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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Military forces use landmines or landmine-like devices because they are capable of autonomously delaying or killing the enemy at a safe distance from friendly forces. Landmines fall into two broad categories. Antipersonnel landmines (APL) are intended to kill or disable soldiers on foot (a dismounted force).1 Antitank landmines (AT mines) are used against vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers (a mounted force). Mixed systems, which combine both AT mines and APL in the same munition, are typically used against an enemy force that is mostly mounted but is accompanied by significant numbers of dismounted soldiers. APL in mixed systems are intended to prevent or discourage foot soldiers from penetrating or breaching an AT minefield.

Landmines are essentially tactical and operational weapons, although on occasion they also have strategic implications. When used tactically, landmines are usually employed during battlefield engagements of relatively limited duration to disrupt an enemy's progress. There are also long-term strategic landmine missions, such as border protection, as is the case in Korea.

Minefields are used to place an enemy in a vulnerable position that can be exploited by friendly forces, cause the enemy forces to divide, interfere with enemy command and control, inflict damage on enemy personnel and equipment, exploit the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying enemy forces in an engagement area, and protect friendly forces from enemy infiltration. U.S. doctrine requires that minefields be mapped, marked, and eventually cleared. Despite these precautions and for a variety of reasons, U.S. landmines also occasionally kill friendly personnel, typically in hastily marked minefields. In addition, if the tide of battle changes rapidly, U.S. mines previously emplaced during defensive missions could become an obstacle to the execution of rapid offensive maneuvers.

Over time, landmines used by the United States and other countries with advanced military forces have become more complex, more effective, and easier to use. Advances in the 1970s also led to the development of landmines capable of destroying or deactivating themselves after a given time. All landmines currently in U.S. stocks, with the exception of those intended for the defense of Korea, are self-destructing and/or self-deactivating.

Other nations and nonstate actors, unfortunately, have resorted to less technologically advanced landmines, which are inexpensive, easily obtainable, and highly effective. Most of these simple, nonself-destructing mines are deployed with no thought to keeping track of their locations. As a result, millions of these devices are still strewn across old battlefields. APL have killed or maimed thousands of innocent civilians in the last 25 years and impeded the restoration of normal activities after conflicts have ended. Humanitarian groups, international organizations, and many governments around the world have increasingly identified these residual hazards as a threat to innocents and demanded that all APL be eliminated.

Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (otherwise known as the Convention on Conventional Weapons, or CCW) was the first international treaty to attempt to regulate the use of landmines. A review of the CCW in 1996 led to Amended Protocol II, which, among other things, distinguished between the use of APL and AT mines and restricted the uses of all APL. The United States has signed and ratified the CCW, including Amended Protocol II.

Subsequent national and international campaigns demanding a total ban on APL led to the Convention on the



1 The Convention on Conventional Weapons, Amended Protocol II, defines an APL as “a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons” (see Appendix E).



