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can depend only on the quality and relevance of a demand for research
which can be precisely and flexibly formulated only by those directly
concerned. The orientation of scientific effort is for this reason
becoming a matter more of mechanisms than of objectives."5
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES FOR RESEARCH
Materials science and technology throws into sharp relief, more than
many fields of science alone, the critical importance of the form of national
administrative structures for research. Since materials science and engineer-
ing (MSE) depends so heavily on close relationships between all parts of the
spectrum, from basic research to industrial applications, it is a field of
activity which cuts across what are traditionally departmental boundaries in
the administrative structure. Thus, wherever such boundaries pose problems in
technology transfer, there is hope that MSE will provide a robust vehicle
for surmounting them. This section reviews some of the research administrative
structures that have been developed in various countries, and draws implications
for the administration of materials research in the U.S.
General Outlines of Administrative Structures
The typical approach for federal conduct of R&D in the U.S. is for
mission-oriented departments and agencies, such as DOD, AEC, and NASA, to
have the authority for deploying their resources for research between in-
house and outside laboratories, granting R and/or D contracts to industries,
nonprofit laboratories and universities, and supporting a mix of basic and
applied research. In addition, NSF has traditionally concerned itself with
the health of the nation's science by supporting high-quality academic
research. This administrative system seems relatively unique to the U.S.
For the most part' other countries appear to have administrative systems
which lead to a more clear-cut delineation between organizations responsible
for supporting basic research on the one hand and the mission-oriented
organizations supporting applied work on the other.
In Western Europe, the governments of France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom shoulder the main responsibility for formulating and coordinating
science policy but none of the three has brought all scientific and techno-
logical activities into a single ministry, though the degree of centralization
varies in the different countries. Similarly in Japan, and even Russia,
where national technological planning has perhaps figured more conspicuously
than in other countries, there is no one body responsible for the whole of
technology.
The Research System; OECD, p. 55, 1972e
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United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, responsibility is shared between the Department of
Education and Science (DES - mainly basic research) and the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI - primarily applied and mission-oriented research)
but with considerable freedom for maneuver left to the private sector.
Reporting to the Cabinet is a Central Advisory Council for Science and
Technology (whose current chairman is a well-known metallurgist), the function
of which is to advise on the most effective national strategy for the use and
development of the country's scientific and technical resources.
The DES is responsible, among other things, for governmental policy
regarding the universities and for promoting civil science throughout the
U.K. The Departments' relations with the universities are conducted through
the University Grants Committee (UGC); and its responsibilities for basic
and applied civil science are discharged mainly through the five research
councils: Science, Medical, Agricultural, Natural Environment, and Social
Science. The Department is also responsible for some aspects of international
scientific relations and for governmental policy regarding libraries and
information systems. To advise the head of the Department (Secretary of
State for E and S) in the exercise of his responsibilities for formulating
and executing scientific policy, there is a Council for Scientific Policy
(CSP). Among the issues with which the CSP is concerned is the balance of
scientific effort in those areas within the purview of the DES.
The DTI has as its main objective the assistance of British industry and
commerce to improve their economic and technological strength and competi-
tiveness by establishing a general framework of requirements, incentives, and
restraints within which firms can operate to their own individual advantage.
The DTI, among other things, is responsible for the Atomic Energy Authority,
the National Research and Development Corporation, and six industrial research
establishments including the National Engineering Laboratory, the National
Physical Laboratory, and the Warren Spring Laboratory (primarily chemical
engineering). Besides R&D for industry, these establishments are engaged in
the application of techniques and discoveries to design, production, quality
control, and distribution. The DTI also sponsors research in autonomous
industrial research associations as well as in industry and universities.
A third agency is the Department of the Environment (DE). The DE
has responsibility for the range of functions affecting the physical environ-
ment in which people live and work. These include: Housing and Construction,
Transport, and Environmental Pollution, each of which engages in some
research.
Germany
In Europe, decentralization is most marked in Germany (where, for
example, the Lander retain considerable autonomy in education) - the system
appears to have achieved a high degree of social, political and economic
pluralism, here the initiatives and contributions of the different institu-
tions of the public and private sectors cross-fertilize each other, but
each of the partners retains a large measure of autonomy. Support of basic
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research is mainly in the hands of private organizations -- the
Deutscheforschungsgemainschaft (DFG) and the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPG),
with the federal government primarily involved with applied and mission-
oriented research administered through the "Ministry fur Bildung und
Wissenschaft." There is good cooperation between the ministry and other
agencies, especially DFG, to bring about contacts and joint efforts between
industry and universities. This reflects recognition of the serious communi-
cations gap that has persisted between the academic and the industrial
establishments in Germany where the tradition of the autocratic, independent,
securely tenured, professorships still has a firm hold. Materials research
has played a particularly important role in bringing about more collaboration
both within universities and between universities and industry. Furthermore,
the materials disciplines, including solid-state physics, are receiving much
more attention in all respects than they did five to ten years ago when
nuclear physics dominated science policy.
