Index

A

AAQS. See Ambient Air Quality Standards

ABC. See Allowable biological catch

Absentee landlords, 210

Access conditions, de facto open, 11

Acid Rain Program, 204, 217

Actor-focused ecology, and the economics of flexibility, in common-pool resource studies, 375–378

Actors

calculating the numbers of, 23

generally correct understanding of, 459

rational, dominance of model of, 4

utility of, 159

Adaptation

to change in social and environmental conditions, 466

of institutions, 472

Adaptive management

in cross-scale interactions, 311–313

in design of tradable permits, 205–206

integrating uncertainty into decision-making, 311

Adaptive systems. See Complex systems

Adequacy, challenges to theoretical, 11

Administrative factors, 131

AEPS. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

Aggregate limits, defining, in design of tradable permits, 206–207

Agreements, ability to build, 5

Agroforestry, 73n

Air pollution, 23

success in controlling, 221

Alaska, Native land claims in, 268

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 286n

Allocation of resources, 108n

initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209

intrahousehold, 73n

relationship to maintenance levels, 102

Allowable biological catch (ABC), 207, 224n

Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS), 206– 207

Antarctica, 278

Anticipation, of future interactions, 5

Antisocial impulses, controlling, 5

Antitrust prosecution, 203

Apocalyptical beliefs, 431

Appropriate linkages, among institutions, establishing, 465–466

Appropriating the commons. See also Harvesters, Users

comparison of public goods, 176–178

contributions to the public good with and without punishment, 177

a theoretical explanation, 157–191



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The Drama of the Commons Index A AAQS. See Ambient Air Quality Standards ABC. See Allowable biological catch Absentee landlords, 210 Access conditions, de facto open, 11 Acid Rain Program, 204, 217 Actor-focused ecology, and the economics of flexibility, in common-pool resource studies, 375–378 Actors calculating the numbers of, 23 generally correct understanding of, 459 rational, dominance of model of, 4 utility of, 159 Adaptation to change in social and environmental conditions, 466 of institutions, 472 Adaptive management in cross-scale interactions, 311–313 in design of tradable permits, 205–206 integrating uncertainty into decision-making, 311 Adaptive systems. See Complex systems Adequacy, challenges to theoretical, 11 Administrative factors, 131 AEPS. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Aggregate limits, defining, in design of tradable permits, 206–207 Agreements, ability to build, 5 Agroforestry, 73n Air pollution, 23 success in controlling, 221 Alaska, Native land claims in, 268 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 286n Allocation of resources, 108n initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209 intrahousehold, 73n relationship to maintenance levels, 102 Allowable biological catch (ABC), 207, 224n Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS), 206– 207 Antarctica, 278 Anticipation, of future interactions, 5 Antisocial impulses, controlling, 5 Antitrust prosecution, 203 Apocalyptical beliefs, 431 Appropriate linkages, among institutions, establishing, 465–466 Appropriating the commons. See also Harvesters, Users comparison of public goods, 176–178 contributions to the public good with and without punishment, 177 a theoretical explanation, 157–191

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The Drama of the Commons theoretical models of reciprocity and fairness, 159–163 theoretical predictions, 163–176 Arctic Council, 308 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), 280 Artisanal practices, 266 Assurance game, 12, 28n Asymmetric equilibria, with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190 Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, 343 Atmosphere, global, 19 greenhouse gases released into, 3, 24 Authority rules, 98 B Baland, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55 Bandwidth, broadcasting, 22–23 Bangladesh Department of Fisheries, 305–306 Barbed wire, example of exclusion, 57 Barents Sea, 281–282 Bargaining power, of users, 15 Baseline issue, in design of tradable permits, 204 Behavior explanation of, 38 prediction of, 37–38 Beneficiaries, impossibility of excluding, 19–20 Benefits, unfair distribution of, 66 Bering Sea, 275–276, 281–283 doughnut hole, 287n Fishery Conservation Zone in, 275 Bering Sea Community Development Program, 210 Beverly-Qamanirjuaq Caribou Co-Management Board (Canada), 301, 303 Biases, in cultural evolution, 410 Biodiversity loss of, 24 threats to, 23 Biological species, as resources, 22 Biophysical environment, as a sink, 29n Biosphere, concern with, 28n Boundary rules, 98 British North America Act, 267 Broadcasting bandwidth, 22–23 Bush, President George W., 73n Bycatch, 213 Bycatch discard, 213 C CAFF. See Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna California water shortage, 131, 138, 203 CAMPFIRE program (Zimbabwe), 251 Canadian North, fur trade in, 297–298 Canal networks, 99–100 Capacity, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279 Case study research, roles of, 467 Cattle herds, 56 Causal analysis, 67–68, 447–451 knowledge about processes and mechanisms, 458–459 links for institutional sustainability, illustrative sets of, 69–70 paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on the maintenance of common-pool resources, 448 Causal models development and testing of, 468 specifying carefully, 66 Causation contingent and multiple, 67 of perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 137–139 proximate, 408 in situated rational choice, determining, 367–369 ultimate, 408 CBMRs. See Community-based management regimes CFCs. See Chlorofluorocarbons Change demographic, 477 global social, 476–477 in social and environmental conditions, adapting to, 466 technological, 477 Cheating, 143, 174, 388 Checkers, and learning in complex adaptive systems, 337–340 Chicken, game of, 12, 28n

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The Drama of the Commons Chile, water resources in, 203 Chimpanzees, conditionally cooperative enforcers among, 181n Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 264 Choice building on existing institutions, 370–372 determining effects in, 367–369 and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375 horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374 muddling through, 374–375 situated rational, 363–375 step-wise model of, 365–370 Circumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN), 279–281 Citizen science, cross-scale linkages in, 307 Clean Air Act, 205, 217 Climate change, 3, 24 global, 23 Closed-form solutions, 38 Co-management arrangements, 260–261, 284 between communities and governments, 301–304 cross-scale linkages in, 304–307 of environmental resources, 222 Coalition formation, 130 Coastal states, jurisdiction claimed by, 272– 273 Coercive dominance, 416–418 Coherence, social, 108n Collaborative research, that enables cross-scale linkages, 308–310 Collaborative research centers, 16, 76n Collective action, 73n by small groups, 59–60 Collective efficacy, 132–133 Collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351 organizational question, 341–347 organizations, rights, and incentives, 347–351 Colonization, 295–296 Comedy of the commons model, 4 Commerce in resources, 247–250 Commitments, motives for follow-up on, 135 Common management, of irrigation systems, 47–49 Common-pool resource game, equilibria with sanctioning possibilities, 169–172, 190–191 Common-pool resource studies, 16, 26, 28n actor-focused ecology and the economics of flexibility, 375–378 being specific and critical about community, 384–387 bibliography of, 6 deliberation and discourse, 383–384 embeddedness, 381–384 old and new directions in, 375–387 political ecology, 378–381 problems with, 45 Common-pool resources (CPRs), 3, 15, 17–18, 87–112. See also Common resources, Commons causal paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on maintenance of, 448 as collective goods, 93 cost of measurement, 24 governance of, 26 need for extending insights to a broader array of, 472–474 renewable or nonrenewable, 22–23 scale of, 23–24 sustainable management of, 46–54 Common-Pool Resources database, 5, 28n Common-pool sinks, 19 Common property regimes, 15, 17–18, 27, 41– 85. See also Community-based management regimes designations given to, 253n in Ethopia, 13 in the Swiss Alps, 13 in Upper Burma, 13 vs. open access conditions, 51 Common Property Resource Digest, The, 17– 18 Common resources, 17–18, 233–257. See also Common-pool resources, Commons addressing problems of method, 63–70 analyses of sustainable management of common-pool resources, 46–54 and CBMR and TEA regimes as management institutions, 237–253 critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons, 62– 63 facilitating conditions identified by Wade, 48

