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Page 1 Executive Summary At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council, under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board, established a committee to assess the Department of the Navy's current and future naval theater missile defense (TMD) capabilities. The Committee for Naval Forces' Capability for Theater Missile Defense first convened in April 2000 and met approximately 2 days a month for 8 months. This report is based on the information presented to the committee during that period and on the committee members' accumulated experience and expertise in military operations, systems, and technologies. ES.1 TODAY'S FRAMEWORK IN PERSPECTIVE Through their evolving strategies Forward...From the Sea1 and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS),2 the Navy and Marine Corps have acknowledged a shift in warfare from operations on the open seas to operations in and adjacent to littoral areas. This shift in warfare location presents many technical and operational challenges to naval forces in power projection, the most notable 1 Department of the Navy. 1994. “Forward...From the Sea, Continuing the Preparation of the Naval Services for the 21st Century,” U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September 19. 2 Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 1996. "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 4. Available online at <http://www.188.8.131.52/omfts.htm>
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Page 2 TABLE ES.1 Future Naval Force Capabilities for Handling Cruise and Ballistic Missile Threats Threat Capability Antiship cruise missile (ASCM) Multifunction radar (MFR) Ship self-defense system (SSDS) Evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM) SPY-1D(V) radar Overland cruise missile (OCM) E-2C Radar Modernization Program/AMTI radar with ADS-18 antenna (funding uncertain) Complementary low altitude weapon system (CLAWS) Ballistic missile Navy area defense (NAD) system Navy theater wide (NTW) system of which may be an increase in the land-based threat to the forces engaged in such operations. Both theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) and cruise missile defense (CMD; including antiship cruise missile defense (ASCMD) and overland cruise missile defense (OCMD)) are important emerging military capabilities that are inherently necessary if naval forces are to execute missions in littoral areas. Today, there are large numbers and varieties of cruise and ballistic missiles in the operational inventories of many potential future adversaries of the United States. Although high-performance ballistic missiles exist and could become available to potential future adversaries, most of the ballistic missiles that are currently available to such adversaries are of rather unsophisticated design. Many have limited accuracy of delivery and are ineffective for hitting tactical targets. As currently configured, many are nonseparating, single-stage rockets that are less stressing to defense systems than are multistage missiles. Many others are not able to deploy penetration aids. In a military sense, these threats will have limited tactical value unless they carry nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads. However, even as currently configured, they pose a serious threat to deployed forces and assets, as well as to the political stability of neighboring or allied countries. Future naval force capabilities for handling cruise and ballistic missile threats are shown in Table ES.1. Based on its assessment of these future capabilities and the evolving threat, the committee's conclusions can be summarized as follows: ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD are essential for littoral operations. The threats to naval (and joint) forces operating in littoral areas stress the capabilities
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Page 3 of current ASCMD, OCMD, and projected TBMD systems. All indications are that cruise and ballistic threats will become more stressing. Current ASCMD systems have marginal or poor performance in littoral areas against some existing advanced antiship cruise missile (ASCM) threats. The Navy has many significant improvements under development—e.g., multi-function radar (MFR), ship self-defense system (SSDS), evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM) system, and SPY-1D(V) radar—which should be fielded as soon as possible. Some needed components are not under development (e.g., an ESSM launcher for non-Aegis combatants). Furthermore, naval combatants need an elevated detection platform and an over-the-horizon engagement system to restore an area defense capability providing the depth of fire needed for robust defense. The Navy area defense (NAD) and Navy theater wide (NTW) Block I systems will enable defeating some current unsophisticated ballistic missile threats; however, until upgraded systems are fielded, these systems will have limited capabilities against postulated advanced ballistic missile threats. The SM-2 Block IVA and SM-3 weapon programs associated with NAD and NTW Block I are well structured, but upgrades are required to the SPY-1 radar to make its capabilities compatible with the reach of the SM-3. Although both the NAD and NTW systems are based on the concept of spiral development (build-improve-build-improve . . .), the research and development (R&D) to support such a development concept is not in place. Negation of stressing overland cruise missile (OCM) and ASCM threats will require the Navy and Marine Corps to field new sensor and weapon capabilities and/or to become dependent on and integrated with nonorganic sensor systems of other Services and agencies. Naval forces lack a competent battle management command, control, and communications (BMC3) capability in terms of both concepts of operation and system effectiveness for missile defense in coordination with operations for offense in littoral areas. Inadequate procedures and technical capabilities exist for coordinating assets in the battle space, and current enhancement efforts are often based on legacy technology (e.g., Link 16) that does not support the necessary flexible modes of operation. ES.2 PRIORITIZATION OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS Antiship cruise missile defense, overland cruise missile defense, and ballistic missile defense (BMD) will all be necessary for naval (and joint) forces conducting 21st-century military operations for a number of reasons: ASCMD—Antiship cruise missiles in the hands of potential adversaries are numerous, sophisticated, and widespread. Every naval combatant becomes a
