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1
Introduction
The great achievements of molecular biology and genetics over the
last 50 years have produced advances in agriculture and industrial
processes and have revolutionized the practice of medicine. The
very technologies that fueled these benefits to society, however, pose a
potential risk as well the possibility that these technologies could also
be used to create the next generation of biological weapons. Biotechnol-
ogy represents a "dual use" dilemma in which the same technologies can
be used legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism.
Events over the 1990s focused growing attention on this balance of risks
and benefits, part of a larger concern about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) chemical, nuclear, or biological. In early 1992,
President Yeltsin acknowledged that, despite being an original signatory
and State party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC),
the Soviet Union had maintained a major clandestine biological weapons
program into the early 1990s.1 Yeltsin ordered the program shut down, but
concerns about other possible secret programs remained. Policymakers in
the United States became increasingly concerned that so-called "rogue
states" would turn to WMD to counter the overwhelming U.S. conventional
military superiority. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin launched the "Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative" in December 1993 to develop additional
means to address these threats. Official statements continue to cite at least a
dozen countries believed to have or to be pursuing a biological weapons
capability.2 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
anthrax letters accelerated already existing concerns that terrorists would
seek WMD capabilities as well. President Bush, in a speech at West Point in
15
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16
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
2002, said: "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of
radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and
nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology when that oc-
curs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power
to strike great nations."3 States, groups, and individuals are pursuing a
biological weapons capability and the means for them to do so are widely
available. U.S. and British concerns about Iraq's reported biological and
other WMD programs in early 2003 were a primary reason for launching
preemptive military action to find and destroy these weapons capabilities.4
Biological weapons have long been stigmatized as "indiscriminant
agents of unnecessary suffering, [whose] use ... contradicts the univer-
sal principles of war."5 As discussed below, since November 1969 the
U.S. programs linked to biological weapons have been restricted to re-
search and development on defensive measures only. Thus few biologists
in the United States today have knowledge of our country's past offensive
weapons programs or of the concerns of the national security branches of
government. In this respect the life sciences community is in a different
situation from that of the physics community, which in large part has
been continuously involved in government-sponsored weapons research
programs since at least World War II. The scientific community and the
government jointly face a double challenge: (1) to establish a working re-
lationship with the national security branches of government, and (2) to
help craft a system that will minimize the risk of wrongful use of biologi-
cal agents or technology without damaging the scientific infrastructure
that has made biological research so vital to the health of the nation.
THE LIFE SCIENCES TODAY
The biological sciences have experienced enormous growth over the
last century, fueled by a stream of discoveries such as the principles of
genetics, the structure of DNA, and the discovery of gene-splicing tech-
nologies. These have opened new fields of inquiry and provided the basis
for myriad applications in industry, agriculture, and medicine. Among
the technological breakthroughs in the life sciences, genetic engineering
plays a particularly significant role.
Genetic engineering is a technique that permits the artificial modifica-
tion and transfer of genetic material from one organism to another and
from one species to another. This technology is used throughout the world
to alter the protein produced by a gene and to design organisms with
desirable traits for applications ranging from basic research and develop-
ment activities to pharmaceutical and industrial uses. During the last 30
years, these recombinant techniques have spawned a vibrant biotechnol-
ogy industry focused largely on the development of new pharmaceuticals
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INTRODUCTION
17
to fight disease.6 By 2000 the annual investment in the biotechnology in-
dustry peaked at nearly $29 billion, while employment in the biotechnol-
ogy industry reached 191,000 by 2001.7
In response to the opportunities presented by these developments,
the resources devoted to the life sciences have increased dramatically,
making further discoveries possible. The government has funded biologi-
cal research generously through the National Institutes of Health and Na-
tional Science Foundation budgets, with few strings attached; private
foundations and the pharmaceutical industry have also made major con-
tributions. The number of PhDs awarded each year in the biological and
agricultural sciences has increased steadily; 6,526 were awarded in 2001.8
This ever-expanding research activity has resulted in numerous new
biopharmaceutical products that are transforming medicine. Examples
include human recombinant insulin for the treatment of diabetes, a vac-
cine against hepatitis B. and medicines for diabetes, cancer therapy, ar-
thritis, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis, heart attacks, hemophilia, and
sepsis. As knowledge of the human genome increases, it may even be-
come possible to tailor pharmaceutical products not only to specific dis-
eases but also to specific individuals. Throughout this process, the time
between new discoveries and their applications has grown ever shorter.