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The Drama of the Commons facilitating successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52 illustrative sets of causal links in commons research, 69–70 and institutional sustainability, 41–85 Ostrom’s design principles, 50 Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 14–17 supplementing the set of substantive factors, 54–63 synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau , 54–55 Commons, 18. See also Common-pool resources; Common property; Common resources early formal analyses by resource economists, 9–11 early work on, 8 future of research in, 17 Hardin’s model and its limitations, 11–14 heterogenity in, 88–96 ideal test bed for social sciences, 5 in Switzerland, 72n large-n studies of, 96–102 large-scale multivariate research, 87–112 management questions, 426–432 theoretical explanation of appropriating, 157–191 tradable permits approach to protecting, 197–232 Commons dilemma, 114 factors influencing cooperation in, 113– 156 scale of, 146–147 Commons literature, 118–144 on the decision structure of the task, 122–127 functional classification of variables from, 455 intellectual history of, 6–17 on individual differences, 118–121 on perceptual factors, 137–144 on the social structure of the task, 128– 137 Communication, 5, 12 coordination of 173–175 in commons dilemmas, 134–137 directionality in, 136 impact of, 172–176 rational, 384 as a sanctioning device, 175–176 Communism, 8 Communities, 72n being specific and critical about, in common-pool resource studies, 384–387 cross-scale linkages and co-management arrangements with, 301–304 epistemic, 307–308 imagined, 421 social identification with, 131 Communities for a Better Environment, 224n, 226n Community-based management regimes (CBMRs), 27 and commerce in resources, 247–250 compared with TEAs, 233–257 extraction vs. pollution in, 245–247 as management institutions, 237–253 nested, 238–239 and resource complexity, 240–245 and resource size, 237–240 rights structures in, 248–249 synthesis in, 250–253 varying solutions under varying conditions, 237–253 Comparative methods, 467 Compatibility, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279 Competence, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279 Competitive individuals, 161 Complex systems, 327–359 collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351 conditional view of uncertainty, 332–334 example from the New England fisheries, 328–329 learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340 response to uncertainty, 329–332 uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335 Complexity, 312 of human motivation, 3 a problem in commons management, 426–427 of resources, 240–245

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The Drama of the Commons Compliance with rules, by users, and monitoring the resource, 462–463 Conceptual categories challenges to, 11 inproving, 468–469 Conceptual developments, 17–26 cost of measurement of common-pool resources, 24 free-rider problem, 19–21 institutional attributes, 21 problem of overuse, 18–19 renewable or nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23 scale of common-pool resources, 23–24 search for effective institutions, 24–26 Conceptual framework, 452–454 Conceptual models, general, 458 Concern with the biosphere, 28n with ecosystems, 28n with the welfare of other humans, 28n with the welfare of species, 28n Conditional conservation, by users, 92 Conditional generalizations, 458 Conditional preferences, 145 Conditional view, of uncertainty, 332–334 Conditionally cooperative enforcers (CCEs), 170–171, 190–191 among chimpanzees, 181n Conditions, for emergence of self-organized organizations, 456 Conference on Common Property Resource Management, 300 Conference on Environment and Development, 282 Conflict management, 471–472 Conflicting values and interests, reconciling, 464 Conformance, in rules, 98, 100 Confucian system, 417 Consequentialism, 391 Conservation indigenous, 370–371 by users, conditional, 92 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 280–281, 287n Consumption jointness of, or rivalness of, 19 problem of overconsumption, 123 Contingencies, 453, 455 Contingent causation, 67 Contingent generalizations, 446–447 Contingent hypotheses, expanded use of multicase comparative methods for investigating, 467 Contingent relationships, 131 empirically supported, between group heterogeneity and institutional performance, 447 Contributions to the public good, with and without punishment, 177 Controls, of egotistical and antisocial impulses, 5 Cooperation, 404–406 contingent on many things, 405 cross-disciplinary, 39 effect of numbers of actors on, 23 heterogeneity inducing, 24 human proneness to, 404 uncertainty reducing, 126 Cooperation in commons dilemmas experimental primer, 117–118 factors influencing, 113–156 framework, 115–117 historical roots of experimental research on commons dilemmas, 114–115 recent findings in the experimental literature, 118–144 a review of experimental psychological research, 113–156 synthesis, 144–148 Cooperative individuals, 120, 161 Cooperative institutions evolution of, 412–425 segmentary hierarchy, 418–425 tribal social instincts hypothesis, 413– 415 work-around hypothesis, 415–418 Cooperative Resource Management Committees (CRMCs), 424, 428 Coordination, in appropriating the commons, 173–175 Correlations, identifying, 14 Corruption, in public officials, 13–14 Costly exclusions, 21 Costly punishment, 176–178 Costs. See also Low-cost enforcement of rules of fishing effort, 9–10 of measuring common-pool resources, 24 of monitoring and enforcement, 450 of sanctioning systems, 169

