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Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines (2001)

Chapter: 5 Alternatives Available Today

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Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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5

Alternatives Available Today

To the military, mines are an extremely cost-effective method of denying ground; so much so that extensive studies undertaken in the U.S. have so far failed to find any practical substitute that could be used if a ban were implemented. (Jane's, 1997)

OVERVIEW

The committee first considered whether nonmateriel alternatives, such as changes in tactics and/or operational concepts, could fully compensate for the elimination of APL. Because these alternatives did not lend themselves to the type of scoring used for materiel solutions, the committee simply described possible changes. The committee then focused on materiel solutions (i.e., weapons and weapon systems), including the four existing mine systems that could be considered Ottawa compliant and five precision-guided weapons. In general, the most critical limitation of nonmine alternatives that depend on direct or indirect support weapon systems is the lack of certainty of their availability at precisely the time that they would be required. None of the alternatives can replicate all of the dimensions of the instantaneous response of APL.

NONMATERIEL ALTERNATIVES

The committee believes that DOD has looked to the National Academy of Sciences for advice on technical solutions to the landmine issue instead of the many military institutions fully capable of advising DOD on operational concepts and tactics. Therefore, the committee provides only a cursory evaluation of operational concepts and tactics.

The nonmateriel alternatives to landmines have been suggested by various sources, including committee members. First, the committee rejected the obvious option of simply eliminating APL and accepting additional casualties. A variety of operational concepts and tactics that might be effective were considered. Because of the many variables, such as mission, threat, weather, terrain, and other conditions in which APL could be employed, these nonmateriel alternatives were only addressed in a general way.

Operational Concepts

In its simplest form, an APL consists of a sensor (a targetactivated fuze), rudimentary communications (e.g., noise), and an instantaneous kill mechanism. Other sensors and kill mechanisms in the U.S. inventory might be used to achieve similar results. The committee considered the following operational concepts as possible alternatives: on the ground; are frequently unavailable to small units).

  • Use mechanical ground systems, such as trip flares and improvised noisemakers. (Disadvantage: not linked to instantaneous lethal mechanisms)

  • Use electronic ground systems, such as the remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS), ground-based portable radars. (Disadvantages: not generally available at the small combat unit level; heavier than current APL; no delay; no enemy casualties without linked kill mechanisms)

  • Provide additional human systems, such as armed soldiers and more effective equipment, including binoculars, night-vision devices, or other capabilities; more deep-reconnaissance/surveillance units in conventional or special operations force organizations. (Disadvantage: increased soldier vulnerability because reaction time can be dramatically slowed by incoming enemy fire, fatigue, weather, darkness, and other conditions)

  • Employ animal systems, such as dogs or geese. (Disadvantages: noisy; high logistical cost for animal support)

  • Call upon airborne systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS), and satellites. (Disadvantages: increased time between detection of an enemy and receipt of information by the unit

Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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on the ground; are frequently unavaliable to small units).

Tactics

The commander on the ground is responsible for accomplishing the unit mission by ensuring that subordinate units or troops use all weapons in a way that exploits the unique conditions of enemy, terrain, weather, and light. A commander might tactically employ soldiers, sensors, weapons, and units in the following ways to provide similar advantages as APL:

  • Use more forward reconnaissance (e.g., additional soldiers, ground sensors, and aerial sensors) to determine the enemy's location earlier in the decision cycle so continuous and sequential destruction can be inflicted as the enemy comes into the range of each available indirect-fire system, direct-fire system, and mine-like device. (Disadvantages: requires additional military manpower; greater likelihood of high U.S. casualties)

  • Use more soldiers, weapons, or units in a given battlefield area to increase firepower advantage on a given piece of terrain and increase the likelihood of slowing or defeating the enemy. (Disadvantages: requires additional military manpower; greater likelihood of high U.S. casualties)

  • Provide small, lightweight containers of contingency sensors and / or weapons that can be moved quickly by ground or air to the position of a small unit. The items in the containers would be tailored for local conditions and could include any combination of night-vision devices, ground sensors, Claymores, grenade launchers, machine guns, hand-held mortars, ammunition, and nonlethal munitions. (Disadvantages: uncertainty that container would be available when needed; additional training required to teach soldiers to use a range of sensors and weapons not normally available to them)

