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biological weapons
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WHO DID IT?
M is restless with anticipation. It is Monday, September 17, and the
day has been carefully planned. Late in the afternoon, in his small
makeshift laboratory, he takes an 8-ounce jar containing a light tan
powder from the shelf above the workbench. Composed of micro-
scopic particles, the powder resembles exceedingly fine flour. Even
though he has been vaccinated against anthrax, M is very cautious.
Wearing gloves, jumpsuit, and face mask, he gingerly unscrews the
cap.
He taps some material into a small plastic receptacle perched on an
electrically calibrated scale. The scale is hooded to avoid spilling.
When the scale registers 1 gram, he stops. He sifts the weighed pow-
der into a transparent plastic test tube. The powder is so light that he
must hold the tube still for several minutes as the material slowly
settles into it. He repeats the exercise with a second test tube.
Each tube now contains billions of particles. The particles are an-
thrax spores, some clinging to each other in clusters of 20 or 30
because of electrostatic attraction. But the spores have been treated
with a silica-based material that minimizes the electrostatic effect,
and many particles are individual free-floating spores. A single spore,
about 1 to 3 microns in length, is so tiny that 10,000 could fit on the
head of a pin.
Days earlier M knew he would send identical terror messages to the
editor of the New York Post and to Tom Brokaw at NBC in New
York City. In preparation, he purchased 34-cent prestamped enve-
185
,. .,A:.:.~9,~
186
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
lopes produced by the U.S. Postal Service and printed their addresses
on them in block letters. He also printed a message on a single piece
of paper and made copies of it on a copy-machine:
09-1 1-01
THIS IS NEXT
TAKE PENACILIN NOW
DEATH TO AMERICA
DEATH TO ISRAEL
ALLAH IS GREAT
As evening approaches he folds a copy of the message into each enve-
lope. Then he slowly empties the powder from the first test tube into
one envelope and from the second tube into the other envelope. Care-
ful not to spill any material on the outer surfaces, he seals the enve-
lopes with tape. He places them in a plastic Ziploc bag, then in a
brown paper bag, and rests the bag on the workbench. He sits si-
lently through the evening.
By midnight the streets in downtown Princeton are quiet. The night
sky is clear, the temperature a comfortable 50°. As rehearsed during
previous evenings, M drives at deliberate speed south on Nassau
Street. The Princeton University campus is on the left as he crosses
Witherspoon Street and then John Square. Three short blocks later
he makes a right on to Bank Street, pulls over and parks. Before
leaving the car, M draws on a pair of latex gloves and reaches for the
Ziploc bag next to him. He glances about, the bag firmly in hand,
and he walks several yards back to Nassau Street where three blue
mailboxes stand near the curb. They are opposite the American Ex-
press travel office on the corner.
No one else is near. Good. September 11 comes to mind and M
thinks: "That day was the first step. Anthrax will be the second."
Standing in front of the boxes, he unzips the plastic bag and pulls out
the two powder-filled letters. He deposits them in the middle box,
quickly returns to the car, and drives off.
At 11 a.m. the next morning a postal carrier removes a white plastic
tub of mail from each mailbox and replaces each one with an empty
tub. After picking up mail from other boxes along his route, the
carrier brings his collection to the local post office in Princeton. In
the afternoon the accumulated batches are transported to the sorting
and distribution center in nearby Hamilton. Meanwhile, spores have
begun to leak from the anthrax letters onto other mail. The cross-
contamination is intensified at the Hamilton facility by the turbu-
WHO DID IT?
fence of the sorting machines. As the letters are routed to their desti-
nations, they continue to leak spores along the way. Some time later
they are delivered to the of fires of the addressed parties. The anthrax
attack is under way.
187
clevisec! this vignette, purposely ignoring the presumer! motives
of the perpetrator, ant! asker! some experts if they thought it
plausible. The presumer! presence of silica material with the
spores was questioner! by some. It is an issue of continuing clis-
agreement among scientists. Further, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg
saicl, "I do find an implausibility." Responcling by e-mail, she wrote:
"Insufficient containment (unless you are making the case that the
first mailing was not easily aerosolizable, unlike the second. The
Daschie anthrax jumper! off the microscope slide when they trier!
to look at it." "Otherwise," she saicl, "OK."
Her observation about the aerosol characteristic is important.
The quality of anthrax in the letters sent to NBC ant! the New York
Post apparently was different from that in the letters sent to Sena-
tors Daschie ant! Leahy. The first two letters, which were post-
markoc! September 18, 2001, reportecIly container! cleat! vegetative
anthrax organisms ant! other debris mixer! with spores. The seconc!
two, postmarked! October 9, container! a pure preparation of spores
that more reaclily became aerosolizecI. That is, they easily floater! in
the air " jumper! off the microscope slicle," as Rosenberg saicI. (In
a letter to the New York Times on May 18, 2002, Fecleral Bureau
of Investigation [FBI] spokesman fohn Collingwooc! confirmed! the
difference in potency between the two pairs of letters.) Thus, my
scenario would seem appropriate for the September mailing, which
is the one I depict, but not for the October mailing.
When I askocl Rosenberg to elaborate on what she thought suf-
ficient containment would entail, she responclec! that the perpetra-
tor either "hac! access to a containment lab or he improviser! one
on his own." He hac! to be "completely protected," she saicI. The
material somehow hac! to be isolates! "or else he hac! to be working
where contamination would never be founcI."
Rosenberg, a professor of environmental science at the State
University of New York in Purchase, has been working on biologi-
cal weapons issues since the early 1980s. For her, as for many in
both the law enforcement ant! scientific communities, available in-
formation suggested a lone perpetrator who had workocl in a U.S.
government laboratory.
188
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
Y: :' ; - - -~i --; - ~y~
...Y..~ ~.i..-Y'
........ - - ~ ~~ Yet yet ; y
y~...,~,...~:~J
In January 2002, Tom Ridge, director of homelanc! security,
acknowlecigec! that immecliately after the initial anthrax incidents
"our natural inclination was to look to external terrorists." But
now, he saicI, the "primary direction of the investigation is turner!
inwarcl." In fact, as early as October 25, 2001, George Tenet, cli-
rector of central intelligence, ant! Robert Mueller, FBI director, toic!
senators they were not ruling out any possibilities, but that an Iraqi
connection seemec! unlikely.