One example is the very short time it took the scientific community to
identify the coronavirus as the causal agent of the newly emerging hu-
man disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Biotechnology research is now a truly global enterprise. While indus-
trialized countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, Israel, and lapan may be the first to develop advanced research
and technologies, other countries have a skill base that will enable broad
domestic utilization of biological technologies.9 For example:
China has an aggressive program in plant biotechnology, and as of 2002
plans to increase funding by 400 percent by 2005. This energetic invest-
ment also exists in the Chinese private sector, and the national scientific
establishment is attempting to lure foreign-trained scientists to return
with lucrative financial packages. India is in the process of tripling fund-
ing to its national biotech center, and is promoting the development and
use of genetically modified crops throughout Asia. Singapore has for
many years made a practice of recruiting foreign scientists. Taiwan is
investing large amounts in biotechnology and is seeking citizens to re-
turn home to build up biotechnology in academia and industry. A Brazil-
ian coalition recently demonstrated sophisticated domestic use of bio-
logical technologies by successfully sequencing the plant pathogen
X[ylella]fastidiosa in 2000.~°
In addition to the dispersed research enterprise, publications and per-
sonnel are also widely spread. Well over 10,000 journals in the life sci-
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18
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
ences are published worldwide. Biological Abstracts, an international da-
tabase on biology, clinical and experimental medicine, biochemistry, and
biotechnology, provides coverage of over 6,000 active international jour-
nals and 14,000 archival titles from over 100 countries; Medline, the online
service of the National Institutes of Health, provides abstract information
for more than 4,600 biomedical journals published in the United States
and 70 other countries; and PubMed currently provides full-text web ac-
cess to 4,058 journals. According to Medline, the total number of scientific
articles published in the peer-reviewed biomedical literature increased
from 449,109 in 1998 to 491,620 in 2001. Given the global nature of the
biotechnology research and development enterprise, it is unrealistic to
think that biological technologies and the knowledge base upon which
they rest can somehow be isolated within the borders of a few countries.
The rapid advance of scientific knowledge and applications owes
much to a research culture in which knowledge and biological materials
are shared among scientists and people move freely between universities,
government agencies, and private industry. Large numbers of foreign
graduate students and postdoctoral associates have been an essential in-
gredient in the success of the biological research enterprise. The scientific
workforce is increasingly international; at the National Institutes of
Health, for example, approximately 50 percent of the technical staff are
non-U.S. citizens. Research results have been widely disseminated, so that
even high school students now routinely perform experiments involving
recombinant DNA techniques. In short, a dynamic national and interna-
tional research enterprise has evolved, with an extraordinary record of
achievement at multiple centers of excellence. These are values that should
be preserved in any sensible policy for minimizing the risks associated
with the misapplication of the fruits of the biotechnology enterprise.
THE DUAL USE DILEMMA
The regulation of dual use biotechnology research is a highly conten-
tious technical, political, and societal issue. In the language of arms con-
trol and disarmament, dual use refers to technologies intended for civil-
ian application that can also be used for military purposes. Technology
involves more than just products; it also encompasses a means to produce
and use products in such a way as to solve a problem. Thus, technology
comprises "the ability to recognize technical problems, the ability to de-
velop new concepts and tangible solutions to technical problems, the con-
cepts and tangibles developed to solve technical problems, and the ability
to exploit the concepts and tangibles in an effective way."
The "general purpose clause" of the BWC prohibits the development,
production, and stockpiling of biological weapons, but permits States that
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INTRODUCTION
19
are parties to the treaty to conduct research activities for peaceful pur-
poses or in order to defend or protect against BW agents. Useful distinc-
tions between permitted and prohibited activities at the level of basic re-
search are difficult to make because biotechnology presents a classic
example of the dual use dilemma. In the life sciences, for example, the
same techniques used to gain insight and understanding regarding the
fundamental life processes for the benefit of human health and welfare
may also be used to create a new generation of BW agents by hostile gov-
ernments and individuals. For the scientists and technicians involved in
cutting-edge research and development in biology, biotechnology, medi-
cine, and agriculture, this duality creates both uncertainties and ethical
dilemmas. The duality between the purposes permitted and prohibited
under the BWC is at the heart of this Committee's activities.~3
Current research programs in universities, government laboratories,
and pharmaceutical companies include experiments directed toward such
goals as discovering vaccines for major diseases such as influenza, AIDS,
and cancer; new antibiotics for both bacterial and fungal diseases; new
sources of genes to protect crops against pests and diseases; and treat-
ments for diabetes, stroke, and Alzheimer's disease. These research activi-
ties also include an intense effort to discover vaccines, antibiotics, and
detection systems that would provide the defense against each of the se-
lect agents. But many of the same methods for developing attenuated live
vaccines against viral diseases can have offensive applications as well.~4
The key issue is whether the risks associated with misuse can be reduced
while still enabling critical research to go forward.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Of thousands of species of potentially pathogenic microorganisms,
very few have been developed and deployed as biological weapons. As
a society, we tend to think that biological and chemical warfare are re-
cent threats to individuals and populations, but in reality, the offensive
use of chemical and biological agents has its origins in antiquity (see
Annex to this chapter). It has only been within the last century, how-
ever, that infectious disease agents have been seriously considered, on a
continuing basis, as tools of war. Based on scientific discoveries during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, biologists were able
for the first time to identify, isolate, and culture disease-causing mi-
crobes under controlled conditions and use them to intentionally induce
disease in a "naive" host. "The foundations of microbiology pioneered
by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch offered new prospects for those inter-
ested in biological weapons because it allowed agents to be chosen and
designed on a rational basis."~5