France
In France, the interministerial structure of the Delegation Generale
a la Recherche Scientifique et Technique indicates an effort to centralize
and coordinate decisions, while executive responsibility is assigned in
particular to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry for Industrial and
Scientific Development. The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
is the mainspring of the French system of financing and performing basic
research. It combines the roles performed by the DFG and MPG in Germany.
Each of the above countries seems to have recognized the impracticality
of detailed planning of fundamental research while feeling the need to ensure
the balanced use of available resources. It has proved difficult to reconcile
the accomplishment of sector missions with the undifferentiated financing of
basic research. But research policies are becoming more inseparable from
national planning policies; they are explicitly included, for example, in
the "national five-year plans" that have been practiced for several decades in
France and, of course, the U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R.
In Russia, the prestigious Academy of Sciences has long exercised a
central responsibility for the nation's research programs carried out in its
own institutes and in the universities, while applied research and develop-
ment of a mission-oriented nature is the responsibility of the various
industrial ministries. Effort to achieve overall coordination has centered
mainly in the Academy of Sciences, but "departmental barriers" between
different research sectors are considerable, and have been overcome in the
case of major Scientific projects only by means of special arrangements. En
the case of the atomic bomb project' this was achieved by the setting-up of
special government agencies, supported by the defense departments, which cut
across existing barriers, involving both the Academy of Sciences and industry
plus a massive authority to exercise priorities for resources. LIore recently
the trend has been for applied R&D to be consolidated under the appropriate
technical ministries.
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Before about 1930, the Academy had been firmly oriented towards
theoretical research or "pure science." During the early 1930's, however,
an effort to associate the Academy, and "pure science" generally, closely
with the industrialization drive, a number of leading engineers and tech-
nologists were elected as Academicians; technological research institutes
were established under the Academy; and in 1935, a separate Division of
Technical Sciences was formed.
Between 1959 and 1963, the role of the Academy in the technological
sciences was strongly called into question. It was argued that the large
technological research establishments within the Academy system did not have
sufficiently-close connections with industry; moreover, because the efforts
of the Academy were overextended, it did not devote enough attention to
leadership in the natural and social sciences. Subsequently, a substantial
number of institutes concerned with applied R&D were transferred from the
Academies to the incus tries concerned .
C zechos lovakia
The Eastern European countries which came under U.S.S.R. influence after
World War II offer unique opportunities to observe what happens when a
country's scientific establishment is reorganized completely along Soviet
lines. The case of Czechoslovakia is particularly interesting since this
country was technologically the most advanced of the countries in question
when Russia took over in 1948.
Paralleling national policy in the U.S.S.R. the Communist government in
Czechoslovakia gave science top priority. At first, a research bureau was
set up to direct all basic and applied research, but in 1952 the Soviet model
of an Academy of Sciences was adopted for coordinating all basic research.
That this was done reflected the high prestige and power of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences. Thus, like the Academy in the Soviet Union, the
Czechoslovakian Academy became relatively disconnected from industry.
Within a few years, the following became the principal features of
science organization in Czechoslovakia:
(a) The Academy was responsible to the government for all basic research
in the natural sciences, mathematics, social sciences, and humanities,
both within its own institutes and the small amount carried on in the
universities;
(b) The universities were restricted very much to teaching, receiving
only very limited support for research;
(c) A relatively large number of applied research institutes under
various Ministries were created with responsibilities for applied
research and development for industry.
The "Basic Research Plan" of the country is divided into many "Problems"
such as nuclear physics, elementary particles, solid-state physics, plasma
physics, analysis, topology. Every Problem is divided into "Sub-problems,"
such as solid-state physics into semiconductor physics, physics of metals,
physics of ionic crystals, structure of solids, ferroelectrics, etc. Each
Sub-problem contains actual topics of research such as, for semiconductors,
"theoretical determination of band structure," "experimental determination of
In
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band structure," "amorphous semiconductors," and so on. These topics usually
denote the actual work done by various groups headed by Candidates of Science.
The division of research into Problems and Sub-problems was fixed in the late
fifties and provided a formal, almost permanent structure for the administra-
tion of planning.
Each year, every research group in every institute of the Academy
suggests the plan of work for the following year; this is discussed in the
Council of the Director of the Institute and then sent to the "Coordinators
for Sub-problems" in the Planning Department of the Academy. After consulta-
tions with all concerned, the Coordinator lists the topics for each Sub-
problem, the responsible investigator, the date of termination of various
phases of the research, and the estimated amount of money required.
The plan assembled in this way has to be approved first by the various
bodies in the Academy. The members of the Academy are divided into Collegia,
such as Collegium of Physics, Collegium of Nuclear Energy, Collegium of
Mathematics, etc. For reviewing the research plan the Collegia are augmented
by others, such as directors of large institutes, a few professors of the
University and a few outstanding scientists from the institutes of the
Academy. One or more members study the proposed problems submitted to the
Collegium for approval and report their findings to the Collegium. Approval,
perhaps with a few suggested changes, is given in principle by voting;
usually the decisions are unanimous.