Days later news reports suggester! the focus hac! become clo-
mestic. The area arounc! Trenton ant! Princeton, from which the
anthrax letters were mailecI, appearec! to be of particular interest.
On October 31, the Wall Street f corn reporter! that investigators
were interviewing laboratory researchers in the Princeton area, ask-
ing about "specific equipment and whether any such specializecl
machinery has clisappearecl." Then, on November 9, the FBI posted
a profile on the Internet that strongly suggester! a domestic perpe-
trator. The message was unusually specific about the characteristics
of the presumed culprit. Tracey Silberling, a spokeswoman for the
bureau, acknowlecigec! that the FBI hac! never before macle public
such extensive material on an unsolvec! case. She saic! that the in-
formation wouicl educate people about the threat and perhaps "ring
a bell with someone" who might then contact the bureau.
Uncler the Yearling "Amerithrax Press Briefing" (Amerithrax
was the FBI's name for the investigation), the bureau offerer! "lin-
guistic ant! behavioral assessments" of the anthrax mailer. The no-
tice askocl the public "to study these assessments and reflect on
whether someone of their acquaintance might fit the profile." The
anthrax mailer, according to the notice, was likely an aclult male
with a scientific background! "or at least a strong interest in sci-
ence." He has access to a source of anthrax ant! knows how to
refine it, and he is familiar with the Trenton, New Jersey, area.
(Princeton is 10 miles north of Trenton.) Further, the perpetrator is
"a non-confrontational person, at least in his public life." But he
"may hoist grudges for a long time vowing that he will get even
with 'them' one clay." Ant! he "prefers being by himself more often
than not."
The personality characteristics resembles! those of Tec!
Kaczynski, the Unabomber. Between 1978 ant! the time of his cap-
WHO DID IT?
189
tore in 1996, Kaczynski was responsible for 16 bomb attacks, most
of them by mail, that killer! three people. The experience was still
fresh in people's mincis. lames FitzgeralcI, an FBI profiler, toic! the
Los Angeles Times that the Unabomber's profile helpec! inspire the
bureau's description of the presumer! anthrax mailer.
Three clays after the FBI notice, on November 12, Barbara
Hatch Rosenberg poster! her own assessment of the anthrax perpe-
trator. It appearec! on the Web site of the Federation of American
Scientists (FAS), an organization of 3,000 scientists whose focus is
on science policy. Rosenberg chairs the fecleration's working group
on biological weapons. Her message, ant! others that she poster! in
subsequent months, catapulted! her into public visibility. In April
2002 an admiring article by Lois Ember in Chemical and Engineer-
ing News characterizes! her as an "intellectual provocateur." At the
same time, for Davic! Tell, opinion editor of the Weekly Standard,
she was "Miss Marple" with a "crackpot theory."
Rosenberg's message mover! the FBI's presumptions into new
territory. She asserted that the perpetrator was an American scien-
tist with access to U.S. "weaponizecI" anthrax or hac! been taught
by an expert how to make it. Ant! she speculates! that if the bureau
believecl "the anthrax was an 'insicle' job, it wouicl probably want
to cover it up." Failure by the FBI to identify the perpetrator, she
wrote, might have arisen from a clesire to protect politically embar-
. . . .
Sassing Information.
Barbara Rosenberg is a demure enthusiast. Fashionably
ciressecI, behinc! ciark-rimmec! glasses, her appearance harcIly sug-
gests that of an impassioned! crusader. But she is intensely clevotec!
to keeping the world free of biological weapons. She receiver! a
Ph.D. in biochemistry from Cornell University Meclical School in
1962. Not until the 1980s, while working at the Memorial SIoan-
Kettering Cancer Center in New York, clic! she turn to biological
warfare issues. During that time, she authorec! a blistering environ-
mental critique of a proposer! biological research laboratory at the
Army's Dugway Proving Grounc! in Utah. She also began to leac!
FAS efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons
Convention.
Now, with her Internet posting in November, she turned her
attention to the anthrax letters. What was the basis for her assess-
ments? I askocl her. "I had inside sources," she answerecl. "I heard
from people in the bioclefense community who thought a specific
person was the most likely one who clic! it." There was no proof at
the time, just strong suspicions. She emphasized that her analysis
190
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
was not baser! on the FBI's profile but on her own sources ant!
clecluctions.
Rosenberg refiner! her assessments ant! poster! them on Decem-
ber 10, 2001. Now she suggester! that the government hac! "un-
cloubtecIly known for some time that the anthrax terrorism was an
insicle job." A month later, on January 17, another posting: "By
now the FBI must have a goof! idea of who the perpetrator is." Ant!
she introclucec! an icleological component: "The choice of Senators
Daschie ant! Leahy [as targets] suggests that the perpetrator may
lean to the political right ant! may have some specific grudges
against those Senators." This conjecture floes not, of course, ex-
plain why anthrax letters were sent to the American Media tab-
loicis or to the right-leaning New York Post.
Rosenberg's January notice incluclec! a section titles! "Possible
Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator." The perpetrator, she wrote,
has a "cloctoral degree in a relevant branch of biology"; he "works
for a CIA contractor in [the] Washington, DC area"; he "knows
Bill Patrick [the former U.S. chief bioweaponeer] ant! has probably
learner! a thing or two about weaponizing from him"; he "has hac!
a dispute with a government agency." While not embracing
Rosenberg's specificity, the FBI also remainec! fixer! on the clomes-
tic loner theory. At the enc! of January, Van Harp, assistant director
of the bureau's Washington fielc! office, sent an extraordinary letter
to the 32,000 U.S. members of the nation's leacling organization of
microbiologists:
I would like to appeal to the talented men and women of the Ameri-
can Society for Microbiology to assist the FBI in identifying the per-
son who mailed these letters. It is very likely that one or more of you
know this individual.... Based on his or her selection of the Ames
strain of Bacillus anthracis one would expect that this individual has
or had legitimate access to select biological agents at some time.
