CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

Kenneth W. Dam and Herbert S. Lin, Editors

Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy

Computer Science and Telecommunications Board

Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications

National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS

Washington, D.C. 1996



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CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY Kenneth W. Dam and Herbert S. Lin, Editors Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications National Research Council NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1996

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Page ii NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20418 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Support for this project was provided by the Department of Defense (under contract number DASW01-94-C-0178) and the Department of Commerce (under contract number 50SBNB4C8089). Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 96-68943 International Standard Book Number 0-309-05475-3 The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB) will be glad to receive comments on this report. Please send them via Internet e-mail to CRYPTO@NAS.EDU, or via regular mail to CSTB, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20418. Copyright 1996 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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Page iii COMMITTEE TO STUDY NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY KENNETH W. DAM, University of Chicago Law School, Chair W.Y. SMITH, Institute for Defense Analyses (retired), Vice Chair LEE BOLLINGER, Dartmouth College ANN CARACRISTI, National Security Agency (retired) BENJAMIN R. CIVILETTI, Venable, Baetjer, Howard and Civiletti COLIN CROOK, Citicorp SAMUEL H. FULLER, Digital Equipment Corporation LESLIE H. GELB, Council on Foreign Relations RONALD GRAHAM, AT&T Bell Laboratories MARTIN HELLMAN, Stanford University JULIUS L. KATZ, Hills & Company PETER G. NEUMANN, SRI International RAYMOND OZZIE, Iris Associates EDWARD C. SCHMULTS, General Telephone and Electronics (retired) ELLIOT M. STONE, Massachusetts Health Data Consortium WILLIS H. WARE, RAND Corporation Staff MARJORY S. BLUMENTHAL, Director HERBERT S. LIN, Study Director and Senior Staff Officer JOHN M. GODFREY, Research Associate FRANK PITTELLI, Consultant to CSTB GAIL E. PRITCHARD, Project Assistant

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Page iv COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD WILLIAM A. WULF, University of Virginia, Chair FRANCES E. ALLEN, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center DAVID D. CLARK, Massachusetts Institute of Technology JEFF DOZIER, University of California at Santa Barbara HENRY FUCHS, University of North Carolina CHARLES GESCHKE, Adobe Systems Incorporated JAMES GRAY, Microsoft Corporation BARBARA GROSZ, Harvard University JURIS HARTMANIS, Cornell University DEBORAH A. JOSEPH, University of Wisconsin BUTLER W. LAMPSON, Microsoft Corporation BARBARA LISKOV, Massachusetts Institute of Technology JOHN MAJOR, Motorola ROBERT L. MARTIN, AT&T Network Systems DAVID G. MESSERSCHMITT, University of California at Berkeley WILLIAM PRESS, Harvard University CHARLES L. SEITZ, Myricom Incorporated EDWARD SHORTLIFFE, Stanford University School of Medicine CASIMIR S. SKRZYPCZAK, NYNEX Corporation LESLIE L. VADASZ, Intel Corporation MARJORY S. BLUMENTHAL, Director HERBERT S. LIN, Senior Staff Officer PAUL D. SEMENZA, Staff Officer JERRY R. SHEEHAN, Staff Officer JEAN E. SMITH, Program Associate JOHN M. GODFREY, Research Associate LESLIE M. WADE, Research Assistant GLORIA P. BEMAH, Administrative Assistant GAIL E. PRITCHARD, Project Assistant

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Page v COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS ROBERT J. HERMANN, United Technologies Corporation, Chair PETER M. BANKS, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan SYLVIA T. CEYER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology L. LOUIS HEGEDUS, Elf Atochem North America Inc. JOHN E. HOPCROFT, Cornell University RHONDA J. HUGHES, Bryn Mawr College SHIRLEY A. JACKSON, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission KENNETH I. KELLERMANN, National Radio Astronomy Observatory KEN KENNEDY, Rice University THOMAS A. PRINCE, California Institute of Technology JEROME SACKS, National Institute of Statistical Sciences L.E. SCRIVEN, University of Minnesota LEON T. SILVER, California Institute of Technology CHARLES P. SLICHTER, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ALVIN W. TRIVELPIECE, Oak Ridge National Laboratory SHMUEL WINOGRAD, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center CHARLES A. ZRAKET, MITRE Corporation (retired) NORMAN METZGER, Executive Director

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Page vi The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is interim president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and interim vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

