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Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Under mandate of Section 253, Study and Report on
Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology
Program Changes, of the Fiscal Year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-107; U.S.
Congress, 2001), the U.S. Air Force contracted with
the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct the
present study. In response, the NRC established the
Committee on Review of the Effectiveness of Air Force
Science and Technology Program Changes com-
posed of academics, active and retired industry execu-
tives, former Air Force and Department of Defense
(DoD) civilian executives, and retired general officers
with acquisition and science and technology (S&T)
backgrounds. The committee was to review the effec-
tiveness of the Air Force S&T program and, in particu-
lar, the actions that the Air Force has taken to improve
the management of the program in recent years in re-
sponse to concerns voiced in numerous study reports
and by Congress. The committee's principal charter
was to assess whether, as a whole, the changes put in
place by the Air Force since 1999 are sufficient to as-
sure that adequate technology will be available to en-
sure U.S. military superiority (see Box ES-1~.
The committee conducted four open meetings to
collect information from the Air Force and its Scien-
tific Advisory Board (SAB), the U.S Navy, the U.S.
Army, and DoD. A great many factors influence any
judgment of the S&T program's sufficiency in support-
ing future warfighter needs; these factors include threat
assessment, budget constraints, technology opportuni-
ties, workforce, and program content. Given the rela-
tively short time available for this study and consider-
1
ing the detailed reviews conducted annually by the
SAB, the technical content of the S&T program was
necessarily beyond the committee's purview. Rather,
the committee focused on S&T management, includ-
ing areas that have been studied many times, in depth,
by previous advisory groups (e.g., Defense Science
Board EDSB], SAB, Air Force Association LAFA],
Naval Research Advisory Committee ENRAC], and
NRC). Besides addressing technical content, those
prior studies and congressional concerns highlighted
four overarching S&T issues: advocacy and visibility,
planning, workforce, and investment levels. In re-
sponse, the Air Force instituted changes in S&T man-
agement. This study should be considered a review of
Air Force work in progress, because there has been only
a relatively short time (for an organization working to
annual budget cycles) for the effects of these changes
to be manifested.
The Air Force S&T budget total is set from the top
down (i.e., allocated by Air Force leadership in compe-
tition with other demands, such as readiness, modern-
ization, and operations a competition held against the
backdrop of dramatic reductions in overall Air Force
funding during the l990s). As a competitor for scarce
resources against shorter-term, often more pressing
concerns, S&T's success in the budget negotiations is
dependent upon the Air Force leadership's perception
of the value that S&T can bring to meeting the needs of
the Air Force. This perception is dependent on both the
program's true value and the effectiveness with which
that value is communicated to Air Force leadership.
Long-term funding stability is critical to successful
S&T. Elements that must be present for success in the
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EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
budgeting process are (1) communication of the value
of a program (which depends on the skill, influence,
and message of the communicator); (2) relevance of
the program to the warfighter (which comes from plan-
ning); and (3) the quality of the program (for which
quality of the workforce is a major determinant). Thus,
the committee's focus and recommendations concen-
trate on these issues. They are all areas in which the Air
Force has worked in recent years to improve its S&T
capabilities.
The committee' s views are contained in many find-
ings and recommendations. They are summarized in
the following four sections: "S&T Investment,"
"Workforce," "Planning" (S&T Planning, and Devel-
opment/Capability Planning), and "Communications:
Advocacy and Visibility." The complete findings are
in Chapters 2 and 3.
S&T INVESTMENT
The proper level of Air Force S&T investment and
how to ensure it have been issues of some debate. Over-
all, top-line funding for S&T is set by the allocation of
funds in competition with elements such as readiness
and modernization.
The committee holds firmly to the view that stabil-
ity in funding is fundamental to ensuring S&T success.
While funding stability is important to any endeavor-
operations, development, and modernization its im-
portance grows with the time span of the effort. Thus,
it is most important to the S&T program, which has the
longest time horizon for return on investment. The S&T
program consists of three elements: basic research
(6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology
development (6.3), the latter consisting of two parts-
critical experiments and advanced technology demon-
strations (ATDs).~ Stability of funding is especially
important at the 6.1 and 6.2 levels and is also important
in order to maintain the infrastructure necessary for the
critical experiments fraction of the advanced technol-
ogy development (6.3) budget. Investment in ATDs can
and should be based on an understanding of the antici-
pated technological needs of the programmed and
planned acquisition programs.
Air Force S&T funding needs and opportunities are
rapidly expanding, suggesting that an increased level
iThe designations 6.l, 6.2, and 6.3 represent the DoD budget
activities corresponding to basic research, applied research, and
advanced technology development, respectively.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
of investment in S&T to support Air Force missions
could be productively applied to help ensure the long-
term security and military superiority of the nation.