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Page 1 Executive Summary BACKGROUND Military forces use landmines or landmine-like devices because they are capable of autonomously delaying or killing the enemy at a safe distance from friendly forces. Landmines fall into two broad categories. Antipersonnel landmines (APL) are intended to kill or disable soldiers on foot (a dismounted force).1 Antitank landmines (AT mines) are used against vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers (a mounted force). Mixed systems, which combine both AT mines and APL in the same munition, are typically used against an enemy force that is mostly mounted but is accompanied by significant numbers of dismounted soldiers. APL in mixed systems are intended to prevent or discourage foot soldiers from penetrating or breaching an AT minefield. Landmines are essentially tactical and operational weapons, although on occasion they also have strategic implications. When used tactically, landmines are usually employed during battlefield engagements of relatively limited duration to disrupt an enemy's progress. There are also long-term strategic landmine missions, such as border protection, as is the case in Korea. Minefields are used to place an enemy in a vulnerable position that can be exploited by friendly forces, cause the enemy forces to divide, interfere with enemy command and control, inflict damage on enemy personnel and equipment, exploit the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying enemy forces in an engagement area, and protect friendly forces from enemy infiltration. U.S. doctrine requires that minefields be mapped, marked, and eventually cleared. Despite these precautions and for a variety of reasons, U.S. landmines also occasionally kill friendly personnel, typically in hastily marked minefields. In addition, if the tide of battle changes rapidly, U.S. mines previously emplaced during defensive missions could become an obstacle to the execution of rapid offensive maneuvers. Over time, landmines used by the United States and other countries with advanced military forces have become more complex, more effective, and easier to use. Advances in the 1970s also led to the development of landmines capable of destroying or deactivating themselves after a given time. All landmines currently in U.S. stocks, with the exception of those intended for the defense of Korea, are self-destructing and/or self-deactivating. Other nations and nonstate actors, unfortunately, have resorted to less technologically advanced landmines, which are inexpensive, easily obtainable, and highly effective. Most of these simple, nonself-destructing mines are deployed with no thought to keeping track of their locations. As a result, millions of these devices are still strewn across old battlefields. APL have killed or maimed thousands of innocent civilians in the last 25 years and impeded the restoration of normal activities after conflicts have ended. Humanitarian groups, international organizations, and many governments around the world have increasingly identified these residual hazards as a threat to innocents and demanded that all APL be eliminated. Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (otherwise known as the Convention on Conventional Weapons, or CCW) was the first international treaty to attempt to regulate the use of landmines. A review of the CCW in 1996 led to Amended Protocol II, which, among other things, distinguished between the use of APL and AT mines and restricted the uses of all APL. The United States has signed and ratified the CCW, including Amended Protocol II. Subsequent national and international campaigns demanding a total ban on APL led to the Convention on the 1 The Convention on Conventional Weapons, Amended Protocol II, defines an APL as “a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons” (see Appendix E).

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Page 2 Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention), which was signed by 122 countries in Ottawa, Canada, on December 3, 1997, and entered into force in March 1999. As of September 2000, 139 nations had signed the Ottawa Convention, including all NATO member states, except the United States and Turkey, and all European Union member states, except Finland. The Ottawa Convention bans the use of all APL,2 whether used alone or in mixed systems, including those that are self-destructing and self-deactivating.3 Signatories are prohibited from developing, producing, acquiring, or stockpiling APL, as well as assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone else to undertake these actions. All APL currently held by signatories must be destroyed within four years of the signing. Despite showing early support for a ban on APL and taking the lead in efforts to ameliorate residual effects, the United States did not sign the Ottawa Convention. President Clinton stated that the United States would consider acceding to the convention when alternative technologies that provide capabilities similar to those of APL have been identified and fielded. He also announced that the United States would undertake an active research and development program to find such alternatives. At the same time he established the presidential policy that after 2003, the United States would no longer use pure APL4 outside Korea, where landmines are considered particularly important. If alternatives for Korea and for mixed systems can be found by 2006, the president said, the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention. In the meantime, the United States has destroyed three million nonself-destructing mines. U.S. SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES In 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) began the task of developing alternatives to APL. DOD initially adopted a two-track approach. Track I, led by the U.S. Army, was a search for alternatives to the nonself-destructing landmines used in Korea. Track II, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program, was focused on an assessment of long-term, more technologically advanced alternatives that would effectively prevent access to an area. In 1999, Congress provided funds to add a third track. The goal of Track III, which overlaps both Track I and Track II, is to find existing and new technologies and operational concepts that can provide an equivalent to the capabilities of (1) nonself-destructing APL; (2) APL used in mixed AT mine systems; and (3) current mixed landmine systems, including AT mines with antihandling devices. The National Academies As part of the Track III initiative, DOD contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study of existing and new technologies that might provide an alternative to APL. In response, the Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines was established. The committee was asked to (1) identify and examine possible tactics, technologies, and operational concepts that could provide tactical advantages similar to those provided by APL by 2006; (2) suggest a near-term alternative technology, weapon system, or combination of systems that could be derived from known, available systems or that could provide a short-term solution if the recommended alternative will not be available by 2006; and (3) describe how the identified technologies and systems could be used consistently with current tactical doctrine and operational concepts or recommend changes in tactics or operational concepts. This report is the result of that study. Political Context for the Study The committee was asked to consider alternatives that would provide tactical advantages to U.S. forces similar to those provided by APL. The committee also recognized that it had an opportunity to recommend alternatives, especially improved sensors and communications that would be more militarily effective than current APL. However, considering the presidential policy and official statements regarding APL, the committee recognized that one reason for the search for alternatives was to enable the United States to accede to the Ottawa Convention. The committee made no judgment as to whether the United States should accede to the Ottawa Convention. Conclusion 1. The major reasons for seeking alternatives to current antipersonnel landmines (APL) are humanitarian concerns, compliance with the Ottawa Convention, and enhanced military effectiveness. Indeed, this study would not have been empanelled were it not for the Ottawa Convention. The current inventory of self-destructing and self-deactivating U.S. APL is militarily advantageous and safe. They achieve desired military objectives without endangering U.S. warfighters or noncombatants more than other weapons of war, but they are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention. However, humanitarian concerns and Ottawa compliance are not always synonymous. In fact, some of the apparently Ottawa-compliant alternatives examined by the committee may be less humane than present U.S. self-destructing and self-deactivating landmines. 2 The convention does not prohibit command-detonated munitions, such as the Claymore, although they are customarily described as APL. 3 The negotiators did not allow for the inclusion of self-destructing and self-deactivating APL for several reasons. These mines still fit the definition of APL, and no exception were to be made. If an exception had been made for these mines, primarily in the inventory of only the United States and a few western European countries, exceptions might have had to be made for weapon systems of other countries. 4 “Pure” APL are APL used alone and not as part of a mixed system.