The letter concluclec! with a remincler that the rewarc! for informa-
tion leacling to the culprit's arrest and conviction had grown to
$2.5 million.
Rosenberg viewer! the FBI's mailing as a waste of time. All but
a couple of huncirec! members of the society, she saicI, live in a
"clifferent woricl" from the perpetrator. Although she wouicl not
name the suspect, she was impatient with the FBI for not doing so.
The evidence was sufficient to "single out the perpetrator from the
other likely suspects," she wrote. But the bureau's reluctance to
name him was perhaps because he knew something "sufficiently
WHO DID IT?
191
damaging to the Uniter! States to make him untouchable by the
FBI."
Rosenberg's assessments were widely reported, often in a po-
litical cast. Liberal magazines, inclucling the American Prospect ant!
the New Yorker, publisher! articles that sympathizer! with her posi-
tion. Conservative publications, notably the Wall Street;fournal ant!
the New York Post, were skeptical. No journalist was more fixer!
on the issue than New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. Be-
tween January ant! August 2002 he clevotec! six columns to the
subject. Incorporating most of Rosenberg's themes ant! then some,
he criticizer! the FBI for "lackadaisical ineptitude in pursuing the
anthrax killer."
Davic! Tell, in the Weekly Standard, incluclec! a point-by-point
critique of the argument that the anthrax mailer was a domestic
scientist. Tell was as critical of the FBI as he was of Rosenberg. The
result was an ironic triangle: He ant! Rosenberg pointecIly clisagreec!
with each other, ant! both clisagreec! with the FBI, albeit for cliffer-
ent reasons.
Whereas Rosenberg contenclec! that the Ames strain in the let-
ters likely came from an American laboratory, Tell saic! that the
Uniter! States hac! sharer! the Ames samples with labs overseas,
which could have been the source. Whereas the FBI believer! that
the block capitals in the anthrax letters were written by a native
English-speaker, Tell asker! why the writer might not have been
"someone who grew up speaking a language like Arabic whose
alphabet has no upper or lower cases." Whereas Rosenberg thought
the writer's warning to take penicillin meant he clic! not intent! to
kill, Tell clisagreecI. He believer! that no "benignly inspired" expert
would now prescribe penicillin for an anthrax infection. (C)pro
ant! cloxycycline are consiclerec! the antibiotics of choice.) He con-
cluclec! that "the possibility is far from forecloses! that the anthrax
bioterrorist was just who he saic! he was: a Muslim, impliecIly from
overseas, who thought the events of 09-11-01 were something to
be celebrates! ant! who would have been cloubly pleaser! to see
'you die now."'
In 2003, Rosenberg remainec! as convincer! of her case as she
was in 2001. "To my mincI, everything that subsequently became
known playoc! right into my hypothesis, which strengthener! my
own convictions," she said to me. Ancl she is equally steadfast about
the unflattering criticism she has received: "It rolls right off. I mean,
the people who are making these statements are right wingers who
have axes to grind. They're trying to prove that it was Iraq, or Al
92
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
Qaecia, or anything but the U.S. bioclefense program. So, I mean, I
expect that." When I notes! that the person she clescribec! in her
postings seemec! to fit the profile of Steven Hatfi~l, she responclec!
softly, "I have not mentioner! a name ant! I clon't intent! to."
EYE Y YES ^.-Y-S it;
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3~:~Y~Xy~
~ _~
Pat Clawson exucles gusto ant! strong opinions. As he climber!
out of his clentec! 1988 rec! Plymouth Reliant, he announced, "I'm
just a fat, ugly Irishman who doesn't like what's happening to my
friend." It was the enc! of January 2003, a coic! but clear afternoon
in Washington. We fount! a quiet table at Kelly's Irish Times, a
downtown pub. Over a cornet! beef sandwich ant! some Ellis Islanc!
beer, for 2 hours Clawson catalogucc! the injustices he believes
Steven Hatfi~l has suffered. During the 1990s he ant! Hatfi~l clevel-
opec! a friendship at clinner parties attenclec! by a circle of fellow
conservatives. Both men are the same age, 48, ant! they share a
world view that they purvey with spiritec! confidence.
When I spoke with Clawson, Hatfi~l hac! been unemployed! for
5 months. Clawson, a veteran raclio ant! television reporter at NBC
ant! CNN, hac! also recently left his job with Raclio America. Un-
like his friencl, he anticipated finding work again quickly. Hatfi~l
has been instructed! by his lawyers not to talk to any outsiders, but
he has accepted the meclia-savvy Clawson's offer to act as his
spokesman. With Hatfi~l's blessing, Clawson has regularly appeared
on the air ant! in print on his behalf.
Clawson first learner! that Hatfi~l might be in trouble on fune
25, 2001. He heart! a raclio reporter say that the FBI hac! searcher!
an apartment in Frederick, MarylancI. "It was connecter! with the
anthrax investigation ant! he mentioner! 'Steven Hatfi~l,"' Clawson
saicI. For a moment Clawson wonclerec! if Hatfi~l could have been
the anthrax killer. But then the broadcaster inclicatec! that Hatfi~l
was not a suspect, ant! hac! consented! to the search. "Well, hell,"
Clawson thought, "Steve's just being a good soiclier and cooperat-
ing with the FBI."
Clawson knew that Hatfi~l was an expert on bioterrorism ant!
recalled Hatfi~l telling him the FBI had interviewocl him about the
anthrax letters. No cause for concern. He was among huncirecis
being interviewocI, inclucling almost everyone who hac! recently
worker! at the U.S. Army Meclical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID). But then, according to Clawson, media sto-
WHO DID IT?
193
ries began suggesting that Hatfill hac! become the center of the in-
vestigation. Clawson cites! the articles by Nicholas Kristof ant! oth-
ers. "Steve was being portrayer! as a nutty, lone scientist who was
pissec! off at the government because he lost his security clearance,
lost his job, ant! was a closet racist who hac! worker! for racist
regimes in Rhodesia ant! South Africa." Clawson's baritone infiec-
tions sounc! remarkably similar to those of talk-raclio's Rush
Limbaugh. Clawson paused, rester! his beer on the table, ant! saicI,
"That wasn't the Steve that I knew."