  • Employ AT mines “just-in-time” to support maneuver. Conduct a thorough terrain/enemy analysis, make detailed fire plans, and establish priority of fires so that AT mines could be delivered just in time (within minutes rather than hours) to support maneuver. For example, a dangerous enemy avenue into an advancing friendly force's flank could be closed with AT mines delivered remotely just prior to friendly force arrival. This would minimize the enemy's ability to find the scattered minefield, and the passing friendly forces would be able to cover the minefield with realtime observation, direct fire, and indirect fire. (Disadvantage: uncertainty that a dedicated delivery means, such as artillery, would be immediately available)

  • Employ remotely delivered AT mines in greater numbers, over greater areas, with more rapid reseeding rates. The larger the minefield the more difficult it may be for the enemy to bypass it (going around a minefield is usually the simplest countermeasure but often leads to a kill zone); a larger minefield is likely to require more time to breach with mine plows or more specialized armored breaching vehicles. As noted in Appendix D, APL are used to slow dismounted breaches of AT minefields. By reseeding existing AT minefields with additional remotely delivered AT mines, both mounted and dismounted breach attempts could be slowed as lanes thought to be passable would have to be recleared. Ideally, reseeding would be accomplished under real-time direction from a ground observer, a manned aircraft, or an unmanned aerial vehicle sensor. Otherwise, high-priority, remotely delivered minefields could be periodically reseeded as the tactical situation required. (Disadvantages: requires additional delivery means, mines, and military personnel)

The effectiveness of any of the tactical approaches listed above would greatly depend on the mission, the situation, and the force structure. Furthermore, history has shown that when one side changes tactics, the other side makes counterchanges. On the battlefield, tactics evolve, sometimes radically. Even though APL are rarely decisive on the battlefield, they do provide a commander with one more capability to shape the battle space, tailor his tactics, and enhance the effects of other more decisive systems. Therefore, the tactical approaches listed above might have a delaying effect but, either singly or in combination, they could not replicate the instantaneous lethality of APL on a precise point on the battlefield.

MATERIEL ALTERNATIVES

Materiel alternatives to APL are likely to consist of a combination of sensor, communication links, and lethal or nonlethal munitions. The committee carefully evaluated technologies in each of these categories in terms of the fundamental problem of current mines—they cannot distinguish between friend and foe. Although significant efforts have been devoted to existing and future communications and munition technologies, ground-based sensors cannot discriminate rapidly and accurately between types of soldiers and/or noncombatants. In the committee's opinion, the development of long-lasting, accurate, all-weather capable, low-power ground sensors may be key to the creation of the most flexible and militarily effective alternatives to APL.

APL have two missions—to kill dismounted targets and to protect AT mines from being breached; the latter is typically accomplished by mixed systems. An alternative to APL in these mixed systems could either (1) remove the APL and use only AT mines equipped with antihandling devices or (2) use other weapons designed for non-mine missions that

Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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can destroy tanks and other heavy vehicles without the risk of breaching. For this reason, some of the alternatives considered are AT mines or weapons.

Table 5-1 shows existing systems that would be compliant with the Ottawa Convention. The table also describes their principal characteristics. Following the table are full descriptions of each alternative. The descriptions are followed by brief assessments and tables measuring alternatives are measured against the criteria described in Chapter 4.

For Use Against Dismounted Threats

Claymore (M18)

Source: Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32 (U.S. Army, 1998b)

The M18 series, or Claymore mine, is a nonself-destructing directional fragmentation mine detonated by 682 grams of composition C4. The Claymore projects 700 steel balls in a fan-shaped pattern in a 60 degree arc to a maximum height of 2 meters. The M18 can be activated in the commanddetonation mode by an electric blasting cap inserted into the detonator well. The mine body is nonmetallic, and the steel balls are cast in the same composition as the front part of the mine. The lethal radius extends to 100 meters forward and 16 meters to the rear. The Claymore mine is issued with an electric initiation system (hand generator, wire, and electric blasting cap) and is now doctrinally detonated by command, although so-called “mechanical ambushes,” using trip-wires, were common during the Vietnam War. Amended Protocol II to the CCW imposes some restrictions on the use of trip wires to detonate the Claymore; the Ottawa Convention prohibits the use of trip wires with all mines. The command-detonated Claymore does not use a trip wire and is, therefore, permitted by both the CCW and the Ottawa Convention.