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Page 3 Recommendation 1a. If the decision is made to accede to the Ottawa Convention, a transition period may be necessary before implementation to maintain current U.S. military capabilities until suitable alternatives can be made available. During that transition, existing self-destructing and self-deactivating antipersonnel landmines should be retained, both in their stand-alone form and as part of mixed systems. Recommendation 1b. Of the solutions not compliant with the Ottawa Convention, simply retaining the current self-destructing and self-deactivating mines would be the best course of action. COMMITTEE ASSESSMENTS After reviewing the functions performed by landmines, as well as the context within which these functions might be needed now and in the future, the committee sought alternative ways of performing the same tasks. The committee reviewed a broad variety of nonmateriel alternatives, including innovative operational concepts and military tactics, and materiel alternatives, such as weapon systems, nonlethal devices, and improved sensors and communications. The alternatives considered included existing systems, concepts under consideration or development, and new concepts. Although a number of these ideas are not fully developed, they might be a basis for new approaches for the future. A prominent feature of many alternatives is the “man-inthe-loop,” which ensures a positive identification of an intruder before a response element is activated. The man-inthe-loop concept envisions a soldier/operator positioned in such a way that he can observe the minefield and determine whether or not the intruder is a friend, an enemy, or a non-combatant. New technologies, especially improved sensors and communications, would enable the soldier/operator to make a faster, more accurate identification, which would be beneficial for humanitarian purposes and would reduce fratricide. However, a man-in-the-loop also introduces a variety of new vulnerabilities. Conclusion 2. The rapid emergence of new technologies after 2006 will create opportunities for the development of systems that can outperform today's antipersonnel landmines and that would be compliant with Ottawa. Recommendation 2a. The development of sensor-net technology should be pursued aggressively and eventually incorporated into a fully militarized, deployed system characterized by networking, strong detection and tracking capabilities, robustness, low power consumption, low cost, covertness, low probability of intercept, easy deployment, and disposability. Recommendation 2b. Investments already being made in new technologies for other purposes should be leveraged and applied to the search for alternatives to antipersonnel landmines. Evaluation Methodology Unfortunately, the committee did not have enough time or resources to use independent modeling or simulations in evaluating the alternatives. Therefore, the committee developed a score sheet to assess systematically the effectiveness of alternatives. The resulting analysis is admittedly subjective, and the results are qualitative rather than quantitative. Guided by the Statement of Task, the committee first screened alternatives in terms of their availability by or before 2006. Because 2006 is near, especially in terms of the steps required for fielding an alternative system, and because remarkable improvements in technology are forecast for the near future, alternatives that might become available after 2006 were also considered. Each of the alternatives was considered against a baseline, depending on whether it was intended to be used against dismounted or mounted targets. The M14 and M16, current APL that are nonself-destructing and require hand emplacement, were used as the baseline for alternatives against dismounted targets. The Volcano (M87), a mixed system that includes self-destructing APL to protect AT mines, was used as the baseline for alternatives against mounted targets. The committee used several criteria to judge the alternatives against these baseline systems: military effectiveness; humanitarian concerns; technical risk; tactics and operational concepts; and cost. To determine whether an alternative would meet DOD's military requirements, the committee used the two mission need statements developed by DOD for APL alternatives as a basis for assessing military effectiveness. The humanitarian intent of international agreements such as the Ottawa Convention and the CCW Amended Protocol II, although not specified in the Statement of Task, was an implicit basis for this study and was also considered a criterion. The committee also considered the overall technical risk of an alternative, that is, whether the technology could feasibly be developed and manufactured. The committee also indicated whether an alternative would require a change in tactics and operational concepts. The last criterion was cost. Although the sponsor indicated that cost should not be a driving factor in the selection of an alternative, the committee decided a rudimentary consideration of cost was necessary. Table ES-1 lists all of the current systems and alternatives considered by the committee. Descriptions can be found in the body of the report. The alternatives that are mentioned in the committee's conclusions and recommendations are described briefly below. NONMATERIEL ALTERNATIVES The committee first considered whether nonmateriel alternatives, such as changes in tactics and operational concepts, could fully compensate for the elimination of APL.

