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Personal Cars and China Appendix B Case Study: Shanghai, China Daniel Sperling, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis Lu Ximing, Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute Zhou Hongchang, Tongji University, Shanghai Shanghai is experiencing rapid economic growth. Affluence is motivating dramatic and far-ranging changes in urban structure, transportation, and energy use. This report examines two transportation trajectories that Shanghai might follow. Shanghai’s metropolitan population of about 16 million people1 continues to grow relatively slowly, but its economy is growing rapidly. The average per capita income is roughly $4,000,2 three times higher than that of the rest of China, and the Shanghai economy is expected to grow at more than 7 percent a year through 2020. Massive new transport system investments planned for the next two decades are aimed at lowering Shanghai’s extremely high population density, supporting economic growth, and enhancing the quality of life. The list of new investments is impressive: expansion of the new airport; construction of a deep-water harbor, three new bridges, and tunnel river crossings; completion of a 200-kilometer (km) modern rapid transit rail system; expansion of suburban highways; and construction of 2,000 km of 1 There is considerable disagreement about Shanghai’s population. According to the official statistics, the Shanghai metropolitan area (including some rural areas) has 13 million registered residents, but it is estimated that 3 million more people also reside there. 2 City-level income data are scarce and highly unreliable. One household survey found per capita income in 2000 to be RMB11,718 (State Statistical Bureau, 2001:311) or $1,415 at the official exchange rate (RMB8.28 = U.S.$1). Other estimates measured as “purchasing power parity” or “gross city product” are three times or more greater (see State Statistical Bureau, 1998).
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Personal Cars and China new and upgraded urban roads. These investments will improve the city’s transportation system, but are costly and threaten greater energy use and air pollution. A central issue in Shanghai’s development is the role of personal vehicles, especially cars. The city currently devotes little land to roads and has only 650,000 cars and trucks, very few of which are privately owned, placing vehicle ownership levels well below those of virtually all cities of similar income. Even with this small number of vehicles, Shanghai already suffers from serious transport-induced air pollution and traffic congestion. Shanghai city planners project a quadrupling of cars and trucks in the city by 2020. This projected increase is premised principally on two factors: (1) rapid income growth, which will make car ownership possible for a much larger segment of the population; and (2) falling vehicle prices resulting from China’s imminent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Prices are expected to fall because of increased competition, compulsory reductions in vehicle tariffs, and easier access to consumer credit. The magnitude of the increase in vehicle use is not certain, however. Even apart from WTO membership, vehicle ownership and use—and their environmental implications—will be strongly influenced by three interrelated policy debates: industrial policy toward the automotive industry, air quality policy, and transportation and urban growth policy. The city’s decisions about vehicle use will be critical in shaping Shanghai’s future. In this case study, which addresses the forces about to transform Shanghai’s transportation system, two transportation scenarios of the future are constructed, drawing upon extensive interviews with decision makers and experts in Shanghai and Beijing. One scenario is premised on rapid motorization, the other on dramatic interventions to restrain car use and energy consumption. Neither is a “business-as-usual” scenario, because this characterization is meaningless in a time of massive investments and policy shifts. Rather, these scenarios are meant to characterize two competing transportation trajectories, taking as given the projected strong economic growth. If the economy grows more slowly, motorization will be slower. Even in the most conservative scenario, though, vehicle travel, vehicle ownership, and energy use increase dramatically. Caution is urged in generalizing the findings of this case study to other cities in developing nations. Shanghai is not a typical Asian city, given its surging economy and its world-class planning capabilities and strong government institutions. However, the conditions for reining in growth are more propitious here than perhaps any other megacity of the world. If the city is effective at restraining vehicle use, Shanghai may serve as a model for other cities in the developing world.
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Personal Cars and China FIGURE B-1 Shanghai. SOURCE: Re-created from Wu (1999) and Shanghai Map Publishing House, 1997. SHANGHAI: A CITY IN TRANSITION Sixteen million people reside in the 6,340 km2 of Shanghai, located on the eastern coast of China in the Yangtze River Delta. The population density of the central city currently averages 22,700 persons per square kilometer. The densest area exceeds 60,000 persons per square kilometer, roughly three times that of Manhattan (Mei et al., 1998:126; Kenworthy and Laube, 1999:429; Wu, 1999:210). Much of the total land area is rural (Mei et al., 1998:119). The older urban area comprises 280 square kilometers, and a newly urbanized area on the opposite side of the Huangpu River covers another 130 km2 (see Figure B-1). The urban area of Shanghai is thus about twice the size of Washington, D.C. (Kenworthy and Laube, 1999:393). As a result of market forces and deliberate planning policies, city authorities expect the urban area to expand from 410 km2 today to 1,100 km2 in 2010 (Mei et al. 1998:128; Wu, 1999:210, Figure 2).