Supporting factors include these: new and emerging
threats clearly evident after the atrocity of September
11,2001; results of the Section 252 review2 that identi-
fied significant unfunded opportunities and challenges;
new classes of systems moving toward the field, such
as directed energy weapons; reduced S&T investments
by others (such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration [NASA]) from which the Air Force his-
torically benefits; and new opportunities afforded by
scientific advances (such as in the nano, biological, and
ever-expanding information sciences). Emphasis on
new threats and new opportunities should not always
be at the expense of ongoing research.
This committee believes that stability, in fact as well
as in prospect, is as important as a specific (reasonable)
S&T funding level. Considering, within the context of
stability as a governing principle, the questions of what
the proper level of S&T funding is and how to get there,
the first question is ill posed; elaboration is required.
The Air Force leadership (and its DoD and congres-
sional oversight) address the question of what the Air
Force S&T budget should be in a particular year given
competing budget priorities. The question implied in
the committee's statement of task is whether the Air
Force S&T program is sufficient to counter future high-
priority threats and ensure military superiority. Previ-
ous reports examining S&T funding use still other cri-
teria. Addressing the question of the S&T funding in a
substantive, quantitative manner would require a study
far beyond the scope of this effort.
While lacking an analysis-based, quantitative assess-
ment as discussed above, it is possible to examine the
issue of funding level through the second question-
how to get there. In both the fiscal year (FY) 1999 and
FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Acts, Con-
gress said that 2 percent real growth per year over the
period covered by the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) should be the objective for defense S&T fund-
ing, especially Air Force S&T funding (U.S. Congress,
2000, 2001~. The Air Force has not met this objective.
The committee believes that an approach of 2 percent
annual real growth over the 6-year period of the FYDP
has merit. This increase is modest in terms of annual
growth, manageable by the Air Force Research Labo-
2Air Force S&T planning review mandated by Section 252 of
P.L. 106-398, the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act.
3
ratory (AFRL) and, in the committee' s judgment, real-
izable within the pressures facing the Air Force bud-
get. Over the 6-year period of the FYDP, a 2 percent
real growth rate would bring the S&T budget to about
the average level of the past two decades. This increase
would provide funding to pursue new requirements and
opportunities beyond those that could be funded if ex-
isting programs were trimmed.
Recommendations for the detailed distribution of a
funding increase are beyond the scope of this study.
Broadly speaking, however, the committee suggests
that growth should be balanced among near-, mid-, and
far-term opportunities. The growth should apply to the
sum of 6.1 and 6.2 budgets (with AFRL leadership de-
termining the relative growth between the two) and to
the 6.3 total. The growth in 6.1 and 6.2 funds is com-
mingled here because the committee believes that there
is more of a continuum between 6.1 and 6.2 than is
generally acknowledged and that it is the responsibility
of AFRL leadership to determine the relative growth
between the two. The committee notes, however, that
the 6.1 budget has suffered considerable atrophy over
the past decade, especially compared with that for 6.2.
The 6.3 advanced technology demonstrations (ATDs)
are most effective in supplying the latest technology
when they are completed near the time that the technol-
ogy is needed by an acquisition program. As a result,
the allocation between critical experiments and ATDs
should be modulated according to the demands of an-
ticipated acquisition programs.
Stability is also influenced by the S&T budget frac-
tion that is under direct Air Force control. AFRL is the
organization responsible for execution of the Air Force
S&T budget, but Air Force S&T funds comprise only
60 percent of the AFRL budget. The remainder is pro-
vided by other sources, such as the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Outside funding
augments the Air Force's S&T funding, providing
leverage for AFRL. However, there is a danger in over-
reliance on such funding, since these resources are out-
side the Air Force planning processes and are subject
to external organizations' shifts in priorities.
Recommendation. The committee recommends that
the Air Force S&T budget be grown, in accordance
with the investment objective stated by Congress.
When that level is achieved, every effort should be
made to keep it there, thereby assuring future S&T in-
vestment stability.
The balance between Air Force S&T and other
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EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
sources of AFRL funding should be monitored with
regard to impact on the stability of the total S&T pro-
gram and the maturation and transition of the technol-
ogy needed for acquisition programs.
WORKFORCE
A successful S&T enterprise must be staffed by tal-
ented and motivated people. The quality of the military
and civilian S&T workforce is as important as the level
of the S&T budget. Indeed, a quality workforce is a
prerequisite for effective use of S&T funding. With
new classes of threats to national security and the in-
creasing importance of system-level and multi-
disciplinary technologies, the need for an agile Air
Force S&T enterprise has never been greater.
