Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 141
8
Lessons from Analogous Public
Education Campaigns
Mark R. Rosenzweig
A fundamental challenge in environmental policy is to alter the private
actions of individuals and institutions so that the social costs and bene-
fits of the consequences of those actions are optimally balanced. In
many cases, the net private benefits from an action exceed the net social benefits.
When this divergence is confined to the decisions of a limited number of ac-
tors large firms it is possible for a public agency to effectively regulate the
firms' behavior so as to align social and private benefits.
When millions of individuals are the agents whose cumulative behavior has
an important environmental impact, it is sometimes impractical to attempt to
directly enforce behavioral restrictions. One example is the proper disposal of
batteries. Monitoring this behavior is not feasible. It is administratively possible
to place a tax on batteries to align social and private costs, but such a tax may be
politically unpopular. This is not to say that "ecological" taxes are always polit-
ically unacceptable, as such taxes have been put in place in European countries.
But it is clear there are limits to individual regulation and to taxation as mecha-
nisms for achieving public policy goals, perhaps particularly in the United States,
so that alternative approaches to altering behavior may be warranted.) One alter-
native approach is a program of public education.
Chapters 6 and 7 provide examples of public education programs, most of
which are outside the environmental arena. The issue is whether we can draw
inferences from the experiences described in those chapters to formulate public
education campaigns in the environmental realm. Mileti and Peek' s chapter pro-
vides the lessons learned from efforts to improve "disaster preparedness" among
populations at high risk. Valente and Schuster's chapter describes a number of
public education campaigns, mostly focusing on improving health or the effi-
141
OCR for page 142
42
LESSONS FROM ANALOGOUS PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS
ciency by which households control fertility. Although both the target behaviors
and the methods of information delivery that are the foci of each chapter appear
quite different, they share important features. First, the campaigns are strictly
informational, either about the benefits of changing behavior or about the behav-
iors of "peer" groups. There is no attempt to change people's values. The pre-
sumption is that experts have information that the population does not, and that
the transmission of this information therefore will improve welfare. Second, and
relatedly, the campaigns emphasize private benefits. Individuals are provided
information without reference to externalities or to the collective benefits that
exceed the sum of private benefits.2 Individuals and families presumably want
to avert the consequences of disasters, reduce the risk of heart disease, and
control family size. As a consequence, they have incentives to be better in-
formed they will be interested in what is being delivered.
I will briefly discuss and evaluate each of the cases discussed in Chapters 6
and 7 by considering a set of questions: First, is there evidence that the cam-
paigns actually changed people's behavior? Second, is there evidence that the
campaigns were cost-effective, in the sense that the total costs of the campaign
did not exceed the total benefits? Third, were the campaigns described the most
cost-effective means of achieving the goals, thereby deomonstrating global cost-
effectiveness? Finally, I will assess to what extent these campaigns are helpful
in providing solutions for protecting the environment.
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN DISASTER-PRONE AREAS
Chapter 7 provides a clear example demonstrating that how a public educa-
tion campaign is carried out matters, and that such a campaign can be effective
in altering people's behavior. Anyone interested in improving disaster prepared-
ness through a public education campaign should read Chapter 7; it provides
clear information on what to do and what not to do. However, the chapter does
not attempt to describe the costs or benefits of the campaign. Furthermore, there
is little discussion of its rationale. In particular, it is not clear how markets have
failed such that people' s decisions in a risky environment are suboptimal. There
are two types of actions related to risk. First, there are actions taken at the time
of an adverse natural event. Second, there are actions taken prior to disastrous
events that reduce an individual's vulnerability to disaster, such as bracing a
house or moving out of a risky area. Because in this case individuals face all of
the costs of not being prepared, they presumably have the appropriate incentives
to make whatever risk-reducing costly preparations are in their interest. Or do
they?
One reason individuals may not be optimally preparing for disasters is that
they are effectively protected against the cost of their risk exposure they expect
that if their house is destroyed by a flood, they will be financially "bailed out."
Government programs that provide emergency assistance, for example, reduce
OCR for page 143
MARK R. ROSENZ7VEEIG
143
incentives for individuals to reduce risk ex ante. Such public bailouts also drive
out private insurance. Yet private insurance companies have incentives to set
premiums to reflect risk, inclusive of risk-mitigating actions taken ex ante by
policyholders. For example, premiums presumably would be less for braced
houses, therefore providing an incentive for people to undertake bracing. Many
of these risk-reducing remedies are clearly visible, and thus easily monitored.
The point is that removing barriers to insurance markets may be much more
cost-effective than education campaigns in improving disaster preparedness. We
cannot evaluate a campaign solely by whether it alters behavior.