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Personal Cars and China Shanghai is one of only four cities in China to have the status of a province rather than a municipality. As a result, Shanghai has a higher profile and greater access to national funds than most other cities. Even so, infrastructure spending in Shanghai was low until the 1990s. Because of historical political considerations, the central government did not return a proportionate share of the large tax revenues collected in Shanghai. Housing was in bad repair, as was commercial and industrial space, and road capacity per capita was among the lowest in the world (Wu, 1999:209). These conditions have changed. Infrastructure funding from local and central government sources, domestic and foreign investment, and international loans have sharply increased (Wu, 1999:207). Massive construction of office and residential space, transportation infrastructure, and public utilities is under way. This massive investment in infrastructure is due partly to the city’s thriving economy. The city has grown faster than the national average, and is widely expected to exceed the nation’s forecasted economic growth of 7 percent a year into the foreseeable future.3 A central feature of Shanghai’s development plans is to reduce its high population density. The local planning authority is pursuing a plan of multicentralization by building eleven satellite cities to siphon portions of the population away from the dense core. Substantial relocation of industry to these cities has already occurred, and many high-rise apartment buildings are under construction. Multicentralization is not a unique phenomenon or goal; it is the de facto or formal planning strategy of most major cities around the world, though Shanghai is pursing this goal more aggressively and deliberately than most. SHANGHAI’S TRANSPORTATION PICTURE Despite rapid economic growth, vehicle ownership remains remarkably low in Shanghai. Meanwhile, the city has been investing huge sums in road and rail infrastructure, in part to support decentralization of the city. More infrastructure, satellite cities, and population dispersion will mean more cars, energy use, and environmental stress (see Box B-1). Shanghai’s development has been shaped by its historical role as China’s largest seaport. Railways, highways, inland canals, and ocean ship- 3 See State Statistical Bureau (1998) for Shanghai growth rates. For forecasts of future national growth, see Stiglitz (1997).
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Personal Cars and China BOX B-1 Comprehensive Transportation Planning for Shanghai City Among major Chinese cities confronting rapidly accelerating motorization, Shanghai has the lowest ratio of cars to population. Although Shanghai is not free of pollution or congestion, it has less of each than Beijing and Guangzhou. This situation has been achieved largely through the use of regulations, incentives, and fees imposed by Shanghai’s municipal government to preserve the city’s unique character and environment. Under the five-year plan for the automotive industry, however, policy related to automobile ownership and use will be coordinated at the national level. Shanghai is therefore in the process of adjusting its planning so that it can join the national movement toward motorization while protecting commerce, transport, and the urban environment. Shanghai’s experience with transportation management and the options under consideration may be useful to other municipalities facing similar challenges. Those assessing the future economic development of China, including the Shanghai region, predict a 10 percent increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) during 2001–2005, the years covered by the tenth five-year plan. The increase in Shanghai is uncertain, with growth during the next 15 years projected to be about 7 percent. The city’s population is estimated to reach from 17.5 to 21 million and the number of motor vehicles to reach between 2 and 3.5 million. For Shanghai, the implications of the expected population and transportation pressure are clear: planning for the suitable development of transportation facilities must begin immediately. For planning purposes, Shanghai has adopted three principles: development, integration, and prioritization. The development principle means attempting to achieve moderate growth, while preparing for higher growth and avoiding wasted resources if the growth should be lower. Planners must dynamically balance the improvement in transportation services with the rate of growth, try to develop transportation facilities moderately ahead of schedule, and adopt an effective system for traffic demand management. The integration principle means integrating all traffic systems into a single organic system, including transportation facilities and land use and economic policies. The prioritization principle calls for investing first in the projects that will have the most important impact, making best use of advanced transportation management methods to create a highly efficient and fair traffic system. Present Status of Comprehensive Planning In 1992 a consortium of municipal organizations in Shanghai completed the Shanghai Comprehensive Transportation Planning system, SCTP1, with the technical assistance of overseas experts. Since then, the population and the state of motorization have changed as a result of economic develop-
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Personal Cars and China ment policies. At the end of 2000 a revised plan, SCTP2, was announced, based on the second citywide transportation research survey in 1995 and a series of other commissioned studies. The studies noted a series of specific problems with the current transportation system that require correction: The system lacks integration among the different travel modes within the public transportation system. The capacity of roads and the coverage of the rail network are insufficient. The level of management and service is still low. Because the roads are crowded, bus schedules lag and compete ineffectually with bicycles and motorcycles. Some roads are underused, and the rail transportation system is not used efficiently. The traffic flow and environmental quality are not good. Pedestrians, bicycles, and autos are jammed together, resulting in high accident rates and worsening pollution, especially from motorcycles. SCTP2 will attempt to prepare Shanghai to meet the future challenges just described, and, in doing so, will adopt a focus that extends beyond the city center to the entire metropolitan area. During the interval between the completion of SCTP1 in 1992 and the initiation of SCTP2 in 2000, the city transportation system did not stand still. During the 1990s the length of roads increased 40 percent, to 6,829 km, the reach of public transportation increased 13 percent, to 23,007 km, and the total number of motor vehicles increased 250 percent, to nearly 700,000. Finally, three new subway lines were added, with a total length of 65 km. Furthermore during this period, the standard of transportation service was upgraded