The Planning Department then assembles all the approved Problems and
presents them at the beginning of the year to the government for the formality
of final approval.
The Coordinator follows the progress of the research effort during the
year. If some work does not proceed as planned, modifications to the plan
are discussed between the Coordinator and the investigator. At the end of
the year a brief performance report is submitted for approval by the
appropriate Collegium. In turn, the Planning Department submits a final
report on the fulfillment of the plan to the General Assembly of the Academy
which, after discussion, approves it by voting, and transmits it to the
Government for the formal final approval.
If taken literally, the Central Planning procedures are exceedingly
tedious and frustrating and call for commitments of research programs towards
well-defined, practical objectives. However, as is not unknown in the West,
ways are found for wording proposals that are politically expedient and yet
leave the scientists relatively free to pursue their work in the way they
judge best.
Funding is not tied directly to each annual proposal in the Plan but
is more in the form of a block grant to the institute. Equipment purchasing
is time-consuming -- large items, such as an electron microscope, have to be
planned for at least two years ahead, while even small equipment Csuch as
voltmeters) requires a year Is advance notice. Restrictions on equipment
imported from the West may cause severe delays.
Attempts at coordinating the work of Academies in various Eastern Bloc
countries have been of only limited success -- limited mainly to exchanges of
scientists, the organization of conferences and summer schools, and exchange
of information about research programs. Joint programs have not developed, in
spite of goodwill among the scientists, mainly because of bureaucratic
difficulties.
I:
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As far as advantages and disadvantages are concerned:
(a) The system provides a fair degree of protection for the scientists since
their research programs are officially approved by the government. As a
result, research in natural sciences enjoys relatively free development.
(b) The planning procedures do not actually make heavy demands on the time of
the scientists and yet they are assured of relatively long-term support
(As a result, in Czechoslovakia remarkable progress was made in chemistry,
physics, and biology (compared to the situation before the War).
(c) The detailed planning results in some program inflexibility. It is
difficult to terminate existing programs in order to provide resources to
start new ones. Thus research programs tend to be perpetuated well beyond
the point of obsolescence.
(d) It is difficult to impose research programs from above principally
because such programs seldom appeal to the scientists who prefer to continue
working on what they choose even if the financial support is somewhat less.
Be) In spite of all the central planning, science as a whole is poorly
coordinated, principally because research plans from different institutes can
be differently worded even if the work is much the same. (The best form of
coordination arises through personal contacts and direct information exchange
at conferences.)
(f) The planning largely fails in the task for which it is primarily created --
to provide a link between basic research and industrial research (see below).
(g) The planning system is inefficient for promoting interdisciplinary
research involving different institutes. Instead, if a physics institute
needs the cooperation of chemists, it generally Was to have them on its own
staff rather than try to arrange collaboration with a chemistry institute.
In the fifties, many scientists in Czechoslovakia were sympathetic to
the notion that most research should have a practical pay-off, but the way in
which industry was organized and operated tended to frustrate effective
cooperation between the Academy scientists and the industrial engineers.
There seemed to be strong indications of the "Not Invented Here" syndrome
in industry which had set up its own development or technological institutes.
But also, industrial planning was much more specific and tied to clear-cut
objectives. If these objectives were met, there were bonuses. On the other
hand, the bonus could still be obtained despite failure to meet the objective
if the failure could be attributed to bad advice or information from the
Academy scientists.
Another negative feature of the bonus system in industry was that
individual workers were encouraged in this way to make suggestions that
would lead primarily to cost savings in production. The result was often a
decrease in the quality of the product. Such a system worked against intro-
ducing potentially more costly, even if better, ideas stemming from research.
The fact that the customers had virtually no product choice also gave little
incentive for product quality.
Thus, in ways such as these the Academies became the whipping-boys for
industry. And in every dispute with industry the politicians tended to side
with industry.
As an example, when engineers in the electronics industry became inter-
ested in solid-state devices they initially obtained information from Academy
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scientists. This information was then declared "useless," the industrial
institute claimed it had to make many "technology improvements," and thereby
earned its bonus. Nevertheless, Academy scientists did see some of their
work being applied in industry and this led, in turn, to useful informal
contacts at the working level. However, for obvious reasons these were
generally frowned upon by upper management, especially in industry, and the
scientists had to spend much effort to defend themselves against various
accusations. They noticed, however, after a time, that such difficulties
did not arise when their work had no practical applications. Thus, the
Academy work tended to become more fundamental and more detached from in-
dustrial application. Some institutes acquired a high reputation for their
research and when this was noted by influential Academicians in the U.S.S.R.
it came as a surprise to the government which had heard nothing but com-
plaints about the Academy from industry. So, in due course, a modus vivendi
or co-existence with relatively little interaction developed between the
Academy, the research institutes, and industry.