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Page vii Preface INTRODUCTION For most of history, cryptography—the art and science of secret writing—has belonged to governments concerned about protecting their own secrets and about asserting their prerogatives for access to information relevant to national security and public safety. In the United States, cryptography policy has reflected the U.S. government's needs for effective cryptographic protection of classified and other sensitive communications as well as its needs to gather intelligence for national security purposes, needs that would be damaged by the widespread use of cryptography. National security concerns have motivated such actions as development of cryptographic technologies, development of countermeasures to reverse the effects of encryption, and control of cryptographic technologies for export. In the last 20 years, a number of developments have brought about what could be called the popularization of cryptography. First, some industries—notably financial services—have come to rely on encryption as an enabler of secure electronic funds transfers. Second, other industries have developed an interest in encryption for protection of proprietary and other sensitive information. Third, the broadening use of computers and computer networks has generalized the demand for technologies to secure communications down to the level of individual citizens and assure the privacy and security of their electronic records and transmissions. Fourth, the sharply increased use of wireless communications (e.g., cellular telephones) has highlighted the greater vulnerability

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Page viii of such communications to unauthorized intercept as well as the difficulty of detecting these intercepts. As a result, efforts have increased to develop encryption systems for private sector use and to integrate encryption with other information technology products. Interest has grown in the commercial market for cryptographic technologies and systems incorporating such technologies, and the nation has witnessed a heightened debate over individual need for and access to technologies to protect individual privacy. Still another consequence of the expectation of widespread use of encryption is the emergence of law enforcement concerns that parallel, on a civilian basis, some of the national security concerns. Law enforcement officials fear that wide dissemination of effective cryptographic technologies will impede their efforts to collect information necessary for pursuing criminal investigations. On the other side, civil libertarians fear that controls on cryptographic technologies will give government authorities both in the United States and abroad unprecedented and unwarranted capabilities for intrusion into the private lives of citizens. CHARGE OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY At the request of the U.S. Congress in November 1993, the National Research Council's Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB) formed the Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy. In accordance with its legislative charge (Box P.1), the committee undertook the following tasks: • Framing the problem. What are the technology trends with which national cryptography policy must keep pace? What is the political environment? What are the significant changes in the post-Cold War environment that call attention to the need for, and should have an impact on, cryptography policy? • Understanding the underlying technology issues and their expected development and impact on policy over time. What is and is not possible with current cryptographic (and related) technologies? How could these capabilities have an impact on various U.S. interests? • Describing current cryptography policy. To the committee's knowledge, there is no single document, classified or unclassified, within the U.S. government that fully describes national cryptography policy. • Articulating a framework for thinking about cryptography policy. The interests affected by national cryptography policy are multiple, varied, and related: they include personal liberties and constitutional rights, the maintenance of public order and national security, technology develop-

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Page ix BOX P.1 Legislative Charge to the National Research Council Public Law 103-160 Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1994 Signed November 30,1993 SEC. 267. COMPREHENSIVE INDEPENDENT STUDY OF NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY. (a) Study by National Research Council.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall request the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive study of cryptographic technologies and national cryptography policy. (b) Matters To Be Assessed in Study.—The study shall assess— (1) the effect of cryptographic technologies on—    (A) national security interests of the United States Government;    (B) law enforcement interests of the United States Government;    (C) commercial interests of United States industry; and    (D) privacy interests of United States citizens; and (2) the effect on commercial interests of United States industry of export controls on cryptographic technologies. (c) Interagency Cooperation With Study.—The Secretary of Defense shall direct the National Security Agency, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and other appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense to cooperate fully with the National Research Council in its activities in carrying out the study under this section. The Secretary shall request all other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to provide similar cooperation to the National Research Council. ment, and U.S. economic competitiveness and markets. At a minimum, policy makers (and their critics) must understand how these interests interrelate, although they may decide that one particular policy configuration better serves the overall national interest than does another. •  Identifying a range offeasible policy options. The debate over cryptography policy has been hampered by an incomplete analysis and discussion of various policy options—both proponents of current policy and of alternative policies are forced into debating positions in which it is difficult or impossible to acknowledge that a competing view might have some merit. This report attempts to discuss fairly the pros and cons of a number of options. •  Making recommendations regarding cryptography policy. No cryptography policy will be stable for all time. That is, it is unrealistic to imagine