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20
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
Germany was accused of using disease-causing germs during World
War I by infecting horses and mules with "landers a highly infectious
animal disease and cattle with anthrax. German spies were caught in
1917 allegedly trying to spread anthrax bacteria among reindeer herds in
the far northern portion of Norway, near the border with Russia. These
charges were confirmed when anthrax-laced sugar cubes obtained from
a Swedish-German-Finnish aristocrat arrested as a German agent in
1917 were found to be still viable after being stored in the archives of a
Norwegian museum for the last 80 years.~7
Over the past 60 years pathogens have been identified and per-
fected as strategic and tactical weapons. Every major combatant dur-
ing World War II including the United States, Great Britain, Canada,
France, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan had some type
of biological weapons program. During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-
1945), Japan repeatedly attacked China with the plague-causing bacte-
ria Yersinia Testis, targeting some eleven cities. At least 700 Chinese
reportedly died from plague alone,~9 although the number of Chinese
civilians killed between 1933 and 1945 by Japanese germ warfare may
be much higher.20
lapan's secret biological warfare program, Unit 731,2~ officially re-
ferred to as the Army Anti-Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit,
was located in a remote, high-security area in lapanese-occupied Man-
churia, first in Harbin and then in Ping Fan. The Japanese perfected cul-
ture and dispersal techniques for a large number of biological agents. Af-
ter the war the Japanese commander of Unit 731, General Shiro Ishii,
traded research data, at the suggestion of his debriefers with the Ameri-
can occupation government in Japan, in exchange for a grant of immunity
from war crimes prosecution. Information obtained from General Ishii
later found its way to Camp Detrick, and is still held in the National Ar-
chives in the United States.22
The United States' offensive biological weapons program also had its
origins in World War II. Begun in 1942 within the Chemical Warfare Ser-
vice at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, the program's primary mis-
sion during World War II was biological warfare research on the caus-
ative agents of anthrax and botulism.23 The main element for carrying out
this program, the Special Projects Division of the Army Chemical Warfare
Service, had at its peak 3,900 personnel, of which 2,800 were Army, nearly
1,000 Navy, and the remaining 100 civilian. The work was carried out at
four installations. Camp Detrick was the parent research and pilot plant
center. Field testing facilities were established in 1943 and 1944 in Missis-
sippi and Utah, respectively, and a production plant was constructed in
Indiana in 1944. All work, which was coordinated with Great Britain and
Canada, was conducted under strictest secrecy.24
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INTRODUCTION
21
From the end of World War II until the U.S. decision to renounce its
biological weapons program in 1969, this program developed and per-
fected offensive weapons capabilities for the Air Force, Navy, and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), utilizing a variety of human, animal,
and plant pathogens.25 "Between 1941 [sic] and 1969, the policy of the
United States regarding biological warfare was first (to) deter its use
against the United States and its forces, and secondly to retaliate if deter-
rence failed."26
The largest biological weapons complex ever created was in the
former Soviet Union. Two main groups of facilities were involved in the
research and development, production, and testing of biological weap-
ons: a military-controlled system, which started in the 1920s, and
Biopreparat, a top-secret program operating under civilian cover from
1972 until at least 1992,27 despite the fact that the Soviet Union was an
original signatory to and repository for the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion. As a result, the Soviet program not only caught up with but sur-
passed the U.S. program to become the most sophisticated biological
weapons program in the world. Its size and scope were enormous; by the
early 1990s more than 60,000 people were involved in the research, devel-
opment, and production of biological weapons as well as the stockpiling
of hundreds of tons of anthrax spores and tens of tons of other pathogens,
including smallpox and plague.28 In addition, it is now known that other
state programs were involved in aspects of this effort including those of
the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, KGB,
and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
U.S. POLICY AND THE CREATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND
TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
After intensive debate in the United Nations and domestic inter-
agency review, President Richard Nixon on November 25, 1969 renounced
the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemicals and stated that he
would seek ratification of the Geneva Protocol by the U.S. Senate. (The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical or biological mate-
rials in war, although it does not proscribe their acquisition or posses-
sion.) President Nixon also renounced the use of lethal bacteriological
(biological) agents and weapons as well as all other methods of biological
warfare, and directed the Defense Department to make recommendations
for the disposal of existing BW stockpiles. He further stated that the
United States would confine its biological agent and toxin research to de-
fensive measures, such as immunization and safety. On February 14, 1970,
this policy was extended to biological toxins regardless of their means of
production.29
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22
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
The United States decided to abandon its offensive biological weap-
ons program, destroy its existing stockpiles of biological and toxin weap-
ons, and convert the production facilities to other purposes because it was
recognized that:
· Biological weapons could be as great a threat to large populations
as nuclear weapons and that no reliable defense is likely;
· Biological weapons could be much simpler and less expensive than
nuclear weapons to develop and produce; proliferation of biological
weapons would therefore greatly increase the number of nations to which
the populations of the United States and its allies [could] be held hostage;
· Our biological weapons program was pioneering an easily dupli-
cated technology and was likely to inspire others to follow suit.30
The United States concluded that its biological weapons program was
a substantial threat to its own national security and that one of the best
ways to reduce this threat was not only to renounce biological weapons in
this country but also to strengthen the international barriers to their pro-
liferation.3~ The United States, the United Kingdom, and the former So-
viet Union together were responsible for the effort to sponsor the Biologi-
cal and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 the first arms control
agreement to ban outright an entire class of weapons.32 The U.S. Senate
ratified the BWC in 1975. To date, 162 countries have signed and 148 coun-
tries have ratified the BWC.