TABLE 5-1 Alternatives Available Today
         

Dismounted Enemy

 

Mounted Enemy

 

System Name

APL/AT/ Mixed Non-Mine

Self-destructing/Self-deactivating

Lethal/Nonlethal

Ottawa Complianta

Remotely Delivered

Hand Emplaced

Remotely Delivered

Hand Emplaced

Claymore (M18)

APL

N

L

Y

 

X

   

Volcano (M87A1)

AT

Y

L

Y

   

X

 

Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS)

AT

Y

L

Y

   

X

 

Hornet/Wide Area Munition (WAM)

AT

Y

L

Y

     

X

Maverick (AGM-65)

n/m

N

L

Y

   

X

 

Longbow Hellfire (AGM-114)

n/m

N

L

Y

   

X

 

Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW)

n/m

N

L

Y

   

X

 

Sense and Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM)

n/m

N

L

Y

   

X

 

Brilliant Antiarmor (BAT) Submunition

n/m

N

L

Y

   

X

 

aThe committee used the definition found in the Ottawa Convention to determine whether a system would be Ottawa compliant.

For Use Against Mounted Threats

Volcano (M87A1)

Source: Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32 (U.S. Army, 1998b)

The Volcano system (M87) replaced the older M56 helicopter-delivered AT mine system and the GEMSS/ Flipper system. The M87 is a mixed system, and the M87A1 is a pure AT system. Volcano dispensers can be mounted on several tracked or wheeled vehicles or on the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. The system is made up of the launcher rack and dispenser-control unit, vehicle-specific mounting hardware, and mine canisters, each of which holds six mines. A completely loaded dispenser holds 160 canisters, or 960 mines. The mines are placed in a uniform density of approximately one mine per linear meter over a linear distance of one kilometer. Self-destruct times of 4 hours, 48 hours, or 15 days are set at launch time. The Volcano system can be used to emplace protective and tactical minefields anywhere on the battlefield reachable by the dispensing vehicles.

Remote Antiarmor MineSystem (RAAMS)

Source: Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32 (U.S. Army, 1998b)

The Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) consists of a 155-millimeter (mm) howitzer projectile containing nine AT mines. RAAMS is usually used with the ADAM

Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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(Area-Denial Artillery Munition), but can also be used alone. Each mine in the projectile is a right-circular cylinder, 11.25 centimeters (cm) in diameter and 7.5-cm high, weighing 1.8 kilograms and containing about 0.78 kilograms of pressed explosive in the main charge. RAAMS have factory-set self-destruct times of either 4 or 48 hours. About 20 percent have an antihandling feature that causes them to explode when tilted at an angle of 17 degrees or more. They are designed to destroy mounted targets by perforating the underside of the vehicle. The mines have magnetic-influence fuzes designed to stop mounted vehicles when they are detonated, as intended, between the tracks; if they are detonated directly under a track, they may not stop the vehicle.

Hornet/Wide Area Munition (WAM)

Source: Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32 (U.S. Army, 1998b)

The Hornet/WAM is an autonomous hand-emplaced AT mine. It weighs about 16 kilograms, is about 36 centimeters high and about 23 centimeters in diameter. After it is emplaced and armed, seismic sensors can detect movement and alert the mine to turn on its acoustic sensors that detect and classify a target. If an armored target approaches within 100 meters, a small submunition with an infrared sensor is launched over the target and fires an explosively formed projectile down into the engine compartment. The Hornet/WAM is designed to operate for 30 days after arming and then to self-destruct. It has an antihandling feature that causes the mine to detonate when disturbed. The submunition is similar to those in the Air Force Sensor Fused Weapon. Originally, the Hornet/WAM was to be dispensed from a Volcano launcher and/or from a deep-attack asset, such as a multiple launch rocket system or a tactical missile system. Subsequent evolutions of requirements and the exigencies of the development program have precluded these options. For the foreseeable future, the Hornet/WAM will be hand emplaced, which sharply limits its utility.