significantly, and public transportation became more diversified. Taxis made 2 million person-trips a day. During rush hour, the full loading rate of buses was reduced from 8–9 persons per square meter to 5 persons per square meter. The road system also was improved through the addition of 65 km of overhead freeway and the widening of arteries and main streets, and an Adaptive Signal Timing System was adopted to keep traffic running smoothly. Meanwhile, during the 1990s more than 1 million residents moved from the city center to the periphery and the suburbs. In all these changes, the general goal was, and still is, to construct an accessible, convenient, efficient, safe, reliable, and low-polluting transportation system that is up to international standards and conforms to Shanghai’s particular characteristics. Shanghai’s comprehensive transportation system will consist of four linked elements. The passenger transport system will be based on public ground transportation, with taxis and ferries as supplements. The road system will be based on a framework of freeways and artery roads with evenly distributed local streets, including adequate and convenient parking facilities. The linking system with the outside world
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Personal Cars and China will include airports, a deep harbor, an information depot, freeways, and high-speed railways, linked to the citywide road system, the passenger transit system, and the freight system. It will have intermodal terminal facilities, with the capability to support the expected passenger and freight traffic. Finally, the transportation management system will use advanced technologies to ensure smooth operations, safety, environmental protection, and high efficiency. The passenger transport system will embrace four distinct public transport services. The rail system will be expanded, with a capacity ratio of rail transportation to buses of 6:4. The rail system will have three levels: citywide freeway, townwide artery, and interborough main streets. Traditional public ground transportation will support more than half of the passenger trips, serving short- and medium-distance passengers and those traveling to areas not covered by rail. Within the public ground transportation system, priority will be given to buses for parking, traffic flow, and passenger transfer nodes. To help limit congestion, the number of taxis will be controlled to reduce the vacancy rate from 50 percent to 30 percent. The role of ferries also will be reduced, with an emphasis on providing more service for bicycles. Finally, terminals will be built to facilitate passenger use of the multimodal system. The road system will be designed specifically to increase the capacity of the downtown street area. Downtown roads will be classified as freeways, arteries, main streets, or local streets. New, outgoing arteries from downtown will serve the new suburban cities, airports, and industrial areas, with speed limits higher than on ring roads and internodal connectors, for both passengers and freight. Part of the road system will be designated for freight to expedite commercial activity without causing excess congestion of central areas. Bicycle lanes will be constructed, and separation of motor vehicles and nonmotorized vehicles will be maintained. Similarly, the pedestrian environment will be protected, with walk signals and pedestrian malls in commercial areas. A new comprehensive parking system, with fees and space designed to limit auto traffic in the city center, will include public parking lots for the transportation nodes in the suburbs. Perhaps most important, a traffic management system will be developed to manage the time distribution and space distribution of traffic flow, using methods such as land use management, toll fees, parking restrictions, information guidance for drivers, and restricted area policies. The goal will be to create a modern traffic environment suitable for an international metropolis. The Adaptive Signal Timing System will be expanded and improved. A major feature of the new system will be an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) based on information technology. The main information resources of the ITS will include real-time traffic flow, socioeconomic information, parking availability, vehicular traffic, freight traffic, police status, and a basic geographic information system. The ITS will enable the Shanghai authorities to monitor and respond to changes in the vehicle
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Personal Cars and China population and patterns of use, to employ new roads and other facilities rapidly after they are placed in service, and to evaluate continually the effectiveness of the transportation management system to provide optimal service at all times. Safety will be a primary goal of the traffic management system, and safeguards for pedestrians and bicycles will receive high priority. Among the measures being considered are designating exclusive lanes for buses in the downtown area, controlling the emissions and noise of motor vehicles, separating motor vehicles from nonmotorized vehicles and pedestrians from vehicles, optimizing signal time slots to reduce the emissions caused by deceleration and low speed, reducing the traffic accident frequency, strengthening inspection requirements for vehicles and roads, and accelerating the replacement of old, poor, and damaged cars to improve the overall standard of Shanghai’s road transportation system. —Lu Ximing Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute ping lines meet in Shanghai to exchange freight and passengers. Since the late 1970s economic activity and intercity movement of passengers and goods have sharply increased. Shanghai’s port handles 18 percent of the nation’s exports, and ranks sixth in the world in capacity (China Mingbao News, September 21, 2000). With the booming economy, the seaport is becoming busier. Land delivery of goods through Shanghai’s urban transport system also is increasing. Like almost everywhere else in the world, highway transport of passenger and freight has increased faster than railway and sea transport, and airline transport has increased fastest of all. Thus both passenger and freight transport in Shanghai have gradually shifted to more energy-intensive modes (State Statistical Bureau, 1998). Intracity travel, on the other hand, has relied on modes of travel that consume very little energy. Until about 1990 almost all travel was by foot, bicycle, or bus. Cars, scooters and motorcycles were rare. Over the last two decades, bicycles have gradually assumed a larger role, replacing walking, and buses have continued to account for a large share of passenger travel. By the end of the 1980s Shanghai reportedly had the largest urban bus system in the world, and the number of riders was still increasing. But limited funding was leading to lagging investments in network expansion, bus amenities, and service frequency. As a result this deterioration of service, combined with higher personal incomes, other, more personalized modes became relatively more attractive.