DoD research laboratories generally and the Air
Force laboratory specifically have been plagued by
endemic workforce challenges. Problems within the
DoD scientist and engineer (S&E) workforce have been
aggravated in the past 15 years by policies that have
adversely affected personnel and resulted in a crisis in
the Air Force S&E workforce, both civilian and mili-
tary. The Air Force has been acutely aware of this prob-
lem for a number of years and has attempted remedial
actions. The committee urges that the process and
progress of these efforts be carefully reviewed to en-
sure that on the basis of a sufficiently comprehensive
analysis the right steps are being taken and that future
actions are implemented consistently over the years and
are measured on the basis of carefully derived metrics.
One major hurdle that the Air Force and other DoD
enterprises have encountered is that many personnel
problems are beyond the authority of a local com-
mander to remedy. For example, under current rules,
the service laboratories simply cannot compete for top-
notch talent. One reason is the long delay now required
to formalize employment offers. A person who is
greatly interested in a job with a government labora-
tory may understandably be unwilling to wait many
months for approval when the private sector can pro-
vide an immediate offer of employment. Unless per-
sonnel constraints such as this are addressed immedi-
ately, the service laboratories face a downward spiral
from which recovery will be extraordinarily difficult.
A key step toward alleviating this situation would
be for Section 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act (Public Law EP.L.] 106-398) (U.S.
Congress, 2000) to be implemented.3 Because this is-
sue transcends the Air Force, such direction would have
to apply to all of the service laboratories and would
therefore be effective only if directed by the Secretary
of Defense. The committee believes that this is a situa-
tion in which national security concerns merit direct
involvement of the Secretary of Defense.
The S&E workforce problems did not materialize
overnight, and fixing them will require time, a dynamic
understanding of requirements, career management of
the military and civilian S&E workforce, continuing
infusion of resources, and, most importantly, long-term
commitments by the current and future Air Force sec-
retaries and chiefs of staff. The committee strongly
believes that these workforce actions must be taken.
Recommendations. The Secretary of Defense should
immediately direct the implementation of the provi-
sions of Section 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398) so that Department
of Defense laboratory directors have the ability to shape
their workforces. The Air Force Secretary and Chief of
Staff should ensure rapid execution of these provisions.
The Air Force should conduct a comprehensive re-
view of requirements for military and civilian S&E-
trained people across the Air Force, including labora-
tories and system program offices, and establish a
system for long-term management of the S &E
PLANNING
The quality and utility of the Air Force S&T pro-
gram is as dependent on the planning process as it is on
the execution. As described below, the Air Force plans
its technology programs on many levels through for-
malized processes.
S&T Planning
Recognizing the importance of comprehensive plan-
ning, Congress mandated "a review of the long-term
challenges and short-term objectives" of the Air Force
S&T programs (Section 252, FY 2001 National De-
3Section ~ ~14 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization
Act (PL. 106-398) amended Section 342 of the FY 1995 National
Defense Authorization Act (PL. 103-337), by giving the Secretary
of Defense the authority, without approval by the Office of Person-
ne} Management, to conduct personnel demonstration projects in
DoD laboratories.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
fense Authorization Act, P.L.106-398~. The Air Force
complied with requirements of this act by involving
some 300 people in a planning process in 2001 that
identified six long-term challenges and eight short-term
objectives. The annual resources that would be needed
to execute the S&T that this process identified total
about twice the current S&T funding level.
Participants agreed that this process was an effec-
tive aid in defining a candidate investment portfolio.
Additional refinements beyond the Section 252 plan-
ning methodology are needed to influence the S&T
portfolio, and many possibilities for refinements exist.
The applied technology councils (ATCs) provide a
powerful mechanism for reviewing the 6.3 S&T activ-
ity. The 6.2 activities would also benefit from a similar
annual review that engaged outside stakeholders such
as the warfighters and Air Force major commands
(MAJCOMs). Such a review should include activities
marginally above and below the nominal budget limit.
Recommendations. The Air Force should take advan-
tage of the framework provided by Section 252 of the
FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act as an
important step in its overall long-term S&T planning
process. Further legislation is not required.
For future use, the Air Force should refine the FY
2001 National Defense Authorization Act Section 252
framework to develop the long-term plan that the Air
Force sees as the overarching concern. In doing this,
the Air Force should seriously consider the many sug-
gestions offered by this committee, but giving special
attention to the following: (1) implementing the "les-
sons learned" that were briefed to the committee by
personnel from the office of the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and
Engineering; (2) fully incorporating the planning pro-
cess into the planning, programming, and budgeting
system, specifically with regard to timing and the ap-
plication of fiscal constraints, especially for long-term
challenges; (3) revising the planning categories to
cover mid-term challenges (5 to 15 years) and long-
term challenges (15 years and beyond); and (4) align-
ing the framework to the current Air Force strategic
planning process by using the ConOps Task Forces
framework in lieu of the short-term objectives frame-
work.
The Air Force Research Laboratory should institute
a review process for 6.2 and 6.3 critical experiments
that engages the warfighters and major commands.