Clawson reacher! Hatfi~l ant! asker! him what all these stories
were about. "Pat, I clon't know what the hell is going on," Hatfi~l
answered. Clawson watcher! his frienc! break into tears. "They're
following me arounc! the clock, everywhere I go, ant! I clon't have a
dawn thing to clo with any of this."
Hatfi~l's background! is certainly unusual. He hac! clistortec!
items on his resume, inclucling a false claim that he helc! a Ph.D.
But much about his recorc! is not in dispute. He was born in St.
Louis in 1953, grew up in Illinois, ant! gracluatec! from Southwest-
ern College in Kansas in 1975. After serving in the U.S. Army, he
went to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to stucly medicine. In 1984 he
receiver! an M.D. from the Godfrey Huggins School of Medicine
(now the University of Zimbabwe). He completer! a hematology
residency in South Africa, where he also obtainer! a master's degree
in meclical biochemistry ant! another one in microbial genetics.
In 1994 he submitter! a Ph.D. thesis on molecular biology at
Rhocles University in South Africa but never receiver! the degree.
Hatfi~l left Africa in 1995 ant! spent a year as a research scientist at
Oxford. He returnee! to the Uniter! States for a 2-year fellowship at
the National Institutes of Health and then 2 years, from 1997 to
1999, at USAMRIID. There he concluctec! research on viruses, in-
clucling Ebola ant! Marburg, which are consiclerec! possible
biowarfare agents. Afterwards, in January 1999, he began to work
for Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a pri-
vate defense contractor in Virginia.
Hatfi~l was firer! from SAIC in March 2002, though Clawson
refuses! to say why. According to meclia reports, it was because the
Department of Defense hac! suspenclec! his security clearance in
August 2001 ant! Hatfi~l's efforts to regain the clearance hac! been
unsuccessful. The suspension might have been relater! to his par-
ticipation in the 1980s with the military in Rhodesia ant! South
Africa. An intelligence analyst who knows Hatfi~l confirmed to me
that Hatfi~l hac! been involves! with special operations there of an
194
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
unspecified! nature. In any case, after leaving SAIC, Hateful was hirer!
to work in a biomeclical training program at Louisiana State Uni-
versity. But amic! the notoriety, he was let go in early September
2002.
Hatfill's intense interest in bioclefense is obvious from his
resume. In the late 1990s he clevelopec! a biological warfare sylla-
bus for emergency room physicians ant! he was a biological weap-
ons consultant for the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Meclical
Strike Force. His resume also says: "Working knowledge of the
former U.S. and foreign BW programs, wet and dry BW agents,
large-scale production of bacterial, rickettsial, ant! viral BW patho-
gens, stabilizers ant! other aciclitives."
These were among the reasons Hatfi~l hac! been targeted, im-
plicitly by Rosenberg, ant! explicitly by Kristof ant! Attorney Gen-
eral fohn Ashcroft. The search of Hatfi~l's apartment in fune was
follower! by another search on August 1, but this time the FBI
brought a criminal search warrant. While still denying that Hateful
was a suspect, the FBI ant! the attorney general cleemec! him a "per-
son of interest." He was one of 30 persons of interest, according to
the bureau, but Hateful apparently was the only one uncler sustainer!
FBI surveillance.
Clawson was convincer! that Hatfi~l's public silence was not
helping him. "Steve, you've got to get your sicle of the story out.
You neec! to talk to the press ant! let people see who you are," he
saicl.
"No, I don't want to," Hatfi~l repliecl, according to Clawson.
"Well, you're going to have to. You're getting eaten alive."
"Look, you know how my lawyer feels about it," Hatfill
repliecl.
Soon after, Clawson spoke to Victor Glassberg, Hatfi~l's law-
yer. "We hac! a tough conversation," Clawson saicI, referring to
their opposing views about the neec! for a press conference. But on
August 11, in front of his lawyer's office in Alexanclria, Virginia,
Steven Hatfi~l proclaimer! his innocence in a statement to the press.
This was followocI, Clawson saicI, by a "disinformation campaign"
by the FBI, inclucling the bureau's clenial that they had trashed his
apartment. "But we hac! pictures," Clawson saicI, "which we re-
leasec! to the press." On August 25, Hateful helc! another press con-
ference.
Telecast nationwicle, a resolute Steven Hateful pointed his index
finger towarc! the assembler! cameras ant! saicI: "I want to look my
fellow Americans clirectly in the eye and cleclare to them, 'I am not
WHO DID IT?
195
the anthrax killer."' His dark blue suit coverer! the stocky frame of
a seemingly over-age wrestler. He inveigher! against Barbara
Rosenberg ant! Nicholas Kristof for conveying a "never-ending tor-
rent of leaks." He assailer! Attorney General fohn Ashcroft for sin-
gling him out as a "person of interest." Ant! he accuser! the govern-
ment of abusing him: "This assassination of my character appears
to be part of a government-run effort to show the American people
that it is proceeding vigorously ant! successfully with the anthrax
investigation."
Hatfi~l proviclec! timesheets to reporters showing that he hac!
been working overtime at the SAIC offices in McLean, Virginia, on
September 17 ant! 18 ant! October 8 ant! 9, arounc! the times the
anthrax letters were mailecI. "I know nothing about the anthrax
attack," he saicl. "I had absolutely nothing to do with this terrible
crime."
After the seconc! press conference, Hatfill mover! from
Frederick, MarylancI, to his girifriencl's apartment in Washington,
D.C. But the FBI remainec! interested! in his former home ant! the
surrounding area. At the time that I spoke with Clawson in lanu-
ary 2003, investigators were searching a wooded area near Hatfi~l's
former home. The search was " just a continuation of our investiga-
tion on the anthrax case," according to FBI spokeswoman Debra
Weierman. In June the FBI returned to the area and drained a 1-
acre ponc! at a cost of $250,000.