THE NEW THREAT
The revolution in biotechnology was just beginning when the BWC
went into force in 1975. With the advent of the biotechnology revolu-
tion and the apparent proliferation of countries desiring to have a bio-
logical weapons capability, its signatories must reexamine the efficacy
of the Convention in governing the use of disease as a method to
spread terror.
The acquisition of biotechnology and biological weapons capability is
considerably easier than was the case in the 1940s and 1950s. The explo-
sion in biotechnologies and genetic engineering technologies all of
which have legitimate civilian applications could empower a hostile
agent. Gordon Oehler, director of the Non-Proliferation Center at the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee on March 27, 1996, and stated that there was "a continuing pursuit
by many countries to acquire chemical and biological weapons and that
The chilling reality is that these materials and technologies are more ac-
cessible now than at any other time in history."33
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INTRODUCTION
23
The information to conduct genetic engineering research is easily ac-
cessible on the Internet. Moreover, the equipment and expertise to use
this information to create novel agents are available globally. The interna-
tional diffusion of knowledge and capabilities in biotechnology means
that the capacity to carry out beneficial as well as harmful research activi-
ties is widely accessible, both to nations and to terrorist groups.
In this situation it is futile to imagine that access to dangerous patho-
gens and destructive biotechnologies can be physically restricted, as is the
case for nuclear weapons and fissionable materials.34 The nature of the
biotechnology problem indeed the nature of the biological research en-
terprise is vastly different from that of theoretical and applied nuclear
physics in the late 1930s. The contrast between what is a legitimate, per-
haps compelling subject for research and what might justifiably be pro-
hibited or tightly controlled cannot be made a priori, stated in categorical
terms, nor confirmed by remote observation.
Matthew Meselson, a leading molecular biologist, gave a stark warn-
ing of the potential dangers posed by the destructive applications of bio-
technology in May 2000:
Every major technology metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion,
aviation, electronics, nuclear energy has been intensively exploited, not
only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also hap-
pen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the com-
ing century? During the century just begun, as our ability to modify fun-
damental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not
only to devise additional ways to destroy life but ... also ... to manipu-
late it including the processes of cognition, development, reproduction,
and inheritance. A world in which these capabilities are widely employed
for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of con-
flict has radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportuni-
ties for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation.35
These dangers cannot be eliminated entirely since the fundamental
knowledge from which they emerge is available around the world and
the potential benefits of biotechnology for health promotion and national
defense are too great to contemplate efforts to prohibit or reverse such
research. But the potential adverse effects associated with the malicious
exploitation of these technological advances cannot be ignored. Because
of widespread moral repugnance against the production and use of chemi-
cal and biological weapons (CBW), the involvement of scientists and en-
gineers in CBW research, development, and production is widely con-
demned.36 History demonstrates, however, that without any military
application in mind, research in biology may still contribute to the pro-
duction of biological weapons.37 As discussed earlier, the discovery and
elaboration of the "germ theory of disease" in the nineteenth century led
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24
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
not only to better sanitation and hygiene practices but also to the inten-
tional development of disease as a weapon in the twentieth century.
In discussing modifications of microorganisms that might have sig-
nificance for bioweapons, Nixdorff and Bender38 identified four classes
of microbial manipulations that have been the subject of intense debate
within and outside the scientific community:
1. The transfer of antibiotic resistance to microorganisms,
2. Modification of the antigenic properties of microorganisms,
3. Modification of the stability of microorganisms to the environment,
and
4. The transfer of pathogenic properties to microorganisms.
Regarding these manipulations, they observed that:
All four kinds of manipulations are possible and are being carried out
daily in research laboratories. Some of the most intensive research con-
cerns the elucidation of the mechanisms of pathogenesis. This work is
essential for combating infectious diseases. It is hoped that the produc-
tion of more effective vaccines with [fewer] side effects, better diagnos-
tics and new therapeutic drugs will result from this research. At the same
time, it is feared that the advances in biotechnology can be misused to
develop and produce biological weapons.39
The National Institutes of Health's (NIH's) recently released research
priorities for countering bioterrorism identified several categories of re-
search activities in immunology and genomics that would be considered
"provocative" if conducted by a hostile or rogue government. These in-
clude efforts to "identify pathogen-induced immunoregulatory and immu-
nosuppressive effects" as well as to "analyze gene expression of agents of
bioterrorism."40 John Cannon, former chairman of the National Intelligence
Council and a former deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, observed
that "the continuing revolution in science and technology will accentuate
the dual use problem related to biotech breakthroughs in biomedical engi-
neering, genomic profiling, genetic modification, and drug development....
