helping state and local governments cope with floods, storms, and other disasters, including terrorism, but, fortunately, no direct experience with the consequences of chemical or biological terrorism. In May 1997, the Institute of Medicine was asked to help OEP prepare for the possibility of chemical or biological terrorism, and, with help from the National Research Council's Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology, formed this committee to provide recommendations for priority research and development (R&D).

     In the ensuing year and a half, the committee met four times, heard presentations on existing technology and ongoing R&D, attempted to absorb a virtual mountain of information, and formulated their recommendations. In the process, a number of things became clear to me. I suspect the rest of the committee would agree, but I will exercise the chair's prerogative at this point, and share the view from my perspective.

     First, there is no way to prepare in an optimal fashion for a terror incident. There is too low an incidence to justify the enormous financial outlay it would take to optimally prepare every community for every possible incident. Furthermore, there are not enough incidents for any community to acquire enough experience to make a significant impact on response to the next episode.

     Second, although there is a sophisticated technology, described within the body of the report, for in-line detection of an opposing forces chemical agent, it will not be possible to select the sites to protect in a civilian setting with such technology, even if the expense could be borne. At best, it might be possible to selectively protect a public arena where the President was to give an address.

     Third, there is no guarantee that the terrorist will announce the attack. Without such an announcement, there will be no recognition that a biological attack is occurring until enough cases, including a number of fatalities, are observed and reported to allow recognition of an epidemic of an unusual disease. Since exposed victims will almost certainly not seek medical care in the same facility, the problem becomes compounded even more greatly.*

     Fourth, virtually all the militarily important biologic agents present with early clinical symptoms that resemble viral flu syndromes. Since these are the most common form of acute illness, and since they are usually mild and nonserious, it is probable that the early victims of the attack will be unrecognized, and sent home from a physician's office or Emergency Department as a mild viral syndrome. Therefore, in any response planning, it has to be acknowledged that it will be impossible to prevent ALL mortality, no matter how good a technology can be developed, and no matter how much money we are willing to spend to enhance our response.

     Fifth, there is a huge gap between detection technology and therapy. There are many biologic agents, and certainly many chemical agents for which there are no known treatments. We should not expect that terrorists will choose the agents for which we are prepared, and for which we have effective treatment, even if they are the easiest to create and disperse, such as anthrax or sarin.

     Sixth, the approach that the committee found most useful to consider in making its recommendations was considering how to superimpose a response to a terror attack upon the systems that are already in place to deal with nonterror events. For example, an earthquake, or a chemical spill, or a flu epidemic will all stress and often overload existing medical facilities. There must be systems in place to deal with these problems, not only on a local basis, but when help must be brought in from outside the afflicted area. These are the systems that will be most appropriate to build on for an effective response to an incident of chemical or biological terrorism.

     Seventh, communication between the medical community and agencies that gather and analyze intelligence about potential terrorists and attacks is critical. As alluded to above, it will not only shorten the identification issues and lead to more effective responses, but will clearly lower mortality.

     There are a number of areas that will not be covered in this report. For example, it was not possible for the committee to discuss every conceivable biological and chemical weapon that might be used in an attack. It is probable that to prepare only for the list of known weapons and most likely agents will take a commitment and a financial expenditure that will exceed the resources of virtually all communities.

     The committee's charge did not include making recommendations on organization and training of individuals and groups faced with managing the consequences of a chemical or biological incident, nor on how to equip such persons or groups, nor on what therapeutic options they should choose. Nevertheless, as noted in our interim report, the committee believes that it would be irresponsible to focus solely on R&D while ignoring potentially simpler, faster, or less expensive mechanisms, such as organization, staff, training, and procurement. Examples from our interim report include:

• Survey major metropolitan hospitals on supplies of antidotes, drugs, ventilators, personal protective equipment, decontamination capacity, mass-casualty planning and training, isolation rooms for infectious disease, and familiarity of staff with the effects and treatment of chemical and biological weapons.

• Encourage the CDC to share with the states its database on the location and owners of dangerous biological materials. State health departments in turn should be encouraged, perhaps by education or training on the effects of the agents and medical responses required, to add infections by these materials to their lists of reportable diseases.

• Convene discussions with FDA on the use of investigational products in mass-casualty situations and on acceptable proof of efficacy for products where clinical trials are not ethical or are otherwise impossible.

• Develop incentives for hospitals to be ambulance-receiving hospitals, to stockpile nerve-agent antidotes and selected antitoxins and put them in the hands of first responders (this may require changes to existing laws or regulations in some states), to purchase appropriate personal protective equipment and expandable decontamination facilities and train emergency department personnel in their use.

• Supplement existing state and federal training initiatives with a program to incorporate existing information on possible chemical or biological terror agents and their treatment into the manuals, SOPs, and reference libraries of first responders, emergency departments, and poison control centers. Professional societies and journal publishers should be recruited to help in this effort.

• Intensify Public Health Service efforts to organize and equip Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in high-risk cities throughout the country. Although MMSTs are designed to cope with terrorism, because they use local personnel and resources, they also increase the community's general ability to cope with industrial accidents and other mass-casualty events.

     Even though the tasks of being prepared and responding adequately appear at times to contain insurmountable obstacles, the committee does believe that by utilizing the resources that are present, along with improvements in communications, monitoring capabilities, detection, and therapeutics, it will be possible to minimize the damage that a terror attack will cause. It is not our intent to leave the readers of this report with feelings of hopelessness. Even if preparation for certain attacks only forces the attackers to choose a weapon that we have not prepared for, we will have developed a system with which we can improvise. The goal, as always in medicine, is to reduce morbidity and mortality and minimize suffering.

     In closing I would like to offer my sincere thanks to the staff of the Institute of Medicine, who made our meetings as comfortable and efficient as possible and pulled our sometimes splintered efforts into a coherent whole, and to the members of the committee, busy professionals who volunteered precious time and energy in a highly collegial manner. It was a privilege to work with this outstanding group.

Peter Rosen, M.D.

Chair

*For example, in Wyoming this year (Summer 1998), there has been an epidemic of E. coli diarrhea from a contaminated spring that fed the water supply of the small town of Alpine. There were well over a hundred cases that involved 12 states since the tourists who acquired the disease were from many different locations. It took at least two months to find the source of the contamination, and the only reason that the epidemic was recognized as early as it was, is that there were only a small number of medical facilities available to the victims.