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Personal Cars and China Shanghai responded in the 1990s in several ways. To restrain large and growing bus subsidies, it introduced competition into the bus supply system. Other cities in China did the same, but Shanghai pursued change more aggressively than most. In Shanghai the municipal bus company was deregulated, and several independent operating companies were created to compete for operating concessions. Bus data from different sources conflict, but all agree that Shanghai continued to have the largest bus system in China through the 1990s, though passenger volumes were shrinking.4 Shanghai planners anticipate renewed growth in bus travel in the coming decades, with ridership doubling by 2020. They expect that continuing reforms will strengthen the bus industry and that new road infrastructure will be built to serve buses. Plans include building six elevated busways to facilitate bus travel in congested areas. Planners expect the doubling of bus ridership in part because of a large overall increase in passenger travel. Residents started traveling more and further in the 1980s and increasingly so in the 1990s not only because of income growth, but also because of industry relocation. The movement of factories from the central city to the periphery created long commutes for many workers. Because the newly developed areas were not densely populated, and therefore not profitable to serve, bus companies provided limited service. And because the commuting distance was often too far for bicycles, motorized two-wheelers (scooters and small motorcycles) became a popular mode of travel. The automobile population in Shanghai is well below the world average for cities of similar income levels. The vehicle population began to expand rapidly in the 1990s, increasing from 300,000 to 600,000 between 1990 and 1998 (Xia and Lu, 1999:22) and reaching about 650,000 in 2000. Businesses and governments own most of these vehicles. About 40,000 are taxis. Individuals own only about 15,000–50,000.5 The city government controlled new vehicle registrations with a high vehicle registration fee through 1998. The city has used an auction system for vehicle registrations since then. 4 See, for example, Stares and Zhi (1995b:489) and Chang (1999/2000). 5 Official sources from 1998 indicate 10,000 privately owned vehicles (see Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute, 1998; Rao, 1999). Informally, city officials indicate the number is closer to 20,000. But the car manufacturing companies in Shanghai indicate that their employees own about 10,000 vehicles by themselves. Executives at the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, the Chinese holding company for joint ventures with Volkswagen, General Motors, and others, indicate that an additional 30,000 or so employees of major Shanghai companies own their own vehicles but have registered their vehicles through their employers—and thus the city does not record those 30,000 or so as privately owned.
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Personal Cars and China Even with the small vehicle population, the streets are congested— the result of high population density, many pedestrians and bicycles, and limited road infrastructure. Bicycling and walking are the primary means of travel, together accounting for over 60 percent of total trips taken in 1995 in Shanghai (Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute, 1997a:5). Shanghai residents own 6–7 million bicycles (roughly one for every two residents), plus 250,000 scooters and small motorcycles, and about 500,000 mopeds (less than 50 cubic centimeters).6 The scooter and motorcycle population is declining in the central city area because of new restrictions on the registration of new scooters and other vehicles with two-stroke engines. These restrictions are premised on air pollution and safety concerns. This decline may be temporary, however. As incomes increase, travel patterns disperse, and cleaner-burning four-stroke engines (and perhaps battery-powered two-wheelers) become available, sales of motorcycles and scooters are likely to surge. Because most walking and bicycling trips are short, measuring the modal split by passenger-kilometers traveled paints a different picture than measuring it by number of trips, as indicated by Figure B-2.7 Motorized travel now accounts for about two-thirds of all passenger-kilometers traveled. About two-fifths of that motorized travel is by car and motorized two-wheelers.8 Although the absolute number of vehicles is still relatively small, traffic congestion and air pollution are becoming severe. By 1993 transportation accounted for most of Shanghai’s urban air pollution, contributing an estimated 90 percent of carbon monoxide, 92 percent of volatile organic gases, and 23 percent of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. In 1996 monitor- 6 Written briefing provided by Shanghai government planners for visiting National Academy of Sciences committee, May 16, 2001, and affirmed by senior planners. Also see Ying (1998:155). 7 Modal shares measured in terms of passenger-kilometers are calculated using estimates of typical travel distances by mode, average loads on each mode, and number of trips by mode. To estimate passenger-kilometers, multiply the number of passengers by the distance traveled. For example, 10 passenger-kilometers could equal 1 passenger traveling 10 kilometers or 10 passengers traveling 1 kilometer. 8 Not all sources agree on transportation statistics presented here. For example, Shanghai government data indicate somewhat lower nonmotorized shares than World Bank sources (see Chang, 1999/2000:24). These data uncertainties do not, however, undermine the central observation that nonmotorized travel in Shanghai continues to be unusually high, facilitated by the city’s high population density and mixed land uses. Mixed land use, meaning combined rather than separate areas for industrial, commercial, and residential use, tends to result in fewer long-distance trips, especially in cities, because shopping, work, and school destinations can be more clustered.