Responsible scientists will have an extraordinary opportunity to improve
the quality of human life across the planet. At the same time, terrorists and
other evildoers may develop a powerful capability to destroy that life."4
RECENT EXAMPLES OF "CONTENTIOUS RESEARCH"
IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
Biological weapons differ from other weapons systems in a number of
important respects. They generally are based on naturally occurring patho-
gens that have convolved along with their hosts to possess features such as
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INTRODUCTION
25
high infectivity, ease of transmission, and virulence. As a corollary, how-
ever, the effects of naturally occurring pathogens are limited by the evolu-
tionary advantage gained by not eliminating their hosts. Among the many
implications of the anticipated progress in biotechnology is the presump-
tion that it may be feasible to create novel biological agents that are far more
predictable and dangerous than any of the naturally occurring pathogens
that have been developed as biological weapons in the past.42 It may be
difficult to engineer a more successful pathogen than those already present
in nature that have been perfected by evolution for their niche in life. How-
ever, application of the new genetic technologies makes the creation of "de-
signer diseases" and pathogens with increased military utility more likely.43
There have been several recent examples of what Gerald Epstein of
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency refers to as "contentious re-
search"44 experiments that resulted in the creation of organisms or
knowledge with "dual use" potential. The Australian ectromelia virus
(mousepox) experiment; total synthesis of the poliovirus genome and re-
covery of infectious virus, and the comparison of the immune response to
a host defense function from vaccinia and smallpox have all attracted the
attention of the scientific community, the media, the defense community,
and policy analysts. Each is elaborated below.
The Mousepox Virus: A Case Study in Preconsideration
The mousepax virus: a case study in preconsideration. Probably the
most celebrated recent case involving the dissemination of research with
the potential for bioterrorist uses was the report of an unexpected effect of
the bioengineering of a strain of ectromelia virus (mousepox) that was in-
tended to help eradicate mice in Australia. The authors of the papery had
originally set out to make an infectious immunocontraceptive for wild
mice by incorporating an ovary specific antigen, the mouse zone pellu-
cida 3 (ZP3) glycoproteina gene into the genome of ectromelia virus. The
authors subsequently sought to alter the ectromelia by adding an
immunomodulator with the hope that this would increase the immune
response of the infected mice to their fertilized eggs and thus make them
permanently infertile. They drew upon previous published work by oth-
ers with recombinant vaccinia virus in mice in which it had been shown
that incorporating the gene for the immunomodulatory cytokine IL-4 into
the viral genome and thus overexpressing it in vivo enhanced the viru-
lence of vaccinia virus in mice. The increased virulence is probably due to
suppression of the antiviral immune response mediated through compet-
ing cytokines like IL-2, IL-12, and interferon gamma, which work by
stimulating immune effecter cells to kill virus-infected cells and thus con-
trol the virus infection.
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30
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
cations of biotechnology research. This is not a completely new issue.
When gene splicing technology was first reported, the scientific commu-
nity at the time raised concerns that the technology might deliberately or
inadvertently be used to create organisms with increased virulence or
novel characteristics.5~ These possibilities eventually led to the 1975
Asilomar Conference, where scientists gathered to discuss the safety of
manipulating DNA from different species.52 The meeting resulted in the
issuance by NIH of Guidelines for Research Involving rDNA Molecules
(hereafter called the NIH Guidelines) in 1976 that regulated the conduct
of NIH-sponsored recombinant DNA research and established a mecha-
nism for reviewing proposed experiments in this field.
lust as the life sciences community with the Asilomar Conference
stepped up to the challenge of responding to concerns that biology could
set back rather than advance human welfare, so too the Human Genome
Project created the ethical, legal, and social implications program to ex-
plore how advances in genetics intended to improve human health could
proceed without undermining other dimensions of human well-being.
National commissions and Congress continue to debate whether certain
advances in biology should be pursued and published.53
The initial fears about the inadvertent creation of virulent microbes
by gene splicing techniques have abated because of overwhelming scien-
tific evidence to the contrary. There have been no reported cases of dis-
ease caused by recombinant microorganisms despite the widespread use
of gene splicing techniques in academic laboratories and in the produc-
tion of pharmaceuticals. In view of this experience, and the prospects for
understanding the etiology of complex diseases and finding cures for
them, the NIH has revised its Guidelines several times, with the net result
being the elimination of the earlier prohibitions and the exemption from
the Guidelines of essentially all recombinant DNA experiments except
those that involve the molecular manipulation of human and restricted
animal and plant pathogens.
COMMITTEE CHARGE AND PROCESS
Current policy at both the national and international levels may not
be adequate to cope with the dangers inherent in the use and applications
of genetic engineering. As discussed in greater detail in the following
chapters, the United States has enacted legislation to provide for the physi-
cal security of select agents and screening of personnel. The Committee's
proposed system for reviewing research projects and publications would
complement and strengthen this statutory regime.
Internationally, however, protection against misuse of biotechnol-
ogy is very uneven. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the
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INTRODUCTION
31
centerpiece of biological weapons arms control, lacks effective verifica-
tion and compliance measures. Moreover, it addresses only the actions
of states and was never intended to guard against the development of a
BW capability by individuals or nonstate actors (although national
implementing legislation required by Article IV of the Convention
could constrain the actions of individuals and groups within the state).