Japan
Japan uses separate organizations for supporting basic and applied
research -- principally the Ministry of Education for the former and the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry CMITI) and other technical
ministries for the latter. The Prime Minister is advised in scientific
matters by two committees: the Council for Science and Technology, an arm
of the central Science and Technology Agency which links the various
Ministries and Agencies and is comprised of various key ministers and external
"men of learning;" and the Science Council of Japan which is a representative
organization of Japanese scientists.
The role of MITI in implementing national science and technology policy
is worth reviewing. MITI generates an overall plan for the direction in
which technology is to develop in Japan, determines the subsidy or funding
which is to be provided, and determines which organizations are to undertake
the initial development and then the subsequent steps. MITI administers 16
laboratories with a staff of 2600 researchers. The following are some
examples of recent actions taken by MITI:
(a) In 1968 MITI held talks with representatives of various Japanese electric
and electronic manufacturers to consider the future course of integrated
circuit (IC) production, as well as current problems. The Ministry was par-
ticularly concerned over the fact that more than ten firms were producing
IC's on a small scale, whereas mass production was considered to have many
benefits. As a result of these talks, an Integrated Circuit Council was
established by nine of the manufacturers with a view to advancing the IC
industry through closer cooperation among manufacturers an well as backup
from the government. The next step was the standardization of IC's into a
modest number of types with the aim of mass producing this smaller quantity
at lower cost. Subsequently, some of the restrictions on the kinds of IC's
that could be undertaken were eased as the industry gained strength.
(b) MITI undertook the same general pattern in the computer industry where,
under its guidance, six computer manufacturers agreed to concentrate
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production on certain standard types of computers and output devices on a
division-of-labor basis. It was agreed which of these manufacturers would
produce which units.
(c) MITI undertook to regulate the equipment investment by 57 companies in
the electronics industry during fiscal 1969. The program called specifically
for increased investment in the manufacture of electronic computers, for the
volume production of integrated circuits, for increased production of color
TV sets and related parts, and for increased output of electronic desk-top
calculators and tape recorders.
(d) Another project undertaken by MITI was the development of electric
automobiles. As might be expected, the initial effort was to concentrate on
high-power batteries which could be used to run such a car. The electric
automobile program now is being carried out under six phases. The first is
the development of five types of experimental vehicles by five separate
companies; second, the development of a reinforced plastic body; the third,
development of batteries by three firms; fourth, the development of motor
controls by three firms; fifth and sixth are research on battery-charging
systems and research on utility systems.
(e) MITI has formed plans to integrate some 20 oil development enterprises in
the country into groups of three or four firms in order to promote effective
operations for overseas oil resources. It appears that they have been
dissatisfied with the previous effort of one company which did not have the
resources itself to carry on a program of this magnitude.
(f) MITI is now establishing a basic policy for setting up a special enter-
prise for the development of Japan's next civil air transport plane. It is
said that this will be undertaken jointly with some foreign aircraft firm,
possibly Boeing.
(g) MITI has formed a plan to control the steelmaking capacity of the country
by reducing the number of blast furnaces in operation, as larger and more
modern blast furnaces are put into service. The pattern for the control of
the capacity is based on a long-range projection of the nation's steel
supplies and demands. It is recognized that there could be ill-effects not
only domestically because of overproduction, but also in international
relations because of the drive to export as a consequence of such excess
capacity.
(h) MITI recently placed extra emphasis on modernization of the polyvinyl-
chloride industry. This move was undertaken because that industry was
suffering seriously from falling profits in the Japanese petrochemical in-
dustrial sector. The modernization would include establishment of a joint
export company and the formation of a joint government-industry organization
to regulate the expansion of facilities.
(i) MITI has worked out a "stockpile system" to help assure a stable supply
of important basic materials like oil and nonferrous metals. The aims are
to avoid emergency supply shortages caused by disasters or accidents and
the encountering of sharp increases in market prices, as well as to strengthen
Japan's bargaining powers in negotiating purchases from overseas sources.
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Other Countries
It is interesting that in some smaller, but technically advanced,
countries, such as Belgium and Sweden, responsibility for science rests with
the Prime Minister and is not delegated.
Centralized or Decentralized Administration?
This question has been discussed by Brooks6 in a broader framework but
it is particularly pertinent to the administration of MSE.
The aims of science policy in the future will be more diversified, but
also more coherent, and will be designed to produce innovations comprising
important nontechnological components.
Research policy during the next few years will, therefore, include an
increasing variety of circumscribed and even highly-specific programs. It
may be thought that such a situation requires flexible agencies endowed with
wide autonomy, capable of reacting quickly to events without deviating from
the missions assigned to them. A careful selection and integration of a
wide range of changing and sometimes conflicting options, however, seems to
call for some central decision-making mechanism.