Maverick Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM-65)

Source: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

Called to the attention of the committee by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, the Maverick (AGM-65) is a tactical guided missile designed for close air support, interdiction, and defense suppression (Deagle, 2000). Maverick provides stand-off capability and has a high probability of striking a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air defenses, ships, transportation equipment, and fuel storage facilities. Because Maverick has a modular design, different combinations of guidance packages and warheads can be attached to the rocket motor section to produce different weapons.

Maverick has three different seekers and two different warheads. The solid-rocket motor propulsion section is common to all variants. The seeker options are electrooptical imaging, infrared imaging, or a laser guidance package. The warhead, either a 56.7 kilogram shaped charge or a 136.08-kilogram penetrator, is in the missile's center section. A contact fuze in the nose fires the shaped-charge warhead. The penetrator uses a delayed fuze, allowing the warhead to penetrate the target by kinetic energy before firing, which is very effective against large, hard targets.

Maverick has a cylindrical body with long-chord delta wings and tail control surfaces mounted close to the trailing edge of the wing of the aircraft using it. Mavericks can be launched from high altitudes to tree top level. The A-10, F-15E, and F-16 aircraft can carry as many as six Mavericks allowing the pilot to engage several targets on one mission. The missile also has “launch-and-leave” capability that enables a pilot to fire it and immediately take evasive action or attack another target as the missile guides itself to the target. Tactical employment of Maverick is fully covered in doctrinal manuals. This weapon is in production and requires no further research and development.

Advantages

  • Complies with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • Can destroy targets from a stand-off platform, which has a psychological impact on an enemy force.

  • Is effective against all land-combat vehicles, including heavy armor.

Disadvantages

  • Requires a target acquisition capability to locate engagement areas.

  • Requires an expensive, complicated launch platform (fixed-wing tactical aircraft).

  • Resupply requires extensive lift and transportation capability.

  • Uncertainty about the launch platform's ability to support additional tactical missions.

  • Because of the delivery system, it is difficult to use close to friendly troops.

  • Provides no protection from dismounted troops.

  • Although compliant with Ottawa, Maverick may cause serious collateral damage.

Longbow Hellfire Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM-114)

Source: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

Called to the attention of the committee by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, the Longbow Hellfire air-to-ground missile (AGM-114) can engage both moving and stationary vehicles and provide an adverse-weather,

Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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fire-and-forget, heavy-antiarmor capability for attack helicopters (Deagle, 2000). The Longbow program also includes a fire-control radar system and numerous modifications to the helicopter. The fire-control radar system can locate, classify, and prioritize targets for the Longbow Hellfire missile.

The first three generations of Hellfire missiles use a laser seeker. The fourth generation, Longbow Hellfire, is a fire-and-forget version that uses an active radio-frequency seeker operating in the millimeter-wave frequency band and has a dual tandem warhead designed to defeat reactive armor. Either the Apache Attack Helicopter's (AH-64D) fire-control radar or a laser designator may identify targets. Integration of the Longbow into the entire fleet of Apache attack helicopters and into one-third of the Comanche reconnaissance helicopter fleet is planned. Tactical employment is fully covered by doctrinal manuals. Research and development of this program is supported and funded as an Army missile program.

Advantages

  • Complies with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • Can lock on and destroy targets on the battlefield, which has a psychological impact on an enemy force.

  • Can operate in adverse weather (rain, snow, fog, smoke, and battlefield obscurants).

  • Has good survivability.

  • Has fire-and-forget guidance.

  • Can be reprogrammed and adapted to changing threats and mission requirements.

  • Has millimeter-wave countermeasures, which allows the munition to be launched and then remasked, minimizing its exposure to enemy fire.

  • Is capable of defeating reactive armor configurations.

Disadvantages

  • Requires a target acquisition capability to locate engagement areas.

  • Requires an expensive, complicated launch platform (AH-64).

