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OCR for page 11
2
Air Force S&T investment Level and Balance
INTRODUCTION
Primary among the concerns raised by Congress and
other groups reviewing the Air Force S&T program
has been the appropriateness of the S&T investment
level (see Appendix E). Since this study was tasked
with evaluating (1) the adequacy with which the Air
Force has addressed the concerns voiced in these re-
ports and (2) the sufficiency of the technology invest-
ment, the committee examined the Air Force S&T in-
vestment level and balance.
After a brief program description, this chapter ad-
dresses the level of the Air Force's total S&T invest-
ment (top line) and the balance of that investment the
latter from both an internal perspective (near- versus
mid- versus long-term S&T) and an external perspec-
tive (the balance of S&T investment with other ele-
ments of the Air Force program).
AIR FORCE S&T PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
Planned and executed by the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL), the Air Force S&T program has
three elements basic research, applied research, and
advanced technology development. These are often re-
ferred to by the designation of the applicable DoD bud-
get activities: 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, respectively. AFRL fur-
ther divides advanced technology development (6.3)
into critical experiments and advanced technology
demonstrations (ATDs). In addition to funding appro-
priated specifically for Air Force S&T, AFRL also re-
ceives funding from other sources (e.g., DARPA).
Some of this outside funding is used for advanced con-
cept technology demonstrations (ACTDs).
11
The 6.2 tasks often flow from advances in the 6.1
program, 6.3 critical experiments from the 6.2 program,
and ATDs from critical experiments. ATDs are spe-
cifically planned to lead to efforts that have been pro-
grammed or planned by the Air Force and that are ei-
ther preliminary to an acquisition program or are part
of an acquisition program. In some cases, the products
of the technology programs can be immediately applied
in response to operational needs, as in the case of tech-
nology demonstrations that have a residual operational
capability. Usually, however, the results of a technol-
ogy program must be transitioned into an acquisition
program to complete the development, production, and
deployment of sustainable products to the operational
forces.
The act of transitioning technology to an acquisition
program is often not directly controlled by the Air
Force. Rather, the mechanism for technology transi-
tion to acquisition programs is largely through system
architecture decisions and design choices made by in-
dustry in response to performance requirements or the
need for new capabilities, as stated by the Air Force.
In planning its S&T program, the Air Force de-
scribes its approach as twofold. First, AFRL works
closely with the operational users and acquisition cen-
ters to identify the highest-priority technology needs
(operational pull or challenges). Second, AFRL devel-
ops a broad range of S&T that promises to provide new
and improved capabilities (technology push or oppor-
tunities). Ultimately, the tasks and programs planned
to address technology needs and to provide technology
push compete for constrained funding.
AFRL is often called on to address issues facing the
OCR for page 12
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
140 -
~n 1 2D -
o
. _
. _
. _
,^
V'
CO
o
o
>I
_'
IL
100 -
80 -
60 -
40 -
20 -
O-
~ \
/ \
S&T ~ 980s Peak
to 199Os Trough: 45.6°/
3.5
Overall TOA ~ 980s Peak
to ~ 990s Trouch: 44.3°/O
-3.0
~ ~ ~2.5
I'\ In. ~ '` ~
......... ,,,
Overall AF TOA
~ S&T TOA
SIT FY 2003 Appropriation
S&T PBR
" S&T PBR - OSD Adds
Fiscal Year
in
o
. _
. _
20 ~
· ._
Cal
8
CM
_'
- 1.0 c/'
-0.5
O
FIGURE 2- 1 Air Force TOA for S&T and the Air Force as a whole (S&T TOA through FY 2002, appropriation for FY 2003,
DoD FYDP for FY 2004 through FY 2007, all in FY 2003 constant dollars). SOURCES: Schneider, 2002b (Chart 44~; DoD,
2002a; Hunsberger, 2002; Jones, 2002; gorger, 2002; U.S. Air Force, 2002.
Air Force to which AFRL's science and engineering
expertise apply. Also, the Air Force S&T program of-
ten provides benefits that extend beyond Air Force pro-
grams. However, although it makes other important
contributions, the primary purpose of the Air Force
S&T program and of AFRL is to provide the technol-
ogy base needed by Air Force acquisition (moderniza-
tion) programs.
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL
This section addresses the issue of setting the Air
Force S&T top line. In doing so, it first provides a his-
torical look at Air Force S&T funding. It then addresses
the balance of the Air Force S&T investment with other
elements of the Air Force program.
Air Force S&T Funding History
Figure 2-1 shows the estimate, as of the fall of 2002,
for the overall annual funding for Air Force S&T from
FY 1980 through FY 2007 in FY 2003 constant dol-
lars. ~ In the figure, "S&T TOA" is the Air Force' s total
obligational authority (TOA) for S&T resulting from
the annual appropriation act plus subsequent funding
actions. The version available to the committee accom-
panied the FY 2003 President's budget request (PBR)
Unless otherwise stated, all funding data shown in this report
that were not cited in the relevant source in FY 2003 constant dol-
lars have been inflated/deflated using the ratio of current year to
constant year TOA for the applicable title as reported in DoD
(2002a).
OCR for page 13
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
and defined the DoD baseline through FY 2007. For
comparison, the overall Air Force TOA is also shown.
As Figure 2-1 shows, S&T funding peaked during
the strategic modernization program of the 1980s. The
average during the 1980s was about the same as the
long-term average of $2.1 billion. In the 1990s, how-
ever, S&T TOA generally declined to a post-World
War II low of about $1.3 billion in FY 1998, a decline
of about 46 percent from the maximum in the 1980s.2
S&T was up in FY 1998 through FY 2002, primarily as
a result of congressional increases over the PBR. This
trend continued in FY 2003 when Congress increased
the funding by $147 million, or 9 percent over the PBR.
Actual S&T TOA for any fiscal year has usually ended
up being less than the appropriation for that fiscal year
as a result of funding actions by DoD or Congress, at
times by more than $100 million (Robertson, 2002~.
In the FY 2003 PBR, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) made additions to the Air Force S&T
program for the Transformational Wideband Military
Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM) program
and Special Programs.3 Congress then reduced part of
the funding and moved the remainder to non-S&T bud-
get activities.4 The data at the right side of Figure 2-1,
which show the estimate in the future years both with
and without that planned for Transformational
Wideband MILSATCOM,5 provide an indication of the
range of possible budget variations. The result is con-
siderable uncertainty in out-year funding for S&T fund-
ing in general and for the two programs added by OSD
in particular.
Figure 2-2 provides a closer look at the right-hand
side of Figure 2- 1. Starting in FY 1991, it contrasts the
S&T TOA through FY 2002 and the FY 2003 appro-
priation with the PBR to Congress. The TOA reflects
the changes made to the PBR by Congress in the ap-
propriation and any subsequent actions by Congress or
2Some earlier reports (AFA, 2000, and NRC, 2001a) showed the
funding time series starting in FY 1989 using data that were differ-
ent from those provided to this committee for FY 1989 (about $2.8
billion versus the $2.3 billion shown here). Though the trend in the
l990s is the same, the slope in the early l990s is dramatically dif-
ferent.