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Personal Cars and China FIGURE B-2 Travel by mode, Shanghai. A. Modal split by number of trips (1995); B. Modal split by number of passenger-kilometers traveled (2000). SOURCES: Lu et al. (1996) and Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute (1997a). ing data indicated that transportation accounted for 56 percent of NOx emissions (Chen, 1997). To limit air pollution and traffic congestion, city officials began capping the registration of all new cars and trucks in 1998 at 50,000 annually (Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute, 1998). The government also limits ownership of motorized two-wheelers. In 1996 Shanghai capped the registration of mopeds (under 50 cc), allowing owners to transfer registrations to new mopeds but not to purchase additional mopeds, and soon after banned the use of all scooters and motorcycles (over 50 cc) from the city center. The only unrestricted motorized vehicles are two-wheelers powered by batteries, but few of these are available.9 These motorcycles and scooters are unlike those seen in the United States and most of Western Europe. They are very small, with inexpensive two-stroke engines that are inefficient and highly polluting. The largest ones are almost all less than 150 cc, much smaller than most scooters and motorcycles in the United States. Restrictions on motorized two-wheelers stem in part from their high emissions and noise. They also are perceived as unsafe because they mix with slower moving bicycles and often are driven aggressively by young 9 A mandate in Taiwan requiring a growing proportion of zero emissions (battery-powered) two-wheelers suggests that this new technology may become more competitive in the near future.
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Personal Cars and China SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE Vehicle ownership and use will soar in Shanghai under any plausible scenario. But with more vehicles and travel will come more air pollution, energy use, GHG emissions, and road infrastructure costs. These impacts can be mitigated by restraining vehicle ownership and use. At times, the impacts also can be mitigated independent of one another and sometimes even independent of vehicle use. They are not necessarily locked into a fixed relationship with motorization. The best, but not only, example of targeted strategies is air pollution control. Enhanced emissions control technology can greatly reduce air pollution from conventional internal combustion engine vehicles. Indeed, China is already embarking on that path with the adoption of Euro II emissions standards. Energy use and GHG emissions are far more difficult to reduce. In the most extreme case, fossil energy use and GHG emissions could be almost completely eliminated—without changing car ownership levels—by substituting nonfossil energy sources. In less extreme scenarios, energy consumption (and therefore greenhouse gases) could be reduced by reducing the size and weight of vehicles and the combustion efficiency of the engines. Vehicles can be large sedans or small minicars, and they can use relatively inefficient conventional internal combustion engines or highly efficient advanced diesel engines and fuel cells. A small, efficient vehicle, for example, would consume as little as one-tenth of the energy consumed by a large, gas-guzzling sport-utility vehicle. And demand for road space can be reduced, not only be restraining vehicle use, but also by downsizing vehicles, managing roadways more efficiently (for example, with advanced traffic management technologies), and creating new car-sharing ownership mechanisms. Exactly how Shanghai develops will have far-reaching implications for Shanghai’s economic, environmental, and social well-being. Here two scenarios of Shanghai’s transport future are postulated. Each is motivated by a different set of political, economic, and environmental conditions. Scenarios are commonly employed to deal with complexity and uncertainty in forecasting. Ideally, the researchers generate relevant information using credible research methods and objectively analyze it by means of alternative scenarios of the future that provide upper and lower bounds on a plausible range of motorization levels and adverse environmental impacts. The scenarios reflect realistic, but often quite contrary, development paths. This approach can provide a useful context for the development of a “no regrets” public policy and business strategy. To generate scenarios, the authors interviewed Chinese transportation experts and political leaders in Shanghai and Beijing. They also analyzed historical data and examined various options and strategies. The