I asker! Clawson how Hatfill was spencling his time. "He
watches CAN a lot," Clawson repliecI. "He is angry that his repu-
tation is in tatters ant! that he has been reclucec! to virtual poverty."
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Rancly Murch put his cup of coffee on the saucer, remover! his
black suit jacket, ant! cirapec! it over the back of his chair. He tiltec!
his head forwarcl. We were in a corner of the breakfast room of a
hose! in northwest Washington. "I coined the term 'microbial fo-
rensics' when I was with the FBI," he saicI. After 23 years with the
bureau, Murch, 50, retiree! at the enc! of 2002 to work on terrorism
issues at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a think tank in Alexan-
ciria, Virginia. Now, 2 months later, in February 2003, he cliscussec!
his former role as deputy assistant director in charge of forensic
programs in the FBI's laboratory. He lifter! a pair of goicI-rimmec!
reacting glasses from his pocket, slipper! them on, ant! sketcher! a
WHO DID IT?
201
Gregg Epstein, president of Perry Viclex, walkocl the group
through a cavernous warehouse fillet! with bulky equipment. He
pauses! at the mouth of a huge steel cylincler positioner! horizon-
tally. Its thick floor was swung open, as if beckoning entry into a
bank vault. Epstein explainer! that the piece is a centrifuge that
separates large quantities of liquids from solids. "This one was ac-
tually user! to make vitamin C," he saicI, "but bac! stuff like satin or
VX nerve agents would corrode the metal." He pointer! at the metal
inner wall ant! saic! that if it hac! been liner! with a corrosion-resis-
tant material, like Teflon, the inspectors should be suspicious.
He mover! to a 6-foot tall metallic cylincler about 3 feet in cli-
ameter, capper! with a removable clome. A half clozen pipes
sprouter! from the sicle ant! base. "This is a spray dryer," he saicI.
Manufacturecl by the Niro Company, it is used in pharmaceutical
ant! foot! processing to make free-flowing particles that can be mi-
croscopic in size. A slurry of material ant! a fine powder are fee! in
through the top. From the sicle a pipe conveys hot air into the cylin-
cler while another one ciraws cooler air away. Although spray ciry-
ers are user! in the manufacture of a variety of innocuous products
like toothpaste ant! flavorer! foods, they can also be user! to pro-
cluce biological warfare agents.
It is just such a piece of equipment that Richard Spertze! has in
mine! when he thinks about the possible source of the anthrax let-
ters. Contrary to the FBI ant! many other observers, Spertze! finds
the "lone wolf" theory unlikely. In December 2001 he toicl the
House Committee on International Relations that descriptions of
the anthrax in the Daschie letter inclicatec! "it could be proclucec!
only by some group that was involvecl with a current or former
state program in recent years."
Spertzel's favorer! cancliciate for the source was Iraq, where he
hac! previously server! as a weapons inspector for the Uniter! Na-
tions Special Commission. The Daschie letter container! anthrax
that was more pure and concentrated than any that had been found
in the Soviet, U.S., or Iraqi biological programs. But, Spertze! notes!
in his testimony, "Iraq, unlike the Soviet ant! U.S. programs, clic!
not mill its airier! product; rather the Iraqi BW [biological weapons]
team learner! the methoc! of obtaining reaclily aerosolizable small-
particle product in a one-step spray-cirying process."
A year later, in September 2002, Spertze! testifier! before the
House Armecl Services Committee:
Although Iraq denies it, Iraq had the equipment and know-how to
dry BW agents in a small particle that would be highly dispersible
202
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
into an aerosol.... It still retains the necessary personnel, equipment
(including spray dryer), and supplies to have an equal or expanded
capability in this regard.
Few can match the experience Spertzel brings to the discussion.
After graduating in 1960 from the University of Pennsylvania
School of Veterinary Medicine, he began a 28-year Army career.
While in the service, he receiver! a Ph.D. in microbiology from
Notre Dame. But most of his career was spent at Fort Detrick
where, until the enc! of the U.S. offensive biological arms program
in 1969, he helpec! develop germ weapons, including anthrax.
Spertzel cites! his expertise to underscore how unlikely the lone
wolf theory is. "In my opinion," he toic! the Washington Post in
October 2002, "there are maybe four or five people in the whole
country who might be able to make this stuff, ant! I'm one of them."
He was referring to the unusually pure mix of the anthrax in the
Daschie ant! Leahy letters. "Ant! even with a goof! lab ant! staff to
help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as
good." (Others believe that cleveloping the product wouic! be easier
than Spertzel suggests. Matthew Meselson ant! Ken Alibek say that
the micrographs they saw of spores in the Daschie letter showocl no
aciclec! materials. Each of them toic! me he thought the spores could
have been preparer! by any skillful microbiologist.)
In 1994, Spertzel began a 4-year tour with UNSCOM, the pre-
clecessor of UNMOVIC. Serving as the commission's head biologi-
cal weapons inspector, he oversaw UNSCOM's fincling in 1995 that
Iraq's germ weapons program had been far more advanced than
the regime previously acknowlecigecI. Moreover, the commission
cleterminec! that Iraq was still hilling information. Spertzel himself
hac! fount! "a major disparity between the amount of agent cle-
ciarec! as proclucec! by Iraq ant! that estimates! by UNCSOM ex-
perts," he later toicl Congress.
Paracloxically, despite the eviclence, several members of the
U.N. Security Council hac! begun to criticize UNSCOM for being
too aggressive. By 1998, Russia, France, ant! China even seemec! to
be challenging the integrity of the inspectors. Spertzel hac! cleciclec!
the commission hac! become a political football ant! could no longer
function usefully. He left in July. In December, President Clinton
orclerec! the bombing of Iraqi installations with the prociaimec! aim
of clegracling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Subsequently,
Saciciam Hussein prohibited! the return of UN inspectors. The next
year UNSCOM was clisbanclec! ant! replacer! in December 1999
with a newly staffer! UNMOVIC.
WHO DID IT?