It is not surprising that the proper balance between the pluralistic and
the centralized systems is a matter of continuing debate. In practice, there
is no national system of science policy that follows either model in its
simplest form. Any viable system of science policy must involve some blend
of the two idealized approaches. Each tends, with time, to develop its own
rigidities and limitations, and some shift in the mix from time to time may
actually be beneficial.
Many national systems that recently approximated the centralized model
are now moving towards a more pluralistic or sectoral approach. There appears
to be a convergence of all systems of national science policy towards arrange-
ments that embody elements of both idealized models.
The mixed scheme fairly closely resembles that of most large science-
based firms. Such companies often have research arms attached to each of
their operations or product divisions, in addition to a corporate laboratory
responsible for long-range research aimed at developing new products and
operations, and providing a general technical background for all the firms
activities and decisions.
To summarize more specifically, experience in various countries indicates
that a certain proportion of the total R&D funds should be allocated centrally
by a scientific agency concerned mainly with longer-term research, while
another part of the R&D funds should be allocated by those responsible for
individual sectors. There should be sufficient overlap between the research
supported in the two different ways so that there is a continuous two-way
flow of information and personnel between the scientific and operating areas.
H. Brooks' Science, Growth and Society, OECD, Paris' 1971.
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There is an additional problem of coordination, where goal planning in-
volves the intersection of various sectors, both technical and nontechnical.
Science is then only one resource included in the planning and, under such
circumstances, the planning function may have to develop in a single type
of staff agency -- an agency with projection, forecasting and analysis
functions rather than just a coordinating agency for science and technology.
Some of the principal features of the pluralistic and centralized model, are
summarized in Table 8.6.
Discussion of Administrative Structures in the U.S.S.R. and the U.K.
Further insight may be gained concerning the effects of various adminis-
trative structures by examining such structures in the U.S.S.R., generally
regarded as a centralized model, and the U.K., generally regarded as closer
to the pluralistic model. These remarks are based on information given in
"National Science Policies in Europe," UNESCO, Paris, 1910; "Science Policy
.
in the USSR,': OECD, Paris, 1969; and 'tA Framework for Government Research and
Development," Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1911 (the "Rothschild-
Dainton Debated.
U.S.S.R.
The main organizations administering science policy in the U.S.S.R. are
the Academy of Sciences for basic research and the various ministries for
applied research. All are subordinate to the Council of Ministers (Cabinet).
Many of the ministries possess their own substantial R&D networks, controlled
from the center. Likewise, the Academy of Sciences exercises central control
over research in natural and social sciences in many Soviet institutions.
Thus, in principle, the degree of central control of all science is very high
Prior to 1965, the Academy was also responsible for numerous applied research
institutes, but in 1965 these were transferred to appropriate technical
ministries. At the same time the Academy's responsibilities for the natural
and social sciences were increased. The Soviet Academy is now responsible
for managing the research of its own establishments and for planning and
supervising all research in the natural and social sciences, whether carried
out at its own establishments, in the Union-Republican Academies of Sciences,
or in Higher Educational Establishments. How far the planning and coordinat-
ing powders of the Academy are effective is not clear. Within the Academy
itself, complaints abound that research plans are simply bureaucratic com-
pilations of independent projects, and that science councils are often mere
talking-groups which lack the powers to enforce their decisions. It is also
difficult to assess how far the Soviet Academy influences the activities of
Republican Academies and of Higher Educational Establishments.
The available evidence reflects a rather complicated process in which
attempts at central planning of fundamental research, often somewhat
bureaucratic, have been coupled with a situation in which much of the
direction of research is determined by individual scientists rather than by
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Table 8.6 Comparison of Pluralistic and Centralized Model of Research
Programming
PLURALISTIC MODEL
CENTRALIZED MODEL
STRUCTURE
Resources assigned to each
policy sector as a whole --
e.g. defense, health, trans-
port, etc.
All resources for R&D given
to a single agency for
allocation among sectors.
ADVANTAGES
1) R&D is well coupled to
the operational needs of vari-
ous social goals and is more
responsive to these needs.
2) New technological opportun-
ities and scientific knowledge
likely to be brought quickly
to attention of relevant
sector.
1) Facilitates more effec-
tive use of limited techni-
cal resources -- manpower,
facilities and money.
2) Encourages development of
overall coherent policy for
technical activity that
avoids disruption of
scientific establishment
caused by sudden policy
shifts.
3) Can have high flexibility
and adaptability.
DISADVANTAGES
1) Places long-term and short-
term needs of the sector in
direct competition with each
other.
2) Definition of scientific
and technological goals in the
sector tend to become static.
3) Sector becomes less alert
ton new technical stimuli from
elsewhere.
1) Likely to be less respon-
sive to the operational
needs of the various
sectors.
2) Results of research can
more easily be ignored or
overlooked in sectoral
planning.
3) May result in some
rigidity or excessive con-
servatism in the operational
aims of the various sectors.