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Personal Cars and China TABLE B-2 Energy Use for Vehicles and Fuels, Shanghai, 2000 and 2020 (kilometers per liter of fuel) 2000 2020 Gasoline motor scooter (two-stroke) 32.1 35.5 Gasoline motor scooter (four-stroke) 44.9 49.7 Gasoline minicar 24.7 28.5 Gasoline car 10.7 10.7 Diesel car 15.8 15.8 Diesel bus 3.3 3.3 Gasoline bus 2.2 2.2 NOTES: The average generating mix for China used in calculating GHG emissions for battery electric vehicles (and rail transit) is: 78 percent coal, 15 percent hydro, 4 percent oil, 2 percent nuclear, and 1 percent natural gas. For 2020 the energy consumption, measured as joules or BTUs (British thermal units) of battery electric cars and scooters was estimated to be 10 percent less than that of comparable gasoline vehicles on an energy cycle basis, of compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles to be 5 percent less than that of gasoline cars in terms of propulsion energy, and of hydrogen fuel cell buses to be 50 percent less than that of diesel buses. SOURCE: For details and documentation of fuel consumption estimates, see Zhou et al. (2001) and Delucchi (1997). final set of parameters was specified after extensive consultation among the authors and with others. The two scenarios generated are both premised on consensus forecasts of strong, continued economic growth. If economic growth were faster or slower, vehicle ownership and energy use would be higher or lower than indicated by the scenarios. However, because this study does not address economic policy, economic variables were not considered. Even in the most conservative scenario, assuming continued economic growth, large increases will be experienced in vehicles, energy use, and GHG emissions. Neither scenario is meant to represent (or indicate) “business-asusual,” because even that characterization is meaningless in this period of massive investments and policy shifts. Instead, these scenarios are meant to provide upper and lower bounds on likely increases in motorization and associated transportation impacts over the next 20 years. The key parameters for the two scenarios are presented in Tables B-2 and B-3. They include population,14 amount of motorized and non-motor- 14 The official long-term projection is for Shanghai’s official population to gradually increase from 13 to 16 million (Xia and Lu, 1999:22), equivalent to an actual population of 16 to
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Personal Cars and China TABLE B-3 Key Travel and Population Parameters for Scenarios, 2000 and 2020 2000 2020 Low 2020 High Passengers per vehicle Passenger car 2.5 3.0 2.5 Scooter 1.2 1.3 1.2 Minicar 1.5 1.8 1.5 Bicycle 1.0 1.0 1.0 Bus 27 32 27 Passenger modal split by passenger-kilometer (percent) Gasoline cars 14 25 52 Diesel cars 0 5 0 CNG/LPG cars 1 3 0 Gasoline minicars 0 1 0 Battery and fuel cell minicars 0 4 0 Two-stroke two-wheelers 12 0 2 Electric two-wheelers 0 6 0 Four-stroke two-wheelers 0 7 5 Diesel bus 20 15 15 Gasoline bus 19 1 6 CNG bus 0 3 2 Fuel cell bus 0 2 0 Rail transit 0 16 12 Walking 7 3 3 Bicycle 27 9 3 Total 100 100 100 Population (millions) 16 18 20 Total passenger travel (ratio) 1a 3.4 4.2 a Baseline. NOTE: CNG= compressed natural gas; LPG = liquefied petroleum gas. 18 million. But another future is plausible. Shanghai’s population has increased slowly in recent years, the result of two major policies. The first is the national family planning policy that provides strong incentives for single-child families. The second policy is the local resi-dent registration system that restricts domestic migration. In the future, as the market economy expands and the population of Shanghai ages, it may become increasingly difficult to keep poor rural residents from moving to richer cities like Shanghai. Indeed, Shanghai already houses a “floating population” numbering in the millions. Shanghai will become an increasingly strong magnet for immigration, especially for young workers from rural areas.