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Page x that this committee or any set of policy makers could craft a policy that would not have to evolve over time as the technological and political milieu itself changes. Thus, the committee's recommendations are framed in the context of a transition, from a world characterized by slowly evolving technology, well-defined enemies, and unquestioned U.S. technological, economic, and geopolitical dominance to one characterized by rapidly evolving technology, fuzzy lines between friend and foe, and increasing technological, economic, and political interdependencies between the United States and other nations of the world. Given the diverse applications of cryptography, national cryptography policy involves a very large number of important issues. Important to national cryptography policy as well are issues related to the deployment of a large-scale infrastructure for cryptography and legislation and regulations to support the widespread use of cryptography for authentication and data integrity purposes (i.e., collateral applications of cryptography), even though these issues have not taken center stage in the policy debate. The committee focused its efforts primarily on issues related to cryptography for confidentiality, because the contentious problem that this committee was assembled to address at the center of the public policy debate relates to the use of cryptography in confidentiality applications. It also addressed issues of cryptography policy related to authentication and data integrity at a relatively high level, casting its findings and recommendations in these areas in fairly general terms. However, it notes that detailed consideration of issues and policy options in these collateral areas requires additional study at a level of detail and thoroughness comparable to that of this report. In preparing this report, the committee reviewed and synthesized relevant material from recent reports, took written and oral testimony from government, industry, and private individuals, reached out extensively to the affected stakeholders to solicit input, and met seven times to discuss the input from these sources as well as the independent observations and findings of the committee members themselves. In addition, this study built upon three prior efforts to examine national cryptography policy: the Association for Computing Machinery report Codes, Keys, and Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy,1the Office of Technology Assessment report Information Security and Privacy in Network Environments,2and 1 Susan Landau et al., Codes, Keys, and Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy, Association for Computing Machinery Inc., New York, 1994. 2 Office of Technology Assessment, Information Security and Privacy in Network Environments, OTA-TCT-606, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September 1994.

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Page xi the JASON encryption study.3A number of other examinations of cryptography and/or information security policy were also important to the committee's work.4(Appendix N contains source documents (e.g., statutes, regulations, memorandums of understanding), relevant to the national debate over cryptography policy.) WHAT THIS REPORT IS NOT The subject of national cryptography policy is quite complex, as it figures importantly in many areas of national interest. To keep the project manageable within the time, resources, and expertise available, the committee chose not to address in detail a number of issues that arose with some nontrivial frequency during the course of its study. •  This report is not a comprehensive study of the grand trade-offs that might be made in other dimensions of national policy to compensate for changes in cryptography policy. For example, this report does not address matters such as relaxing exclusionary rules that govern the court admissibility of evidence or installing video cameras in every police helmet as part of a package that also eliminates restrictions on cryptography, though such packages are in principle possible. Similarly, it does not address options such as increasing the budget for counterterrorist operations as a quid pro quo for relaxations on export controls of cryptography. The report does provide information that would help to assess the impact of various approaches to cryptography policy, although how that impact should be weighed against the impact of policies related to other areas is outside the scope of this study and the expertise of the committee assembled for it. •  This report is not a study on the future of the National Security Agency (NSA) in the post-Cold War era. A determination of what mis- 3 JASON Program Office, JASON Encryption/Privacy Study, Report JSR-93-520 (unpublished), MITRE Corporation, McLean, Va., August 18,1993. 4 These works include Global Information Infrastructure, a joint report by the European Association of Manufacturers of Business Machines and Information Technology Industry, the U.S. Information Technology Industry Council, and the Japan Electronic Industry Development Association (EUROBIT-ITI-JEIDA), developed for the G-7 Summit on the Global Information Society, GII Tripartite Preparatory Meeting, January 26-27, 1995, Brussels; the U.S. Council for International Business statement titled ''Business Requirements for Encryption," October 10, 1994, New York; and the International Chamber of Commerce position paper "International Encryption Policy," Document No. 373/202 Rev. and No. 373-30/ 9 Rev., Paris, undated. Important source documents can be found in Lance J. Hoffman (ed.), Building in Big Brother: The Cryptographic Policy Debate, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1995, and in the cryptography policy source books published annually by the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, D.C.

