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APPENDIX B ESTABLISHING REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS The Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee of the National Research Council land its opening meeting on September 22, 1986, in Washington, D C This appendix contains the following key references leading up to its establishment Report cuff the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, William P Rogers,Chairman,June6, 19X6 Excerpt Vol. 1,pp 198-199,Recommendations introduction and Recommendation TI! Letter from the President of the United States to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, June 13, 19X6, directing that the recommendations of the Presidential Commission be implemented Letter from the Administrator of NASA to the Chairman, National Research Council, July 3 1986, requesting the NRC to form an audit panel as called for in Recommendation IT! of the Presidential Commission Page 91 Letter from the Chairman off the National Research Council to the Administrator of NASA, July 15, 1986, agreeing to establish an audit panel under the National Research Council 93 Report to the President Actions try pent tile ~ecr'''~zen~ations of TI7e I'residential C,~'ission o'' the Space ~~7~`tt/e (,/7~7~/e''ger Acci`]e~'t, NASA, July 14, 1986, excerpt from In. I9. .5t`~te'~tent Off Task, COtllillittc'e ()n Space Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit, Noven~ber 12, 1986 (revision) 6 87 94 95

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['residenlial ~ ommission on the S'nat e Shuttle ~ hallenger Ar dicier June 6, 1986 Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Commission, it is my privilege to present the report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Since being sworn in on February 6, 1986, the Commission has been able to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the Challenger accident. This report documents our findings and makes recommendations for your consideration. Our objective has been not only to prevent any recurrence of the failure related to this accident, but to the extent pos- sible to reduce other risks in future flights. However, the Commission did not construe its mandate to require a detailed evaluation of the entire Shuttle system. It fully recognizes -that the risk associated with space flight cannot be totally eliminated. Each member of the Commission shared the pain and anguish the nation felt at the loss of seven brave Americans in the Challenger accident on January 28, 1986. The nation's task now is to move ahead to return to safe space flight and to its recognized position of leadership in space. There could be no more fitting tribute to the Challenger crew than to do so. Sincerely, William A. Rogers Chairman The President of the United States The White House Washington, D. C. 20500 TV Mar~lan~iA`~t Ss~ utashington n( 20024 (202~453-14~)5

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': 6 EXCERPTS FROM: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident William P. Rogers, Chairman June 6, 1986 Pages ~ 98-] 99 Recommendations f Its Tt~ Chin has ~ `'ncluc tell an ~ ~;- tc nail e ins ~ ~7ti~gati`~n of the Challen- g~ r ac ~ ident to determine the prob- ab1c cause and necessary corrective aft tions Bc~xecl on the tindin~7 and detc rn~ination~7 `'f its ins csti~;ation. the Cr~mmis~7ion has unanirnou~71y adopted recommendations to help .ssurc this return tt' cafe flight. Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors should review all Criticality 1, 1R, 2, and 2R items and hazard analyses. This review should identify those items that must be improved prior The C`'n~nission urges that the Administrator `~t NASA submit. cone year from no``, a report t`' the President on the progress that NASA has remade in effc~tin~g the Commission'.s recommen- clc~tion~7~7et forth below: - IT} to IlIgnt to ensure mission success and flight safe- ty. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National Research Council. should verify the ~flem''~r`~ of . 1 . rr . ~ 7 ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ..~ fine effort and report directly to the Administrator of NASA. 89

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THE WHITE HOUSE WA S H ING T ON June 13, 1986 Dear Jim: 1 6 ~ have completed my remew of the report from the Commission on the Space Shuttle CHALLENGER Accident. ~ believe that a program must be undertaken to inclement its recommenda- tions as soon as possible. The procedural and organizational changes suggested in the report will be essential to resuming effective and efficient Space Transportation System operations, and win be crucial in restoring U.S. space launch activities to full operational status. Specifically, ~ would like NASA to report back to me in 30 days on how and when the Commission's recommendations win be implemented. This report should include milestones by which progress in the implementation process can be measured. Let me emphasize, as ~ have so many times, that the men and women of NASA and the tasks they so ably perform are essential to the nation if we are to rend our leadership the pursuit of technological and scientific progress. Despite misfortunes and setbacks, we are determined to press on in our space programs. Again, Jim, we turn to you for leadership. You anti the NASA team have our support and our blessings to do what has to be clone to make our space program safe, reliable, and a source of pride to our nation and of benefit to all mankind. look forward] to receiving your report on implementing the Commiesion's recommendations. Sincerely, The Honorable James C. Fletcher Administrator N ation a] Aeronautic e and Space Aciministration Washington, D. C. 20546 90