3"Special Programs" are highly classified programs with special
access required.
4Similar issues arose and similar outcomes resulted when Dis-
coverer II and Space Based Laser were moved to S&T in the FY
2000 proposed budget see AFA (2000), p. 18.
sThe planned S&T funding beyond FY 2003 for the Special Pro-
grams was not available to the committee.
13
2.0 -
o
. _
. _
G
~ 1.5-
Cal
C' 1.0-
o
N
. ~ .~.
, , , , , , , , , , , j . j
~~99 ~~99 ~~99~ ,~99 ,~99~ ,9 ,~9~ ,~99°° ,~999 ,pOOO spoor GOON GOON COT Alp All' ON
~ S&T in the PBR
S&T in the PBR -
OSD Adds
S&TTOA
x FY03 Appropriation
Fiscal Year
FIGURE 2-2 Air Force S&T TOA compared with the
PBR. SOURCES: Hunsberger, 2002; Jones, 2002; gorger,
2002; DoD, 2002b; U.S. Air Force, 2002.
DoD. The FY 2003 appropriation indicates the changes
made by Congress to the PBR for that year. No con-
gressional action has yet been taken on the PBR be-
yond FY 2003. The PBR reflects Air Force manage-
ment of its S&T program, perhaps modified by OSD
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over-
sight.
Early in the period shown in the figure, the funds
appropriated by Congress were usually lower than the
PBR. In the latter part of the period, the PBR, which
presumably reflects the Air Force's recommendations,
requested increased S&T for the Air Force but not as
fast as Congress increased the annual appropriation.
This trend continued for the FY 2003 appropriation
(though, as noted above, the final S&T TOA may be
lower than shown). The lower curve on the right side of
Figure 2-2 shows the estimate without the OSD addi-
tions discussed above in FY 2003 and without the
Transformational Wideband MILSATCOM in the fol-
lowing years.6 Without the additions, the requested
funding for Air Force S&T would have declined in FY
2003 compared with that in FY 2002. Preliminary in-
6As noted above, the planned S&T funding beyond FY 2003 for
the Special Programs was not available to the committee.
OCR for page 14
14
Air Force*
Defense
-wide
Total:
24.3%
1 t~
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
6- .
+ Defense-wide
Air Force _
& Army
Navy
_`
a)
o
. _
. _
'- 4- .
o
ct 3-
g
ON 2 —=
x x v
....~f..............................................................
~ = ~ _~
O- . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Fiscal Year
1999 2001 2003
FIGURE 2-3 Companson of service and Defense-wide
S&T TOA (TOA through FY 2002, appropriation for FY
2003~. SOURCES: Hunsberger, 2002; DoD, 2002a; Jones,
2002.
formation suggests that the FY 2004 and FY 2005
PBRs will be down compared to the 2003 level. It is
clear from the above data that the Air Force S&T fund-
ing history resembles a roller coaster, a condition un-
der which program planning and execution are ex-
tremely taxing.
Some of the reports referred to in Chapter 1 discuss
the Air Force S&T funding in relation to that of the
other services. Figure 2-3 compares the funding among
the services along with that for Defense-wide S&T (i.e.,
for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
EDARPA], the Missile Defense Agency EMDA], and
so on).7 The sum of the constituents shown in the fig-
ure is the total DoD S&T, for which the appropriations
are almost $11.5 billion for FY 2003.
As Figure 2-3 shows, Air Force S&T funding in FY
1989 was higher than that for the other services, fell by
the early 1990s to about the same level as the other
services, and has been lower than the other services
fin addition to DARPA and MDA, other elements of Defense-
wide S&T include the Chemical and Biological Defense Program,
Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Special Weapons
Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Uniformed Services
University.
*Includes AFIT, SBIR, MAJCOMs, Centers,
ALCs, etc.
Other
Defense-wide
10%
3°/
DARPA
12%
Navy
1% /,
Army |
1 % Other
1%
Organic
Air Force S&T
61%
FIGURE 2-4 Sources of total funding for AFRL in FY
2002. SOURCE: Legault, 2002.
since then. On the other hand, Defense-wide S&T fund-
ing, which also declined in the mid-199Os, has grown
substantially in the past 3 years.
Substantial funds in addition to those specifically
identified earlier as Air Force S&T go toward address-
ing Air Force technology needs. As shown in Figure 2-
4, Air Force S&T in FY 2002, as an example, accounted
for just over 60 percent of the funds available to AFRL
(which is about the same as in FY 2000 when it was 59
percent) (AFRL, 1999).
As shown in Figure 2-4, about one-quarter of
AFRL's total funding came from the Defense-wide
S&T program (up slightly from just under 23 percent
in FY 2000) (Neighbor, 1999), with DARPA being the
largest such source (although down slightly from 14
percent in FY 2000~. The remainder came from Air
Force non-S&T funds, the other services, and non-DoD
sources. In addition, other parts of the Defense-wide
S&T program may ultimately help to satisfy Air Force
technology needs. Still other parts of Defense-wide
S&T may fund programs that the Air Force would be
directed to fund were it not for the Defense-wide pro-
grams. The Air Force can leverage its S&T investment
with funds made available through the risk-taking, in-
novative culture of DARPA and other Defense-wide
programs, but at the same time, it should be kept in
mind that the direction of such work is controlled to a
significant degree by the organizations that transfer the
funds to AFRL.
In addition to the S&T supported by AFRL, Air
Force acquisition programs benefit from industry Inde-
OCR for page 15
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
1.2 -
o
.= 0.8- .
Cal
o
u)
o
C)
N
go
N
1 .n -
0.6 -
,,,,, - N
,'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''I''''
..
...........................................................................
..~.......................
0.4 -
0.2- ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
O-
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Fiscal Year
FIGURE 2-5 President's budget requests for NASA aero-
nautical technology. (These amounts do not include govern-
ment personnel or facilities.) SOURCE: NASA Office of
Aerospace Technology, 2003.
pendent Research and Development funds, which are
funded by allowable indirect (overhead) costs on cer-
tain DoD contracts. Also, technology developments
funded by other federal (such as Department of Energy
EDoE] and NASA), commercial, and international ef-
forts often support Air Force needs and may be adapted
to Air Force needs in its S&T and acquisition programs.
In a broad sense, the Air Force and NASA share
stewardship of the nation's aerospace future, since their
activities dwarf those of the other services and non-DoD
agencies. Consider. for example. aeronautics. which
encompasses all of the disciplines needed for flight,
including avionics, software, communications, automa-
tion, human factors, navigation, control, propulsion,
structures, materials, aerodynamics, and systems engi-
neering. Together, the Air Force and NASA provide most
of the funding for university and industrial research in
aeronautics, collectively subsidizing aerospace education
and technology. They also perform most of the in-house
government aeronautical research. During the 1990s, the
AFRL expenditures in this area were roughly the same as
NASA's (see Figures 2-5 and 2-8~.