Development/Capability Planning
"Development planning" is the definition of broad
requirements in support of the eventual procurement of
a system (aircraft, spacecraft, munitions, and so on)
and its operation in the system-of-systems that now
comprises a modern warfighting organization. In re-
cent years, one of the weakest aspects of Air Force
planning has been the dearth of development (or, using
current Air Force terminology, "capability") planning.
This was a strong process in the Air Force through the
1980s, but it was subsequently zero funded by Congress
without Air Force challenge. More recently Congress has
reauthorized development planning, and the first steps
toward restoring it are under way in the Air Force.
Establishing a development (capability) planning
organization with development teams and planning
personnel is mandatory for improving the planning of
future systems. While the Air Force now recognizes
the need for this process, it is a long way from having
viable development/capability planning. The shortage
of S&E personnel is a major worry today, but the short-
age of qualified system-of-systems analysts and con-
cept designers with a strong systems engineering back-
ground is more acute. Attracting these skilled people
requires a funded budget line item, special job posi-
tions, and high-level leadership (e.g., a leader with ex-
perience reaching back to earlier development plan-
ning). The organization should be led by a general
officer or senior executive service (SES) civilian and
staffed with a cadre that includes personnel with opera-
tional and S&T experience. Such a group is necessary
if there is to be an effective capability plan leading to
innovative future warfighting systems that rapidly and
fully exploit our expanding technology base.
Recommendation. The Air Force should reconstitute
a strong, crosscutting development/capability planning
organization staffed by experienced individuals with
broad backgrounds and in-depth expertise (combined
operational and S&T experience would be highly de-
sirable).
COMMUNICATIONS: ADVOCACY AND VISIBILITY
Effective communication of the value of S&T is
important to ensure an adequately funded, healthy pro-
gram. To this end, the Air Force made three major
changes to improve the advocacy and visibility of the
S&T program.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
The first change was the designation of the Air Force
Materiel Command (AFMC) commander (a four-star
general) as the S&T advocate. In the past, this was the
role of the AFRL commander (a two-star general). This
change is positive in terms of both increased visibility
and stronger advocacy of the S&T program both to
internal stakeholders (the Air Force) and to external
stakeholders (other services, the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense FOSD], and Congress). Actual effec-
tiveness can be measured over time by metrics such as
(1) the level and trend of the S&T budget relative to
that of prior years and to the Air Force budget and (2)
the amount of technology transitioned from the labora-
tory to Air Force acquisition programs.
The second change was the instigation of "S&T
Summits," day-long meetings of top Air Force leader-
ship at which the entire time is spent reviewing S&T.
The summits have been effective in improving dialogue
among S&T people, the MAJCOM commanders, and
key staff personnel. While it is still too early to deter-
mine the summits' longevity, there are grounds for con-
cern, since the December 2002 summit was canceled
and may not be rescheduled. Summits are demanding
in terms of preparation time and attendance time for
senior leaders, but they are worth the effort. Indeed, the
scope of this effort could be expanded by instituting
similar exchanges between the S&T advocate and other
constituencies, including OSD, other services, and key
congressional members and staff.
The third change involves the applied technology
councils. Some of the most important coordination is
among the S&T community (which develops technol-
ogy), the product centers (which use technology to de-
velop systems), and the warfighters (who use the sys-
tems). The focus of these activities is the transition of
technology out of the laboratory, into systems, and out
to the field. ATCs are one mechanism instituted to
make available technology visible to the users and to
effect its orderly transition. The ATC process has al-
ready been very beneficial and should be continued.
However, this process has not yet been codified in an
Air Force regulation, although one had been drafted
(as of late December 2002~.
While to many the value of S&T to the Air Force is
self-evident, to many others the lessons of history could
profitably be told. One approach to this endeavor would
be to task the Air Force history community to docu-
ment, for reading throughout the Air Force, the techno-
logical history of the enablers of current major Air
Force capabilities (such as stealth and precision muni-
tions). Another approach would be the development of
case studies that could be used at the Air War College
to enhance the curriculum for all Air Force mid-level
officers. The objective would be to provide future Air
Force planners and leaders with an appreciation of the
link between S&T and operational military capabili-
ties.
Recommendations. The important S&T Summit pro-
cess should be continued on an annual basis, arranged
over time to cover the full range of S&T categories.
The summits should be aligned to best influence the
budget process.
The applied technology council process, along with
Weapon System Capability Plans, should be continued
and codified by regulation.
The commander of the Air Force Materiel Command
should continue as the S&T advocate. A mechanism
should be instituted for the S&T advocate to brief the
S&T plan to and receive feedback from the combatant
commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
other service personnel, key congressional staff, and
members of Congress, if practical; this mechanism
should include the possibility of briefing the results of
the S&T Summits as well.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
authorization act