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Page xxii 2 CRYPTOGRAPHY: ROLES, MARKET, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 51 2.1 Cryptography in Context 51 2.2 What Is Cryptography and What Can It Do? 52 2.3 How Cryptography Fits into the Big Security Picture 57 2.3.1 Factors Inhibiting Access to Information 58 2.3.2 Factors Facilitating Access to Information 60 2.4 The Market for Cryptography 65 2.4.1 The Demand Side of the Cryptography Market 66 2.4.2 The Supply Side of the Cryptography Market 72 2.5 Infrastructure for Widespread Use of Cryptography 74 2.5.1 Key Management Infrastructure 74 2.5.2 Certificate Infrastructures 75 2.6 Recap 77 3 NEEDS FOR ACCESS TO ENCRYPTED INFORMATION 79 3.1 Terminology 79 3.2 Law Enforcement: Investigation and Prosecution 81 3.2.1 The Value of Access to Information for Law Enforcement 81 3.2.2 The Legal Framework Governing Surveillance 84 3.2.3 The Nature of the Surveillance Needs of Law Enforcement 88 3.2.4 The Impact of Cryptography and New Media on Law Enforcement (Stored and Communicated Data) 90 3.3 National Security and Signals Intelligence 94 3.3.1 The Value of Signals Intelligence 95 3.3.2 The Impact of Cryptography on Signals Intelligence 101 3.4 Similarities in and Differences Between Foreign Policy/National Security and Law Enforcement Needs for Communications Monitoring 102 3.4.1 Similarities 102 3.4.2 Differences 104 3.5 Business and Individual Needs for Exceptional Access to Protected Information 104 3.6 Other Types of Exceptional Access to Protected Information 108 3.7 Recap 109

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Page xxiii PART II—POLICY INSTRUMENTS 4 EXPORT CONTROLS 113 4.1 Brief Description of Current Export Controls 113 4.1.1 The Rationale for Export Controls 113 4.1.2 General Description 114 4.1.3 Discussion of Current Licensing Practices 122 4.2 Effectiveness of Export Controls on Cryptography 127 4.3 The Impact of Export Controls on U.S. Information Technology Vendors 134 4.3.1 De Facto Restrictions on the Domestic Availability of Cryptography 134 4.3.2 Regulatory Uncertainty Related to Export Controls 138 4.3.3 The Size of the Affected Market for Cryptography 145 4.3.4 Inhibiting Vendor Responses to User Needs 152 4.4 The Impact of Export Controls on U.S. Economic and National Security Interests 153 4.4.1 Direct Economic Harm to U.S. Businesses 153 4.4.2 Damage to U.S. Leadership in Information Technology 155 4.5 The Mismatch Between the Perceptions of Government/ National Security and Those of Vendors 157 4.6 Export of Technical Data 159 4.7 Foreign Policy Considerations 162 4.8 Technology-Policy Mismatches 163 4.9 Recap 165 5 ESCROWED ENCRYPTION AND RELATED ISSUES 167 5.1 What Is Escrowed Encryption? 167 5.2 Administration Initiatives Supporting Escrowed Encryption 169 5.2.1 The Clipper Initiative and the Escrowed Encryption Standard 170 5.2.2 The Capstone/Fortezza Initiative 176 5.2.3 The Relaxation of Export Controls on Software Products Using ''Properly Escrowed" 64-bit Encryption 177 5.2.4 Other Federal Initiatives in Escrowed Encryption 179 5.3 Other Approaches to Escrowed Encryption 179

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Page xxiv 5.4 The Impact of Escrowed Encryption on Information Security 181 5.5 The Impact of Escrowed Encryption on Law Enforcement 184 5.5.1 Balance of Crime Enabled vs. Crime Prosecuted 184 5.5.2 Impact on Law Enforcement Access to Information 185 5.6 Mandatory vs. Voluntary Use of Escrowed Encryption 187 5.7 Process Through Which Policy on Escrowed Encryption Was Developed 188 5.8 Affiliation and Number of Escrow Agents 189 5.9 Responsibilities and Obligations of Escrow Agents and Users of Escrowed Encryption 193 5.9.1 Partitioning Escrowed Information 193 5.9.2 Operational Responsibilities of Escrow Agents 194 5.9.3 Liabilities of Escrow Agents 197 5.10 The Role of Secrecy in Ensuring Product Security 201 5.10.1 Algorithm Secrecy 201 5.10.2 Product Design and Implementation Secrecy 204 5.11 The Hardware/Software Choice in Product Implementation 208 5.12 Responsibility for Generation of Unit Keys 211 5.13 Issues Related to the Administration Proposal to Relax Export Controls on 64-bit Escrowed Encryption in Software 213 5.13.1 The Definition of "Proper Escrowing" 213 5.13.2 The Proposed Limitation of Key Lengths to 64 Bits or Less 214 5.14 Recap 215 6 OTHER DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY 216 6.1 The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 216 6.1.1 Brief Description of and Stated Rationale for the CALEA 217 6.1.2 Reducing Resource Requirements for Wiretaps 218 6.1.3 Obtaining Access to Digital Streams in the Future 220