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The Drama of the Commons CPR. See Common Property Resource Digest, The CPRs. See Common-pool resources Credit trading, 204 CRMCs. See Cooperative Resource Management Committees Cross-disciplinary cooperation, 39 Cross-scale institutional linkages adaptive management of, 311–313 characteristics of some institutional forms that enhance, 302 in citizen science, 307 and co-management arrangements between communities and governments, 301–304 collaborative research and management that enable, 308–310 in development and empowerment arrangements, 304–307 and dynamic interactions, 259–321 dynamics of, 310–315 effects of higher level institutions on local institutions, 295–300 environmental consequences of, 263–291 examples of multistakeholder bodies, 305 and institutional interplay, 263–291 between multistakeholder bodies, 304 perspectives from the bottom up, 293– 321 policy communities and social movement networks, 307–308 promising institutions for, 301–310 research and management approaches that enable cross-scale linkages, 309 resilience, 313–315 strategies from a project in Bangladesh, 306 strengthening local-level institutions for cross-scale interaction, 299 Cultural evolution, 406, 410–411 biases in, 410 natural selection in, 410–411 nonrandom variation in, 410 pace of in modern world, 430 small-scale, as problem or resource in commons management, 430–432 Cultural heterogeneity, 89 Cultural theory, 368 Cultural variation, processes that shape heritable, through time, 407–408 Culture, coevolving with genes, 413, 415 D Data-driven research, vs. theory-driven, 39 Decision making. See also Framing deliberative processes in, 469–471 Decision structure of the task, 122–127 payoff structure, 122–125 uncertainty, 125–127 Defections, by users, 95, 127 Deforestation, in Senegal, 95 Deliberative processes in common-pool resource studies, 383–384 in decision making, 469–471 Demographic changes, 477 Density, of institutions, 263 Dependent variables, 455 Descent of Man, 403 Design considerations for tradable permits, 202–216 adaptive management, 205–206 baseline issue, 204 defining the aggregate limits, 206–207 enforcement, 215–216 governance structures, 202–204 initial allocation method, 207–209 legal nature of the entitlement, 205 monitoring, 212–215 the temporal dimension, 211–212 transferability rules, 209–211 Design of common-pool institutions, 327–359 collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351 conditional view of uncertainty, 332–334 example from the New England fisheries, 328–329 learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340 response to uncertainty, 329–332 uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335 Design principles, 390 Ostrom’s, for institutional sustainability, 50 for resource institutions, 16 robust, 25 Developing countries, poverty in, 12 Development arrangements, cross-scale linkages in, 304–307 Dictator game, 136 Dirección General de Aguas, 203 Directionality, in communication, 136

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The Drama of the Commons Discourse, in common-pool resource studies, 383–384 Dispute settlement, 15 Distribution of benefits, unfair, 66 Diversity, a problem in commons management, 426–427 Diversity of human cooperation, 404–406 cooperation contingent on many things, 405 human proneness to cooperation, even with strangers, 404 in institutions, 405 institutions as product of evolution, 405 Dominance, coercive, 416–418 Donors, international, needing to understand property rights impacts, 15 Doughnut hole, 287n Drop-through mechanism, 206 Drosophilia melanogaster, 409 ideal experimental organism, 5, 28n Dynamics in cross-scale interactions, 310–315 adaptive management, 311–313 the environmental consequences of, and institutional interplay, 263–291 resilience, 313–315 Dynamics of resource management institutions, 469–472 conflict management, 471–472 deliberative processes in decision making, 469–471 emergence, adaptation, and evolution of institutions, 472 institutional learning, 471 E Ecology actor-focused, and the economics of flexibility, 375–378 event, 389, 393n political, in common-pool resource studies, 363, 378–381 Economic heterogeneity, 37 Economic theory of tradable permits, 27, 199– 202 approach to optimal resource management, 199–200 comparing with environmental taxes, 201–202 Economists, resource, early formal analyses of the commons by, 9–11 Ecosystems concern with, 28n and learning in complex adaptive systems, 338–340 oceanic, fish harvested from, 3 EEZs. See Exclusive economic zones; Extended economic zones Effectiveness, of sanctioning systems, 124–125 Efficacy, 146 collective, 132–133 illusions of, 133 Efficiency issues, 93, 165–169, 193, 224n Egotistical impulses controlling, 5 studying, 130 Embeddedness, in common-pool resource studies, 381–384 Emergence, 337 Emergence of other-regarding behavior, 144– 146 Emergence of institutions for the commons contexts, situations, and events, 361–402 directions in common-pool resource studies, 375–387 question-driven research on, 387–392 rapidity of, 429–430 situated rational choice in, 363–375 social constructionism in, 387–392 specifying the commons in, 392–393 Emergence of self-organized organizations, conditions for, 456 Emergency situations, response patterns in, 148n Emissions Trading Program, 204 Empirical validity, questions of, 11, 16 Empowerment arrangements, cross-scale linkages in, 304–307 Enabling conditions, critical, for sustainability on the commons, 62–63 Endowment of resources heterogeneity of, 60 initial, of users, 15 Enforcement costs of, 450 in design of tradable permits, 215–216 of limits on environmental effects, 218– 219 of norms, 172 English Commons, 42

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The Drama of the Commons Entitlements, legal nature of, in design considerations for tradable permits, 205–206 Environmental conditions adapting to change in, 466 external, of resource management institutions, 489 Environmental consequences, of cross-scale interactions, 263–291 Environmental degradation, in relation to population growth, 56 Environmental effects, 28n, 217–220 enforcing the limits, 218–219 in evaluating tradable permits, 217–220 meeting the limits, 218 on the resource, 219–220 setting the limits, 218 Environmental nongovernmental organizations, 274, 280, 282–283, 307, 366 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 202, 424 Environmental regulation, 235 Environmental resources, co-management of, 222 Environmental taxes, comparing tradable permits with, 201–202 Environmental uncertainty, 148 EPA. See Environmental Protection Agency Epistemic communities, 307–308 Equal individual risks, 199 Equilibria, 224n. See also Nonequilibrium thinking; Selfish Nash Equilibrium asymmetric, with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190 choosing among, 181n multiple, 174 Nash, 157, 163, 174 with sanctioning possibilities, 170–172, 190–191 symmetric, with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188 Equity preferences for, 158–159 problems exacerbated by heterogeneity, 15 problems with, 25–26 Escherichia coli, ideal experimental organism, 28n Essentialism, 368 Ethiopia, common property in, 13 Ethnic heterogeneity, 89, 96 in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101 Ethnographic analysis, 42, 72n, 75n Evaluation criteria for tradable permits, 216– 223 economic effects, 220–221 environmental effects, 217–220 implementation feasibility, 216–217 Event ecology, 389, 393n Evolution of institutions, 472 institutions as product of, 405 Evolution as multilevel. See Multilevel evolution Evolution of cooperative institutions, 412–425 segmentary hierarchy, 418–425 tribal social instincts hypothesis, 413– 415 work-around hypothesis, 415–418 Evolution of culture. See Cultural evolution Evolutionary models accounting for the processes that shape heritable genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408 consistency with a wide variety of theories, 411–412 explaining the nature of preferences and institutions, 406–407 recursiveness of, 407 use in the social sciences, 412 Evolutionary theory of commons management, 4, 403–442 evolution of cooperative institutions, 412–425 outstanding questions, 426–432 testing hypotheses, 425–426 theories of cooperation, 404–412 Exclusion, 29n, 74n of beneficiaries, impossibility of, 19–20 costly, 21 example of barbed wire, 57 Exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 266, 273, 281–282 Exit options, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 94, 100 Experimental literature on commons dilemmas, 118–144 decision structure of the task, 122–127 functional classification of variables from, 455