The past two decades of NASA funding for aero-
nautics are shown in Figure 2-5. These amounts do not
include the salaries of NASA employees or the NASA
facility costs (in contrast, AFRL employee salaries are
included in its 6.2 budget; see Figure 2-10~. These
monies mostly go to fund industrial and university re-
search (with the rest spent on in-house NASA contract
15
personnel services and research expenses). In the past
5 years, NASA has reduced its support for aeronautics
by over 40 percent (NASA Office of Aerospace Tech-
nology, 2003~.
While not all of NASA's research and technology
investments are directly relevant to Air Force systems,
many are. At the more basic levels (corresponding to
DoD 6.1 and 6.2 categories), technologies such as ma-
terials, propulsion, and electronic devices are often ap-
plicable across a wide range of applications, both mili-
tary and civil. Even at the more applied levels (DoD
6.3), many technologies are relevant to both civil and
military applications.
In summary, from FY 1988 to FY 1998, the Air
Force S&T investment fell significantly approxi-
mately 45 percent in real terms. It then rose from 1998
to 2003, mainly due to Congress's yearly increasing of
S&T funding over the amount requested by the Presi-
dent. By FY 2003, Air Force S&T funding had recov-
ered about half the early 1990s decline. Part of the FY
2003 increase, however, was due to DoD's moving pro-
grams into the Air Force S&T funding line that previ-
ously had not been considered to be S&T. In the FY
2004 PER, DoD again moved programs under the Air
Force S&T top line that previously had not been there.
Taking these programs into account, the FY 2004 fund-
ing requested for the continuing Air Force S&T pro-
gram was less than that received for FY 2003. Plans for
similar reductions appear to be in place for FY 2005.
Currently, the Air Force relies on funding from non-
Air Force S&T sources to supply approximately 40 per-
cent of the AFRL budget. The Air Force also benefits
from the research and technology development con-
ducted by other agencies, principally NASA.
Need for Increased S&T Invesiment
Ensuring that the Air Force has appropriate and suf-
ficient technology to counter future threats is now more
difficult than at any time in the past, in part because
both the challenges posed by the threats and the oppor-
tunities offered by technologies are more numerous and
more complex as a result of the inexorable advances of
scientific discovery and engineering applications. The
words "higher, farther, faster" are given new meaning
by the evolving military applications of directed en-
ergy and information warfare to name just two areas.
As a result, for example,
Potentially hostile nations that cannot afford a large military force
can afford today's advanced information systems, as can terrorist
OCR for page 16
16
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
groups. With these technologies, access to the world through global
connectivity, and hostile intent, such adversaries can cause great
harm at low cost. (NRC, 2001a, p. 4)
New systems such as directed energy and information
warfare represent the fruits of past S&T investments.
As they pass through full-scale development and into
deployment, experience suggests that new technology
needs will rapidly be identified. Thus, S&T in such
areas is really just at the end of the initial phase; much
more will be needed to support and evolve fielded sys-
tems and their descendants.
In addition, nano, biological, and the ever-expand-
ing information sciences are certain to offer new op-
portunities to improve security, add to the technologi-
cal edge, and save lives as an example, see the recent
NRC report Implications of Emerging Micro- and
Nanotechnologies (NRC, 2002~.
At times, new challenges and opportunities such as
those just discussed can be funded by disinfesting in
ongoing areas that can be transitioned or that are no
longer productive toward needed Air Force capabili-
ties (zero-based transfers). That does not mean, how-
ever, that satisfying the need to invest in such new op-
portunities as nano, biological, and information
sciences should always be at the expense of ongoing
programs. Also, NASA has significantly reduced its
support for aeronautics, but Air Force needs for many
of these technologies for advanced air vehicles and ac-
cess to space have certainly not slackened. Further,
decisions on 6.1 research support to universities, for
160 ~ ~
. _
140 - . f ~ WN .
,~ ~\
_
_ .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
_
—, . . , . . . , , , , . . , . , . . . , . . , . ,
MOO ~9~ ~9~ ~9~ ~9~ 99O ,~99~ ,~99> ,~99~ ~99°° HOOF HOOF ON ON
a,
O 120-
. _
. _
. _
a,
o
a,
co
lo
lo
N
IL
100
80
60
40
20
o
FY 1 980s Peak to
FY 1990s Trough: 44.3%
,,
Fiscal Year
FIGURE 2-6 Air Force TOA (TOA through FY 2002, PER
for FY 2003, FYDP for FY 2004-FY 2007). SOURCE:
DoD, 2002a.
example, can have far-reaching impact, even to the
point of affecting curricula; once made, such decisions
cannot be readily or quickly reversed. There are likely
to be times, therefore, when increases in basic and ap-
plied research will be appropriate in order to protect
the future. Considering the increased tempo of opera-
tions and demands for modernization to meet the evolv-
ing threats, the present is one of those times.
In summary, the committee believes that there are
many indicators suggesting that increased Air Force
S&T investment may be appropriate. These include
numerous new and complex threats, new opportunities
opened up by basic research, new classes of systems
entering the Air Force inventory, ongoing S&T pro-
grams for which the investments need to maintained,
and reductions in non-Air Force S&T efforts from
which the Air Force benefits.
Balancing the S&T Top Line with Other Requirements
With constrained budgetary resources, all possible
combinations of readiness, modernization, and S&T
investment entail risk. Increasing investment in one
area may reduce risk in that area but increase risk in
other areas. The trade-offs that must be made are
greatly complicated by uncertainty in the size of risks
accompanying particular investment levels and uncer-
tainty in comparing risks among areas. A number of
the studies summarized in Appendix E have addressed
this challenge. The Defense Science Board (DSB), for
example, has recommended increasing the level of
DoD S&T funding to a fixed percentage of the total
DoD TOA (DSB, 2000, 2002~. In declining to endorse
the DSB ' s percentage of TOA recommendation, the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB ~ noted that such
an approach restricts leadership' s ability to manage the
total budget in times of extreme constraints that is, to
balance, and hopefully minimize, risk. Instead, the
SAB recommended that the Air Force tie its S&T in-
vestment strategy to its long-range plan and vision
(SAB, 2001).
As background for understanding the Air Force S&T
funding allocation relative to the competing demands,
the committee noted that during most of the 1990s the
Air Force was faced with the demands of a high opera-
tional tempo, including Northern and Southern Watch
over Iraq, operations in the Balkans, and numerous
humanitarian actions all in the face of funding that
declined through FY 1997 and remained relatively low
through the decade (see Figure 2-6~.
OCR for page 17
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
70 -
60 -
In
o
. _
50 -
20 ~
10
At
_ Al
77 \~~ FY 1 980s Max to
/ \ FY1990sMin:
/ ~ RDT&E: 53.8%
I it.