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Page xxv 6.1.4 The CALEA Exemption of Information Service Providers and Distinctions Between Voice and Data Services 221 6.2 Other Levers Used in National Cryptography Policy 221 6.2.1 Federal Information Processing Standards 222 6.2.2 The Government Procurement Process 224 6.2.3 Implementation of Policy: Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt, Delay, Complexity 225 6.2.4 R&D Funding 227 6.2.5 Patents and Intellectual Property 228 6.2.6 Formal and Informal Arrangements with Various Other Governments and Organizations 231 6.2.7 Certification and Evaluation 232 6.2.8 Nonstatutory Influence 234 6.2.9 Interagency Agreements Within the Executive Branch 235 6.3 Organization of the Federal Government with Respect to Information Security 237 6.3.1 Role of National Security vis-à-vis Civilian Information Infrastructures 237 6.3.2 Other Government Entities with Influence on Information Security 241 6.4 International Dimensions of Cryptography Policy 243 6.5 Recap 244 PART III—POLICY OPTIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 249 7.1 Export Control Options for Cryptography 249 7.1.1 Dimensions of Choice for Controlling the Export of Cryptography 249 7.1.2 Complete Elimination of Export Controls on Cryptography 251 7.1.3 Transfer of All Cryptography Products to the Commerce Control List 254 7.1.4 End-use Certification 256 7.1.5 Nation-by-Nation Relaxation of Controls and Harmonization of U.S. Export Control Policy on Cryptography with Export/Import Policies of Other Nations 256 7.1.6 Liberal Export for Strong Cryptography with Weak Defaults 257

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Page xxvi 7.1.7 Liberal Export for Cryptographic Applications Programming Interfaces 259 7.1.8 Liberal Export for Escrowable Products with Encryption Capabilities 262 7.1.9 Alternatives to Government Certification of Escrow Agents Abroad 263 7.1.10 Use of Differential Work Factors in Cryptography 264 7.1.11 Separation of Cryptography from Other Items on the U.S. Munitions List 264 7.2 Alternatives for Providing Government Exceptional Access to Encrypted Data 265 7.2.1 A Prohibition on the Use and Sale of Cryptography Lacking Features for Exceptional Access 265 7.2.2 Criminalization of the Use of Cryptography in the Commission of a Crime 273 7.2.3 Technical Nonescrow Approaches for Obtaining Access to Information, 274 7.2.4 Network-based Encryption 278 7.2.5 Distinguishing Between Encrypted Voice and Data Communications Services for Exceptional Access 281 7.2.6 A Centralized Decryption Facility for Government Exceptional Access 284 7.3 Looming Issues 286 7.3.1 The Adequacy of Various Levels of Encryption Against High-Quality Attack 286 7.3.2 Organizing the U.S. Government for Better Information Security on a National Basis 289 7.4 Recap 292 8 SYNTHESIS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 293 8.1 Synthesis and Findings 293 8.1.1 The Problem of Information Vulnerability 293 8.1.2 Cryptographic Solutions to Information Vulnerabilities 296 8.1.3 The Policy Dilemma Posed by Cryptography 297 8.1.4 National Cryptography Policy for the Information Age 298 8.2 Recommendations 303 8.3 Additional Work Needed 338 8.4 Conclusion 339

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Page xxvii APPENDIXES A CONTRIBUTORS TO THE NRC PROJECT ON NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY 343 A.1 Committee Members 343 A.2 Additional Contributors to the Project 349 B GLOSSARY 353 C A BRIEF PRIMER ON CRYPTOGRAPHY 364 C.1 A Very Short History of Cryptography 364 C.2 Capabilities Enabled by Cryptography 365 C.2.1 Ensuring the Integrity of Data 365 C.2.2 Authentication of Users 367 C.2.3 Nonrepudiation 370 C.2.4 Preservation of Confidentiality 371 C.3 Basic Constructs of Cryptography 374 C.4 Attacks on Cryptographic Systems 378 C.5 Elements of Cryptographic Security 383 C.6 Expected Lifetimes of Cryptographic Systems 384 C.6.1 Background 385 C.6.2 Asymmetric Cryptographic Systems 385 C.6.3 Conventional Cryptographic Systems 388 C.6.4 Timing Attacks 390 C.6.5 Skipjack/Clipper/EES 391 C.6.6 A Warning 391 C.6.7 Quantum and DNA Computing 392 C.6.8 Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Systems 394 C.6.9 Quantum Cryptography 394 D AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS 396 D.1 The Legal Framework for Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance 396 D.1.1 The General Prohibition on Electronic Surveillance 396 D.1.2 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 396 D.1.3 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 403 D.2 Historical Overview of Electronic Surveillance 410