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The Drama of the Commons individual differences, 118–121 perceptual factors, 137–144 social structure of the task, 128–137 Experimental psychological research, 113–156 on cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156 elements influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 116 experimental primer, 117–118 framework, 115–117 historical roots of, 114–115 recent findings in, 118–144 synthesis of, 144–148 Explicit incentive devices, 172 Exploitation of resources, 7 of symbolic systems, 420–423 Extended economic zones (EEZs), 371 External environment, of resource management institutions, 157, 489 Extraction, vs. pollution, 245–247 F Facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability, from Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau, 48, 54–55 for successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52 Fairness procedural, 159 questions of, 63–64, 66, 131, 179–180 theoretical models of, 159–163 FCZ. See Fishery Conservation Zone Feasibility, of implementation, in evaluating tradable permits, 193, 216–217 Federal Central Valley Project, 424 Federalist Papers, 354 Fish, harvested from oceanic ecosystems, 3 Fisheries, 27, 95, 293 declines of, 23 example from New England, 328–329 governance structures for, 202–206 inshore, 16 relationships among effort, cost, and revenue, 9–10 South Texas shrimp, 93 understanding, 73n Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 353n Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ), 275 Fishing technology, destructiveness of modern, 22 Flexibility of cooperative institutions in commons management, 427–428 economics of, and actor-focused ecology in common-pool resource studies, 375–378 Ford Foundation, conference sponsored by, 28n Forests timber harvested from, 3 understanding, 22, 73n Framing in perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 140–144 of property rights, 142 in social dilemmas, 140 Free-rider problem, 4, 19–21, 177 in the context of the village, 12 solving, 122, 374 Functional interplay, 260 Functionalist theory, 4 Fungibility, 212 Fur trade, in the Canadian North, 297–298 G Gadus morhua, 391 Game of chicken, 12, 28n Game theory, 12, 37, 89, 174, 452 repeated, 107n Games coordination, 181n one-shot, 163–164 GEF. See Global Environment Facility Gender differences, 107n, 121 Generalizability, challenges to, 11 Generalizations conditional, 458 contingent, 446–447 Genes, coevolving with culture, 413, 415 Genetic variation between groups, factors limiting, 434n processes that shape heritable, through time, 407–408 Georges Bank, 349

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The Drama of the Commons German General Staff, lessons from, 432 Gini coefficients, 99, 108n Global climate change, 23 Global Environment Facility (GEF), 265 Global social changes, 476–477 Globalization syndrome, 74n, 475–476 Golden rule, 124 Gordon-Schaefer model, 9–10 Governance of the commons, 26, 44 facilitating conditions for successful, from Baland and Platteau, 52 Governance structures, 393n in design of tradable permits, 202–204 for fisheries, 202–206 Governments cross-scale linkages and co-management arrangements with, 301–304 ownership by, 9, 21 Grandfathering approach, 202, 208, 216 Grasslands, 367 Grazing lands, 55, 73n Greenhouse gases, released into the global atmosphere, 3, 24, 264 Greenland Home Rule, 268 Groundnut farming, 95 Group characteristics, of resource management institutions, 488–489 Group exchange condition, 122 Group heterogeneity, empirically supported contingent relationship with institutional performance, 447 Group selection, in multilevel evolution, 409 Group size, 65 in commons dilemmas, 132–134 effect on performance of institutional arrangements, 15 and likelihood of collective action, 59–60 Groups self-efficacious, 132 symbolically marked, 422 Guarantors of property rights, 58 Gujarat, irrigation systems in, 92 H Hardin’s model, of the commons, limitations of, 11–14 Harvesters. See also Users behavior of, 9, 20, 56–57, 95, 117, 126– 127, 367 poor monitoring of, 11 Head-end differences, vs. tail-end, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 88, 99–100 Herding in Mali, 95 in Mauritania, 95 Heritable genetic and cultural variation, processes that shape through time, 407–408 Heterogeneity, 26 cultural, 89 economic, 37 of endowment of resources, 60 ethnic, 89, 96 ethnic and social, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101 four types of, 29n group, empirically supported contingent relationship with institutional performance, 447 of individual preferences, 161 inducing cooperation, 24 of interests, 60 intragroup, 60 large-n studies of, 96–102 in large-scale multivariate research, 87– 112 social, 146 spatial and temporal, 15 summary of empirical studies, 104–105 Heuristic classifications, 480n Highgrading, 213, 243 Historical context, 474–477 globalization syndrome, 475–476 major demographic changes, 477 other global social changes, 476–477 technological change, 477 Hoarding, 210 Homo economicus, perspective of, 170 Horizontal interplay, 260 Horizontal linkages, in institutions for the commons, 293, 372–374 How Institutions Think, 387 Human cooperation. See also Cooperation contingent on many things, 405 extent and diversity of, 404–406 human proneness to, even with strangers, 404 in institutions, 405 institutions as product of evolution, 405 Human ecological arguments, 4

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The Drama of the Commons Human motivation. See Motivation Humans, concern with the welfare of other, 28n Hunter-gatherer societies, 414, 427 Hydraulic economies, poor, 88 Hypotheses. See also Contingent hypotheses empirically supported causal, 468 proposed, about resource management institutions, 487–489 for research, 446–447 I IASCP. See International Association for the Study of Common Property ICC. See Inuit Circumpolar Conference ICNAF. See International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Identification, social, with communities, 131 IFRI. See International Forestry Resources and Institutions IGOs. See Intergovernmental organizations Illusions of efficacy, 133 Imagined communities, 421 Imperfect knowledge, managing resources with, 464–465 Implementation feasibility, in evaluating tradable permits, 193, 216–217 Incentives, 72n. See also Economic theory of tradable permits explicit devices for, 172 of institutions, 347–351 problems of, 18, 22 Income inequality, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 98–99 Independent variables, 455 India irrigation systems in, 97 Joint Forest Management in, 301 management in, 73n People’s Biodiversity Registers in, 307 Indigenous conservation, 370–371 Indigenous institutions, rejection of existing, 11 Indirect effects, 457 Individual characteristics, of resource management institutions, 488–489 Individual differences, 118–121 gender, 121 social motives, 118–121 Individual-level selection, in multilevel evolution, 408–409 Individual preferences, heterogeneity of, 161 Individual risks, lower vs. equal, 199 Individual transferable quotas (ITQs), 203, 210, 213–216, 218–221, 272, 274–275 Individualism, 8, 161 Indonesia, harvesting of tropical forests in, 270 Indulgences, sale of in the Middle Ages, 224n Industrialization, effects of, 42 Inequalities, 75n of income, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 98–99 of wealth causal paths describing hypothesized effects on the maintenance of common-pool resources, 448 in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 99 Inequity-averse subjects, 37, 160–161 asymmetric equilibria with, 168, 188–190 best response function of, 165 symmetric equilibria with, 167–168, 186–188 Information technology, 214 Infrastructure investments, in Pakistan, 97, 99 Initial allocation method, in design of tradable permits, 207–209 Initial endowment of resources, of users, 15 Institutional arrangements defining performance of, 14 effect of group size on performance of, 15 in resource management institutions, 487–488 Institutional attributes, 21 Institutional design challenges, 27–28, 461–466 adapting to change in social and environmental conditions, 466 addressing negative externalities for other resources , 463 establishing appropriate linkages among institutions, 465–466 low-cost enforcement of rules, 462 managing resources with imperfect knowledge, 464–465 monitoring the resource and users’ compliance with rules, 462–463 reconciling conflicting values and interests, 464 refining understanding of, 469 Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 308