  • Resupply requires extensive lift and transportation capability.

  • Additional tactical missions for the system may require procurement of additional missiles.

  • Uncertainty about the launch platform's ability to support additional tactical missions.

  • Provides no protection from dismounted attack.

Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW)

Source: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Textron Systems

Called to the attention of the committee by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, with system information from Textron Systems, the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) is an unpowered, top-attack, wide-area cluster munition designed to achieve multiple kills per aircraft pass against enemy moving and stationary land-combat vehicles (Deagle, 2000; Gard, 1999; telephone conversation between J. Johnson, program manager, Textron Defense Systems and R. Johnson, committee member, April 3, 2000). SFW was specifically designed to defeat multiple targets with a single weapon. The SFW's tactical munition dispenser weighs 454 kilograms and houses 10 submunitions, each of which has four target-sensing, armor-penetrating warheads (a total of 40 lethal warheads per weapon).

After deployment, the tactical munition dispenser opens and dispenses the 10 submunitions that are stabilized with parachutes. At a preset altitude sensed by a radar altimeter, a rocket motor fires to spin the submunition and initiate an ascent. It then releases its four warheads, which are lofted over the target area. The warhead's sensor detects a vehicle's infrared signature and an explosively formed penetrator fires at the heat source. If no target is detected after a period of time, the warheads automatically detonate to limit hazardous residue. The baseline weapon has a time-out, self-destruct feature that limits the dud rate to one in 40. The planned improvement of the SFW provides a redundant self-destruct feature that will essentially eliminate battlefield duds. One weapon can effectively neutralize moving and stationary land-combat vehicles within a 15-acre (60,000 square meters or 6 hectares) area.

The SFW can be deployed from operational U.S. or NATO tactical aircraft, such as the F-16, which can carry four munitions. The weapon can be delivered in all weather conditions, day or night. With the 2001 addition of the wind-corrected munition dispenser tail kit, the SFW will be much more accurate.

Tactical use of the SFW is fully covered in doctrinal manuals. This program is in full rate production and will not require additional research or development.

Advantages

  • Complies with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

  • Autonomously finds and destroys targets on the battlefield, which has a psychological impact on an enemy force.

  • Certified on all U.S. bombers and fighter aircraft.

  • Provides accurate delivery at all altitudes.

  • Is effective against all land-combat vehicles, including heavy armor.

  • Has multiple kills per weapon and wide area coverage.

Disadvantages

  • Requires a target acquisition capability to locate engagement areas.

  • Once launched, the employment time window is limited to seconds (the flight time of the submunition).

Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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  • Requires an expensive, complicated launch platform (fixed-wing tactical aircraft).

  • Resupply requires extensive lift and transportation capability.

  • Because of the delivery system, it is difficult to use close to friendly troops.

  • May not be the weapon of choice against targets more than 200 meters apart.

  • Not used in conflicts where the rules of engagement require delivery above 4500 meters, when wind-corrected munition dispenser is not available and collateral damage is a concern.

  • Although compliant with Ottawa, the SFW could result in increased collateral damage because of the large kill zone.

  • Not considered a stand-off weapon (although use of wind-corrected munition dispenser from high altitude can provide horizontal stand-off equal to about 1.5 times the altitude).

  • Provides no protection from dismounted attack.

  • Sense and Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM)

    Source: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and the Office of the Project Manager-SADARM

    The Sense and Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM) was brought to the attention of the committee by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, the system information was validated by the Office of the Project Manager, SADARM (Deagle, 2000; Gard, 1999; telephone conversation between B. Demassi, deputy project director, SADARM, and R. Johnson, committee member, April 3, 2000). The U.S. Army's SADARM was developed to provide an autonomous, counterbattery capability to indirect-fire artillery units. SADARM is a fire-and-forget, multisensor, smart munition designed to detect and destroy armored vehicles. It is fired principally from self-propelled artillery. SADARM uses three sensors (active, passive millimeter-wave, and infrared) to detect armored vehicles in any weather and destroy them from above. The SADARM submunitions are first delivered to the target array by artillery projectiles; each projectile contains two submunitions. Following expulsion from the projectile, the submunitions are dispensed and decelerate to orient themselves. When the first parachute is deployed, the submunitions scan and process the data. Concurrently, the millimeter-wave sensor detects altitude. When the second parachute is deployed, the warhead is armed. When the target is detected, the warhead fires and the target is defeated by an explosively formed penetrator fired into the top of the target. SADARM's range is approximately 20 kilometers and it can be fired from standard 155-mm tube artillery. Tactical employment is fully covered in doctrinal manuals. Research and development is supported and funded as an Army artillery program.

