factors. The most obvious cases involve exposure scenarios for participants in forward areas at the NTS, including maneuver troops and close-in observers, in which resuspension of substantial amounts of previously deposited fallout by the blast wave produced in a detonation has been ignored even though exposure to relatively high concentrations of resuspended radionuclides caused by the blast wave almost certainly occurred. For example, when the NTPR program has assumed that resuspension of previously deposited fallout was caused by walking or other light activity in cases in which blast-wave effects probably occurred but were ignored, the committee believes that upper bounds of inhalation doses are underestimated by a factor of at least 100, and perhaps by a factor of as much as 1,000 in the worst cases. Furthermore, in such cases, upper bounds of equivalent doses to some organs and tissues could have been substantially above 1 rem.

Of paramount importance is the issue of whether deficiencies in methods of estimating inhalation dose identified by the committee could have affected decisions about compensation of atomic veterans. The committee believes that possible underestimation of upper bounds of inhalation doses by the NTPR program is unlikely to be important for most participants in the Pacific or occupation forces in Japan. Inhalation doses to most of those participants probably were too low for possible underestimation of upper bounds to have affected decisions about compensation. The committee also believes that neglect of possible ingestion doses in dose reconstructions is unlikely to be important for most participants at any site. However, the neglect of blast-wave effects, combined with the frequent neglect of aged fallout that accumulated during the period of atomic testing at the NTS and neglect of fractionation in fallout, is an important concern for thousands of participants who were exposed in forward areas at the NTS shortly after a detonation. On the basis of an example analysis of the effects of a blast wave on inhalation doses (see Appendix E) and screening doses that have been used in evaluating claims for compensation (see Section III.E), use of credible upper bounds of inhalation doses in scenarios involving resuspension by a blast wave could have changed decisions not to grant compensation in some cases, depending on the disease of concern (for example, lung cancer in a nonsmoker).

The question of the importance of deficiencies in methods of estimating inhalation doses in the NTPR program with respect to evaluating claims for compensation for radiation-related diseases is discussed further in Sections VI.F and VII.C.


As discussed in Section IV.D, the upper-bound external dose for the 195,000 troops who participated in the occupation of Japan or were prisoners of war at or near Hiroshima or Nagasaki was estimated, on the basis of very pessimistic assumptions, to be always less than 1 rem, even though the likely dose to most

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