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Page 4 target whenever it enters a theater and must defend itself effectively if it is to be an asset rather than a liability. OCMD—In the future, land attack cruise missiles will allow potential adversaries to deny military forces access to ports, airfields, and other entry points. In effect, the Navy has no OCMD capabilities, and building such capabilities will require time and investment. BMD—Tactical ballistic missiles are widespread weapons of terror and potential mass destruction. Naval forces need capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense to ports, airfields, and other entry points until assets arrive intheater from other Services. In the future, longer-range ballistic missiles will become more prevalent and an adequate theater ballistic missile defense will require defense in depth. With the exception of developing a robust capability for OCMD, there is little disagreement within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and the Navy acquisition community concerning missile defense programs. Moreover, all Navy ballistic missile defense programs are matched to funding limitations or Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)-imposed cost constraints and as a result have adopted evolutionary development programs that defer the development of necessary capabilities until far into the future.3 In the likely event that budget levels will not be sufficient to fund all cruise and ballistic missile defense efforts fully, the committee believes that the Department of the Navy will need to assign funding priorities for R&D efforts as follows: 1. ASCMD, 2. Area defense of forces and assets ashore against both overland cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (NAD system), and 3. The NTW system. The committee's rationale for according first priority for R&D funding to ASCMD is that if the Navy does not have a robust ASCMD capability, its abilities to undertake or support operations in littoral areas will be seriously limited. The committee could not come to a consensus on the relative prioritization of R&D funding between OCMD and NAD. All members of the committee 3 The committee is also concerned that where naval R&D needs and priorities are not supported by BMDO investment, there is no safe mechanism for the Department of the Navy to apply funding of its own. Furthermore, the committee believes that if the Department of the Navy allocates R&D funds for theater missile defense, congressional committees will most likely cut those funds on the basis that missile defense R&D has already been accounted for in the BMDO budget. In the end, there is no investment for theater missile defense R&D. Therefore, the committee believes that a stronger organizational link should be established between the Department of the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in order to support R&D.
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Page 5 recognized that defense against land attack cruise missiles and defense against ballistic missiles are necessary components of the same mission, particularly if the Navy is to protect forces and assets ashore. Some committee members argued that since ballistic missiles are widely available to probable or potential adversaries and since land attack cruise missiles currently are not widely proliferated, priority for R&D funds should be assigned to the NAD program. Furthermore, ballistic missiles, which may be configured to carry weapons of mass destruction, can have a major political impact on allies and on forces ashore. Others on the committee argued that the development of an OCMD capability (be it naval or joint) was essential for the protection of forces ashore against a threat that would be highly likely to proliferate if no such defense were to be developed. Those who supported a relatively high priority for R&D funding for OCMD also pointed out that the most effective means of developing an OCMD capability is through the use of an elevated detection platform. The same elevated platform and sensor system that is needed for OCMD can be used to extend the detection horizons of a surface ship. Thus, the sensor developments that will be necessary to provide OCMD capabilities will also help to improve the Navy's ASCMD capabilities. Although the committee could not achieve a consensus on the relative priority for R&D funding between OCMD and NAD, it was very concerned that R&D funding for the development of a competent OCMD capability has been relatively limited. Unless R&D funding for OCMD is given higher priority than it currently has, the prognosis for the development of OCMD capabilities will continue to be bleak. Furthermore, if the Navy cannot provide OCMD in support of Marine or Army forces ashore, at least in the early stages of operations, then the full potential of naval expeditionary forces (as envisaged in Forward...From the Sea and OMFTS) will not be achieved. 4 Thus, without a land attack cruise missile defense capability to supplement their ballistic missile defense capabilities, naval forces' ability to influence events ashore will be limited to attacks on stationary targets with standoff missiles and air-delivered ordnance. In its assessment of the Navy's existing and planned ballistic missile defense capability, the committee emphasizes the NAD system over the NTW system5. The basis for this emphasis on NAD relates to BMDO's role in de- 4 Some might argue that in a developed theater the Army's Patriot advanced capability-3 (PAC-3) would be deployed. As currently configured, PAC-3 does not depend on the availability of an elevated air moving target indication (AMTI) radar to detect and track missiles that make maximum use of terrain obscuration in order to evade detection by ground-based radars. Thus, until PAC-3 is provided with a robust capability to negate missiles that employ terrain-obscured trajectories, no OCMD capability exists. 5 Program Budget Decision 224 calls for a shift of $121 million from the NTW program to the NAD program over FY02 and FY03 (Inside the Pentagon, January 18, 2001, pp. 12-13).
