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OCR for page 267
New Opportunities for Bilateral Cooperation Glenn E. Schweitzer National Research Council During the workshop, we considered many suggestions for future coopera- tion between governments, between academies, and between individual spe- cialists. I will highlight a few of the suggestions that seem to offer particularly promising themes for such cooperation. Of course, successful cooperation will depend on the level of enthusiasm of our specialists and the interest of sponsors. But there is no doubt that we have addressed some of the most important issues that will confront our two countries, and indeed the world, during the next de- cade and longer. First, in accordance with the suggestion of Academician Velikhov, we have provided a number of publications about high-impact terrorism to the Institute of Nuclear Safety, which in cooperation with other institutes will take the first steps in providing an information center for future interacademy activities in this field. We will try to obtain additional copies of these documents for other interested organizations, and we look forward to receiving similar documents concerning related developments in Russia. Of course we should try to modernize this infor- mation exchange quickly from exchanges of hard copies of documents to ex- changes of electronic databases. We hope to be able to report progress in this area in the near future. Also of special interest is the recommendation of Academician Velikhov to establish a standing interacademy committee that can serve as an umbrella for discussions among American and Russian specialists on many of the topics that have been considered. He undoubtedly will expand on this proposal in the dis- . ~ cusslon penoa. Turning to the specific themes of the workshop, there clearly is a consider- able difference in American and Russian understanding of the term "terrorism." 267

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268 HIGH-IMPACT TERRORISM We do not want to engage in an endless debate over definition. Yet further discussion of the types of activities that are considered by specialists in the two countries as terrorism will undoubtedly be helpful in avoiding misunderstand- ings. Of special interest is the intersection of terrorism and organized crime. This is not simply a question of definition, but it is especially important to improve understanding of how terrorists and criminal organizations fit together and how they operate in separate domains. Although much of our focus has been on the technical aspects of terrorism, we must give continuing attention to the legal dimensions of efforts to thwart terrorism international legal regimes and also national legislative and regulato- ry frameworks. While our academies are not the best organizations to analyze all aspects of the legal underpinnings of counterterrorism efforts, surely as we ad- dress specific forms of terrorism the legal frameworks should be carefully con- sidered alone with the many technical economic social and political dimen- slons. ~ r- A number of participants underscored the importance of discussions of the policy issues as well as sorting out technical aspects of the threats, detection of the threats, and appropriate responses. Such discussions that bring together science and policy would seem to be a particularly appropriate role for our academies. Our Russian colleagues have made several detailed suggestions for major . . . . . cooperative Naves: A working group of American and Russian specialists to address a range of currently neglected issues affecting the likelihood of radiological terrorism, with the purpose of such deliberations being to stimulate actions by the Russian and U.S. governments and by the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen international capabilities to combat this threat; A joint experiment to test the vulnerability of electrical and electronic connections to electromagnetic pulsed power attacks; and Development of scientific guidance for the establishment of an interna- tional center at Vector near Novosibirsk to investigate the epidemiological, diag- nostic, and treatment aspects of outbreaks of infectious diseases. . Other suggestions of themes for joint efforts that were set forth by American and Russian specialists and that are based on preliminary analyses by the spe- cialists include the following: Studies of the many dimensions of information security, including the clarification of the importance and scope of national strategies to improve pro- tection of critical networks and the identification of areas where international cooperation should be strengthened; Assessments of the types of potential terrorist threats directed at facilities that produce or store dangerous industrial chemicals;

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FUTURE TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 269 Development of methodologies for evaluating engineering and other se- curity enhancements that will reduce the vulnerability of a broad range of indus- trial facilities (e.g., nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, airports, metallurgical plants); Consultations of experts on the technical aspects of both marking and tagging of explosives, including record-keeping requirements for taggants and the associated costs; Development of new concepts for more cost-effective destruction of poor- ly secured chemical weapons stockpiles in Russia; Investigations of the feasibility of terrorist groups' assembling radiologi- cal weapons and methods for preventing and detecting such activities; Consideration of the technical details of discriminating between natural outbreaks of diseases and the acts of bioterrorists as well as consideration of the preparations for dealing with the consequences of a bioterrorism attack; Studies of methods for prevention and early detection of animal diseases and for determining the cause of disease outbreaks; Studies of the role of the mass media in terrorism situations and in shap- ing public attitudes toward terrorism; and Joint activities aimed at adapting to the Russian environment the Ameri- can experience in training specialists to deal with terrorism, in developing orga- nizational mechanisms for coordinating activities of many organizations in pre- venting and responding to terrorist attacks, and in using forensic techniques to assist in the search for the instigators of terrorist acts. . The foregoing themes are just the beginning of a long list of topics that are clearly of interest to our academies, and the list will undoubtedly grow and be continuously refined. There are of course more ambitious schemes that should be considered by our governments, such as proposals for joint investigations of incidents and joint training exercises. But my comments have been limited large- ly to interacademy cooperation. Of course, the academies must narrow the list and select several areas where they can indeed have an important impact on international security. In conclusion, I would like to underscore two important points that have been raised by participants. First, any work undertaken in this field must avoid giving terrorists important technical information that could facilitate their efforts to turn hostile intentions into destructive actions. Second, our academies have strong capabilities to provide conceptual approaches and sound methodologies for addressing terrorism concerns; and they can make recommendations to gov- ernments. However, it is the government ministries and departments, and not the academies, that must translate general approaches to counterterrorism into ac- tions at specific facilities, at our borders, and indeed throughout our societies.