1 \
I ~
1~
,*'
V
~_..
_ AN
_ -
I T ~ I I
~ AF RDT&E
DEAF Procurement
· AF Military Personnel
x Operations &
Maintenance
Other (Milt Const., etc.)
~1
Procurement: 73.0°/O
Modernization: 60.5%
Mill Personnel: 37.4°/O
O&M: 27.7%
-
\~,~,~
-
I I I T I ~ I
O 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O <~' <~` ~ ~ 90 99~ 99~ 992~ 99°° OOO,pOo~,pOo~,~~Oo2)
Fiscal Year
17
FIGURE 2-7 Air Force TOA by category (TOA for FY 1989-FY 2002, PBR for FY 2003, FYDP for FY 2004-FY 2007~.
SOURCE: DoD, 2002a.
Comparing Figures 2- 1 and 2-6, the committee noted
that overall Air Force S&T funding fell from its peak
in the 1980s by about the same percentage as the de-
cline in overall Air Force TOA. While the S&T fund-
ing in Figure 2-1 has in fact kept pace with recent in-
creases in the overall Air Force TOA, this would not
have been the case had the Air Force plan been imple-
mented (reflected in Figure 2-2 by the curve for the
PBR less the OSD additions).
The Air Force distributed the overall TOA illustrated
in Figure 2-6 among the major appropriation catego-
ries, as shown in Figure 2-7. The figure shows that by
the mid-199Os, modernization (RDT&E "research, de-
velopment, test, and evaluation] plus procurement) was
reduced by about 60 percent and personnel by about 35
percent, reflecting the decline in overall Air Force fund-
ing. Although these reductions were partly offset by
force reductions and reduced near-term emphasis on
strategic nuclear capabilities, the result has been aging
avionics (NRC, 2001c), aging platforms, and aging in-
frastructure (NRC, 2001b), as well as personnel prob-
lems (NRC, 2001a). As the total funding shown in Fig-
OCR for page 18
18
TABLE 2-1 Funding Increases
(constant year dollars)
in Real Terms
Title
Percentage Increase
from FY99 TOA
to FY03 PBR
Percentage Increase
from FY02 TOA
to FY03 PBR
TOA
Personnel
O&M
Procurement
RDT&E
s&Ta
19.9
11.8
14.6
40.7
19.9
25.0
10.9
9.5
5.7
19.0
19.2
4.4
aWithout the OSD additions discussed earlier, S&T would have
grown only 3 percent from the FY 1999 TOA to the FY 2003 PBR
and would have declined by 14 percent from the FY 2002 TOA to
the FY 2003 PBR. The growth from the FY 1999 TOA to the FY
2003 appropriation was 36.1 percent, and from the FY 2002 TOA,
13.6 percent. SOURCE: DoD, 2002a.
ure 2-6 started to increase so that at least some of the
demands could be addressed, the war on terrorism and
the desire for force transformation created new de-
mands. As a result, the Air Force leadership, which
must balance the competing funding demands (subject
to OSD and OMB oversight), had to make hard choices.
Table 2-1 reflects these decisions as the change in the
major budget categories from FY 1999 (planned about
the time the concerns referred to in Chapter 1 started to
arise) to FY 2003 (the latest data to which the commit-
tee had full insight into the Air Force' s plans).
As shown in the table, the largest increase since FY
1999 has been in procurement, where (as shown in
Table 2-2) the increase is primarily to address aging
platforms, special projects and programs, infrastruc-
ture, and munitions, including those used heavily in
Afghanistan.
The data in Table 2-2 also show that the second-
largest percentage increase since FY 1999 has been in
S&T, largely due to congressional action, as discussed
earlier. Conversely, from FY 2002 TOA to the FY 2003
PBR, after the Air Force balanced its program, the in-
crease in S&T was only 4.4 percent (see Table 2-1~.
(As noted earlier, without additions made by OSD for
Transformational Wideband MILSATCOM and for
Special Programs, the PBR for S&T for FY 2003 would
have been below the S&T TOA for FY 2002.)
The data in the last column of Table 2-1 show that
most of the increases in personnel funding and RDT&E
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
funding over the 4-year period occurred in the FY 2003
PBR. The increase in personnel funding presumably
reflects pent-up demand for pay and benefits. The
breakout for RDT&E is shown in Table 2-3.
As shown in Table 2-3, the increases in RDT&E
funds primarily address aging platforms and avionics:
The Joint Strike Fighter (intended to replace the F-16
and A-10) accounts for nearly one-third of the in-
crease,8 while the F-22 (the replacement for the F-15)
and the C-130J all address aging platforms. The C-5
and C-130 programs address life-extension activities.
Among the space satellite systems, Advanced EHF is
an upgrade and replenishment for MILSTAR, NPOESS
for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP), GPS III for GPS II, and SBIRS High for the
Defense Support Program (DSP).
The next several paragraphs examine the meth-
odology used by the Air Force to guide the deci-
sions summarized in Figure 2-7 and Tables 2-1
through 2-3. To balance its budgetary requirements
and set the S&T top line, the Air Force works within
DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Sys-
tem (PPBS). The PPBS is applied to develop the
overall program for the Air Force, the other services,
and the so-called Defense-wide programs managed
directly by the defense agencies and OSD. The Air
Force budget consists of recommended funding for
operations and maintenance (O&M); personnel; pro-
curement; research, development, test, and evalua-
tion (which includes S&T); and other areas to be
proposed by DoD to OMB and subsequently to the
Congress in the President's budget.
Under the PPBS, AFRL recommends the allocation
of the top line S&T funding among 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3
research categories and then to specific programs.
Based on AFRL's input, the Defense Planning Guid-
ance (DPG), and other considerations, the Air Force
determines the budget allocation for S&T. This is an
iterative process.
In some years, AFRL submits recommendations for
increased funding in the form of unfunded require-
ments. The committee understands that in recent years,
requirements above the guidance budget level either
have not been submitted by AFRL or have seldom been
~The Joint Strike Fighter EMD increase was 32 percent of the
total RDT&E increase, but that amount was partly offset by reduc-
tions in the budget for EMD of other programs so that the overall
EMD increase is only 23 percent.
OCR for page 19
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
TABLE 2-2 Allocation of Procurement Increases from FY 1999 to FY 2003
19
Procurement
Appropriation
Percentage
Increase: FY99
TOA to FY03 PBR
Primary Sources of Increase
Aircraft (3010)
Other (3080)
Missile (3020) (includes space)
Ammunition (3011)
42
34
16
8
F-22, C-17, V-22 (partially offset by reductions for older platforms)
Special support projects, electronics and telecommunications
equipment (base communications, tactical C-E, base information),
and vehicular equipment (material handling equipment)
Special Programs, Minuteman modifications, replenishment/
upgraded satellites, air-launched missiles
Rockets, bombs (including JDAM, WCMD), flares, fuses
SOURCES: U.S. Air Force Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2001 Amended Budget Request, February 2000; U.S. Air
Force Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2003 Budget Estimates, February 2002.
elevated to the leadership, given their slim chances of
being funded.