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Page 4 TABLE ES-1 Current and Potential Systems Considered in This Report ~ enlarge ~

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Page 5 Note: Chart on previous page. Conclusion 3. By 2006, alternative tactics or operational concepts could not, on their own, provide tactical advantages similar to those provided by antipersonnel landmines, without a significant increase in force structure. In certain situations, however, some nonmateriel alternatives might be useful: increased reconnaissance forward; more soldiers or weapon systems in a given battlefield area; more commanddetonated Claymores to protect against a dismounted enemy; antitank mines remotely delivered “just in time” to support a maneuver and inhibit the enemy's ability to breach; and speed, mobility, and offensive tactical operations. MATERIEL ALTERNATIVES Alternatives Available Today Of the five APL currently in the U.S. arsenal, only the Claymore, which is activated by a man-in-the-loop, can be used under the terms of the Ottawa Convention. All three existing AT mines are usable under the Ottawa Convention, but APL munitions could not be used to protect them. In addition to landmines, several other systems have been proven effective against tanks and large ground vehicles. All of these are air-delivered, precision weapons, however, and probably could not be rapidly delivered on target. Each of these alternatives fell well short of meeting the military effectiveness criteria compared to the Volcano baseline. Although not included in the scoring criteria, the committee was also concerned about the unintended consequences of unexploded ordnance that might result from these weapons. These residual effects could be worse than those of self-destructing and self-deactivating APL. Alternatives Available by 2006 Between now and 2006, many innovations will be made in weapons technology and sensors and communications. Alternatives that use these technologies will feature new characteristics, such as separation of sensors and kill