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND FERTILITY CHANGE
Chapter 6 provides an excellent overview of the issues involved in evaluat-
ing public campaigns in the first sense do they alter behavior? The chapter
demonstrates why this is not easy to do, and is sensitive to the pitfalls of infer-
ring causation from data and to the possibility of alternative interpretations of
statistical findings. The chapter would have been more interesting if it had
focused on the details of one of the campaigns. Chapter 6 gives special attention
to family planning campaigns. Family planning campaigns are perhaps more
relevant to environmental issues than campaigns designed to change people's
diets or exercise habits. Population growth is viewed by many as relevant to
environmental degradation. Fertility decisions taken by families may not fully
reflect the social benefits and costs to the extent that the size and growth rate of
the population has a direct impact on the environment. This is indeed one of the
rationales for the subsidization of family planning efforts, inclusive of both the
subvention of the tools of private fertility regulation (contraceptives) and public
education campaigns.
Public education campaigns directed to altering contraceptive behavior often
have had no impact on behavior. What does this lack of behavioral change tell us
that is useful? I believe it suggests that campaigns will fail if there is an incorrect
diagnosis of the fundamental problem the campaign is attempting to solve in
this case, high fertility. Many family planning education campaigns are purely
informational, providing information on the tools of fertility control. Research-
ers have found that many households are essentially ignorant of modern family
planning methods and practices, and conclude that lack of information is the
barrier to reducing fertility. This may be a false inference, however, because it
ignores the fact that the information people have is the result of choice, reflect-
ing the costs and benefits of acquiring the information. Residents of Manhattan
do not know much about car repair, or in some cases even how to drive. How-
ever, that is not why they do not generally own cars; they do not own cars
because cars are expensive to maintain and cheap alternatives are available.
Similarly, if households in Bolivia, for example, find it optimal to have large
families, based on their preferences or on an evaluation of the costs of children
OCR for page 144
44
LESSONS FROM ANALOGOUS PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS
and their economic benefits, then they have little incentive to inform themselves
about efficient ways of reducing fertility. Ignorance thus may be a symptom of
more fundamental features of the Bolivian economy or society, not a cause.
Providing family planning information to rural Bolivians therefore would have
little effect on behavior if the private value of the information to them is low.
ALTERNATIVE ANALOGUES
The success of the disaster preparedness campaign in terms of altering be-
havior and the lack of effect of the many family planning campaigns apparently
tell us that if information is valuable to individuals they will use it, although it is
not clear from the fact that behavior is altered that the campaign is cost-effective
relative to alternatives. Conversely, if information provides little private benefit,
then an information-based campaign will be ineffective in any sense, even if
there is clear evidence that people do not have the information. It is not at all
clear that providing accurate information about the consequences of behaviors is
the key ingredient that will reduce the environmental damage caused by particu-
lar private actions. For example, recycling provides few private benefits and
clearly has private costs. Moreover, the specific social consequences of whether
an individual recycles or not are minuscule, so making people aware of the
specific damage they cause by not recycling would hardly alter behavior, as is
suggested by the findings in Chapter 4. The recycling example also shows, how-
ever, that information on the behavior of peers may alter individual behavior.
Additional analogous situations may offer more relevant lessons for altering
environmentally related behavior, including those in which private actions have
little private return, but involve large collective effects. Two examples come to
mind. The first example is voting. One person's vote does not count for much.
Yet many people vote, so there is hope that people will act with the collective
good in mind. Many nonpartisan campaigns have been undertaken to increase
voter turnout; perhaps these provide some valuable lessons for changing behav-
ior when it is not in an individual's pure self-interest. Again, however, if we are
interested in global cost-effectiveness, it is not clear why market-based incen-
tives are not more effective than "campaigns" why not give tax benefits to
those who vote, or pay voters directly? The second example is in survey re-
search. Again, there is little private gain to anyone participating in a survey, but
if no one volunteers to participate, there is an important societal loss. Research
exists on augmenting survey participation rates that may be relevant to environ-
mental education campaigns designed to alter behavior when the private benefits
of doing so are negative. Among the findings of this research is that influence
techniques such as frequent prompts and reference to the behavior of others
(which may provide information on social norms) do alter behavior, along with
direct payments.
OCR for page 145
MARK R. ROSENZVEEIG
145
Finally, if purely information "education" campaigns emphasizing private
gains or peer behavior are not effective, then it may be necessary to change
people's values to render behavior more socially beneficial. However, setting in
place governmental efforts that go beyond the dissemination of scientifically
valid information to purposively changing the values of citizens raises ethical
questions that are beyond my expertise. However, I believe they should be of
concern in considering nonregulatory and nonfinancial alternatives to improving
the environmental impact of the choices people make.
NOTES
1 For a discussion of the political feasibility of ecological tax reform, see Von Wiezsacker and
Jesinghaus (1992).
2 Campaigns in the environment arena also emphasize private benefits. For example, cam-
paigns to improve U.S. household energy efficiency involved marketing the idea that households
would benefit by reducing their monthly energy costs.
REFERENCE
Von Wiezsacker, E.U., and J. Jesinghaus
1992 Ecological Tax Reform. London, Eng.: Zed Books.
OCR for page 146
Representative terms from entire chapter:
education campaigns