    Advantages

    • Complies with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

    • Autonomously finds and destroys targets on the battlefield, which has a psychological impact on an enemy force.

    • Can penetrate all known top armor.

    Disadvantages

    • Requires a target acquisition capability to locate engagement areas.

    • Once launched, the employment time window is limited to seconds (the flight time of the submunition).

    • Resupply requires extensive lift and transportation capability.

    • Additional tactical missions for the system may require procurement of additional projectiles (and submunitions).

    • Because of the delivery system, it is difficult to use close to friendly troops.

    • Although compliant with Ottawa, SADARM may cause serious collateral damage.

    Brilliant Antiarmor (BAT) Submunition

    Source: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Office of the Project Manager, Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition

    The Brilliant Antiarmor (BAT) Submunition was brought to the attention of the committee by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (Deagle, 2000); system information was provided by the Office of the Project Manager, Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (telephone conversation between D. Pinkston, Office of the Project Manager, BAT, and R. Johnson, committee member, April 3, 2000). The BAT submunition uses passive acoustic and infrared sensors to find, attack, and destroy moving tanks and other armored vehicles deep in enemy territory. It is called “brilliant” because it can seek, identify, and destroy armored targets autonomously. An unpowered, aerodynamically stable glider, BAT can operate day or night and in all weather conditions. After separation from the launch missile, BAT's acoustic sensors, working in combination with a high-speed onboard computer, steer it toward the sound of the target vehicles. The infrared sensor then guides the weapon in for the terminal attack phase. BAT destroys enemy targets with a hit-to-kill, conventional, shaped-charge warhead.

    BAT is 91.44 centimeters long, 13.97 centimeters in diameter with wings folded, and weighs 19.96 kilograms. The preplanned product improvement BAT retains the same physical characteristics of BAT and has a new dual-mode imaging infrared / millimeter wave seeker. This upgraded terminal seeker adds capability against stationary targets and

    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    is more robust in adverse weather and against countermeasures. The target set of the improved BAT includes missiles and rocket launchers. Because the operational software is downloaded rather than resident inside BAT, additional targets can be programmed without hardware modifications.

    BAT is designed to be carried by the tactical missile system for “many-on-many” attacks against massed moving armor. It is also designed to be compatible with other delivery vehicles, such as the tactical munition dispenser, which allows it to be dispensed from a jet aircraft and cruise and ballistic missiles, such as the Tomahawk and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

    Tactical employment of BAT will be fully covered in doctrinal manuals. Research and development is supported and funded as an Army artillery program.

    Advantages

    • Complies with CCW Amended Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention.

    • Low collateral damage and stand-off attack capability.

    • Future costs are only for maintenance and storage.

    • Autonomously finds and destroys targets on the battlefield, which will have a psychological impact on an enemy force.

    Disadvantages

    • Requires a target acquisition capability to locate engagement areas.

    • Once launched, the time window is limited to seconds (BAT's flight time).

    • Requires an expensive, complicated, scarce launch vehicle, such as the MLRS combined with the Tactical Missile System (TACMS).

    • Resupply requires extensive lift and transportation capability.

    • Additional tactical missions may require procurement of additional missiles (and submunitions).

    • Launch platform may not be able to support additional tactical missions.

    • Because of the delivery system, it is difficult to use close to friendly troops.

    • Provides no protection from dismounted attack.