The Air Force then balances the risks for readi-
ness (O&M and personnel), modernization (devel-
opment, test, and evaluation; and procurement), and
military construction against those of S&T in pre-
paring funding allocations in its program objectives
memorandum (POM). Thus, in assessing whether
"appropriate and sufficient technology is available
to ensure the military superiority of the United
States and counter future high-risk threats," as de-
fined in the statement of task for the committee, the
Air Force leadership has to balance the risks to near-
term military superiority by balancing the risks
among the elements of its longer-term programs.
AFRL submits its S&T funding proposals about 2
years before funding becomes available, and planning
must precede submission. Action within the PPBS is
subsequently completed about 1 year before the S&T
details are set in the annual appropriations act. Once
the funding is available, S&T tasks must be executed
to provide the technology basis for the acquisition pro-
grams, usually a multiyear step. Thus, planning the
S&T program must include long-range forecasts of fac-
tors such as technology needs and scheduling for the
acquisition programs that may apply the resulting tech-
nology.
The preceding discussion was necessarily abbrevi-
ated; however, the point is that, in a fiscally constrained
environment, achieving the best balance between Air
Force S&T and other demands within a specific top
line budget is a complex problem. The Air Force pro-
cedures to generate an appropriate S&T top line by
building from the bottom up (i.e., assembling specific
TABLE 2-3 Allocation of RDT&E Increases from FY 2002 to FY 2003
RDT&E Budget Activity
Percentage Increase:
FY02 TOA to FY03 PBR
Primary Sources of Increase (Rank Ordered)
S&T
Demonstration and validation
EMD
RDT&E management support
Operational systems development
3
16
23
58
Advanced technology development
Advanced EHF, Transformational Wideband
MILSATCOM, NPOESS, GPS III
Joint Strike Fighter, SBIRS High, ICBM,
Counterspace Systems
F-22, GPS, AWACS, C-5, C-130, selected activities,
C- 130J, MILSATCOM terminals
SOURCE: DoD, 2002b.
OCR for page 20
20
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
technical tasks) are just as complex and involve the
work of many people over multiple years.
In summary, the Air Force leadership must set the
top line funding for S&T in competition with other el-
ements such as readiness and modernization (other than
S&T) within fiscal constraints established by the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense. It is a difficult, com-
plex task to which OSD and the Air Force apply a com-
plex, multiyear, resource-intensive process. The
committee was not presented with convincing argu-
ments that the resulting S&T funding is now signifi-
cantly out of balance with its budget competitors.
IMPORTANCE OF S&T FUNDING STABILITY
Perhaps the dominant characteristic of the S&T
funding shown in Figure 2-1 is instability. Yet, the
committee judges that stable funding is required for the
effective and efficient generation and maturation of
new technology over the long term, from 6.1 research,
through 6.2 programs, 6.3 critical experiments, and fi-
nally 6.3 advanced technology demonstrations (ATDs)
into technology ready for application when needed in
an acquisition program. This stability is needed both
for the funding plans of individual projects and for the
longer-term health of the research organizations in
which they reside.
Unplanned funding decreases interrupt or stretch out
work, prevent or delay transition, and may lead to the
closing of valuable facilities or the dissolution of re-
search and development teams. Attempts to maintain
teams may spread funding too thin across too many
programs. To the extent that such "keep-alive" funding
is applied, the result is typically little progress. De-
creases not planned well in advance also result in the
inefficiencies of "broken" programs. Cumulative de-
creases over many years, as was the case in the reduc-
tion of over 45 percent from FY 1989 to FY 1998
shown in Figure 2-1, could have a proportionally larger
effect on program execution through continuing man-
agement distraction, associated workforce reductions,
and declining morale.
Increases can also have destabilizing effects. In-
creases that occur too fast can be greater than the
system can efficiently absorb. It takes time to put
into place S&T projects that are well planned and
structured, strongly integrated with related projects,
and that are relevant and contribute to overall S&T
objectives. Furthermore, funding controlled by
sources external to the Air Force can be cut off with-
out concurrence or consultation, contributing sub-
stantial instability.
The committee recognizes that, as with any DoD or
government funding line, stability is a difficult target,
given exogenous factors such as congressional man-
dates, abrupt DoD transfers of large programs into and
out of the S&T budget, and unplanned operations. Nev-
ertheless, the committee judges that stability, both in
fact and in prospect, is a key characteristic of success-
ful S&T programs and should be adopted as a planning
guideline by the Air Force.
AIR FORCE S&T PROGRAM INTERNAL BALANCE
The Air Force reports that it regards the issue of in-
vestment balance as having multiple aspects: topical
areas (e.g., air versus space), expected payback time
(near- versus mid- versus long-term), and the S&T to-
tal versus other uses for the funds. It further reports
that it has addressed balance by taking action on 4 of
some 14 recommendations embodied in the reports ref-
erenced in Chapter 1. The discussion here will focus on
the balance among near-, mid-, and long-term efforts,
consistent with the committee's statement of task.
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the Air
Force S&T program consists of three distinct budget
activities: basic research (for brevity, often denoted as
6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology
development (6.3~.9 The discussion that follows identi-
fies 6.1 as long-term, 6.2 as mid-term, and 6.3 as near-
term.
The Air Force S&T program proposed for FY 2003
consists of 27 program elements (PEs): 1 covering all
of 6.1, 11 for 6.2, and 15 for 6.3. The funds in the 6.1
PE are divided among 11 science and engineering ar-
eas. These, in turn, consist of a large number of indi-
vidual projects and tasks. For example, in FY 2001,
there were 132 AFRL 6.1 projects and 337 grants and
contracts to universities and industry (Carlson, 2002~.
The funds in the 11 PEs for 6.2 are spread over 45
projects, while the 15 PEs for 6.3 are divided among 44
projects. Overall, the committee understands that sub-
sumed within this arrangement are a thousand or more
individual tasks. The volume of data needed to describe
9The RDT&E Budget Activities, including those for S&T, are
defined in the DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume
2B, Chapter 5, Section 05020 1, June 2002.
OCR for page 21
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
BY BUDGET ACTIVITY
FY03 PBR
BAC (in millions)
6.1 219.1
6.2 697.5
6.3 742.9
TOTAL 1,659.6
FY03 BUDGET:
$~.660 Billion
Numbers may not add due to rounding.
BY TECHNICAL AREA
HUMAN
EFFECTIVENESS
6%
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
6%
MUNITIONS
6%
SPACE VEHICLES
6%
INFORMATION
6%
MATERIALS & MFG
Rio
DIRECTED ENERGY DUAL USE
5% ~ 1Y
° PROPULSION
15%
AIR VEHICLES SENSORS
r/O 1 0%
BASIC
RESEARCH
13%
MILSATCOM
12%
TECHNICAL AREA
PROPULSION
......................................................................................................................................................... '
BASIC RESEARCH
.................................................
