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--> PROLIFERATION CONCERNS Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1997
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--> NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20418 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competencies and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is interim president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and interim vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. This project was sponsored by Defense Special Weapons Agency, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22310-3398. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. A limited number copies of this report are available from: Office for Central Europe and Eurasia National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20418 Additional copies are available for sale from: National Academy Press 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Box 285 Washington. DC 20055 Tel: 1-800-624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington Metropolitan Area). Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 97-66336 International Standard Book Number: 0-309-05741-8 Copyright 1997 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
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--> LIST OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND STAFF RICHARD A. MESERVE (Chairman), Covington & Burling JOHN F. AHEARNE, Duke University and Sigma Xi GARY K. BERTSCH, The University of Georgia DON JEFFREY (JEFF) BOSTOCK, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. PAUL M. DOTY, Harvard University (retired) WILLIAM G. HOWARD, JR., Independent consultant BOYD J. McKELVAIN, General Electric Company WILLIAM C. POTTER, Monterey Institute of International Studies ALAN SCHRIESHEIM, Argonne National Laboratory (retired) LEONARD S. SPECTOR, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Consultant WILLIAM H. HANNUM, Argonne National Laboratory Ex-Officio Members GERALD P. DINNEEN, Honeywell Corporation (retired) HAROLD K. FORSEN, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Engineering F. SHERWOOD ROWLAND, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences National Research Council Staff GLENN SCHWEITZER, Study Director and Director, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia JO HUSBANDS, Director, Committee for International Security and Arms Control INTA BRIKOVSKIS, Program Officer STEPHEN DEETS, Program Associate ELSA BANKS, Program Assistant
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--> Contents PREFACE ix Origin of the Study ix Time Period of Interest xi Related Efforts of the Academy Complex xi Related Studies by Other Organizations xiii Role of the NRC Committee for this Study xiv 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 Challenges in Controlling Militarily Sensitive Items 2 U.S. Response for Securing Sensitive Items in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan 4 Findings and Recommendations to the U.S. Government Concerning Cooperation in MPC&A 8 Findings and Recommendations to the U.S. Government Concerning Cooperation in Export Control 15 2 INTRODUCTION 21 Two Nonproliferation Tools: MPC&A and Export Control 21 Focus of the Study: The U.S. Response for Containing Sensitive Items in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan 23 Scope of the Study 26 Committee's Approach to Reviewing Program Effectiveness 29 Organization of the Report 30
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--> 3 THE ENVIRONMENT FOR CONTAINMENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 32 Societies in Transition 32 Weapons Technologies of All Types in the Former Soviet Union 41 Interests of Countries of Proliferation Concern 48 Sales and Smuggling of Sensitive Items 49 Implications for Cooperative Programs 50 4 PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL 52 The Proliferation Risk from Leakage of Direct-Use Material 52 Components of MPC&A 57 International Context for MPC&A Systems 59 Scope and Objectives of U.S. Collaboration with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan 61 Measures of Success 68 General Findings Concerning U.S. Cooperative Programs 69 Recommendations to the U.S. Government Concerning Future Cooperation in MPC&A 71 Areas for Additional Study 83 5 SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING EXPORTS OF MILITARILY SENSITIVE ITEMS 85 Scope of Export Control Requirements 85 Efforts of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to Establish and Upgrade Export Control Systems 91 Initiation of U.S. Programs of Cooperation 97 General Findings Concerning Cooperation in Export Control 99 Recommendations to the U.S. Government Concerning Future Cooperation in Export Control 109 Areas for Additional Study 116 6 EPILOGUE 118 APPENDICES 121 AOVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL REGIMES 123 BSITE VISITS AND MEETINGS OF COMMITTEE 132 CCHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE 137 DBIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 139
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--> LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES TABLES 1.1 Participation in International Control Regimes 5 1.2 MPC&A Program Activities in the FSU Supported by DOE 7 1.3 U.S. Export Control Program Activities Involving Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan 7 1.4 Components of an MPC&A System 8 1.5 Common Standard for Export Control 9 2.1 Examples of Controlled Items 27 4.1 Sites of MPC&A Cooperation 72 4.2 Funds for MPC&A Cooperation 73 5.1 Goals of U.S. Cooperative Export Control Programs 101 5.2 Export Control Cooperation Activities 102 5.3 Government-Industry Relations—Elements of an Enterprise Export Control Compliance Program 105 FIGURES 5.1 Funding for Export Control Cooperation 100
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--> Preface ORIGIN OF THE STUDY Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were alarming reports of inadequate control of nuclear weapons and nuclear material in the successor states. In response, the U.S. Congress enacted the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar initiative. One object of the initiative was to assist Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in reducing the likelihood of proliferation from these countries of materials, equipment, and technology related to weapons of mass destruction. As suggested by the title of the legislation, the primary concern was containment of the nuclear threat, although concerns over biological and chemical agents also were to be addressed.1 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) developed the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to implement the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and the CTR program soon involved many organizations in both the United States and the four target countries of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. In the meantime, the National Research Council (NRC) had taken an active role in helping mobilize support in the United States for international programs 1 Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are grouped together as weapons of mass destruction, but in fact the effects of the three types of weapons vary widely, with nuclear weapons in a class by themselves in terms of the swiftness and sheer magnitude of destruction they would cause. Also, the difficulties associated with designing, producing, and delivering the three types of weapons vary substantially.