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The Drama of the Commons regimes for marine resources, 281–283 regimes for terrestrial resources, 279–281 Interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 11, 266–276 systems of land tenure, 267–271 systems of sea tenure, 271–276 Intervening variables, 455 Interventions, 29n, 453, 455 Intragroup heterogeneity, 60 Intrahousehold allocation of resources, 73n Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), 308 Irrigation systems, 16, 56, 96 commonly managed, 47–49 exceptionalism in, 103 in Gujarat, 92 in India, 97 in Mexico, 97 in Nepal, 97, 107n in the Philippines, 97 unequal, and heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112 ITQs. See Individual transferable quotas ITTA. See International Tropical Timber Agreement J James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Canada), 300, 302–303 Joint Forest Management, in India, 301 Joint-stock company, 8 Jointness of consumption, 19 Juntas de vigilancia, 203 Just society, life in, as a public good, 20 Justice, local, 75n K Key terms, 17–26 effective institutions, 24–26 free-rider problem, 19–21 institutional attributes, 21 problem of overuse, 18–19 renewable or nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23 scale of common-pool resources, 23–24 Kin selection, in multilevel evolution, 409 Knowledge, scientific, as a public good, 5 Knowledge base, 26–27, 466–469 case study research role, 467 causal paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on maintenance of common-pool resources, 448 classification of variables from the commons literature, 455 costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450 development and testing of causal models, 468 directions for research, 466–479 improving conceptual categories, 468–469 lessons learned, 454–466 managing resources with imperfect, 464– 465 multicase comparative methods for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467 progress in the field, 445–454 proposed hypotheses about resource management institutions, 487–489 refining understanding of institutional design, 469 relationship between group heterogeneity and institutional performance, 447 roles of case study research, 467 systematic development of, 466–469 triangulation, 468 L Lakes exclusion in, 29n pollution of, 23 Lamarckian effects, 408 Land tenure, in interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 267–271 Large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 38, 68, 96–102 choosing rules, 101–102 ethnic and social heterogeneity, 101 exit options, 100 head-enders and tail-enders, 99–100 income inequality, 98–99 wealth inequality, 99 Large-scale multivariate research on heterogeneity, 88–96 heterogeneity and commons management in, 87–112

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The Drama of the Commons large-n studies, 96–102 summary of empirical studies, 104–105 Leaders, 131, 415, 419 legitimacy of, 132 Learning, institutional, 471 Learning in complex adaptive systems, 335– 351 from checkers to ecosystems, 338–340 collective, 340–351 Legal nature of entitlement, in design of tradable permits, 205 Legitimacy of institutions, 423–425 of leaders, 132 Legitimization, of local-level institutions, 299 Lessons learned, 221–224 about evaluation, 221–223 challenges of institutional design, 461– 466 practical value of research, 457–461 substantive lessons, 27, 456–457 unfulfilled theoretical expectations, 223– 224 Leviathans, 233, 236 kleptocratic, 417 Life in a just society, as a public good, 20 Limitations aggregate, in design of tradable permits, 206–207 enforcing, 218–219 of Hardin’s model of the commons, 11– 14 meeting, 218 of privatization, 193–257 setting, 218 tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232 of the tragedy of the commons model, 456 on use of resources, 3 Linkages among institutions, 27 establishing appropriate, 465–466 Linking Social and Ecological Systems, 316 Literature, commons, 27, 72n, 118–144, 455 intellectual history, 6–17 Local justice, 75n Local-level institutions, legitimization of, 299 Logic of Collective Action, The, 114 Low-cost enforcement of rules, 462 Lower individual risks, 199 Lumpiness, of monitoring, 75n, 107n M Magnuson-Stevens Act, 202, 227n Maintenance, of common-pool resources. See also Resource management; resource management institutions; Sustainable management hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on, 448 Maintenance levels, relationship of resource allocation to, 102 Malaysia, harvesting of tropical forests in, 270 Mali, herding in, 95 Management. See also Adaptive management; Co-management; Common management; Resource management in Africa, 73n enabling cross-scale linkages, 308–310 in India, 73n multilevel, 15 in the Philippines, 73n successful, 73n, 106 Management institutions, CBMR and TEA regimes as, 237–253 Marginalization, of sheep flocks, 75–76n Marine resources in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 281–283 regimes for, 281–283 Market forces, 72n, 416 effects of emerging and spreading, 42, 56 to implement policy, 193 Market integration, 57 Mating systems, 434n Matrices, for payoff structure, 141 Mauritania, herding in, 95 Maximum economic yield (MEY), 241 Maximum sustainable yield, 10 Maximum use, sustainable yield (MUSY), 241 Measurement of common-pool resources, cost of, 24 Mediated effects, 457 Mediators, 453, 455 Mediterranean Action Plan, 308 Memes, 412 Meritocracies, 429 Methodology in design of tradable permits, 207–209 for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467