M ~ USATCOM
SENSORS
AIR VEHICLES
MATERIALS & MEG
FY03 PBR
243.5
......................
219.1
...............................................................................
195.0
162.7
123.0
1 21.9
.
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
INFORMATION
~_ ~
SPACE VEHICLES
MUNITIONS
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
, .....................................................................................................
HUMAN EFFECTIVENESS
96.2
DIRECTED ENERGY
DUAL USE
TOTAL
................................
85.8
10.6
1,659.6
FIGURE 2-8 Proposed Air Force S&T FY 2003 budget. SOURCE: Ruck, 2002.
each task's technical and funding plan constrains the
depth of any review that is practical outside AFRL.
Any practical approach for allocating S&T funding
must account for this reality.
The Air Force S&T funding for 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3
proposed by the President for FY 2003 is shown in
Figure 2-8. The split of 6.2 and 6.3 funding into techni-
cal areas is also shown. The data show that among the
6.2 and 6.3 categories, propulsion receives the most
21
funding ($243.5 million), followed by MILSATCOM
($195 million one of the OSD additions), sensors
($162.7 million), air vehicles ($123 million), and ma-
terials and manufacturing ($121.9 million). These top
five categories make up over 50 percent of the total
budget.
The trend in funding from FY 2002 to FY 2003 in
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 is shown in the Figure 2-9. The FY
2003 PBR for 6.1 and 6.2 decreased relative to both the
OCR for page 22
6.1 224.2 229.7 219.1 224.0
6.2 706.6 779.6 697.5 865.0
6.3 471.7 580.7 742.9 718.0
TOTAL 1,402.5 1,590.1 1,659.6 1,807.0
22
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
FY03
FY02 PBR FY02 TOA FY03 PBR Appropriation
BUDGET ACTIVITY FY02 PBR FY02 TOA
FY03 PBR FY03 Appropriation
. .
Numbers may not add due to rounding.
FIGURE 2-9 Air Force S&T by budget activity (FY 2003 constant dollars, in millions). SOURCES: Hunsberger, 2002; DoD,
2002a; Jones, 2002.
FY 2002 PBR and TOA; 6.3 would have decreased
without the OSD additions discussed earlier. For FY
2003, the 6.1 appropriation was higher than the PBR
but less than the FY 2002 TOA. The 6.2 FY 2003 ap-
propriation increased significantly. The 6.3 FY 2003
appropriation also provided a significant increase over
the FY 2002 TOA but was lower than the PBR because
of the issues regarding the OSD additions.
Basic Research (6.~)
The 6.1 activities are defined in the DoD Financial
Management Regulation (FMR).~° The Air Force asso-
ciates 6.1 with Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 1
and 2.~ Key phrases in these definitions are "directed
l°DoD FMR, Vol. 2B, Section 050201. Generally consistent but
less detailed definitions are also contained in DoDI 5000.2 on the
operation of the DoD acquisition system.
iiSee GAO/NSIAD-99-162, p. 68, for definitions of the TRLs
(GAO, 1999~.
toward greater knowledge or understanding of the fun-
damental aspects of phenomena . . . without specific
applications . . . fundamental knowledge and under-
standing . . . related to long-term national security needs
. . . farsighted . . . involve pre-Milestone A efforts" and
"Invention begins.... The application is speculative."
Thus, the 6.1 budget managed by the Air Force Office
of Scientific Research (the basic research arm of
AFRL) is primarily one of "technology push," not nec-
essarily directed toward a specific military application.
In addition, the committee notes that a significant por-
tion of 6.1 funding goes to the nation's universities and
colleges, so it has the very important additional benefit
of helping to build the pool of scientists and engineers
(S&Es) an important consideration, since the Air
Force continues to face a shortage of S&E personnel
(see Chapter 3). The principal output of 6.1 activity is
knowledge in the form of papers published in the open
literature. Most of the technological underpinnings of
today's military capabilities started at this fundamental
level. Thus, 6.1 funding contributes to both national
OCR for page 23
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
1 400 -
1 200 -
~_
to
~ 1 000 -
in
—~ 800 -
o
Cal
in
co
600 -
\` _
'_ do_ ~
Basic Research (6.1)
Applied Research (6.2)
Ada. Tech. Dev. (6.3)
~ /
~ . ~
hi, ~
O- l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
1989 1 991
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Fiscal Year
FIGURE 2-10 Air Force S&T funding trends by budget
activity (TOA through FY 2002, appropriation for FY 2003~.
SOURCES: Hunsberger, 2002; DoD, 2002a.
security and economic security. The 6.1 funding over
time is shown in Figure 2-10.
As shown in Figure 2-10, 6.1 funding declined dur-
ing the mid- l990s but partially recovered over the late
l990s and early 2000s. Work under 6.1 sets the stage
for future technological opportunities, usually a decade
or more in the future. These investments character-
ized by uncertain outcomes, high risk, but possible high
reward (for example, support for the work that led to
the invention of the laser, adaptive optics, the develop-
ment of self-healing polymer composites, dip pen
nanolithography for nanoelectronics, and improved
tracking algorithms) are intended to open new tech-
nological opportunities and to prevent technological
surprise. Because the outcome is uncertain and not
usually related to near-term operational needs, the 6.1
program is perhaps the easiest budget line to cut
arbitrarily, even though doing so mortgages the future
from the viewpoint of both technology and personnel.
The committee suggests that making the flow of tech-
nology from 6.1 through 6.2/6.3, development, and into
the field more readily apparent to the major operational
commands and Air Force corporate leadership through
the use of current and planned as well as retrospective
examples would increase the insight into and interest
in basic science on the part of Air Force senior leader-
ship.
23
Applied Research (6.2)
The DoD FMR cited above also defines 6.2, which
the Air Force associates with TRL 3 and 4. Key phrases
from these definitions are "study to understand the
means to meet a recognized and specific national secu-
rity requirement . . . translates promising basic research
into solutions for broadly defined military needs . . .
non-system specific technology efforts . . . directed to-
ward general military needs with a view toward devel-
oping and evaluating the feasibility and practicality of
proposed solutions . . . precedes system specific re-
search . . . pre-Milestone B efforts, also known as Con-
cept and Technology Development phase tasks, such
as concept exploration efforts" and "proof of concept
. . . physically validate analytical predictions of sepa-
rate elements of the technology.... Component and/or
breadboard validation in laboratory environment . . .
establish that the pieces will work together."
In addition to the current Air Force administrative
structure, 6.2 also funds most of the AFRL manpower
and infrastructure.
Figure 2-10 also shows the historical funding trends
for 6.2. Like 6.1, 6.2 funding also declined in the mid-
l990s but has recovered and now exceeds the level of
FY 1989.