    COMMITTEE ASSESSMENTS

    Nonmateriel Solutions

    The committee could not identify alternative tactics or operational concepts that could, on their own, provide tactical advantages to U.S. forces similar to those provided by APL, without a significant increase in force structure. In certain situations, some alternatives might be useful: increased reconnaissance forward; more soldiers or weapons systems in a given battlefield area; more command-detonated Claymores to protect against a dismounted enemy; AT mines remotely delivered “just in time” to support a maneuver and inhibit the enemy's ability to breach; and speed, mobility, and offensive tactical operations.

    Materiel Alternatives Against Dismounted Targets

    Of all the current APL systems, only one is compliant with the Ottawa convention—the command-detonated Claymore munition. The Claymore scored well on both the military and the humanitarian criteria. However, the command-detonation feature limits the Claymore's ability to alert the force or provide early warning. The required set-up time makes it less effective than nonself-destructing APL for breaking contact with the enemy. On the positive side, from the humanitarian perspective, the Claymore may enable a soldier to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants before detonating the mine.

    Materiel Alternatives Against Mounted Targets

    Of the current mine systems designed for use against mounted targets, two are Ottawa complaint (RAAMS and Hornet/WAM), and one is Ottawa compliant when used in the pure AT mode (Volcano M87A1). At issue is whether any of them can perform as well without the APL that normally protect them.

    The Volcano mine is produced in mixed and AT-pure versions. The mixed-system Volcano (M87) is the baseline against which alternatives for use against mounted targets were measured in this study. The AT-pure version (M87A1) is Ottawa compliant, but without APL, it is less effective. Although the AT pure Volcano is effective in destroying tanks and large vehicles, it does not have the militarily desirable characteristics of APL of slowing dismounted enemy breaches. The RAAMS system not accompanied by the ADAM would be less effective for the same reasons. Both the AT-pure Volcano (M87A1) and AT-pure RAAMS scored better than the baseline system (Volcano M87) according to the humanitarian criteria.

    The Hornet/WAM is an AT-pure munition that is effective against its intended targets—heavy vehicles. Hornet/ WAM is a novel weapon because it has a 100-meter lethal radius, which essentially negates an enemy's use of armored plow type breachers. Dismounted enemy forces have to clear a breach lane more than 200 meters wide in a Hornet/WAM minefield to allow armored vehicles to pass safely. The time for a dismounted enemy force to clear a lane this wide is likely to be similar to the time required for a dismounted enemy to breach a standard minefield of classic AT mines protected with APL. The Hornet/WAM is limited by the requirement that it be placed in position by hand and by its weight (15.88 kilograms) and high profile (35.6 centimeters).

    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    TABLE 5-2 Score Sheet For Alternatives Available Today
    Image: jpg
    ~ enlarge ~

    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    The antihandling device provides some protection against tampering by a dismounted enemy. The Hornet/WAM fares quite well on the humanitarian criteria because it is self-destructing and self-deactivating and because it has no APL.

    Five precision-guided weapons (Maverick, Longbow-Hellfire, SFW, SADARM, and BAT) were assessed as alternatives to mixed systems. All of them are capable of destroying armored vehicles and do not need the protection of APL. These air, missile, and artillery delivered weapons are well suited for their intended purpose of destroying massed enemy combat vehicles at significant distances from the close battle area. However, none would perform as well as the Volcano baseline. Their inability to distinguish between friendly and enemy armored vehicles precludes their use close to friendly troops, which limits their ability to enhance friendly-fire effects in close fight situations.

    These weapons are all controlled at the brigade or higher level, which means there is likely to be a significant time delay between the identification of an enemy target and the arrival of the attacking munition. Precision munitions also have fairly limited kill zones. Therefore, to be effective after they are fired, the enemy vehicles must be in a relatively small elliptical kill area. Otherwise, the munitions fall to the ground and self-detonate. To prevent this, these weapons require highly accurate, real-time intelligence for targeting.

    Other shortcomings of these weapons include the fact that they do not have multiple methods of delivery, have limited launch platforms, and do not provide a range of effects to inhibit dismounted maneuver. In addition, precision munitions delivered by air might negatively influence the larger battle space by forcing artillery and other indirect-fire systems to cease fire to ensure a safe air corridor for the delivery aircraft. Also, although not part of the scoring criteria, considerable concern was expressed about the unintended consequences of unexploded ordnance that might result from these weapons, the residual effects of which could be worse than the residual effects of the self-destructing and self-deactivating APL.