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--> that would assist in preserving the base of important research activities in the successor states while also reducing the incentives for weapons scientists to accept financial offers for transferring weapons know-how to nations of proliferation concern.2 In addition, in 1992 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) launched a study of alternative approaches for disposing of plutonium stocks, which were rapidly increasing with the dismantlement of weapons in the United States and Russia pursuant to reductions called for in arms control agreements.3 Recognizing these and other capabilities of the NRC and its associated institutions, in mid-1993 the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives recommended that DOD engage the NRC to examine the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar initiative. As a result, in the spring of 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense requested that the NRC undertake an assessment of the effectiveness of CTR programs to support the efforts of the four countries in the fields of (a) export control, including control of dual-use technologies, and (b) nuclear materials protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A). This assessment was carried out in parallel with another NRC study of the effectiveness of the early activities of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, which the Office of the Secretary of Defense had also requested in the spring of 1995. An NRC publication, Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center, presents the findings and conclusions of that study.4 DOD provided financial support for this study from funds it had available under the CTR program. However, from the outset of the CTR program, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been the lead agency for MPC&A activities and the U.S. Department of State has coordinated government-wide export control activities; funds for these efforts were appropriated to DOD and then transferred to the other departments. Beginning in fiscal year 1996, funds for MPC&A 2 See National Research Council, Reorienting the Research Capability of the Former Soviet Union: A Report to the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992), and National Research Council, Committee on Enterprise Management in a Market Economy Under Defense Conversion, Redeploying Assets of the Russian Defense Sector to the Civilian Economy (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993). 3 National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994). 4 The United States, in cooperation with the European Union, Japan, and Russia, established this center in 1994 as a mechanism for providing financial support to former Soviet weapons specialists to enable them to work on civilian-oriented projects rather than be tempted by economic opportunities to transfer their weapons know-how to states of proliferation concern. For additional details, see National Research Council, Committee for the Evaluation of the International Science and Technology Center, Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 1996).