In November 2001 the draft text for an international protocol covering
compliance and verification measures was rejected by the United States.
New, informal measures to strengthen the BWC being explored by ex-
pert groups and States parties are scheduled to continue over a period
of three years (the first meetings were held in Geneva in August 2003~.
The measures include enactment of national criminal legislation supple-
mented by an enhanced extradition regime; security standards for
pathogenic organisms; genetic engineering oversight; and international
adoption of professional codes of conduct.54 The hope is that these dis-
cussions will translate into coordinated action by the States parties, but
at present only a few states have instituted security measures to protect
against diversion and misuse of biotechnology.
The most elaborate treaty-based inspection procedures could not
achieve effective restrictions at the level of basic research without severely
restricting research in general. The inevitable diffusion of knowledge and
capabilities has already demonstrated that the capacity to do harm is be-
coming globally available, both to state and nonstate actors. At the same
time, developments in biotechnology are also capable of yielding great
benefits, such as new treatments for many diseases. The distinction be-
tween the great opportunities and great dangers of biotechnology turns
on assessing whether the risks associated with the benefits of funda-
mental research outweigh the potential for misuse. The challenge to the
scientific community, therefore, is to develop formal and informal pro-
cesses and procedures to mitigate or minimize the destructive applica-
tions of advanced biotechnology without unduly restricting legitimate
biotechnology research activities.
Beginning the process of addressing these challenges is the purpose
of this study. Specifically, the Committee was charged to:
1. Review the current rules, regulations, and institutional arrange-
ments and processes in the United States that provide oversight of re-
search on pathogens and potentially dangerous biotechnology research,
within government laboratories, universities and other research institu-
tions, and industry. The review would focus on how choices are made
about which research is and is not appropriate, and how information
about relevant ongoing research is collected and shared.
2. Use the review to assess the adequacy of current U.S. rules, regula-
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32
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
lions, and institutional arrangements and processes to prevent the destruc-
tive application of biotechnology research.
3. Recommend changes in those practices that could improve U.S.
capacity to prevent the destructive application of biotechnology research
while still enabling legitimate research to be conducted.
This report is part of a larger body of work that The National Acad-
emies have undertaken in recent decades on science and security issues,
beginning with Scientific Communication and National Security in 1982 and
continuing into the 1990s with the publication of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response
(1999) and Firepower in the Lab: Automation in the Fight Against Infectious
Diseases and Bioterrorism (2001~. In response to the events of September
lath, the Academies undertook a comprehensive survey of the contribu-
tions that science and technology could make to countering terrorism;
Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism was published in 2002. The report of its panel on bioterrorism,
Countering Bioterrorism: The Role of Science and Technology, was published
separately. In addition, the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Emerging
Infections convened a 3-day workshop on Biological Threats and Terrorism:
Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities, which was released as a
workshop summary late in 2002. The 2002 report on Countering Agricul-
tural Bioterrorism, a study already in progress prior to September 11th, en-
abled the Committee to focus its primary efforts on threats to human
health. In the area of potential controls on information and data, the re-
port on Sharing Publication-Related Data and Materials: Responsibility of Au-
thorship in the Life Sciences (2003) is particularly relevant to the continuing
concerns for ensuring the wide availability of the results of scientific re-
search.55 Information about current projects may be found on the Acad-
emies website http://www.nas.edu.
Committee Process
In creating the Ad hoc Committee on Research Standards and Practices
to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, the National Re-
search Council (the operating arm of The National Academies) selected
committee members representing a broad spectrum of backgrounds, exper-
tise, and interests. Areas of expertise included molecular and cellular biol-
ogy, virology, medicine, laboratory safety, international and regulatory law,
bioethics, and defense policy (see Appendix B for biographical information
on the members of the Committee). In addition, the Committee relied on
the expertise and advice of representatives from the Executive Office of the
President, governmental and nongovernmental technical and policy ex-
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INTRODUCTION
33
perts, as well as educators and private consultants. Information available
from the open literature and materials submitted by experts were reviewed
and considered during the Committee's deliberations (see Appendix C).
Even though the Statement of Task did not require the Committee to
consider information control regimes for dissemination of information in the
life sciences that could be exploited for nefarious purposes, the Committee
concluded that this issue was implicit in the larger task before it and needed
to be considered along with the regulatory environment for biotechnology
research. An additional impetus for the Committee's consideration of infor-
mation control regimes for unclassified research in the life sciences was the
announcement by the White House shortly before the Committee's first meet-
ing of its renewed interest in the application of "sensitive but unclassified
information" control regimes for managing the dissemination of unclassified
research that is financed by the federal government.56
Report Road Map
Chapter 2 reviews the current domestic and international rules,
regulations, and institutional arrangements and processes that provide
oversight of research on pathogens and potentially dangerous biotechnol-
ogy research within government laboratories, universities and other re-
search institutions, and industry. Chapter 3 reviews the existing and
emerging regulatory environment governing the control of information
related to biological research. Chapter 4 presents the Committee's conclu-
sions and recommendations about the ways in which the current regula-
tory environment for genetic engineering research might be enhanced
while allowing the scientific enterprise to continue its essential activities.