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Page 6 fense-related development and acquisition for TMD systems. In some developed theaters competent land-based theater missile defense systems might be predeployed. For example, if the Army's theater high altitude air defense (THADD) system were successfully developed and deployed, it could provide significant midcourse engagement capabilities in a theater where it had been deployed prior to the onset of conflict. In addition, if the Air Force's airborne laser (ABL) system were similarly successful, it could provide ascent-phase engagement capabilities against shorter-range ballistic missiles. In such circumstances, the NTW system would supplement the projected capabilities of these systems in addition to the projected endo-atmospheric ballistic missile engagemnet capabilities of both the NAD and Army PAC-3 systems. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) should assign R&D funding priority in the following order: (1) antiship cruise missile defense, (2) area defenses against both overland cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (NAD system) for the protection of forces and assets ashore, and (3) the NTW system. ES.3 STOVE-PIPED THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS6 The committee recognizes that the distributed architectures envisioned for future theater missile defense operations, driven by the realities of the availability and the readiness of defense elements, make it a risky and uncertain business to provide the required level of protection against threatening ballistic and cruise missiles. A significant part of the uncertainty associated with connecting available sensors and shooters into an effective defense network comes from the fact that TMD systems are developed and tested largely as vertically integrated defense systems (as, for instance, are NAD and PAC-3) and are relatively loosely integrated as a family of systems. This suggests that if dynamically assembled distributed architectures are to function effectively, a new paradigm for development and testing needs to be applied by BMDO and the Services. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the expansion of distributed defense development and test plans by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and experiments to demonstrate the related advanced engagement modes. To the extent practicable, the system integrated tests being planned by BMDO and experimental programs such as the Theater Missile Defense Critical Measure- 6 The term “stove-pipe” refers to a program that stands alone, i.e., is planned, constructed, and supported without regard to other programs within the Department of the Navy or within the other Services.
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Page 7 ments Program should be structured and extended to incorporate the critical defense functions unique to distributed architectures. ES.4 LIMITATIONS RELATED TO THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF OCMD AND TBMD IN THE COURSE OF EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE OPERATIONS WHEN JOINT AND COALITION FORCES ARE PRESENT The Navy has declared expeditionary warfare that will influence events ashore as one of its main missions. The Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 217 (EMW 21) strategy is consistent with and dependent on the Navy's capability in this area. Expeditionary warfare and theater missile defense are thus mutually dependent. Expeditionary operations envision the possibility of forcible seaborne entry into a theater in which Marine Corps forces are launched from Navy ships and proceed directly to targets beyond the shoreline. Such operations may include peace enforcement, noncombatant evacuations, or combat operations. For Marine Corps forces to have the required reach, it will be necessary that ship formations approach the shoreline as needed to deliver supporting fire and logistical support to the Marines ashore. The same kind of support could be required if Army elements are involved as part of a joint task force. In any scenario in the littorals, the Navy must be able to defend both its own ships and the assigned forces against attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles. Recommendation: To achieve a competent cruise missile defense capability for the support of naval and joint forces operating in littoral areas, the CNO and the CMC should do the following: Develop a concept of operations with the other Services that routinely substitutes and employs assets such as the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) air moving target indication (AMTI) radar or the joint land 7 Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 21 is the Marine Corps overarching strategy for conducting 21st-century Marine Corps operations such as those described in “Operational Maneuver From the Sea”; “Ship to Objective Maneuver” (Van Riper, LtGen Paul K., USMC, 1997, “Ship to Objective Maneuver,” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., July 25, available online at <http://184.108.40.206/stom.htm>); “Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 and Beyond” (Krulak, Gen C.C., USMC, 1997, “Marine Prepositioning Force 2010 and Beyond,” Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., December 30, available online at <http://220.127.116.11/mpf.htm>); “Sustained Operations Ashore” (Krulak, Gen C.C., USMC, 1998, “The Marine Air Ground Task Force in Sustained Operations Ashore,” U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., June 10, available online at <http://18.104.22.168/soa.htm>); and “Other Expeditionary Operations” (Warfighting Requirements Division, to be published, “Other Expeditionary Operations, Draft Concept Paper,” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.).