    Image: jpg
    ~ enlarge ~
    FIGURE 5-1 Military effectiveness of currently available alternatives based on qualitative scoring by the committee.


    A system that was not scored by the committee but that deserves mention is the Air Force JSTARS (joint surveillance target attack radar system). The E-8C JSTARS is an airborne battle management and command and control platform that conducts ground surveillance to develop an understanding of the enemy situation and to support attack operations that contribute to the delay, disruption, and destruction of enemy forces. The primary mission of JSTARS is to provide dedicated support for high-level ground commander's (corps or division) intelligence requirements. The E-8C, a modified Boeing 707/300 series commercial airframe (the use of which is weather dependent), is a jam-resistant system capable of operating despite heavy electronic countermeasures. This system and its planned upgrades might provide a viable sensor alternative enabling small ground units to employ weapons to destroy enemy vehicles at a distance, thus reducing the need for certain types of landmines.

    Summary

    The criteria and scores are displayed in tabular form in Table 5-2. The details of how these scores were derived can be found in Chapter 4.

    Figure 5-1 is a graphical summary of the scoring. In keeping with the Statement of Task, this graph shows only the relative military effectiveness of candidate systems without regard to cost, risk, or humanitarian factors. Each bar on the graph is a composite. The lower portion (white) shows the degree to which each system meets the military effectiveness requirements in comparison to the baseline

    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    system. If the candidate system meets all of the requirements at least as well as the baseline system, the score is 0. If it is less effective in any requirement, the score is less than 0. The upper portion (dark shading) of the bar shows capabilities that exceed those of the baseline system.

    For example, scores for the Claymore (in Table 5-2), show that 7 of 9 requirements were met or exceeded (i.e., had a score of 0 or higher); the lower (white) portion of the bar has a value of 7 out of 9, or 78 percent of requirements met. In addition, 6 of the 9 requirements were exceeded (i.e., had a score of 1 or more); the upper (black) portion of the bar has a value of 6 out of 9, or 67 percent.

    A second example illustrates some additional factors. The scores for the Hellfire (again in Table 5-2) range from −4 to +2, which indicates significant deficiencies in some areas and significant advantages in others. To account for the impact of these larger excursions, the scores are adjusted by the degree of deficiency or improvement. Because a score of +1 is the lowest score that would be considered an “improvement,” a score of +2 adds one additional point to the “improvements” score but does not affect the requirements score. Similarly, a score of −2 subtracts one point from the “requirements” score, and a score of −3 subtracts 2 points. In the case of Hellfire, 8 of 14 requirements are met (including the N/A as a “met” requirement), but deficiencies of 4 and 2 result in an adjusted requirements score of 4 out of 14, or 29 percent. Similarly, 4 of 14 requirements are exceeded, two by a score of +2, resulting in an adjusted improvements score of 6 out of 14, or 43 percent.

    In general, if the total bar height in Figure 5-1 is high, the system is likely to be militarily effective. If the value of the lower portion of the bar is near 0, the system meets most of the military requirements. If the lower bar is much lower than 0, the system probably has significant differences from the baseline mine and will not perform some desired functions. However, that system may still be militarily effective if it performs some functions much better than the baseline system. Because the scoring criteria were not weighted, these graphs should be used only for assessing trends and making qualitative comparisons.

    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    Suggested Citation:"5 Alternatives Available Today." National Research Council. 2001. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10071.
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    This book examines potential technologies for replacing antipersonnel landmines by 2006, the U.S. target date for signing an international treaty banning these weapons. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines emphasizes the role that technology can play to allow certain weapons to be used more selectively, reducing the danger to uninvolved civilians while improving the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Landmines are an important weapon in the U.S. military’s arsenal but the persistent variety can cause unintended casualties, to both civilians and friendly forces. New technologies could replace some, but not all, of the U.S. military’s antipersonnel landmines by 2006. In the period following 2006, emerging technologies might eliminate the landmine totally, while retaining the necessary functionalities that today’s mines provide to the military.

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