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Page 6 mechanisms and improved communications between sensors and soldiers. However, unless DOD gives these new technologies a very high priority, six years will not be long enough for the weaponization of any innovative technology. Alternatives for Use Against Dismounted Targets The committee evaluated six alternative deterrents to dismounted threats, four of which are described below: the Nonself-Destructing Alternative (NSD-A) Program; the Hand-Emplaced Sensor Field (HESF); the Bounding Nonlethal Munition (BNLM); and the Taser nonlethal munition. The DOD Track I concept, NSD-A, whose man-in-the-loop design makes the system Ottawa compliant, has a high potential of providing tactical advantages for U.S. forces similar to those provided by current M14 and M16 APL. To be available for implementation by 2006, this system would require concerted, aggressive development and a streamlined acquisition process. Enhancements to the NSD-A system, such as additional sensors and nonlethal elements, could be added over time. The DOD must also decide whether or not to include a capability in the software design of the NSD-A5 to permit the soldier/operator to put the system in an autonomous mode. This capability has been referred to as the “battlefield override switch.” With this feature engaged, the man-in-the-loop would no longer be necessary to activate the munition, which would become a conventional, target-activated, self-destructing APL. The committee recognized that the NSD-A with the switch would provide greater military flexibility in responding to an intruder. However, the committee concluded that the NSD-A without a battlefield override switch would have significant tactical advantages over the existing M14/M16 APL and would reduce the potential for fratricide and noncombatant casualties. Conclusion 4. For use against dismounted forces, the Track I alternative to nonself-destructing landmines (NSD-A) could provide, by 2006, similar or enhanced tactical advantages for U.S. forces as compared to those provided by current nonself-destructing antipersonnel landmines. The battlefield override switch, a software capability that allows the system to operate autonomously, is highly contentious because, as presently designed, it would render the NSD-A non-Ottawa compliant. Even though the timing of a decision on the switch or other programmatic delays could jeopardize the timeline, the NSD-A system appears to be technically mature enough to be available by 2006. This weapon system could be greatly enhanced in the future by planning for the inclusion of additional sensors, nonlethal elements, and an Ottawa-compliant battlefield override capability. Recommendation 4a. The development and production of the Track I alternative to nonself-destructing landmines (NSD-A) system should be aggressively pursued to ensure its availability by 2006. Recommendation 4b. Two suites of weapon software should be developed simultaneously in preparation for a presidential decision concerning the Ottawa Convention. If compliance with the Ottawa Convention were desired, the battlefield override switch, as currently designed, would not be used in the production of the NSD-A. If the president decides that other considerations outweigh Ottawa compliance, the option of retaining the switch would be available. In any case, Ottawa-compliant variations to the battlefield override switch should be explored to provide the United States with greater flexibility. The HESF could exploit the effectiveness of current weapons by providing early warning and enabling man-in-the-loop control. The sensor field would be a combination of sensor technologies, including existing military systems, off-the-shelf technologies, and sensors being actively developed by the military science and technology community. The operator and his chain of command would respond to confirmed enemy targets with an appropriate kill mechanism. Recommendation 4c. Sensor technology should be leveraged immediately to develop sensor systems to improve a soldier's ability to discriminate among friends, foes, and noncombatants in all terrain and all weather conditions at much greater battlefield ranges. Two promising nonlethal alternatives, the BNLM and the Taser nonlethal munition, were also considered as deterrents to dismounted threats. Both weapons could be developed eventually as remotely delivered devices to provide protection against dismounted breaches of AT minefields. Nonlethal alternatives are described and assessed later in this summary. Alternatives for Use Against Mounted Targets The committee compared nine alternatives to the Volcano M87 baseline, four of which are discussed below: the Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) enhanced with telemetry (RD-Telemetry); the Hornet/Wide Area Munition (WAM) Product Improvement Program (PIP), the WAM PIP; the Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM); and the Canister-Launched Area-Denial System (CLADS). The committee was also provided with descriptions of systems under consideration by DOD as part of the Track III search for alternatives. None of these systems had been developed enough to be assessed, although several did appear to be promising. Because of the need to protect proprietary information, none of them is described here. 5 A separate study is under way by an office within DOD to assist with this decision.