Advanced Technology Development (6.3)
Key phrases from the definitions in the DoD FMR
and TRL 5 and 6 for 6.3 include "development of sub-
systems and components and efforts to integrate sub-
systems and components into system prototypes for
field experiments and/or tests in a simulated environ-
ment . . . includes concept and technology demonstra-
tions of components and subsystems or system models
. . . The models may be form, fit and function proto-
types or scaled models . . . proof of technological feasi-
bility and assessment of subsystem and component
operability and producibility rather than the develop-
ment of hardware for service use . . . direct relevance to
identified military needs . . . pre-Milestone B efforts,
such as system concept demonstration, joint and Ser-
vice-specific experiments or Technology Demonstra-
tions . . . do not necessarily lead to subsequent develop-
ment or procurement phases" and "Component and/or
breadboard validation in relevant environment . . . Sys-
tem/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a
relevant environment . . . in a high fidelity laboratory
environment or in simulated operational environment."
OCR for page 24
24
The 6.3 activities are divided into two major catego-
ries critical experiments and advanced technology
demonstrations. Critical experiments address technol-
ogy development efforts that were enabled by 6.2 ini-
tiatives and which may subsequently advance to ATDs.
ATDs represent the final or most advanced phase of
S&T development just prior to transition to an acquisi-
tion program for development, production, and deploy-
ment to an operational user. The committee was in-
formed that AFRL intends to divide 6.3 funding about
evenly between critical experiments and ATDs.
As also shown in Figure 2-10, 6.3 funding declined
sharply in the early 1990s, from about $1.2 billion in
FY 1989 to about $530 million in FY 1994 (in constant
FY 2003 dollars). It then ranged between about $480
million and $600 million, rising to $718 million in the
FY 2003 appropriation.
ATDs and Transition to 6.4 and
Following Budge! Activities
Recent Air Force management initiatives have fo-
cused ATDs on projects expected to be ready to transi-
tion to 6.4 or other acquisition budget activity after one
more development cycle. Key phrases from the DoD
FMR for the activities under 6.4, Advanced Compo-
nent Development and Prototypes include these: "in-
volve efforts prior to Milestone B . . . include technol-
ogy demonstrations . . . Completion of Technology
Readiness Levels 6 and 7.... A logical progression of
program phases and development and/or production
funding must be evident in the FYDP."
The Air Force plan is to restrict ATDs to projects for
which a major Air Force Command has programmed
or plans to program funding for transition. This is an
attempt to jump technology across the traditional gap
between S&T and acquisition programs and ultimately
into fielded capability. The Applied Technology Coun-
cils (ATCs), a relatively new Air Force management
initiative, provide forums to ensure warfighter interest
and commitment to transition for each ATD (see the
discussion of ATCs in Chapter 3~.
Figure 2-10 portrays the historical balance between
the TOA for 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 in constant year FY 2003
i2In some cases, ATDs may provide a residual capability that
can be used operationally, but they are not usually designed with
the supportability features required for sustained operational use.
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
a:
o
~ 40-
(a
rr 30-
._
a:
o
0' 20-
10 -----
O
~ 6.2 Target 50%
. _~ =~= it_
^
6.3 Target 35%
+ 6.1
~ 6.2
_- 6.3
1 7 1
1989 1991
l
I
1993 1995 1997
Fiscal Year
l
l
,
T T 1 1
1999 2001 2003
FIGURE 2-11 Percentage split of Air Force S&T TOA
between 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. SOURCES: Hunsberger, 2002;
Jones, 2002.
dollars. Figure 2- 11 shows the same data as a percent-
age of the total annual S&T TOA.
Figure 2-11 also shows the Air Force targets for a
balanced S&T portfolio: 15 percent for 6.1,50 percent
for 6.2, and 35 percent for 6.3 (Brandt,2002~. The allo-
cations have been near the targets since the mid-199Os,
essentially "on target" in FY 2002, and would have
been near the targets in FY 2003 without the OSD ad-
ditions discussed earlier (6.1 and 6.2 slightly above and
6.3 slightly below). As a matter of completeness, the
committee notes that, like the constant year dollar level,
the allocation to 6.3 is low compared with that in FY
1989 and the early 1990s.
Comparing Balance Among the Services
The 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 funding balance among the ser-
vices is compared in Table 2-4. As shown in the table,
all three services have, on the average over FY 1989 to
FY 2003, allocated the least to 6.1 and slightly more to
6.2 than to 6.3. The primary difference among the ser-
vices is that the Navy allocates twice the fraction to 6.1
(and correspondingly less to 6.2 and 6.3) compared
with the other services.
SETTING THE PROPER S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL
The committee was led by the totality of the factors
discussed in this chapter to conclude that the most im-
OCR for page 25
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
TABLE 2-4 Percentage of Service S&T TOA
Average over FY 1989 to FY 2003
Service
6.1
6.2a
6.3
Army
Navy
Air Force
12.9
27.3
14.5
43.8
38.6
43.6
43.2
34.0
41.9
NOTE: Some rows may not total to 100 percent because of rounding.
SOURCES: Hunsberger, 2002; Jones, 2002.
aAir Force includes laboratory personnel salaries in 6.2; Army and
Navy do not.
portent objective is to achieve basic stability in Air
Force S&T. It also believes that S&T funding should
be increased with modest, realistically achievable real
growth to a sustainable funding level. The committee
judges such a guideline to be critical in light of the
deleterious effects of instability and the need for in-
creased funding discussed earlier. It is clear that there
are very real major opportunities and needs for new
S&T investment. Since there was not time for a review
of the content of the Air Force S&T portfolio, the com-
mittee cannot judge from first-hand information how
much of this demand can be met by the curtailment of
current programs. The committee notes, however, that
for the past 5 years, the Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board has scrubbed the content of the program in great
detail and presumes that the board has done a thorough
and competent job; thus, much of the new emphasis
must come from new investment.
The question of how much the Air Force should in-
vest in S&T is ill posed, so elaboration is required. The
question implied in the committee's statement of task
is Is the Air Force S&T program (and by implication
its budget) sufficient to counter future high-priority
threats and ensure military superiority? This is a differ-
ent question from that addressed each year by the Air
Force leadership (and its DoD and congressional over-
sight), which is What should the Air Force S&T budget
be in that year given competing budget priorities? The
reports referenced in this committee's statement of task
use still other criteria. The SAB recommended that the
Air Force S&T investment be determined on the basis
of the cost of the S&T program needed to satisfy the
Air Force's critical future capabilities (SAB, 2001).
The SAB did not specify an investment level, but im-
25
plied that the current level was too low. The Air Force
Section 252 review (discussed in Chapter 3) concluded
that the investment needed to satisfy fully the Air
Force's short-term objectives and long-term challenges
was roughly twice the investment then planned. The
DSB and Quadrennial Defense Review put forth a
percent-of-TOA approach, recommending, for ex-
ample, that the DoD S&T investment be set at 3 per-
cent of DoD TOA (significantly above the current
level) (DSB, 2000, 2002; DoD, 2001~. The AFA ex-
pressed concern about the decline in the Air Force S&T
investment since the end of the Cold War and recom-
mended that decline be reversed (AFA,2000~. A previ-
ous NRC committee (NRC, 2001a) recommended that
the Air Force S&T investment be increased to 1.5 to 2
times its FY 2001 level. While these recommendations
have rationales in the respective reports, most are not
based on quantitative analysis.