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Page 8 attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensors (JLENS) system to perform over-the-horizon target acquisition and missile command functions envisaged for the E-2C Radar Modernization Program (RMP) radar; and Leverage joint experimentation in order to develop the operational concepts and technical capabilities necessary for joint missile defense operations. ES.5 ASCMD, OCMD, AND TBMD DEFICIENCIES AND THE PROGRAMS TO CORRECT THEM Over the past several years, lower levels of R&D investment have allowed the ASCM threat to evolve somewhat more rapidly than shipboard defenses have been improved. Future threats, which are projected to have much smaller radar signatures, greater agility, and electronic countermeasure (ECM)-resistant sensors, may well overstress these defenses when the Navy is constrained to operate in a littoral environment. The proposed acquisition and deployment of SPY-3 and the X-band horizon search MFR, along with some advances in the Navy's electronic warfare techniques, should redress some but not all of the Navy's projected ASCMD deficiencies. The committee is concerned that there are no programs in place to develop additional techniques to increase the Navy's ASCMD effectiveness. In the final analysis, the ASCMD problem relates to the fact that a low-altitude cruise missile can get relatively close to a surface ship before it crosses the radar horizon of the ship's defensive sensors. If the number of incoming cruise missiles is sufficiently large, their agility and speed sufficiently high, and their radar cross section sufficiently low, the defensive system will be overwhelmed. A strong layer of short-range self-defense is needed, but robust defense requires a depth of fire that can be provided only by employing elevated sensors, such as the JLENS, that extend the horizon of the defensive sensors, along with the use of a missile that is designed to intercept targets beyond the line-of-sight horizon of the firing platform. The committee was not briefed on any systems other than the Army's JLENS for solving this ASCMD problem. With respect to OCMD, the committee observes that there is still no program that will provide a means for the ship-based defense of forces ashore against cruise missile attacks. Although ship-launched interceptor missiles of suitable range are available, the sensors that would permit them to engage cruise missiles not observable from the ship have not been developed or otherwise acquired. The Navy will have to develop the necessary airborne sensors to support an OCMD capability or seek ways in which systems of the other Services, such as JLENS, might be brought into position and employed. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the development of a competent cruise missile defense against anti-ship and overland cruise missiles. Beyond supporting the programmed devel-
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Page 9 opment and acquisition of multifunction radar (MFR) and volume search radar (VSR), such a capability should include the following components: An elevated AMTI radar—possibly AWACS or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based—with robust overland clutter negation capabilities and with future capabilities to operate in a multistatic mode so that low-radar-cross-section overland targets can be engaged; An overland, over-the-horizon variant of the SM-2 missile with dual-mode, semiactive, and active terminal guidance; and The extension of cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to allow the employment of air-directed surface-to-air missiles (ADSAMs) against targets that are beyond the line-of-sight horizon of weapon launch plat-forms. Recommendation: Beyond supporting the SPY-1 upgrades to improve NAD and NTW discrimination capabilities, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should pursue an aggressive R&D effort aimed at producing the following capabilities: A high-resolution, X-band adjunct to the S-band SPY-1 radar that will allow discrimination among warheads, decoys, and debris and reduce the need for salvo launches; A hit-to-kill (HTK) vehicle with greater agility, divert capability, and lethal radius than the Block I HTK vehicle, giving it the ability to handle tethered and tumbling target complexes; A multicolor infrared sensor with improved sensitivity to extend acquisition ranges against low-infrared-signature targets and aid in discrimination; and A radar and/or LADAR on the hit-to-kill vehicle that could precisely measure body dynamics for effective discrimination against replica decoys. Recommendation: In an effort to examine countermeasures beyond the design threat of naval theater ballistic missile defense systems, the Department of the Navy should maintain an ongoing red-blue effort that provides continuous analysis, design, and testing of potential theater ballistic missile defense countermeasures and defense responses and works closely with corresponding Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) efforts. This effort could be conducted in a manner similar to the prior Advanced Ballistic Reentry System Program, which developed penetration aids for U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile systems, or an extension of the current project Hercules, supported by BMDO, that is looking at advanced discrimination techniques.