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--> and export control activities were included, respectively, in the budgets of the Departments of Energy and State. With the strong support of all concerned agencies, the present study has addressed a broad range of relevant U.S. Government efforts, regardless of funding sources. The assessment of MPC&A cooperation has concentrated primarily on the activities of DOE, but it has also taken into account the roles of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOD. The assessment of export control cooperation has included consideration of many activities of the U.S. Department of Commerce, particularly its special role with regard to dual-use technologies; the programs of DOE, with emphasis on nuclear-related controls; the activities of the U.S. Customs Service and State Department; and the supporting efforts of DOD. Looking to the future, the sources of funding for these activities are important; and the study offers suggestions concerning future funding approaches. TIME PERIOD OF INTEREST As noted above, the legislation authorizing the CTR program was originally enacted in the fall of 1991, and DOD began funding program activities shortly thereafter. From the beginning, the executive branch considered MPC&A and export control to be important aspects of the program, and limited efforts in these two fields began in 1992. However, it was not until 1994 that major U.S. investments in MPC&A cooperation began. Similarly, the cooperative program in export control began slowly and gradually increased in size and scope; even now many activities are still in their early stages. Thus, the U.S. agencies anticipate continued involvement with these new programs for at least the next several years and perhaps longer. While the study takes note of the earliest activities of the U.S. Government in the two program areas, principal attention is given to accomplishments during 1995 and the first half of 1996. As to the future, the study assumes that until the end of the century or longer the U.S. and counterpart governments will show considerable interest in pursuing bilateral programs that help reduce the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; enhance the stature of the countries of the region as responsible international trading partners; and prevent theft and smuggling of items of concern. Thus, the recommendations are directed to actions that should be taken promptly, but they recognize that implementation may take several years or even longer. RELATED EFFORTS OF THE ACADEMY COMPLEX In addition to the aforementioned reports on the science centers and plutonium disposition, the NRC has undertaken a number of studies in recent years
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--> that provide important background for the assessment of MPC&A and export control activities in the successor states. First, with regard to MPC&A, in 1989 the NRC published the results of an analysis of material control and accounting in the DOE complex and made a number of recommendations for improving the security of nuclear material in the complex.5 In the study of the disposition of plutonium, special attention was given to the problems of ensuring safe and secure handling of plutonium from the dismantling of warheads through interim storage of excess materials to their ultimate disposition.6 In the area of export control the NRC has carried out four studies of U.S. policies during the past two decades. Each considered the balance of economic and national security interests in establishing trade policies. Each also addressed the role of the former Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and consequently gave considerable attention to trade involving the states of the FSU. These studies recognized the importance of controlling the diffusion of sensitive technologies to Third World countries, although proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was not the focus of the studies.7 The NRC has also sponsored many studies addressing how emerging technologies can support both economic interests and national security objectives. Most recently, it has carried out studies of the opportunities for DOD to utilize commercially available technologies to satisfy military requirements in selected fields.8 An earlier NRC study explicitly addressed the export control dimensions of new computer technologies.9 Also, a study carried out jointly with the Russian 5 National Research Council, Energy Engineering Board, Material Control and Accounting in the Department of Energy's Nuclear Fuel Complex (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989). 6 Management and Disposition, op. cit. 7 National Research Council, Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security, Scientific Communication and National Security: A Report (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982); National Research Council, Academy Industry Program, Export Controls: Reconciling National Objectives (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1984); National Research Council, Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, Balancing the National Interest: U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition (Washington. D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987); National Research Council, Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls, Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991). 8 National Research Council, Committee on Defense Manufacturing Strategy, Breaking the Mold: Forging a Common Defense Manufacturing Vision (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993). 9 National Research Council, Committee to Study International Developments in Computer Science and Technology, Global Trends in Computer Technology and Their Impact on Export Control (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988). 10 National Research Council, Committee on Dual-Use Technologies, Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994).
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--> Academy of Sciences considered confidence-building steps that would encourage an easing of west-east trade restrictions on dual-use technologies.10 The NRC also has a standing committee that provides advice to the U.S. Government on methods for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. With regard to biological weapons, NAS has a working group on controlling such weapons that has carried out many discussions with Russian counterparts on nonproliferation measures.11 RELATED STUDIES BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS During the past several years, many U.S. congressional hearings, U.S. executive branch assessments, national and international conferences, and academic studies have been directed to proliferation problems that have roots in the FSU and the responses of the U.S. Government to these problems. A number of these analytical efforts have emphasized the importance of controlling nuclear material in Russia. Less attention has been given to nuclear-related issues in the other former Soviet states. The development of export control systems to help contain items of proliferation concern and the contribution of American specialists in this process have received only limited attention.12 The writings that emerged from these earlier efforts repeatedly underscored the serious inadequacies in protection of plutonium and highly enriched uranium throughout the nuclear complex of the FSU. Also, the reports emphasized the urgency of financing and launching American programs, in cooperation with counterpart organizations, that will lead to better containment of fissile material that is directly usable in nuclear weapons. They highlight the many administrative difficulties, particularly in Russia, that have inhibited faster implementation of bilateral programs. The most recent reports, however, note that many of these administrative barriers have been overcome and that the programs are now moving ahead more easily.13 11 The Committee on the Review and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program was created under the NRC Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems in 1987, and the Working Group on Biological Weapons was established under the NAS Committee on International Security and Arms Control in 1986. 12 For an early exception, see Gary Bertsch and Igor Khripunov, "Nonproliferation and Export Control in the Former Soviet Union," Eye on Supply, no. 8, Winter 1993, p. 75. 13 See, for example, G. Allison, O. Cote, Jr., R. Falkenrath, and S. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 118-145, and testimonies of government officials and independent experts before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, March 20, 1996.