ANNEX:
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN HISTORY
People figured out how to intentionally spread illnesses long before
naturalists came up with the discovery that germs cause disease. Among
the older military techniques that can be claimed as biological warfare is
the use of corpses of humans or animals to befoul wells or other sources of
drinking water.57 While the principal objective was thought to be the de-
nial of clean water to the enemy, a secondary effect was to spread disease
among people and animals that consumed the contaminated water.58 One
of the earliest recorded instances of biological warfare occurred in 600 BC,
when the Athenian leader Solon poisoned the water supply in the city of
Kirrha with the noxious roots of the Helleborus plant a primitive but ef-
fective biological toxin of plant origin. The Greeks and Romans may have
used human and animal corpses to poison drinking water wells.
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BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
Alexander the Great is thought to have catapulted the bodies of dead men
over the walls of besieged cities, possibly as a means of spreading disease
and inciting terror among their inhabitants.59
A related technique, used in the Middle Ages, was to deliberately
leave dead human or animal corpses behind in areas that would be occu-
pied shortly by invading troops; catapults were used as well.60 In 1346,
invading Tartars intent on controlling the Silk Road trade attacked the
Black Sea port of Caffa at the time occupied by the Genoese. The Tartar
army, already exposed to the Black Death, hurled plague-infested cadav-
ers over the impregnable walls of Caffa to infect the enemy population.
It is usually reported62 that the fleeing Genoese brought the Black Death
with them via plague-infested rodents, along shipping routes to Sicily,
Sardinia, Corsica, and Genoa and from there it spread overland through-
out Italy and Europe. It is considered equally likely, however, that the
entry of plague into Europe from the Crimea occurred independent of
this event.63 Over a four-year period, the plague eventually caused 25
million deaths one-third of Europe's population at the time. Population
losses were probably much higher in the French Mediterranean coastlands
and in northern Italy.64
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, French and British
soldiers and civilians are alleged to have deliberately infected North
American Indian populations with European diseases. "(T)he use of small-
pox as a weapon may have been widely entertained by British military
commanders and may have been employed without scruple when oppor-
tunity offered, possibly on a number of occasions."65 During the French
and Indian Wars, for example, Sir leffrey Amherst, commander-in-chief
of the British forces, was concerned that his troops west of the Allegheny
Mountains were in danger of being overrun by Indians. He wrote to the
commander of the garrison at Fort Pitt on the Pennsylvania frontier and
urged that smallpox be spread among the disaffected tribes.66 In tune
1763, Captain Ecuyer of the Royal Americans met with two Indian chiefs
under a pretense of friendship and gave them blankets that had been taken
from a smallpox hospital. During the following months, according to his-
torians of the episode, many Indians suffered and died as "smallpox raged
among the tribes of the Ohio."67 During the 1800s, U.S. government agents
were alleged to have deliberately infected the Plains Indians by giving
them trading blankets infected with the deadly disease, decimating the
population.68
NOTES
~ Interview with President Boris Yeltsin, Rossiskiye Vesti, May 27, 1992. In Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.:
FBIS-SOV-92-103.
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INTRODUCTION
35
2 John Holum, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, listed
a dozen unspecified countries in 1996 as possessing or pursuing BW capabilities,
commenting that this was twice as many as in 1975 when the BWC entered into
force. Remarks to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Con-
vention in Geneva, Switzerland, November 26,1996. In May 2002 Under Secretary
of State John Bolton named Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Cuba as
states the United States was certain possessed or were actively seeking BW. "Be-
yond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,"
remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.
3 President George W. Bush. June 1, 2002. Remarks at the Graduation Exercise of
the United States Military Academy. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
4 Intelligence estimates prior to the war concluded that Iraq had stocks of biologi-
cal weapons. "We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has
chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN
restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this
decade." National Intelligence Estimate, "Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction," October 2002. Available at http://www.ceip.org/files/
projects/npp/pdf/Iraq/declassifiedintellreport.pdf. An "interim progress report"
on the search for banned weapons of mass destruction in Iraq released on October
2, 2003 revealed no stockpiles of such weapons, though it did cite "rudimentary"
traces of weapons programs, concealed equipment, and so forth. A copy of the
unclassified statement, presented by David Kay and made available by the CIA,
may be found at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/dkaylO0203.html.
5 Zanders, l.P. 2002. Introduction in "Ethics and Reason in Chemical and Biologi-
cal Weapons Research," Minerva (special Issue); 40:5.
6 For purposes of this report, biotechnology is broadly defined to include "any
technique that uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify
products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific
use." Although the fields of biotechnology have expanded greatly in the last three
decades, the term is more suitable for this study than biology or life science. Office
of Technology Assessment (1988~: New Developments in Biotechnology: Field-Testing
Engineered Organisms: Genetic and Ecological Issues, May. NTIS Order #PB88-214101.
7 See U.S. Biotech Employment Chart, available at http://www.bio.org/inves-
tor/signs/200210emp.asp.