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Page 10 ES.6 CURRENT AND PROJECTED MARINE CORPS OCMD CAPABILITIES Marine Corps plans for OMFTS and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) depend on shipboard basing of assault elements and rapid transport of light forces to inland objectives. The Navy is expected to provide air support—close air support along with Marine Corps air, combat air patrol, ship-based fire support, and ship-based early warning of and defense against air and ballistic missile attack. The Marine Corps is also dependent on the Navy for logistical support of many kinds. In the future, the Corps will have a ground-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile capability—a complementary low altitude weapon system—light enough to be taken ashore with assault units but with limited sensor capability, necessitating CEC cueing. Recommendation: Recognizing that there will always be some gaps in naval air defense coverage due to extended littoral operations, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the development and acquisition of the complementary low altitude weapon system (CLAWS) and the multirole radar system (MRRS); interfaces should be developed for targeting and fire control to the following sensors: Army JLENS radar system, Marine Corps TPS-59 (V-3) radar system, E-2C RMP AMTI radar, and Air Force AWACS SPY-l/2 radar system. Recommendation: Recognizing that the MRRS may not be ready in time to provide an initial targeting and fire control radar for the CLAWS, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should consider deployment of the TPS-59 radar on designated maritime preposition force squadrons as an interim measure. ES.7 BATTLE MANAGEMENT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (BMC3) A commander must have the means to understand the operational environment, the location and condition of his forces, and the actions of the enemy. He/she must be able to communicate well enough to reallocate resources and vary subordinate assignments as appropriate to achieve a particular mission, keeping superiors advised as necessary. The need today to comprehend and control on a theaterwide basis presents an immense challenge. Recommendation: Given that management of battle-space force components is a critical aspect of missile defense that is currently seriously defi-
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Page 11 cient, Department of the Navy leadership should actively support efforts relating to doctrine, acquisition programs, and research to overcome such deficiencies, in particular by: Supporting current efforts such as the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) System Engineering Office Program, which is seeking to enhance the quality of the air-space picture; Supporting the development of concepts of operations necessary for expeditionary and joint Service littoral operations, including means for offense-defense coordination; Recognizing that for success in these operations the Department of the Navy will require support from other Services; and Recognizing that all battle-space management development efforts must seek to accommodate the inclusion of unplanned force components. Recommendation: Given that Link 16 and CEC, even when evolved and improved, will not provide a full battle management command, control, and communications (BMC3) capability for either overland cruise missile defense or theater missile defense, the Department of the Navy leadership should initiate actions leading to the development of a next-generation BMC3 system. This entirely new system, leveraging both commercial and defense technology advances, should include the following features: Support of highly flexible and adaptable combinations of naval and joint force configurations by allowing assets to interface readily with one another (e.g., through an Internet Protocol-based, quality-of-service-guaranteed infrastructure); Wide-bandwidth, bandwidth-on-demand wireless communication networks with dynamic allocation of resources; and Initial development of a prototype in parallel with existing BMC3 systems to encourage experimentation and adoption. In addition, development of a high-bandwidth test bed would be particularly valuable. It would allow new capabilities to be tested and explored in the near term while the existing BMC3 systems continue to undergo their intended evolution; transition to the new capabilities would occur only after they had been adequately developed and accepted. ES.8 TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT As presented to the committee by the Navy and Marine Corps, the developmental paths intended to evolve TMD capabilities are generally reasonable, although several exceptions are identified in this report. The evolutionary, or
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Page 12 “spiral,” development of added capabilities to pace the threat is a reasonable concept. However, the committee is concerned that the technology required to support the intended evolution is not being developed. The necessary investments must be made to bring the required technology to a state where it is available for use in the time frame intended. Recommendation: In its technology investment program, the Department of the Navy should develop sensors, weapons, and BMC3 architectures and algorithms that are adaptive and flexible enough to allow responding to unexpected threat capabilities and characteristics. These ballistic missile defense system elements should be combined into experimental systems for evaluation and refinement. The mature technologies from the program should be incorporated into future spirals of the NAD and NTW ballistic missile defense systems.
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