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Introduction Background The space shuttle had 2n successful flights beginning with the Orbiter Columbia in l98l until the Challenger accident on January 28, l986. The Challenger loss caused a general reassessment of the space shuttle program. The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident in its report made several recommendations that included a redesign of the Solid Rocket Motor, a review of critical items in shuttle components, and several aspects of safety. NASA formed a large number of in-house and contractor teams to review technical, operational, and management aspects of the space shuttle program. After an anticipated resumption of space shuttle flights in July l987, NASA later announced a postponement of the launch target date to the first quarter of l988. The Air Force announced that it would not be using its Vandenberg Launch Site for the space shuttle before l992. Furthermore, it presently has a program for production and development of expendable launch vehicles with orders for 23 Titan IVs (formerly known as Titan 34D7s) and plans for medium launch vehicles (MLVs). On August l5, l986, President Reagan announced that a fourth Orbiter would be built to replace Challenger and that the space shuttle would no longer be used to launch commercial payloads. The present study is in response to a Congressional request in the aftermath of the Challenger accident, for an assessment of possible space shuttle flight rates and their implications in respect to payloads and the need for expendable launch vehicles. Approach of the Study Panel The ad hoc panel met on July 2l-22 and August ll-l2, l986, at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. In addition, 2 panel members visited the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and 3 visited the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in connection with information presented to the entire panel. Members also met with Admiral Richard H. Truly, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, at NASA headquarters. During the meetings, briefings were presented by NASA personnel from the Office of Space Flight and the Office of the Space Station,
JSC, the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and KSC, as well as contractors from Martin Marietta External Tank Division, Rockwell International Corporation, Rocketdyne, the Lockheed Space Operations Company, Grumman, and Morton Thiokol. The panel held discussions with staff from the Office of Management and Budget and the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, as well as with representatives of the commercial communications satellite industry (Hughes Communications Company, RCA Astro-Electronics Company, and Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation) and the launch vehicle industry (General Dynamics, Martin Marietta, and Arianespace). In addition, much written testimony was received as noted in Appendix G. Since the study request, 2 events have occurred that affect assumptions: In July l986, NASA announced there would be a delay of at least 24 months in resumption of shuttle flights, and on August l5, l9bb, the President announced the intent to build a fourth Orbiter and to take NASA out of the business of launching private satellites, except under special circumstances. The panel took note of both of these announcements in preparing the following report. This report states each of the requested assessments followed by the ad hoc panel response. In order to present its findings as clearly as possible, the panel opted to provide concise statements in the body of the report and more extensive background information and details in the appendixes. Subjects covered in greater depth in the appendixes include shuttle launch rates, launch utilization, logistics considerations, cost trade-offs, and the national commitment to a sustained manned spaceflight program. The report builds upon the l983 report of the Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews, the Assessment of Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates, which analyzed the individual components determining flight rates. This report assesses certain specific technical issues but neither endorses nor criticizes the general nature of NASA's programs.