203
Richarc! Spertzel's voice is soft. His nasal twang hints at his
western Pennsylvania origins, where he grew up on a farm. In a
dark checker! sports jacket, he squinter! through metal-framec!
glasses as he emphasizer! a point. Despite his quiet demeanor, not
long into a conversation it becomes clear that he is a man of force-
ful convictions.
When I asker! Spertze! to comment on the anthrax mailer sce-
nario I poser! at the beginning of this chapter, his observations were
similar to Barbara Rosenberg's. Despite their differences about the
source of the anthrax letters, they both fount! the depiction largely
plausible, at least for the letters to NBC ant! the New York Post.
Like Rosenberg, Spertze! allowed! that the anthrax in those letters
coup! have been placer! in the envelopes as I clescribecI, though not
the material later sent to the two senators. Spertzel:
The quality of the product in the Daschle and Leahy letters is such
that it could not have been 'tapped' into any receptacle. It would
almost all become airborne. Similarly it could not have been trans-
ferred by 'sifting' into a plastic test tube. After it was in a sealed
container it would take many hours to settle because of its lightness
and flowability.
Exactly how that finely graded anthrax was transferred to the en-
velopes remains puzzling. Perhaps a sucking mechanism of some
sort was user! to draw the powcler into the envelopes.
I asker! Spertzel to talk further about weaponizing anthrax
while not, of course, giving an actual recipe (not that he would in
any case). Spertzel began: "You know, the pharmaceutical industry
uses a number of silica compounds in the manufacturing of inhal-
ant medications." Silica, or silicon clioxicle, is a hare! glassy mineral
that forms a variety of familiar substances, inclucling sane! ant!
quartz. In microscopic size it can adhere to the surface of other
particles ant! keep them from sticking to each other. It is the silica-
coatec! particles that enhance the slippery characteristics of procI-
ucts like paint ant! toothpaste. Spertzel notes! that since the 1950s
silica compounds couicl also be aclclecl to biological agents "which
makes them Plowable' ant! reaclily clispersible in the air." (The coat-
ing recluces the electrostatic attraction that the agents might other-
wise exhibit.) He mentioner! Aerosil, the commercial name for one
such compound It is a fine white powcler whose particles are about
12 nanometers, a thousandth the size of an anthrax spore. He ex-
plainecl further:
To get the kind of product that was in the Leahy and Daschle letters,
204
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
the silica would have to be added before the anthrax was dried.
There's only one drying technique I know that will give you that
narrow range of small particle aerosol. And that's spray drying.
That floes not sounc! very complicatecI, I saicI. "Well, it's not super
complicatecI, but it's a very exacting operation to get to the clesirec!
particle size. You neec! a lot of trial ant! error," Spertzel saicI.
Routine spray drying might produce a batch of particles, some
of them 20 microns in size or larger, some perhaps smaller. The
larger particles are not incliviclual spores but a collection of several
spores that have stuck to each other cluring the processing. They
emerge from the spray dryer as a single particle whose surface is
coatec! with silica. So how could someone produce a "pure" mix of
incliviclual free-floating spores?
You'd need a spray dryer that is called a "co-current" dryer. One of
the currents is heated air and the other current is the material you
want to dry. And the exact proportion of these two streams coming
together is what will determine the particle size. Increasing the heated
air relative to the material you're drying would give you a smaller
particle.
Spertze! cannot fathom any other way that the process could have
yielclec! silica-coatec! particles of 1 to 3 microns, scarcely larger than
the naked! spore. The process, he reiterated, would require repeater!
adjustments to the heater! air flow. Ant! after each trial run, an
examination of particle size would be neeclecI, perhaps uncler a scan-
ning electron microscope. "Trial ant! error, trial ant! error," he re-
peatecl.
A small room would be inacloquate to process the anthrax,
Spertze! insisted, as he tallies! up the necessary equipment: refrig-
erator, incubator, spray clryer, maybe a 3-foot-wicle scanning elec-
tron microscope. Ant! all the work would have to be clone in a
thoroughly container! area. "I wouic! say the space you neec! wouic!
be something like 20 x 50 feet. This is why I say it's got to be
something that was clone with the complicity of the country in
which it was macle," he concluclecI.
Assuming the complexity, time, ant! space that Spertze! speci-
fiecI, production of the finely graclec! anthrax would seem unlikely
to have taken place in a known U.S. laboratory. There wouicl be
too many people around for the effort to go unnoticecl. On the
other hancI, constructing a "safe" room in some obscure location
seems less improbable. Thus, to flatly rule out the possibility of a
domestic loner, as Spertze! cloes, seems an overreach. Still, one can
harcIly cleem his conjectures unreasonable.
WHO DID IT?
20s
He notes! that documents uncovered! by UNSCOM shower! that
Iraqi agencies hac! sought to obtain the Ames strain in 1988 ant!
1989. There were no restrictions at that time to obtaining patho-
gens from laboratories arounc! the woricI. He thinks a likely source
could have been the Pasteur Institute in Paris, which hac! several
strains. "We know the Iraqis obtainer! many strains of anthrax from
the Pasteur Institute," he saicI, "but we only know what two of
them were." (In March 2003, I inquirer! of Michele Mock, director
of the institute's Annual Report on Toxins ant! Bacterial Pathogen-
esis, if the Ames strain hac! ever been stocker! there. Her e-mai!
reply: "No, we never hac! the Ames strain at Pasteur.")
How would all this relate to September 11 ant! Osama bin
Laclen?
Spertze! saic! there is evidence that demonstrates a connection
between Iraq ant! Al Qaecia. He mentioner! that three Iraqi clefec-
tors who clefectec! at different times "all toic! the same story" about
Iraqi cooperation with Al Qaecia, ant! "I have personally spoken to
two of them." Convincer! of their creclibility, it is no great leap for
Spertze! to believe that there was collusion between Iraqi opera-
tives and the people responsible for September 11. Arouncl the time
of our conversation, in early 2003, members of the Bush aciminis-
tration also were emphasizing that there was a linkage. In Febru-
ary, Secretary of State Colin Powell provided the U.N. Security
Council with evidence that Al Qaecia operatives hac! been working
with the Iraqis. Whether this meant collusion concerning the an-
thrax letters remains uncertain.