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N/\SA National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington D C 20546 Office of the Administrator Dr. Frank Press Chairman National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, DC 20418 Dear Frank: JUt 3 186 On May 20, 1986, I wrote to you requesting that the National Research Council (NRC) form an oversight committee to review the work of NASA and our contractors in the necessary redesign, retest, and recertification of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM). Your letter of June 2, 1986, provided NRC acceptance of this request, and the committee is now heavily involved in its work. I believe that a very effective relationship has been established among the parties involved. These actions are consistent with the first recommendation of the Pr~irl~nti~1 Cornrnic~cir~n ran ohm Cm,-^ Ch.~~ 1~ I_ Accident. e~1 ~VIIU111~ IVII All Lll~ Jeans JIIULLI~ GF1~1 1~19~ I must now, however, ask you for further assistance as we take the actions necessary to return the Shuttle to flight status. Recommendation III states that NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors should review all Criticality I, TR, 2, and OR items and hazard analyses and that the review should identify those items that must be improved prior to flight to ensure mission success and flight safety. The Commission also recommends that "An audit panel appointed by the National Research Council should verify the adequacy of the effort and report directly to the Administrator of NASA." This letter is to request that the NRC form such an audit panel, verify the adequacy of the effort, and report to me. 6 The review of these criticality items is under way within the STS program at this time and is anticipated to be completed in early 1987. The current review is being conducted at the individual project level with program level reviews scheduled to begin in the fall. A review of our approach by your panel would be most helpful prior to the beginning of the program level reviews. Subsequent plans for participation by the panel in the process and the reviews will be developed following this initial review. NASA will provide the audit panel with access to all information and technical data necessary to perform the functions of the review. Background and orientation briefings will be provided by NASA and appropriate contractor personnel to permit the panel to proceed with their assessment. Additional meetings and data exchanges with NASA and/or contractor personnel will be arranged as requested by the panel. The principal NASA contact during the course of the review will be Mr. Jay F. Honeycutt of the Office of Space Flight, telephone 453-1261. The expense of the work of the committee will be covered by an addition to NASW-3511. 91

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I appreciate the willingness of the National Research Council to undertake this audit responsibility. Sincerely, j{,i4} ~~~ dames C. [etcher Administrator . ~ 92

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N AT I O N A L RE S E AR C H C O U N C I L 2101 CONSTITUI 10'N AVENUE WASHIN=ON, D. C 20418 OFFICE OF TliE CHAIRMAN' ; t-. at. July 15 ~ 1986 The Honorable James C. Fletcher Administrator National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, D.C. 20546 Dear Jim: I write in response to your letter of July 3, 1986, requesting that the National Research Council appoint an audit panel to review the NASA approach to resolving flight-critical items. The National Research Council will undertake this task, and will work to get started expeditiously. As you know, members of the NRC staff have already met with NASA headquarters management to discuss the scope of this effort. We will begin by having a one or two day scoping effort to better understand the NASA criticality review system as well as alternative review and evaluation procedures that are used in analogous situations. Upon conclusion of this first discussion, we should be ready to select a panel and proceed with the effort. Yours sincerely, Chairman cc: Philip E. Culbertson Jay F. Honeycutt THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL IS THE PRINCIPAL OPERAT~'G AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE NATIONAL TO SERVE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS . 93 . ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING

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I'd my National Aeronautics and Space Administration Report; to the President Actions to Implement the Recommendations of The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident EXCERPT FR OM PAGE ~ 9: . The Commission recommenclecI that the National Research Council (NCR) appoint an Audit Pane} to verify the acloquacy of this effort anc! report clirectly to the Acimin- istrator of NASA. This request has been made by NASA anc! accepted by the NRC. The NRC is forming the pane! ancI NASA will support tureen as required. July 14, 1986 Washington, D.C. . 94

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rim i Code Designator for Group: Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems ASSEMBLY OR COMMISSION Aeronautics and Space Eng'g. Board DIVISION, Off1CE OR BOARD Ccmmitt== on Space Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Cot SOLING STATEMENT OF TASK (Make clear what is expected of the group described and by whom the project is sponsored. Limit to not more than this page.) As recommended in the report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, the Committee will at,~;t the review by NASA arid its primary Shuttle contractors leading to the identification by NASA of those items that must be improved prior to resumption of flight to ensure mission success and flight safety. Particular attention will be given to the Failure>M~des and Effects Analyses (FMEA) , Critical Item Lists (CIL), and The audit will concentrate on prcce~ures, techniques, and a sampling of specific actions taken by MESA and the contractors in order to verify the adequacy of the effort. The results of the atlH;t will be reported directly to the Administrator of NASA by a series of letter reports and a final report. Hazard Analyses. The Executive Committee of the Governing Board of the National Research Council approved this effort at its meeting on August 26, 1986 The work of the Committee is carried out under Contract No. NASW-3511 with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. November 14, 1986 _ Date of Statement 6 September 5, 1986 (Date of previous statement if applicable) CCMMIrTEE RECORDS FORM #1 95

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