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Personal Cars and China ized travel by mode, fuel consumption characteristics, and average vehicle occupancies. High Motorization Scenario This scenario is premised on market forces playing a greater role in the economy, and government playing a lesser role. It is assumed that Shanghai follows the path of fast-growing cities in Asia that have relatively high car ownership and GHG emissions for their income levels. These cities include Bangkok and Jakarta, both known for their high levels of air pollution and traffic congestion. It also is assumed that Shanghai and the central government determine that the automotive industry will be a pillar of economic development, as conceived in the 1990s. Consumer choice is allowed to flourish, and a greater share of wealth is created and managed by the private sector. Following this scenario of expanding private sector initiative and lessening government control, it is postulated that investments in alternative fuels founder, immigration accelerates, and investments in large public infrastructure projects slow, especially for rail transit. The car population increases fourfold, which is the mid-range forecast of the Shanghai City Comprehensive Transportation Planning Institute. Immigration exceeds official forecasts, with the overall population expanding to 20 million (compared with 16 million in 2000 and 18 million in 2020 for the low-emissions scenario). Increased immigration puts pressure on the municipal budget. Although the demand for transport increases greatly and the multicentralization plan is well under way, government is unable to respond as it did in the 1990s. Funding for the rail transit system is suspended after only 5 of the 10 planned lines are built. Those lines that are running are popular, but daily trips by rail are only convenient for a fraction of the population. An increasing share of funds is diverted to buses, which require less capital investment than rail. Bicycle use remains high among the poor. Others walk or use buses. More bike lanes are built to serve the high demand and reduce conflicts with vehicles and buses on mixed-use roads. The shift toward personal motor vehicles (motorcycles, scooters, and cars) accelerates for several reasons. With increased income, reduced car prices, and newly available consumer credit, many more people can purchase vehicles. Frustration over poor-quality buses and longer commutes to work lead to increased car buying. Work trips lengthen because jobs and housing become more dispersed as a result of multicentralization. The private automobile is a symbol of wealth in Shanghai, and wealthier residents use their cars regularly despite deteriorating traffic
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Personal Cars and China FIGURE B-3 Mode of travel in passenger-kilometers, high motorization scenario, 2020. conditions. Dirty, inefficient two-stroke two-wheelers remain banned and are replaced by clean four-stroke and electric scooters. Not only are four-stroke engines much cleaner burning, but they consume about one-third less energy than two-stroke engines (see Table B-2). Nonetheless, their large number and intensive use results in a substantial overall increase in emissions. The central government pursues its plan to create a strong, technologically sophisticated, domestic automotive industry with large investments from international automakers. The principal target markets are large Chinese cities such as Shanghai. Shanghai is successful in attracting a disproportionate share of the automaker investments. City officials relax vehicle taxes and other restrictions in response to the growing political clout of the local automotive industry and local motorists. Cars increase their share of total passenger travel from 15 percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 2020. Scooters and motorcycles drop from 12 to 7 percent, bicycles from 27 to 3 percent, walking from 7 to 3 percent, and mass transit from 39 to 34 percent (see Figure B-3). These reductions in nonmotorized travel are large, but comparable with other major cities. They result from an influx of poor immigrants who cannot afford bicycles, lower population densities, and greater motorization. The net result is a 4.2-fold increase in passenger travel and over a sevenfold increase in energy use.
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Personal Cars and China Low Motorization Scenario In the low motorization scenario, Shanghai follows the path of cities such as Singapore, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. As in Singapore, government plays an active role in restraining vehicle purchases and use. But the challenge is much greater for Shanghai because it is much larger. Motorized travel and energy use are much lower in this scenario. Rail transit plays a large role, providing high-quality service at high capacity; it serves as an attractive alternative to private vehicle use. The availability of high-quality rail transit slows the shift to personal vehicles. Motor vehicle growth management policies, such as limitations on vehicle registrations, continue to be effective. With the population remaining relatively stable and income growing quickly, public resources are available for transportation improvements. The rail transit system is completed on schedule in 2010, and ridership is high. High-density housing is available near rail lines in satellite cities. Extensive bicycle park-and-ride lots at rail stations encourage daily commuters to use bicycles and public transport. The city invests in improved bicycle lanes and high-tech vertical bicycle parking structures at high-volume stations in dense areas. After accession to the WTO, the central government abandons the idea of creating an automotive industry founded on conventional cars and technology. Local companies find it difficult to compete directly with automobiles from the international market. Instead, Shanghai encourages local manufacturers to build minicars, also known as city cars, and agricultural vehicles for rural areas. Disincentives are imposed on the use of larger vehicles. To provide a release for pent-up vehicle demand, Shanghai also provides seed funding, technical assistance, and parking and purchase incentives for the car-sharing organizations proliferating around the city. Minicars become very popular. An increasing number are powered by electricity, although some have small internal combustion engines that burn gasoline and diesel fuel. Some use hybridized combinations of batteries and combustion engines. After 2010 fuel cells are used. Minicars are narrower and approximately half the length of full-size vehicles and therefore cause substantially less traffic congestion and consume much less space for parking. The lower volume of bicycle and vehicle traffic on the roads allows the remaining traffic to move faster, including buses. This gives the Shanghai bus system a strong reputation for reliability and increases ridership. The city continues with its multicentralization strategy, and satellite cities are served primarily by express bus and rail transit. Those who own city cars are able to drive them from the satellite cities to central Shanghai on roads built exclusively for small cars, motorcycles, and scooters. Because they handle only small, light vehicles, such roads take less space and cost much less to build than conventional roads. Sepa-