When I reminclec! Spertze! that many people disagree with his
views about the source of the anthrax letters, he repliecI, "I know
they clot Ant! that's the reason I'm willing to sit back ant! wait for a
couple of years ant! say, 'Look you bastarcis, I toic! you so."' With a
wink ant! a laugh he aciclecI, "If I live long enough."
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"I am still always struck by how clisturbingly 'normal' most
terrorists seem when one actually sits clown ant! talks to them,"
Bruce Hoffman wrote in his 1998 book, Inside Terrorism.
Simply put, a single terrorist "personality" floes not exist,
which can compound the clifficulties in identifying and finding a
terrorist. But if personality type is elusive, patterns of motivation
seem more accessible. As Hoffman suggests, the clefining character-
206
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
istic of terrorism is the quest for a political goal through violence or
the threat of violence. The term "political" here has religious as
well as secular connotations. A terrorist may use the same instru-
ments as those of a lunatic killer guns ant! bombs but his mo-
tive is different. fohn Hinckley's attempt to murcler President
Reagan in 1981 was not an act of terrorism. Rather, it was a per-
vertec! effort to impress the actress foclie Foster. It was grounclec! in
a wish for personal aggrandizement, not prompter! by politics or
icleology.
In contrast to Hinckley-type motivation, the terrorist is an "al-
truist," Hoffman wrote. His action is aimec! at achieving a greater
goocI, not personal benefit. The cause may be overarching, such as
remaking society, or it may be narrow, as in opposing nuclear power
or abortion (a reminder, again, of anthrax hoaxer Clayton Lee
Waagner).
During a conversation in early 2003, Hoffman expresser! an
elevates! sense of frustration. He is the director of the RAND Cor-
poration in Washington, ant! we met in his 8th floor office above
Pentagon City Mall. In corduroy pants ant! shirtsleeves, Hoffman
was comfortably informal as he responclec! to my question about
who might have been behinc! the anthrax letters: "I have to say that
after September 11 any terrorist analyst who ventures a call on this
is on thin ice. September 11 wiper! the slate clean of our assump-
tions. To me, on all aspects of the anthrax case, I'm completely
agnostic."
He was alarmec! by the quality of the anthrax ant! the unantici-
patec! effects it hac! when sent in the mail. "Before October 2001,
we never thought that inhalation anthrax would be causer! by the
mail. Cutaneous maybe, but not inhalation." He ponclerec! as well
the unexpected! nature of the September 11 attacks simultaneous
hijackings by suicide terrorists. Those events, he saicl, undermined
oic! assumptions about who might be a terrorist ant! how they
would conduct their acts. It is clear now, if it hac! not been before,
"that a lone incliviclual can be a terrorist, not part of a group,
though he might be animates! by a political cause." But Hoffman
went no further ant! refuses! to offer an opinion about who was
behind the anthrax letters.
Other terrorism experts fee! less constrained, inclucling Jessica
Stern, a professor of public policy at Harvarcl. She has examined
the motives of terrorists who would commit acts of "extreme vio-
lence," such as the use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.
These "ultimate terrorists," as she calls them, are increasing in num-
WHO DID IT?
207
her. They have siclesteppec! the dictum macle famous in the past by
another terrorism expert, Brian Jenkins, who saic! that terrorists
want "a lot of people watching, not a lot of people cleacl." For
Stern the new type of terrorist is motivates! by religious conviction
or violent right-wing icleology. Prompter! in some instances by cle-
sire for revenge, she believes, these inclivicluals are more likely to
use weapons of mass destruction.
In fact, Timothy McVeigh ant! the acolytes of Osama bin Laclen
nicely represent Stern's two types of terrorists that revel in mass
casualties. McVeigh, the right-wing extremist ant! bin Laclen, the
religious fanatic, both engineered! attacks on core U.S. institutions.
In 1995 McVeigh exploclec! a truck bomb at the Alfrec! P. Murrah
Fecleral Builcling in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. In 1993
Islamic militants bomber! the Woric! Tracle Center, causing the cleath
of six. Ant! in 2001 the bin Laclen-inspirec! attack on the Woric!
Tracle Center killer! nearly 3,000. During the past clecacle many
more terrorist acts could be tracer! to radical Islamic sources than
to any other.
A year after the anthrax attacks, I askocl Jessica Stern who she
thought was responsible for the letters.
From early on I've thought that the most likely person was sympa-
thetic to the American right-wing extremists. But that was based just
on intuition. I think of these movements as an influence on individu-
als who may act as lone wolf avengers even though they are not
actual members of a group.
Stern floes not rule out the possibility of an Al Qaecia connec-
tion, but she is cloubtful because "nobody has proviclec! us evidence
that Al Qaecia was involvecI." Stern's suspicions are strongly influ-
encec! by her own interview experiences with right-wing extrem-
iStS.
My inclination is based on what they've said to me. The guy who
heads the Montana Militia, John Trochman, told me, "Biological
weapons are in the air in the American right-wing Extremists move-
ments." He meant that it's just something they think about all the
time.
Another expert, lerroic! Post, brings to the discussion the per-
spective of a psychiatrist who has stucliec! the motivations of terror-
ists. He agrees that they represent a "wicle range of psychologies,"
inclucling many that seem normal. But he has the impression that a
disproportionate number are narcissistic sociopaths who are self-
absorbec! ant! have low tolerance for frustration. Post, who directs
208
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
the Political Psychology Program at George Washington Univer-
sity, has a deep, gravely voice. "I'm probably the world's leading
terrorist interviewer," he said matter-of-factly. He has interviewed
35 incarcerated Palestinian terrorists from Hamas, Islamic lihad,
and Hezbollah. And he has testified at several U.S. federal trials
involving terrorism. When I asked his thoughts about the possible
anthrax mailer, he began with a general assessment.