USES
When sectoral goals are
fairly constant and the
total resources available
to the sector are growing.
Situation of limited
resources and uncertain or
rapidly-shifting social
goals.
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the central authorities. In the post-war period, the problem of coordinating
all R&D activities was acute. While each industrial ministry possessed
substantial powers over its own R&D network, the authorities responsible for
coordinating the work of the separate research networks (the U.S.S.R.
Academy in the case of fundamental research, the U.S.S.R. Gosplan in the case
of new technologies) lacked sufficient power to influence the activities
of the major ministries.
The first real attempt to achieve such overall coordination was made in
1961, with the creation of the State Committee for the Coordination of
Scientific Research (since 1965, the State Committee for Science and
Technology).
The new Committee received powers to create new scientific establish-
ments, to approve the list of lead institutes, to decide priorities, to
discontinue research, and to allocate research projects to particular
institutes. It soon became evident, however, that these powers were
insufficient to achieve effective coordination. The Academy of Sciences,
which remained independent of the new Committee, became in effect a "ministry"
for the natural and social sciences. The various central authorities which
administered research organizations between 1957 and 1965 often proved strong
enough to resist the attempts of the new State Committee for Coordination of
Scientific Research to control their research. More generally, its work was
undoubtedly hindered by some hostility to the unified planned management of
the development of science.
After 1965 the conception of overall administrative coordination of
science was no longer maintained. Attention shifted to increasing the
efficiency of scientific organizations, ways to accelerate the use of
scientific and technical discoveries in the national economy, and to long-
range (10 to 15 years) scientific and technological forecasting upon which
to base the selection of directions for technical progress and developing
the national economy.
The new instruments and agencies for planning and coordinating R&D still
tend to reflect the administrative gap between the different phases of the
research-to-production cycle. At the center, the State Committee for Science
and Technology is apparently responsible fo,- only R&D per se, up to and
including the prototype stage; production, including the first industrial
batch of a new product, is handled by Gosplan. At the same time, the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences continues to bear the main responsibility for research
in the natural and social sciences, and its plan for these sciences does
not form part of the annual Plan for Scientific Research and New Technology.
It seems that the centralized planning system in its present form
imposes definite limits on the efficiency of Soviet R&D and that the problem
of generally increasing R&D efficiency depends on the successful modification
of the planning system as a whole. Key questions here are the proposed
decentralization of decision-making; the introduction of noncompulsory,
financial and economic instruments of plan implementation; and the use of
consumer's preferences and market equilibrium as major functions in setting
planned targets.
1
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U.K. - The Rothschild-Dainton Debate
The present framework for government R&D has been reviewed recently by
two committees. The first, chaired by Lord Rothschild, Head of the
Government's Central Policy Review Staff, was concerned with the overall
organization and management of government R&D, and mainly applied R&D. The
second, undertaken by the Council for Science Policy within the Department
for Education and Science, concerns the future of the research council
system.
The Rothschild (R) Report "is based on the principle that applied R&D...
must be done on a customer-contractor basis. The customer says what he
wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the customer pays." Pointing
specifically at the Research Councils, R notes that the latter, particularly
the Medical, Agricultural and Natural Environment Research Councils, claim
that much of their work is "applied." "But this work had and has no customer
to commission and approve it. This is wrong. However, distinguished,
intelligent and practical scientists may be, they cannot be so well qualified
to decide what the needs of the nation are, and their priorities, as those
responsible for ensuring that those needs are met. This is why applied R&D
must have a customer."
R also declares that "it is sometimes said, for example, that development
should be done by different people, in a different place, and with a different
administrative system from research. The reverse is the case, whenever
possible." Regarding the technological importance of chance observations in
basic research, "the country's needs are not so trivial as to be left to the
mercies of a form of scientific roulette." As for the often argued fuzziness
in the distinction between pure and applied research, R does not accept this.
R notes that virtually all applied R&D laboratories sooner or later
indulge in some research not directly related to customer-commissioned
programs and amounting, on the average, to an expenditure of about 10% of
these programs. This expenditure should be regarded as a surcharge on the
applied work and covers research done for the following reasons:
(a) To engage in basic research in a field relevant to the applied tasks of
the laboratory, but which is not being done elsewhere.
(b) To test out new, way-out, or unprogrammed ideas of the scientists and
engineers.
(c) To maintain expertise, e.g. to recruit and keep a spectroscopist who will
not join the laboratory unless he can spend part of his time on his own
research.
(d) To facilitate the transition of researchers from academic life to that in
an applied R&D organization.
[N.B. This seems like an incomplete view of the role of research within
organizations whose primary responsibility is applied work. Other values of
basic research that might be listed are:
(e) To establish or enhance the reputation of the laboratory within the
general scientific community.
(f) To facilitate Communication between the laboratory and the general
scientific community by having people with relevant interests and common
language, a communication link that is important for obtaining advance
notice of important developments elsewhere.