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Personal Cars and China FIGURE B-4 Mode of travel in passenger-kilometers, low motorization scenario, 2020. rate but contiguous lanes are built to higher standards at higher cost for express buses and freight trucks. In this restrained motorization scenario, cars increase their share of travel from 15 to 38 percent between 2000 and 2020; mass transit, motorcycles, and scooters maintain their current share; and walking and bicycling drop considerably (though the absolute amount of travel by walking and bicycling stays roughly constant) (see Figure B-4). Pollution, energy use, and greenhouse gases are restrained by the use of cleaner fuels and more energy-efficient technologies. The net result in this case is a 3.4-fold increase in passenger travel and a fourfold increase in energy use. CONCLUSION To date, Shanghai has been highly effective in managing the demand and supply for transport during a period of explosive economic growth. Transport plans and investments have been well coordinated with larger, broader urban development plans. But strong economic growth is going to create even more pressure for personal transport and even more difficult challenges for Shanghai’s leaders. Will Shanghai side with those who believe that primary emphasis must be placed on industrial development and serving people’s desires
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Personal Cars and China for personal transport? This policy approach supports major investments in the automotive industry, with recognition that the presence of a strong automotive industry inevitably undermines efforts to restrain vehicle use. This approach follows that of other cities and nations, including South Korea and Brazil. Or will Shanghai maintain tight control of vehicle growth and use? Will it follow the path of cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and to some extent Tokyo, which restrained vehicle use? Shanghai will experience a large increase in vehicles and energy use into the foreseeable future. The two scenarios presented here represent a plausible upper and lower trajectory of motorization and transport investments. Although both represent rapid growth, the gap between the two expands rapidly, with implications for Shanghai’s economic, environmental, and social well-being. Many factors influence Shanghai’s development path, not all of which are under Shanghai’s control. These factors include (1) national and local support of the domestic automotive industry; (2) the effect of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization on consumer credit and vehicle availability and prices; (3) success of the multicentralization plan; (4) investments in bus and rail transit; (5) investments in road infrastructure; (6) control and pricing of parking and road use; (7) policies for motorcycles and scooters; and (8) population growth rates. The vast difference between the two scenarios suggests that there are many opportunities to influence motorization and its adverse effects. Shanghai is already actively pursuing a broad range of transportation policies and investments. Major investments are being made in rail transit and busways; conventional roads, bridges, and tunnels, many of which support the multicentralization strategies of Shanghai; “intelligent” transportation technologies for traffic control; and new freight transport terminals and distribution centers on the outskirts of the city (important in helping divert large intercity trucks away from city streets). Existing efforts appear well organized, and policies and programs seem well integrated across various levels of city planning. But escalating demand for increased travel and vehicle ownership will create pressure for change. If the high economic and environmental cost of motorization is to be restrained, redoubled commitment to these policies is necessary now. Especially important are commitments to public transportation and restraints on car use. At the heart of these expanded initiatives is provision of a high-quality array of transportation options to travelers, including enhanced mass transit services for those otherwise inclined to shift to personal vehicles. This strategy would lead to better use of existing infrastructure and less need for infrastructure investment.
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Personal Cars and China Although Shanghai is unique in many respects, virtually all of the fundamental strategies and policies examined in this case study, and even most of the specific actions, are applicable to other cities. Some of the strategies and actions proposed by the Shanghai’s planning agencies are described in Box B-1. To the extent that Shanghai can restrain motorization and its adverse effects by adopting such recommendations, as in the low motorization scenario, it could serve as a model for other cities in the developing world. However, if vehicle use, energy consumption, and greenhouse gases skyrocket in Shanghai, as in the high motorization scenario, it is a signal that restraint of motorization will be virtually impossible throughout the developing world. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS An earlier version of this chapter was prepared for and published by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change in Washington, D.C. The Center was established by the Pew Charitable Trusts to bring a new cooperative approach and critical scientific, economic, and technological expertise to the global climate change debate. The Center is independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan. Important contributions to this chapter from Deborah Salon and Mark Delucchi of the University of California, Davis, are gratefully acknowledged. REFERENCES Bose, R., D. Sperling, K. S. Nesamani, G. Tiwari, M. Delucchi, L. Redmond, and L. Schipper. 2001.Transportation in Developing Countries: Greenhouse Gas Scenarios for Delhi, India. Washington, D.C.: Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Carsharing 2000: Sustainable transport’s missing link. 2000. Journal of World Transport Policy and Practice (special issue) 5 (September). Chang, D. T. 1999/2000. A new era for public transport development in China. Woodrow Wilson Center’s China Environment Series, Issue 3. Washington, D.C. Chen C. 1997. Shanghai urban motor vehicle emission pollution reduction strategies. Report for World Bank Project D5, July. Delucchi, M. A. 1997. A Revised Model of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from the Use of Transportation Fuels and Electricity. Institute of Transportation Studies, UCD-ITS-RR-97-22. University of California, Davis, November. Energy Foundation. 2000. China eliminates 238 vehicle fees to encourage automobile ownership. China Clippings 7(June):16. Focas, C., ed. 1998. The Four World Cities Transportation Study. London: London Research Center. Gakenheimer, R., and D. DeLisi. 2000. Urban China Adjusting to Motorization: A Place for Car Sharing? Cooperative Mobility Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May.
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