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The Drama of the Commons problems of, 69 for researching institutional sustainability, 63–70 traditions of the social sciences, 5 Mexico, irrigation systems in, 97 MEY. See Maximum economic yield Military organizations, 420 Mismanagement, 323 Mobility, 65 Model specification, 47 Moderator variables, 455 Modernist orientation, 380 Monitoring, 181n costs of, 450 in design of tradable permits, 212–215 lumpiness of, 75n, 107n of resource boundaries and harvesting practices, poor, 11 of resources, and users’ compliance with rules, 462–463 various forms of, 67 Moral suasion, 124 Motivation. See also Reciprocally motivated subjects assumptions about, 3 complexity of, 3 diverse, 179 for follow-up on commitments, 135 individual differences in social, 118–121 prosocial vs. proself, 118–121 for willingness to tackle social dilemmas, 139 Multicase comparative methods, for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467 Multilevel evolution, 408–409 group selection, 409 individual-level selection, 408–409 kin selection, 409 Multilevel management, 15 Multiple causation, 67 Multiple equilibria, 174 Multistakeholder bodies cross-scale linkages between, 304 examples of, 305 Multivariate research, large-scale, heterogeneity and commons management in, 87–112 MUSY. See Maximum use, sustainable yield N Nash equilibrium, 157, 163, 174. See also Selfish Nash Equilibrium National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 202, 225n, 329–331 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 353n National practices, 266–267 National Research Council, 480n Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 6–7, 14–17, 28n National Science Foundation, 278 Natural selection, in cultural evolution, 410–411 Nature Conservancy, 373 Necessity, of sanctioning systems, 124–125 Negative externalities, 157 ignored by selfish subjects, 165 for resources, addressing, 463 Nepal, irrigation systems in, 97, 107n Nested CBMRs, 238–239 New England fisheries, example from, 328–329 New England Fisheries Management Council, 332, 353n New institutions, rapidity of the emergence and spread of, 429–430 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations NMFS. See National Marine Fisheries Service NOAA. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Nonconvexities, in production technology, 91 Nonequilibrium thinking, 241 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 269, 304–306, 372 environmental, 274, 280, 282–283, 307, 366 Nonrandom variation, in cultural evolution, 410 Nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23 Norm enforcers, 172 Norms, 135–136 North Pole, control of the use of, 23 NOx budget air pollution control program, 224n O Ocean fisheries declines of, 23 exclusion in, 29n Oceanic ecosystems, 327 fish harvested from, 3

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The Drama of the Commons Olson effects, 38, 90–93 One-shot games, 163–164 One-time interactions, 4, 489 Open access conditions, 234 de facto, 11 vs. common property arrangements, 51 Optimal resource management, economic approach to, 199–200 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 197, 211, 218–219, 227n Origin of Man, 403 Ostrom design principles for institutional sustainability, 50 facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55 Other-regarding behavior, emergence of, 144– 146 Outcome framing, in social dilemmas, 140 Outcomes, 453, 455 Outer space, control of the use of, 23 Overuse, problem of, 3, 18–19, 126 Ownership by governments, 9, 21 of resources, 21 Ozone depletion, 24 P Pakistan, infrastructure investments in, 97, 99 Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 6–7, 14–17 sponsorship of, 28n PAR. See Participatory Action Research Participatory Action Research (PAR), 309–310 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), 309–310 Path dependency, 353n Payoff structure, 159–163 in decision structure of the task, 122– 125, 138 matrices for, 141 PD. See Prisoners’ dilemma Peace. See World peace People’s Biodiversity Registers (PBR), in India, 307 Perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 137–144 causes, 137–139 frames, 140–144 Philippines harvesting of tropical forests in, 270 irrigation systems in, 97 management in, 73n Plan of Pitic, 418 Platteau, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55 Play. See also Game theory protocols of, 127 Players. See Actors Poaching wildlife, 123 Poles, control of the use of North and South, 23 Policy communities, and social movement networks, cross-scale linkages in, 307–308 Policy options, 61 analysis of, 25, 27 using markets to implement, 193 value-maximizing sustainable, 200 Policy target, identifying, 199 Political ecology, 363 in common-pool resource studies, 378– 381 Political interplay, 260 Pollution, 24 of air, 23 of rivers and lakes, 23 vs. extraction, 245–247 Population, role in resource management, 56 Postmodern critical theory and analysis, 368, 380 Poverty in developing countries, 12 hydraulic economy in, 88 Power bargaining, of users, 15 in commons dilemmas, 128–132 Powers, vesting, 27 PRA. See Participatory Rural Appraisal Preconditions, for trading permits, 200–201 Prediction, of behavior, 37–38 Preferences conditional, 145 evolutionary models explaining the nature of, 406–407 heterogeneity of individual, 161 of inequity aversion, 162 for reciprocity and equity, 158–159 for type of public good, 96

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The Drama of the Commons Prisoners’ dilemma (PD), 4, 12, 118, 136, 174, 233, 404 overcoming, 238 Private goods, vs. public, 29n Private property, in the Swiss Alps, 13 Privatization, 95 comparing community-based management to tradable environmental allowances, 233–257 and its limitations, 50–51, 193–257 tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232 Procedural fairness, 159 Processes, 27 deliberative, in decision making, 469–471 that shape heritable genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408 Production technology, nonconvexities in, 91 Progress of the field, 445–454 causal analysis, 447–451 contingent generalizations, 446–447 development and differentiation of typologies, 446 integration of research results, 451–452 toward a conceptual framework, 452–454 Property, 15, 17–18, 27. See also International Association for the Study of Common Property; Panel on Common Property Resource Management in Ethopia, 13 regulatory, 233–257 in the Swiss Alps, 13 in Upper Burma, 13 Property rights, 72n framing of, 142 guarantors of, 58 international donors needing to understand impacts of, 15 Proself motives, 118–121 Prosocial motives, 118–121 Prospect theory, in social dilemmas, 140 Protocols of play, 127 Proximate causes, 408 Psychological research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156 experimental, 113–156 framework for, 115–117 historical roots of, 114–115 primer of, 117–118 recent findings in, 118–144 synthesis of, 144–148 Public domain, 267–268 Public goods, 4, 93 comparing, 176–178 preferences for type of, 96 providing, 20 vs. private, 29n Public officials, corruption in, 13–14 Public property, 267–268 Public radio stations, as a public good, 5 Pulse patterns, 244 Punishment, 124, 181n contributions to the public good with and without, 177 costly, 176–178 Q Question of the Commons, The, 386 R Radon exposure, risks from, 364 Rational actor model dominance of, 4 in game theory, 12 Rational choice, 160 building on existing institutions, 370–372 determining effects in, 367–369 and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375 horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374 muddling through, 374–375 step-wise model of, 365–370 Rational communication, 384 Reciprocally motivated subjects, 175 Reciprocity, 180n preferences for, 158–159 theoretical models of, 159–163 RECLAIM system, 202, 212, 217–219, 226n Reconciliation, of conflicting values and interests, 464 Recursiveness, of evolutionary models, 407 Regimes for marine resources, 281–283 for terrestrial resources, 279–281 Regulatory measures, traditional command and control, 200