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(g) To help set the tone and generate confidence within the laboratory by
having scientists who, by digging deeply, show that science does work.]
R states that it is important to accept the concept of multifunctional
laboratories and institutes which can serve several customers from different
departments.
To implement the establishment of the customer-contractor principle, R
recommends that B27.1 million out of E109.5 million now devoted to the
Research Councils by the DES should be transferred to the various other
governmental ministries and departments concerned, that all other work per-
formed by the Councils on behalf of other departments should be paid for by
the latter.
As is to be expected, the views expressed in the Dainton (D) Report are
somewhat different. Stirred by the above writing on the wall, D rises to
the defense of science, emphasizing particularly the importance of obtaining
knowledge and the benefits to mankind that result from such endeavors. In
contrast to R. D argues that "the adjectives, 'pure' and 'applied' imply a
division where none should exist and their use can be harmful. In the course
of his work the engineer or technologist makes use of experiment and theory
in just the same way as the 'pure' scientist, and at least as great demands
are likely to be put upon his intelligence, judgment and imagination."
Again: "The historical boundaries of scientific disciplines are becoming
increasingly blurred. Multi- and interdisciplinary studies grow apace and as
a result old boundaries dissolve and the links between seemingly disparate
parts grow stronger. This internal cohesion of science is one of its most
characteristic features and will surely increase rather than diminish."
Rather than categorize science into "pure" and "applied," D finds it
useful to identify the following three categories:
'3(a) Tactical science -- the science and its application and development
needed by department of state and by industry to further their immediate
executive or commercial functions. The extent and nature of this
activity may vary widely according to the functions served and to the
degree that they involve science. At one extreme it may contain a sig-
nificant element of sophisticated research over a long period, while at
the other extreme it amounts to little more than a modest intelligence
and advisory activity.
(b) Strategic science -- the broad spread of more general scientific effort
which is needed as a foundation for this tactical science. It is no
less relevant in terms of practical objective...but more wide ranging.
For this 'strategic' work to be successful, it is necessary to maintain
the vigor of the underlying scientific disciplines and to deploy these
disciplines with due regard to national goals.
(c) Basic science -- research and training which have no specific application
in view but which are necessary to insure the advance of scientific
knowledge and the maintenance of a corps of able scientists, upon which
depends the future ability of the country to use science."
D emphasizes that the distinctions between these categories are fuzzy
and that the "users" of scientific knowledge and of scientific personnel
also need to have close connections with basic and strategic science as well
as with tactical science.
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The purpose of the Research Councils is broadly to foster research and
training. To do so they operate flexibly, in many ways including the follow-
ing:
(a) Provide grants to support research in universities.
(b) Provide awards to support students proceeding to higher degrees.
(c) Establish research units, usually at universities, staffed by employees
of the Research Councils.
(d) Provide special experimental facilities for universities.
(e) Provide grants to independent research agencies.
(f) Carry out their own research programs in their own research institutions.
(g) Participate in international scientific projects providing facilities for
researchers from the U.K.
A large element in the policy of the Research Councils has been and will
continue to be to support projects on scientific merit in terms of timeliness
and promise. The Councils also choose for particular support areas they
judge to be of national importance. Additionally, they often find it
necessary to encourage the concentration of activity and resources.
The Research Councils interact with a wide range of ministries and
departments. For example, the Science Research Council (which is the one
most relevant for MSE) has major links with:
British Broadcasting Corporation
Central Electricity Generating Board
Department of the Environment
Department of Trade and Industry
Independent Television Authority
Ministry of Aviation Supply
Ministry of Defense
Post Office
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority,
in addition to many links with industrial firms and organizations.
In considering the Research Councils, D believes the most important
general points to keep in mind are: the pervasiveness of the consequences
of science, the diversity of its users, the complexity of the connections
between basic research and related economic benefits, the close relationships
between different scientific disciplines, and the unifying importance of
training in the methods of research. But in addition D recognizes that:
(a) There is now some public disillusion with science and some of its
technological consequences so that one cannot assume there will be
general assent to the proposition that more science will make the nation
wiser and richer.
(b) Because of the pressure of other demands on resources, we are now
probably past the point of maximum growth rate of resources for science.
(Note that, to some extent, the increasing cost of experimentation to
produce the same 'amount' of good science can be partially offset by
international collaboration and by selectivity in the support of science).
(c) Particularly because of these increasing social and financial pressures,
it is imperative that those responsible for determining scientific
priorities should be fully informed of, and should pay due regard to,
governmental policy and national needs."
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(d) There is growing realization that we can no longer expect to improve
existing technologies or introduce new developments by simple application
of knowledge based on the physical and biological sciences. Increasingly,
we need to know more about ways in which such new knowledge can be used
in harmony with the economic and human needs of the situation. And this
calls for a much closer integration between the natural sciences and the
social sciences, not only in research but also in the broader training of
able people so that we may deploy our knowledge in ways which will give
optimal benefit to the community.