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--> Less research and documentation address export control issues. Most underscore the newness in the region of western approaches to export control; and they conclude that, in view of the extensive and often remote borders of the countries of the region, enforcement of export controls will indeed be a difficult task.14 In short, the previous studies provide a very useful, albeit incomplete, background of evidence and analysis of the seriousness of the problems being addressed by the cooperative programs in the fields of export control and MPC&A.15 However, they have not addressed in detail the effectiveness of U.S. cooperative programs, lessons learned from these programs, or steps that can be taken to increase the impact of the programs. This study seeks to fill those gaps. ROLE OF THE NRC COMMITTEE FOR THIS STUDY During the summer of 1995, the chairman of the NRC appointed a 10-member interdisciplinary committee of specialists to carry out this study. The charge to the committee is set out in Appendix C. Biographies of committee members are attached as Appendix D. In preparation for the committee's work, the project staff held discussions with governmental and nongovernmental specialists in the field. Many of these specialists were invited to meet with the committee. Moreover, early in the study many members of the committee participated in special briefings on developments in the FSU organized at several government agencies in Washington and at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. Also, the staff compiled an extensive collection of relevant documents prepared by American and foreign organizations that provided important background for the committee's meetings. All documents used in preparing this report were unclassified, although selected committee members and staff had the benefit of several classified briefings. During the first half of 1996, committee members traveled to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to gain firsthand impressions of developments in these 14 See, for example, "Export Controls in the New Independent States," Proceedings of the International Workshop (Minsk: Eridan. 1995); Mikhail Ustyugov, "Problems of Developing an Export Control System in Kazakstan," and Gary Bertsch, "Controlling the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal." The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control, vol. 2, Winter/ Spring 1996, pp. 8-10 and 33-39: and Gary Bertsch and Igor Khripunov, eds., Russia's Nonproliferation and Conventional Weapons Export Controls: 1995 Annual Report (Athens: University of Georgia, 1996). 15 These studies have involved and been published by many American nongovernmental organizations. Those that have been particularly interested in export control and/or MPC&A issues in the FSU include the Center of International Trade and Security, University of Georgia; John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Natural Resources Defense Council: Lawyers Alliance for World Security; Monterey Institute of International Studies; and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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--> countries, particularly the impact of American programs of interest to the committee. These trips included consultations with local and American officials and specialists and visits to facilities that were of special relevance to U.S. efforts in the countries. Also, in Moscow small seminars were held with Russian specialists concerning (a) dual-use technologies currently in the development phase and (b) the interests of Russian industrialists with regard to the evolution of export controls in Russia. In addition to the meetings in Washington, D.C. and New Mexico, the committee spent one week in July 1996 at the conference site of the National Academy of Sciences in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, to develop the framework for this report. The committee recognized the difficulties of writing a report on programs that are still unfolding in a region in flux and decided to concentrate on developments that took place prior to the summer of 1996. After the report had been reviewed according to NRC procedures, the committee approved the final draft in February 1997, cognizant of many recent events that were not adequately reflected in the report but nevertheless confident that the overall thrust of the report remained valid. Throughout the entire process, many officials and other specialists in the United States and the FSU took time to provide very important information and insights for the committee. The Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, and the American embassies in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty were extraordinarily helpful in arranging visits and consultations for the committee. Appendix B identifies the formal meetings and visits. Of no less significance were the many informal discussions also arranged through numerous channels in the United States and abroad. The committee expresses its appreciation to the many individuals and institutions in the United States and abroad who assisted its efforts. It also is grateful for the exceptional assistance of the NRC staff. Any errors in this report are the committee's own. RICHARD A. MESERVE, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES, EXPORT CONTROL, AND MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
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