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The Drama of the Commons Regulatory property, 233–257 CBMR and TEA regimes as management institutions, 237–253 Reinforcement, 124 Renewable common-pool resources, in the drama of the commons, 22–23 Research. See also Lessons learned; Psychological research; Substantive lessons; Understudied issues case study, 467 collaborative, that enables cross-scale linkages, 308–310 conditional generalizations, 458 general conceptual models, 458 hypotheses, 446–447 integration of results, 451–452 knowledge about causal processes and mechanisms, 458–459 large-scale multivariate, heterogeneity and commons management, 87–112 practical value of, 4, 457–461 theory-driven vs. data-driven, 39 Research directions, 17, 28, 466–479 continuing the systematic development of knowledge, 466–469 Reservoirs, 56 Resilience, 261, 295 building into tradable permit systems, 207 in cross-scale interactions, 313–315 Resource allocation initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209 intrahousehold, 73n relationship to maintenance levels, 102 Resource boundaries, poor monitoring of, 11 Resource complexity, 240–245 CBMRs and, 243–245 TEAs and, 241–243 Resource dilemma. See Commons dilemma Resource economists, early formal analyses of the commons by, 9–11 Resource management. See also Maintenance; Sustainable management economic approach to optimal, 199–200 with imperfect knowledge, 464–465 role of population in, 56 Resource management institutions, 26 and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450 design principles for, 16 external environment, 489 group and individual characteristics, 488–489 institutional arrangements, 487–488 interaction among factors, 489 proposed hypotheses about, 487–489 and resource system characteristics, 488 Resource size, 237–240 CBMRs and, 237–238 nested CBMRs and, 238–239 TEAs and, 239–240 Resource systems, 37–191 appropriating the commons, 157–191 and characteristics of resource management institutions, 488 common resources and institutional sustainability, 41–85 factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156 heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112 and unequal irrigators, 87–112 Resource theft, 123 Resource users. See Users Resources addressing negative externalities for, 463 biological species as, 22, 55 characteristics of, and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450 commerce in, 247–250 environmental effects on, 219–220 exploitation of, 7 heterogeneity of endowment of, 60 intrahousehold allocation of, 73n managing with imperfect knowledge, 464–465 ownership of, 21 race to use, 11 regimes for marine, 281–283 regimes for terrestrial, 279–281 supplements to, 49 of users, initial endowment of, 15 value of, 129–130 viability of institutions to manage, 74n Response function, best in inequity-averse subjects, 165 Result efficiency, 193 Revenue, from fishing effort, 10 Rewards, 124, 160, 180n

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The Drama of the Commons Rights, 72n bundled, 29n in CBMRs, 248–249 of institutions, 347–351 Rio Declaration, 286n Risks individual, 199 from radon exposure, 364 Rivalness of consumption, 19 Rivers, pollution of, 23 Robust design principles, 25 Roman legal system, 417 Rule conformance, 98, 100 Rules ability to build, 5 authority, 98 boundary, 98 choosing, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101–102 compliance with by users, and monitoring the resource, 462–463 difficulty of detecting breakers of, 47 institutional, 45 low-cost enforcement of, 462 as a public good, 20 for transferability, in design of tradable permits, 209–211 wide diversity of, 29n S Sanctioning possibilities common-pool resource game with, 169– 172, 190–191 cost of, 169 value, necessity, and effectiveness of, 124–125 Santa Fe Institute, 312 Scale. See also Cross-scale institutional linkages of common-pool resources, 23–24 of the commons dilemma, 146–147 Scale in cross-scale interactions, 27, 310–315 and adaptive management, 311–313 resilience of, 313–315 Scientific knowledge, as a public good, 5, 20 Scientific uncertainty, 327–359. and collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351 in complex adaptive systems, 334–335 conditional view of, 332–334 example from the New England fisheries, 328–329 and learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340 response to, 329–332 Sea tenure, in interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 271– 276 Segmentary hierarchy of cooperative institutions, 418–425 exploitation of symbolic systems, 420– 423 legitimate institutions, 423–425 Selection group, in multilevel evolution, 409 individual-level, in multilevel evolution, 408–409 by kin, in multilevel evolution, 409 natural, in cultural evolution, 410–411 Self-efficacious groups, 132 Self-interest, 4, 28n Self-organized organizations, emergence of, 456 Selfish Nash Equilibrium (SNE), 165–167, 185–186 Selfish subjects, 28n, 163–164 negative externalities ignored by, 165 Senegal, deforestation in, 95 Sequential protocol, 127 Setting limits, on environmental effects, 218 Settlement, of disputes, 15 Sheep flocks, 56 marginalization of, 75–76n Shellfish, 55 Shrimp. See South Texas shrimp fisheries Sierra Club, 425 Simple CPR game, without reciprocal preferences, 173–174 Sinks biophysical environment as, 29n common-pool, 19, 462 Situated rational choice, 361 building on existing institutions, 370–372 determining effects in, 367–369 and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375 horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374 muddling through, 374–375 step-wise model of, 365–370 Size, of resources, 237–240

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The Drama of the Commons Small-scale cultural evolution, as problem or resource in commons management, 430–432 SNE. See Selfish Nash Equilibrium Social changes, global, 476–477 Social coherence, 108n Social context, 474–477 adapting to change in, 466 globalization syndrome, 475–476 historical context, 477 major demographic changes, 477 other global social changes, 476–477 technological change, 477 Social dilemma situations, 157–195 motives for willingness to tackle, 139 outcome framing in, 140 prospect theory in, 140 Social exchange condition, 122 Social heterogeneity, 146 in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101 Social identification, with communities, 131 Social motives, individual differences in, 118– 121, 144 Social movement networks, in cross-scale linkages, 307–308 Social optimum, calculating, 186 Social sciences methodological traditions of, 5 wide use of evolutionary models in, 412 Social structure of the task, 128–137 communication, 134–137 group size, 132–134 power and status, 128–132 Societies, of hunter-gatherers, 414, 427 South Coast Air Quality Management District, 217 South Pole, control of the use of, 23 South Texas shrimp fisheries, 93 Southeast Asian forests, 270 Space, control of the use of outer, 23 Spatial heterogeneity, 15 Species biological, as resources, 22 concern with the welfare of, 28n Spread of new institutions, rapidity of, 429–430 Stag hunt game, 28n Stakeholders. See Multistakeholder bodies Standard common-pool resource game, 164–169 asymmetric equilibria with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190 Selfish Nash Equilibrium (SNE), 165– 167, 185–186 symmetric equilibria with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188 State California Water Project, 424 State policies, 72n Stationarity, 103 Status, in commons dilemmas, 128–132 Stealing, 123 Step-wise model of situated rational choice, 365–370 Stockholm Declaration, 286n Storage, 103 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 282 Strangers, human proneness to cooperation with , 404 Strategy considerations, in situated rational choice, 369–370 Studies. See Case study research; Common-pool resource studies; Large-n studies of unequal irrigators; Research; Understudied issues Subsistence practices, 266 Subtractability, 20–21, 29n Successful management, 73n, 106 Supply, institutional, problem of, 90, 93 Sustainability, 313 on the commons, critical enabling conditions for, 62–63 institutional, and common resources, 41– 85 Sustainable management best tool for, 25 of common-pool resources, 46–54 Sustainable policy instruments, value-maximizing, 200 Sustainable yield, maximum, 10 Switzerland commons in, 72n private and common property in, 13 Symbolic systems, exploitation of, 420–423 Symbolically marked groups, 422 Symmetric equilibria, with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188 Synthesis in commons dilemmas, 144–148 emergence of other-regarding behavior, 144–146 environmental uncertainty, 148 scale of the dilemma, 146–147 social heterogeneity, 146