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Page xxviii E A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY 414 E.1 Export Controls 414 E.2 Academic Research and the Control of Information About Cryptography 415 E.3 Commercial Cryptography 417 E.4 Recent Developments 419 F A BRIEF PRIMER ON INTELLIGENCE 421 F.1 The Intelligence Mission 423 F.2 The Intelligence Cycle 425 F.2.1 Planning 426 F.2.2 Collection 426 F.2.3 Processing 428 F.2.4 Analysis 428 F.2.5 Dissemination 429 G THE INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY 430 G.1 International Dimensions of Cryptography Policy 430 G.2 Similarities in and Differences Between the United States and Other Nations with Respect to Cryptography 431 G.3 Foreign Export Control Regimes 434 G.4 Foreign Import and Use Control Regimes 436 G.5 The State of International Affairs Today 438 G.6 Obtaining International Cooperation on Policy Regarding Secure Communications 439 G.7 The Fundamental Questions of International Cryptography Policy 444 G.7.1 Who Holds the Keys? 444 G.7.2 Under What Circumstances Does the Key Holder Release the Keys to Other Parties? 444 G.7.3 How Will Nations Reach Consensus on International Cryptography Policy Regarding Exports and Use? 447 H SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR A PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 450 I INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY 455 I.1 Banking and Financial Services 455 I.2 Medical Consultations and Health Care 457 I.3 Manufacturing 461

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Page xxix I.4 The Petroleum Industry 463 I.5 The Pharmaceutical and Chemical Industries 465 I.6 The Entertainment Industry 466 I.7 Government 466 J EXAMPLES OF RISKS POSED BY UNPROTECTED INFORMATION 469 J.1 Risks Addressed by Cryptography for Authentication 469 J.2 Risks Addressed by Cryptography for Confidentiality 470 J.3 Risks Addressed by Cryptography for Both Authentication and Confidentiality 471 J.4 Risks Addressed by Cryptography for Data Integrity 472 K CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS PROGRAMMING INTERFACES 474 L OTHER LOOMING ISSUES RELATED TO CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY 477 L.1 Digital Cash 477 L.1.1 Anonymity and Criminal Activity 480 L.1.2 Public Trust 480 L.1.3 Taxation 482 L.1.4 Cross-Border Movements of Funds 482 L.2 Cryptography for Protecting Intellectual Property 482 M FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS 485 N LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND DOCUMENTS RELEVANT TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 489 N.1 Statutes 489 N.1.1 Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications(U.S. Code, Title 18, Chapter 119) 489 N.1.2 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 36) 511 N.1.3 Pen Register and Traffic Analysis (U.S. Code, Title 18, Chapters 121 and 206) 526 N.1.4 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1995 540 N.1.5 Computer Security Act of 1987 551 N.1.6 Arms Export Control Act (U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 39) 558

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Page xxx N.2 Executive Orders 573 N.2.1 Executive Order 12333 (U.S. Intelligence Activities) 573 N.2.2 Executive Order 12958 (Classified National Security Information) 589 N.2.3 Executive Order 12472 (Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions) 612 N.2.4 National Security Directive 42 (National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems) 620 N.3 Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Agreement (MOA) 627 N.3.1 National Security Agency/National Institute of Standards and Technology MOU 627 N.3.2 National Security Agency/Federal Bureau of Investigation MOU, 630 N.3.3 National Security Agency/Advanced Research Projects Agency/Defense Information Systems Agency MOA 632 N.4 Regulations, 636 N.4.1 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR, Excerpts from Parts 120-123, 125, and 126) 636 N.4.2 Export Administration Regulations 655 INDEX 677

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CRYPTOGRAPHY S 2oLE it. EN SECURING THE it. l NFORMATION SOCIETY

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Page xxxii CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY National cryptography policy entails a complex juggling act among a number of different interests. A member of the National Research Council's Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy, Ronald Graham (pictured above) is also a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a past president of the International Juggling Association. Photograph by Ché Graham.