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Introduction
Background
The space shuttle had 94 successful flights beginning with the
Orbiter Columbia in 1981 until the Challenger accident on January 2S,
1986. The Challenger loss caused a general reassessment of the space
shuttle program.
The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident in its report made several recommendations that included a
redesign of the Solid Rocket Motor, a review of critical items in
shuttle components, and several aspects of safety. NASA formed a
large number of in-house and contractor teams to review technical,
operational, and management aspects of the space shuttle program.
After an anticipated resumption of space shuttle flights in July
1987, NASA later announced a postponement of the launch target date to
the first quarter of 1988.
The Air Force announced that it would not be using its Vandenberg
Launch Site for the space shuttle before 1992. Furthermore, it
presently has a program for production and development of expendable
launch vehicles with orders for 23 Titan IVs (formerly known as Titan
34D7s) and plans for medium launch vehicles (MLVs).
On August 15, 1986, President Reagan announced that a fourth
Orbiter would be built to replace Challenger and that the space
shuttle would no longer be used to launch commercial payloads.
The present study is in response to a Congressional request in the
aftermath of the Challenger accident, for an assessment of possible
space shuttle flight rates and their implications in respect to
payloads and the need for expendable launch vehicles.
Approach of the Study Panel
-
The ad hoc panel met on July 21-22 and August 11-12, 1986, at the
National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. In addition, ~ panel
members visited the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and 3 visited the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in connection with information presented to
the entire panel. Members also met with Admiral Richard H. Truly,
Associate Administrator for Space Flight, at NASA headquarters.
During the meetings, briefings were presented -by NASA personnel
from the Office of Space Flight and the Office of the Space Station,
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JSC, the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and KSC, as well as
contractors from Martin Marietta External Tank Division, Rockwell
International Corporation, Rocketdyne, the Lockheed Space Operations
Company, Grumman, and Morton Thiokol. The panel held discussions with
staff from the Office of Management and Budget and the Strategic
Defense Initiative Office, as well as with representatives of the
commercial communications satellite industry (Hughes Communications
Company, RCA Astro-Electronics Company, and Ford Aerospace and
Communications Corporation) and the launch vehicle industry (General
Dynamics, Martin Marietta, and Arianespace). In addition, much
written testimony was received as noted in Appendix G.
Since the study request, 2 events have occurred that affect
assumptions: In July 1986, NASA announced there would be a delay of
at least 24 months in resumption of shuttle flights, and on August 15,
1986, the President announced the intent to build a fourth Orbiter and
to take NASA out of the business of launching private satellites,
except under special circumstances. The panel took note of both of
these announcements in preparing the following report.
This report states each of the requested assessments followed by
the ad hoc panel response. In order to present its findings as
clearly as possible, the panel opted to provide concise statements in
the body of the report and more extensive background information and
details in the appendixes. Subjects covered in greater depth in the
appendixes include shuttle launch rates, launch utilization, logistics
considerations, cost trade-offs, and the national commitment to a
sustained manned spaceflight program.
The report builds upon the 1983 report of the Committee on NASA
Scientific and Technological Program Reviews, the Assessment of
Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates, which analyzed the
individual components determining flight rates.
This report assesses certain specific technical issues but neither
endorses nor criticizes the general nature of NASA's programs.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
challenger accident