This committee believes that stability, in fact as well
as in prospect, is as important as a specific (reasonable)
S&T funding level. Within the context of stability as a
governing principle, what is the proper level of S&T
funding and how do we get there? The committee is
aware of the extreme difficulty in maintaining funding
stability under the current annual budgeting process.
Nevertheless, such stability is important to the future
of the Air Force and the nation's security. Given a judi-
cious choice of funding level and proper priority by Air
Force leadership, the committee believes that it is pos-
sible to stabilize the S&T funding to a much greater
degree than the historical record would indicate. The
objective is to avoid both the lows of the 1990s (which
resulted in the concerns described in Chapter 1) and the
highs or peaks of previous periods (that proved to be
unsustainable and were always followed by years of
debilitating declines).
The first question, establishing the proper S&T fund-
ing level, is challenging. Addressing the question of
whether the S&T program is sufficient to counter future
high-priority threats and ensure military superiority
comprehensively and in a substantive, quantitative
manner would require detailed study of the threats (cur-
rent and projected), the current S&T program, and
future needs and opportunities. It would need to evalu-
ate the costs of pursuing specific technologies as well
as to assess the risks in not pursuing them. Most likely,
it would need to be conducted at a classified level. Such
an effort on a $1.5 billion program divided into some
27 program elements containing more than 200 projects
was well beyond the scope of this 7-month study.
OCR for page 26
26
While lacking an analysis-based, quantitative as-
sessment as discussed above, it is possible to exam-
ine the issue of the proper funding level by address-
ing the second question, how to get there. The
committee believes that the approach of 2 percent
annual real growth over the 6-year period of the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) has merit.
This increase is modest in terms of annual growth,
manageable by AFRL, and, in the committee's judg-
ment, realizable within the pressures facing the Air
Force budget. This is the same growth rate that Con-
gress, in both the FY 1999 and FY 2000 National
Defense Authorization Acts, said that the Secretary
of Defense should have as an objective for defense
S&T funding, especially Air Force S&T funding
(U.S. Congress, 2000, 2001~. Over the 6-year pe-
riod of the FYDP, a 2 percent real growth rate would
bring the Air Force S&T budget to about the aver-
age level of the past two decades. This represents a
12 to 14 percent increase over the FY 2004 PER
(taken as a reference level). This increase would pro-
vide funding to pursue new requirements and op-
portunities beyond those that could be funded if ex-
isting programs were trimmed. The committee notes
that this investment is still below (but closer to)
those of the Army and Navy.
Recommendations for the detailed distribution of
a funding increase are beyond the scope of this
study. Broadly speaking, however, the committee
suggests that growth should be balanced among
near-, mid-, and far-term opportunities. The growth
should apply to the sum of 6.1 and 6.2 budgets (with
AFRL leadership determining the relative growth
between the two) and to the 6.3 total. The growth in
6.1 and 6.2 funds is commingled here because the
committee believes that there is more of a continuum
between 6.1 and 6.2 than is generally acknowledged
and that it is the responsibility of the AFRL leader-
ship to determine the relative growth between the
two. The committee notes, however, that the 6.1
budget has suffered considerable atrophy over the
past decade, especially compared with that for 6.2.
The 6.3 advanced technology demonstrations
(ATDs) are most effective in supplying the latest
technology when they are completed near the time
that the technology is needed by an acquisition pro-
gram. As a result, the allocation between critical
experiments and ATDs should be modulated accord-
ing to the demands of anticipated acquisition pro-
grams.
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CHANGES
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Finding 2-1. The committee holds firmly to the view
that stability in Air Force S&T funding is the most criti-
cal element of ensuring its S&T success.
Finding 2-2. Increases in the level of investment in
S&T in support of Air Force missions, at least over the
near term, could be productively applied to ensure the
long-term security and military superiority of the na-
tion. Supporting factors include these:
New and emerging threats most evident after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;
- The results of the S&T planning review imple-
mented by the Air Force in response to Section
252 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (P.L. 106-398) (which identified signifi-
cant unfunded challenges and opportunities);
- New types of systems such as directed energy
now moving toward the field;
The reduced S&T investment by others from
which the Air Force historically benefits; and
New opportunities (such as in the nano, biologi-
cal, and the ever-expanding information sci-
ences).
Finding 2-3. While the balance among 6.1, 6.2, and
6.3 is different among the three services, the commit-
tee was not presented with arguments suggesting that
the distribution in the balance for the Air Force should
be dramatically changed.
Finding 2-4. The Air Force has not adequately ad-
dressed the concerns raised by Congress and others re-
garding the Air Force S&T investment level. The Air
Force S&T investment rose during the late 1990s and
early 2000s, primarily as a result of congressional in-
creases. For FY 2004, however, after taking into ac-
count the movement of programs under the Air Force
S&T top line that previously had not been there, the
Air Force requested less funding for the continuing Air
Force S&T program than was received for FY 2003.
Plans for similar reductions appear to be in place for
FY 2005. The committee believes that the Air Force
S&T investment objective stated by Congress in both
the FY 1999 and FY 2000 National Defense Authori-
zation Acts (2 percent real growth per year over the
period covered by the Future Years Defense Program)
OCR for page 27
AIR FORCE S&T INVESTMENT LEVEL AND BALANCE
has merit. In the committee' s judgment, this is modest
in terms of real growth, manageable by the Air Force
Research Laboratory, and realizable within the pres-
sures facing the Air Force budget.
Recommendation 2-1. The committee recommends
that the Air Force S&T budget be grown, in accordance
with the investment objective stated by Congress.
When that level is achieved, every effort should be
made to keep it there, thereby assuring future S&T in-
vestment stability.
Finding 2-5. The Air Force S&T budget covers about
60 percent of the funding for the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL). For the remainder, AFRL lever-
ages funding by other Air Force programs, Defense-
wide S &T programs (principally the Defense
27
Advanced Research Projects Agency), and other gov-
ernment sources. The benefits of such leveraging are
constrained by the direction that comes to AFRL with
the external funding and by dependence on the paths
taken by the external entities but magnified by the range
of innovation and risk taking that consequently drive
Air Force modernization. The committee is concerned
that additional increases in non-Air Force S&T fund-
ing could further jeopardize stability and result in the
Air Force's losing the ability to mature the S&T needed
by the acquisition programs.
Recommendation 2-2. The balance between Air Force
S&T and other sources of AFRL funding should be
monitored with regard to impact on the stability of the
total S&T program and the maturation and transition of
the technology needed for acquisition programs.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
acquisition programs