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Page 7 One concept developed by the committee was the RD-Telemetry (RAAMS enhanced with telemetry). This concept would involve upgrading the existing RAAMS projectile, which contains AT mines, with a subminiature telemetry and communications package that could calculate the precise locations of dispensed mines and send the information back to friendly forces. Although significant research and development would be necessary, the technology might be useful not only for RD-Telemetry, but also for other submunitions. The system the committee considered the best alternative against a mounted enemy that might be available by 2006 was the Hornet/WAM PIP. This two-phased, evolutionary improvement program for the existing Hornet/WAM would add a man-in-the-loop to control the minefield, better sensors to improve target detection, and an improved dualpurpose warhead. The WAM PIP's much greater kill-radius would provide military advantages over the baseline Volcano M87. The disadvantages of this mine are its large size and that it cannot be remotely delivered. Conclusion 5. Under current policy, no fully equivalent alternative to mixed systems is likely to be available by 2006. Other than the Track III search for an alternative, little is being done that could lead to the fielding of a satisfactory alternative. The Hornet/Wide Area Munition (WAM), with its large lethal radius and antihandling device, could replace most of the tactical functions currently provided by mixed systems but has no remote delivery capability. If a satisfactory remote delivery capability could be developed by 2006, the Hornet/WAM appears capable of performing the mixed-minefield mission satisfactorily. Recommendation 5a. Promising Track III concepts should be developed into weapon system programs. The development of any of these concepts by the 2006 deadline, however, would require that considerable additional resources be allocated for development and procurement. Recommendation 5b. The feasibility, cost, and schedule of providing a remote delivery option for the Hornet/Wide Area Munition should be investigated. Shock hardening of the mine to withstand the impact of remote delivery appears to be an Ottawa-compliant, low-risk solution to current mixed minefields. One mixed system considered by the committee was RADAM (Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition), a concept under development by the DOD Track I. The RADAM would combine existing Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) AT mines and the Area-Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) APL, which are now fired separately, into one projectile. This would necessarily reduce the number of AT mines per projectile, so more projectiles might be required to cover a given area. Although APL in mixed systems are acceptable under current presidential policy, they would not comply with the Ottawa Convention. Until another alternative is developed, using ADAM and RAAMS together, rather than developing RADAM, would be a better way to maintain the mixed capability of artillery-delivered scatterable mines. Conclusion 6. The Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM), a mixed system, provides little or no military advantage over the combined use of the Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) and the Area-Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM). Because RADAM would be no more compliant with the Ottawa Convention than the ADAM/RAAMS combination, funding for its development could be better spent on accelerating the development of an Ottawa-compliant alternative. If DOD determines that an artillery-delivered mixed system must be maintained, there are two options: (1) request a change in presidential policy to allow the continued use of ADAM to be fired in tandem with RAAMS; or (2) develop RADAM. The latter option would require taking the Ottawa-compliant RAAMS out of the inventory to create a new non-compliant munition. Recommendation 6. Until a long-term solution can be developed, the Area-Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) should be retained in the inventory for use with the Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS). Production of the Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM) should be halted and funding redirected toward the development of long-term alternatives for mixed systems. The nonlethal CLADS, a joint Army-Marine Corps nonlethal program currently on hold, was evaluated both as a weapon launched separately from AT mines and as part of a mixed system in the same canister as Volcano AT mines. CLADS emits an audible warning signal and projects rubber balls when activated by a trip wire. In general, CLADS is a promising, nonlethal APL alternative that may provide some protection for AT minefields from dismounted breaches. Conclusion 7. Although nonlethal variants by themselves cannot replace antipersonnel landmines, they would be useful in certain military operations. U.S. forces will face a broad range of potential scenarios in the future, from peace operations to intense full combat. With nonlethal variants, U.S. forces could mount a graduated response in situations where the threat is unclear, such as peace operations, or if large noncombatant populations were in the immediate tactical area. Nonlethal weapons have several advantages: they can be used in a broad variety of circumstances; they can be triggered automatically; and they do not require man-in-the-loop operation to be Ottawa compliant, which could improve the timeliness of a response and lessen the burden on the soldier/operator.