He believes that most terrorists fee! constrained from using
weapons of mass destruction. "For the large majority of terrorists,
the goal of their act is to call attention to their cause and to win
positive attention." (Sounds like Brian Jenkins.) Many of the ter-
rorists he interviewed said, in effect, " lust give me a good
Kalashnikov assault rifle." They think it might be nice to have a
weapon that could kill 10,000, Post said, but the idea is also scary
to them. He recalled that a religious terrorist had told him the Ko-
ran proscribes poisoning and that "it would be against our reli-
gious belief to get involved with that."
Post thinks that two types ot terrorists are less constrained
about the use of weapons of mass destruction such as (potentially)
anthrax: religious extremists and the "lone right-wing scientist with
a gripe." Therefore, he said, it is unlikely that Iraq was connected
to the anthrax letters. Why not Iraq? Post explained:
Even though Saddam Hussein had developed his own anthrax weap-
ons, in terms of my own understanding of his psychology, he is a very
prudent individual. He surely knows that if it could be traced back to
him, he'd be incinerated. I don't see him ever letting such materials
out of his hands unless it's with a totally controlled group.
Then who would try to terrorize by sending the anthrax let-
ters? Post suspects that the motive might have been personal, per-
haps a quest for revenge. He thinks the anthrax mailer had exper-
tise in microbiology and harbored "some twisted places in his or
her psychology." Further, the mailer "probably has some dreams of
glory, had not been achieving very much in life, but has gained
profound satisfaction from what his few letters have accom-
plished." Post's description fits the FBI's profile of the lone perpe-
trator.
A former high-level FBI official, an expert on counterterrorism,
also thinks the disaffected loner theory is probably correct. I asked
how he feels about Steven Hatfield. "He fits the bureau's profile,"
the former agent acknowledges, "but I don't think he's the guy."
Requesting anonymity, the ex-agent, who now works for a govern-
WHO DID IT?
209
ment defense contractor, says that he knows Hatfill. "I've traveler!
with him ant! I've socializer! with him through work."
After allowing that Hatfi~l impresser! him as being an ocic! man,
he clescribec! Hatfi~l as very patriotic. "Clearly, he knows the cian-
ger of mailing anthrax, but he doesn't seem to me to be someone
who could kill somebody." The agent's assessment stems from his
long experience in criminal investigations.
What floes the agent think of the unusual speec! with which the
FBI came up with its profile? He answerer! obliquely:
I've never been a big fan of profiling. Look at the two Washington-
area snipers who were apprehended in October 2002. The profilers
had it as a white male. fIt turned out to be two black men.] You can't
base your whole investigative strategy on a profile. It's just not al-
ways right.
So who floes this veteran counterterrorism expert think is re-
sponsible for the anthrax attacks? "I think the likelihood! is in the
following orcler. First, a loner. Second, Al Qaecia, in conjunction
with the September 11 attack. ThircI, Iraq or another government."
The former agent returnee! to Hatfi~l, expressing sympathy for
his current situation. "I think Hatfi~l is unemployable now," he
saic! after allucling to the publicity given to the FBI's investigation
of him. The ex-agent floes not exclucle the possibility that Hatfi~l is
guilty. "Look, he could have clone it. He knows the scientific stuff
inside and out. The question is, 'Dicl he do it?"' "Basically, I'm 70
percent that he clicin't clo it. But 30 percent that he might have,"
saic! this counterrorism expert. He thinks the matter will be re-
solvec! some clay but not necessarily soon. "Cases like this one can
go on for years without being solvecI. Then a single break can
come.''
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In micl-2002, FBI director Robert Mueller denied that the bu-
reau hac! ruler! out any group or laboratory as the source of the
anthrax letters. Still, a year later the FBI Web site on Amerithrax
continued to clisplay the profile it hac! poster! back in November
2001. The focus remained on a probable domestic perpetrator a
nonconfrontational aclult male who "prefers being by himself more
often than not." Is this tilt towarc! the lone operator, which has
been enclorsec! by many others, warranted? Perhaps eventually it
210
THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
will prove to have been. Meanwhile, it would seem irresponsible to
ignore the possibility of an overseas connection to the anthrax let-
ters.
Dr. Larry Bush, the physician who diagnosed Bob Stevens's an-
thrax, shakes his heat! in clisbelief about the lone perpetrator theory.
"For one thing," he askocl, "whoever heard of American Meclia?"
He was referring to the company that publishes the National
Enq?~irer ant! the Sun, which were targetec! with anthrax. "I live in
the neighborhood, ant! I clicin't know who publisher! the National
Enq?~irer. Who would know that?" he asker! again. He ticks off
some familiar coincidences: that several highjackers hac! liver! a few
miles from the American Media builcling ant! that the wife of the
editor of the Sun hac! renter! apartments to two of them.
Then there is the fact that in fune 2001 one of the highjackers
was treater! at a Miami hospital for a black lesion on his leg. In
hindsight the hijacker's physician believer! it was cutaneous an-
thrax. Finally, there was the extraorclinarily brief period, only 6
clays, between September 11 ant! the clay the first letters were
mailecI. Bush offerer! a half smile. His expression was the same as
the one he wore when telling me how people initially clismissec! his
diagnosis of anthrax. It was a worcIless reminder that his suspicion
turner! out to be right after all. Then he saicI: "When I look at all
this stuff about the hijackers, I say, 'Well, wait a minute. This sure
looks suspicious."'
The notion of a connection between the September 11 terror
ant! the anthrax terror remains speculative. But so is the case for a
lone domestic perpetrator. Given the information that is publicly
available, either maciclening scenario seems possible.
For all the profiling and theorizing, it is quite possible that the
anthrax mailer will never be founcI. In November 2001 the Record,
a New Jersey newspaper, inclicatec! that state authorities hac! inves-
tigatecl 178 reports of anthrax in the 3 years before September 11.
All turner! out to be hoaxes, ant! not a single culprit was ever iclen-
tifiecl.
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The question of who was behind the anthrax letters is tantaliz-
~ng ant! important. But it is only one of many unresolved! matters
WHO DID IT?
211
relater! to the anthrax letters. The issues range from clearing with
builclings that are still contaminates! with spores to preparing for
future bioterrorism, ant! the preeminent challenge of all how to
minimize the chances that anthrax or other biological weapons will
be used.