D is clearly struck by the growing interaction and erosion of boundaries
between the scientific disciplines, "by the great extent of multi- and inter-
disciplinary work and by the rapidly increasing tendency for the interactions
between the disciplines to grow stronger. The interactions are facilitated
by having productive and imaginative scientists in day-to-day contact with
colleagues working on related scientific projects with whom they can
collaborate directly in new research. An interaction of this sort is quite
unpredictable both in its nature and in the nature and extent of its con-
sequences which may be the emergence of an entirely new area of scientific
activity or the application of a particular scientific technique to an
entirely different field of science. To maintain therefore strong and
flexible linkages between scientists working in these fields it is important
that they should be within the same organization, administered by people
who recognize the benefit of these interactions, and should not be dispersed
to executive (i.e., functional) departments. For the same reason it is
necessary to have a coherent policy for the whole of this scientific
activity, especially during a period when costs are likely to grow more
rapidly than resources."
The above argument is used to defend the organization of the Research
Councils and their strong links with many departments; fragmentation of the
Councils among these departments is held not to be the answer. By way of
an example, "the applied psychology work which is undertaken by the Medical
Research Council is of very considerable value to the Post Office, the
Ministry of Defense, to the Department of Trade and Industry, and to industry
generally. To allocate an activity of this kind to a particular government
department would create difficulties for the other interested departments
and would involve fragmentation of existing teams of scientists making their
work much less effective than it otherwise would be." Moreover, an additional
complex of linkages and coordinating committees would be needed. Under the
present arrangement, the Research Councils act as a relatively simple focal
point for all these interactions.
D finds it illogical, on the one hand, to assert the unity of science
and the fluidity of its internal boundaries, and on the other hand, to
approve a system of completely independent Research Councils, each of which
can only operate within relatively rigid boundaries set by its individual
charter. D is then led to propose only a slight modification of the current
arrangement, namely, that a Board should be appointed to coordinate and
administer the activities of the five Research Councils and that this Board
would replace the (advisory) Council for Science Policy. The Board would
consist of a Chairman, the scientific heads of the Research Councils, members
from the most relevant governmental organizations, and various others from
outside the government.
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To sum up, Dainton is arguing in favor of retaining the management of
the nationts science primarily in the hands of scientists, but he considers
that they should pay more attention than they have done in the past to
societal needs and pressures. He proposes some organizational changes aimed
at making the management of the Research Councils by the scientists more
efficient and responsive. Rothschild, on the other hand, would give the
customer more control over what the scientists do, especially in applied R&D,
but would allow a surcharge in the applied R&D contracts to cover longer-
range pure research. Moreover, he would transfer at least parts of the
Research Councils to the primary customer departments.
Publication of the Rothschild and Dainton Reports aroused strong reaction
in the scientific community, much of it reflecting nervousness among basic
research scientists over the application of Rothschild's customer-contractor
principle. Nevertheless, fairly widespread acceptance of this principle
eventually emerged: the Institute of Physics (London), for example, stated,
"In relation to national needs where departments of state have statutory
duties, the discharge of which involves the need for scientific research,
we agree that the Rothschild customer-contractor principle is appropriate."
Another point that received much emphasis was that, if the governmental
departments were going to take on more of a role in contracting out research
to the Research Councils and elsewhere, they needed to have the intellectual
resources to administer such activities; the customer-contractor principle
would work only if governmental departments were properly equipped to ask
intelligent questions of their potential contractors.
Brooks (Nature, Feb. ll, 1972) has given a U.S. view of the debate. He
is struck by the mildness of the Rothschild proposals when compared with
American reality which has operated largely on the customer-contractor
principle since World War II and, until recently, fairly comfortably.
Nevertheless, Brooks is concerned by Rothschild~s "apparent obliviousness to
some of the evident weaknesses and dangers of the American system: the in-
stability in funding, the effective lack of concern with the integrity and
viability of scientific institutions -- especially the universities -- the
wasteful competition for control over glamorous or spectacular technical
programs, the confusion of technological virtuosity with scientific achieve-
ment, the increasing obsession with narrowly conceived asocial relevance,'
sometimes to the detriment of scientific quality, the exacerbation of competi-
tiveness, 'grantsmanship,' and political maneuvering in the scientific
community."
Much depends on how the customer-contractor principle is applied in
practice. It works best when the relationship between client and supplier Is
a negotiated one between competent scientists rather than dictated by the
client. Its success depends on persons and attitudes as much as on institute
tional forms.
Brooks notes that the Rothschild concept "of multi-purpose applied
laboratories within government has been poorly developed in the U.S. The
so-called "national laboratories" are largely the captive of single agencies
and offer their services to broader national missions at considerable
political risk...It will be very valuable if Britain can successfully develop
and implement this concept of the broad-spectrum multi-purpose laboratory,
with which many ministries and the private sector may contract for technical
work."
Representative terms from entire chapter:
administrative structures