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Page 8 Recommendation 7. The development of nonlethal variants to support antipersonnel landmine alternatives should be emphasized. Funding should be restored and development accelerated for the nonlethal Canister-Launched Area-Denial System (CLADS). The CLADS munition should then be integrated into Volcano (M87A1) canisters to provide a mix of antitank and nonlethal antipersonnel munitions. Alternatives Potentially Available After 2006 Only well after 2006 will accelerated advancements in technology lead to truly innovative alternatives to APL. As sensor technologies mature into reliable systems of systems, multidimensional sensor networks will become available, which will dramatically improve situational awareness on the battlefield. Conclusion 8. After 2006, improvements in the tactical effectiveness of existing or proposed remotely delivered antitank (AT) landmines ought to be technologically feasible, which could eliminate the need for mixed systems. Future systems that separate the sensor from the shooter could be improved by multiple means of remote deployment and resistance to countermeasures through signature reduction and other techniques. Track III programs, like the Track I initiative, will require concentrated effort and stable funding. In the long term, the emergence of new technologies, such as the ability to distinguish accurately between combatants and noncombatants, will provide opportunities for the development of systems that can outperform today's antipersonnel landmines. Alternatives for Use Against Dismounted Targets The committee considered five systems that should be available after 2006 for use against dismounted targets. When measured against the M14/M16 baseline, they all appeared to meet both the military and humanitarian requirements. All of these systems involved a combination of sensors, communication to a man-in-the-loop, and kill mechanisms. Given their preliminary state of development, the committee did not make any specific recommendations regarding these systems. Alternatives for Use Against Mounted Targets The committee considered eight systems that might be available after 2006 for use against mounted enemies. The concepts included enhancing current AT mines by adding nonlethal devices, such as Tasers, to protect them from being breached, or a telemetry and sensor package that could provide near real-time knowledge of the location of scattered minefields or of a breach attempt. The committee also considered the Raptor, a smart, autonomous, AT system already in development that will improve situational awareness and provide targeting information to other weapons, such as the Hornet/WAM. Recommendation 8a. The Army should proceed rapidly with plans for modernizing existing remotely delivered pure antitank landmine systems, such as the Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) and Volcano (M87A1), by incorporating other technologies, including sensors, precision locators, and nonlethal devices. The Self-Healing Minefield concept, a DARPA Track II program, is an intelligent distributed network of mines with decentralized control. The individual mines detect breaching attempts through mine-to-mine communications and automatically react by moving to fill gaps in the minefield. This innovative system is unlikely to be available in less than 10 years. Recommendation 8b. The development of the Self-Healing Minefield concept, which automatically reacts to any breaching attempt by refilling gaps, should be experimentally evaluated to determine its operational effectiveness. The Distributed Web Sensor Complex (DWSC), the focus of a U.S. Army science and technology program, is a sensor network that would exploit future ground-based and air-based combat systems. The concept envisions delivering, by artillery or air, hundreds, or even thousands, of small, expendable sensors over a wide area. Because the DWSC exploits the capabilities of future combat systems and does not require a dedicated kill mechanism, it appears to be one of the most effective future systems, and it scores very high in the military effectiveness category. Other Considerations The committee was briefed by representatives of organizations, inside and outside DOD, on concepts and technologies being developed for other purposes, such as non-mine systems, sensors for other defense purposes, and commercial devices. Any of these technologies could be leveraged to provide elements of future alternatives to APL. Recommendation 8c. Several other technologies or systems already under development for other purposes should be considered as potential components of long-term alternatives to antipersonnel landmines, including unmanned air and ground vehicles, directed-energy weapons, battlefield sensoryillusion devices, passive transponders (e.g., tags), and other lethal and nonlethal systems. Because U.S. APL, other than some of those used in Korea, are self-destructing and self-deactivating, they do not present as great a danger to noncombatants as do other APL.

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Page 9 Nor do they leave battlefield residue that may inhibit post-war reconstruction. For the safety of both U.S. forces and noncombatants, DOD should consider making other non-recoverable explosive munitions self-destructing and self-deactivating. Conclusion 9. The self-destructing and self-deactivating capability of today's U.S. scatterable landmines, used in accordance with international law, is a desirable operational capability because it (1) increases maneuver options and (2) addresses humanitarian concerns by reducing residual explosive hazards. Recommendation 9. Any nonrecoverable, explosive alternative to antipersonnel landmines should have self-destructing and self-deactivating fuzes to meet operational requirements, address humanitarian concerns, and reduce fratricide among friendly troops. The U.S. government should consider equipping all nonrecoverable explosive munitions with similar technologies.