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The Drama of the Commons Systems. See also Complex systems; Resource systems; Symbolic systems of land tenure, 267–271 of sea tenure, 271–276 T TAC. See Total allowable catch Tail-end differences, vs. head-end, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 88, 99–100 Tasks decision structure of, 122–127 payoff structure of, 122–125 uncertainty concerning, 125–127 TEA. See Tradable environmental allowances regimes Technology pace of change in, 477 production, nonconvexities in, 91 Temporal dimension, in design of tradable permits, 211–212 Temporal heterogeneity, 15 Tenure systems land, 267–271 sea, 271–276 Terrestrial resources, regimes for, 279–281 Territoriality, 124 Testing, of causal models, 468 Teutonic families, 8 Texas. See South Texas shrimp fisheries Theoretical adequacy, challenges to, 11 Theoretical expectations, unfulfilled, in the tradable permits approach, 223–224 Theoretical explanations, of appropriating the commons, 157–191 Theoretical models of reciprocity and fairness in appropriating the commons, 159–163 preferences of inequity aversion, 162 Theoretical predictions about the common-pool resource game with sanctioning opportunities, 169–172 about the impact of communication, 172– 176 about the standard common-pool resource game, 164–169 Theories of cooperation, 404–412 consistency of evolutionary models with a wide variety of theories, 411–412 evolution as multilevel, 408–409 evolution of culture, 410–411 evolutionary models accounting for genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408 evolutionary models explaining the nature of preferences and institutions, 406–407 extent and diversity of human cooperation, 404–406 huge variation in institutions, 405–406 wide use of evolutionary models in the social sciences, 412 Theory-driven research, vs. data-driven, 39 Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 114 Theory of Moral Sentiments, 115 Third World Network, 308 Timber, harvested from forests, 3 Time preference, rate of, 89 Total allowable catch (TAC), 203, 205–206, 218, 272 Townships, 8 Tradable environmental allowances (TEA) regimes, 27, 193–194 commerce in resources, 247–250 compared with CBMRs, 233–257 extraction vs. pollution, 245–247 as management institutions, 247–250 resource complexity, 240–245 resource size, 237–240 synthesis, 250–253 varying solutions under varying conditions, 237–253 Tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232 the basic economic theory, 199–202 building resilience into tradable permit systems, 207 compared with CBMRS, 233–257 compared with environmental taxes, 201–202 design considerations, 202–216 economic effects, 220–221 environmental effects, 217–220 evaluation criteria, 216–221 implementation feasibility, 216–217 lessons learned, 221–224 Tragedy of the commons model, 6, 114, 157, 467 challenges to, 13 logic of, 3 major limitations of, 87, 456

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The Drama of the Commons Transfer payment condition, 133–134 Transferability rules, in design of tradable permits, 209–211 Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act (New Zealand), 210 Triangulation, increased emphasis on, 468 Tribal social instincts hypothesis, for the evolution of cooperative institutions, 413–415 Trust, 5 Typologies, development and differentiation of, 446 U Ultimate causes, 408 Uncertainty. See also Scientific uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335 conditional view of, 332–334 in decision structure of the task, 125–127 defined, 333 environmental, 148 integrating into decision-making process, 311 reducing cooperation, 126 response to, 329–332 Understanding of actors, generally correct, 459 of institutional design, refining, 469 Understudied issues, 27, 469–479 dynamics of resource management institutions, 469–472 effects of social and historical context, 474–477 extending insights to a broader array of common-pool resources, 472–474 institutional linkages, 477–479 Unequal irrigators and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112 and heterogeneity, 88–96 large-n studies of, 96–102 summary of empirical studies, 104–105 Unfair distribution, of benefits, 66 Unfulfilled theoretical expectations, lessons on the tradable permits approach, 223– 224 United Nations, Conference on Environment and Development, 282 U.S. Agency for International Development, conference sponsored by, 28n U.S. Constitution, 431 position on authority of international conventions, 277 Upper Burma, common property in, 13 Users, 26, 37–191. See also Harvesters; Overuse bargaining power, initial endowment of resources, and shared values of, 15 calculating the numbers of, 23 characteristics of, and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450 compliance with rules by, and monitoring the resource, 462–463 conditional conservation by, 92 defections by, 95 restraint by, 3, 43–44 of water resources, 38 V Validity, questions of empirical, 11, 16 Value-maximizing policy instruments, sustainable, 200 Value of research, 457–461 conditional generalizations, 458 general conceptual models, 458 generally correct understanding of the actors, 459 knowledge about causal processes and mechanisms, 458–459 Values reconciling conflicting, 464 of resources, 129–130 of sanctioning systems, 124–125 shared by users, 15 Variables, 59, 65 functional classification from the commons literature, 455 heritable genetic and cultural, processes that shape through time, 407–408 nonrandom, in cultural evolution, 410 Vertical interplay, 260 Vertical linkages, in institutions for the commons, 293, 372–374, 477–478 Vesting powers, 27 Viability of institutions, to manage resources, 74n Village institutions, 12 free-rider problem in the context of, 12 Violations, 225n Voting institutions, 131

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The Drama of the Commons W Wade, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 48, 54– 55 Water resources in Chile, 203 instream uses of, 219–220 shortages in California, 131, 138, 203 users of, 38 Watercourses, 19 Wealth inequality causal paths describing hypothesized effects on the maintenance of common-pool resources , 448 in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 99 Welfare of other humans, concern with, 28n of species, concern with, 28n WEO. See World Environment Organization Wildlife resources, 55 poaching, 123 Work-around hypothesis of cooperative institutions, 413, 415–418 coercive dominance, 416–418 Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 74n International Forestry Resources and Institutions Program, 76n World Bank, 225n, 385 World Environment Organization (WEO), 265 World peace, as a public good, 5, 20 World Trade Organization (WTO), 265, 308 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 385 World Wildlife Fund Arctic Program, 287n conference sponsored by, 28n WTO. See World Trade Organization WWF. See World Wide Fund for Nature Y Year 2000 Objective, 280 Yield, maximum sustainable, 10 Z Zero-revenue auctions, 226n