~ "Doctorates awarded by field of study and year of doctorate, 1999-2001," Science
and Engineering Doctorate Awards: 2001. National Science Foundation, October 2002,
p.5.
9 Carlson, R. 2003. The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies,
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science. 1 (3~:203-215.
lo Ibid.
ii Autio., E., and T. Laamanen.1995. "Measurement and evaluation of technology
transfer: Review of technology transfer mechanisms and indicators." International
Journal of Technology Management. 10~7/8~: 647 as cited in P. Zanders, op. cit., p. 6.
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36
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
i2 United Nations. 1972. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2826 (XXVI)
(New York: United Nations). The BWC recognizes that the equipment and materi-
als used to produce BW agents are almost entirely dual use, having legitimate
commercial as well as military applications. For this reason, the treaty specifically
prohibits only those activities involving pathogens that "cannot be justified for
prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes."
i3 Under the general purpose criterion, it is not the objects themselves but rather
the purposes for which they may be applied that are prohibited. In this way, it is
not necessary to ban dual use technologies that have legitimate purposes but that
can also be applied to develop or produce BW. By using the general purpose crite-
rion, the scope of the prohibition is comprehensive, because Art. 1 of the BWC lists
the purposes that are not prohibited. Nixdorff, K., and W. Bender. 2002. "Ethics of
University Research, Biotechnology and Potential Military Spin-Off," Minerva
(special Issue):40, fn. 2, p. 15 and fn. 18, p. 19.
i4 Huxoll, D. 1989. "Biological weapons proliferation and the new genetics," Tes-
timony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. May 17. Senate Hearing, 101-744;
101St Congress, 1St session.
i5 Frischknecht, F. 2003. "The history of biological warfare: Human experimenta-
tion, modern nightmares, and lone men in the twentieth century," EMBO Reports
4 (special issue): S47.
i6 Wheelis, M. 1999. "Biological sabotage in world war I," in Geissler E. and l.E.
van Courtland Moon, eds., "Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Develop-
ment and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945," SIPRI, 18 (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press), p. 52.
i7 Redmond, C., et al. 1998. "Deadly relic of the great war," Nature, 393:747-748.
i~ Geissler, E., and l.E. van Courtland Moon, eds. 1999. "Biological and Toxin
Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945," SIPRI,
18 (London: Oxford University Press).
i9 Williams, P., and D. Wallace. 1989. Unit 731: The fapanese Army's Secret of Secrets.
(London: Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 280-281; and Harris, S.H. 1994. Factories of
Death: fapanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-Up (London:
Routledge).
20 "Chinese Civilians Sue Over WWI-Era lapanese Biological Weapons Activities"
CBW Chronicle III (3~:December 2001. "http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=
cb20020112244" http: / /www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=cb20020112244.
2i There were at least four operational units of the lapanese secret biological war-
fare complex: Unit 731, located in Ping Fan, Unit 100 in Changchun, Unit 9420 in
Singapore, and Unit Ei 1644 in Nanking. There is also some evidence that the
lapanese had an epidemic prevention center a euphemism for BW research on
tropical diseases in Rangoon, Burma. Each unit had 10-15 individual facilities
located within and outside mainland China. See Williams, P. and D. Wallace, 1989,
Unit 731: The fapanese Army's Secret of Secrets. (London: Hodder and Stoughton), p.
280-281; and Harris, S.H. 1994, Factories of Death: fapanese Biological Warfare, 1932-
45, and the American Cover-Up (London: Routledge).
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INTRODUCTION
22 Ibid.
37
23 Bernstein, B.1988. "America's biological warfare program in the Second World
War," Journal of Strategic Studies 11 (September):292-317, especially p.304 and 308-
310. In addition to Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum, pathogens studied
at Camp Detrick included the causative agents of: "landers; brucellosis; tularemia;
melioidosis; plague; psittacosis; coccidiomycosis; a variety of plant pathogens in-
cluding the causative agents for rice blast; rice brown spot disease; late blight of
potato; and cereal stem rust. Animal and avian pathogens studied included rinder-
pest virus, Newcastle disease virus, and fowl plague virus. The Problem of Chemical
and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, I (London: Oxford University Press), 1971, p.122. See
also Cochrane, R.C. 1947. "Biological Warfare Research in the United States" in
History of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (1 July 1940 - 15 August
1945), Vol. II (declassified). Historical Section, Office of Chief, Chemical Corps.
24U.S. Department of the Army.1977. U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological War-
fare Programs I; (unclassified) February 24, p. 1-3.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. iii.
27Alibek, K., and S. Handelman. 1999. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Larg-
est Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Toldfrom the Inside by the Man
Who Ran It (New York: Random House).
28 For personnel numbers, see Leitenberg, M.1993, "The Conversion of Biological
Warfare Research and Development Facilities to Peaceful Uses," in Control of Dual-
Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme, SIPRI Chemical and Biological
Warfare Series, 15 (London: Oxford University Press). For the environmental im-
pacts associated with biological weapons field testing see Choffnes, E. 2001,
"Germs on the loose," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57 (March/April): 57-61.
29 U,S, Department of the Army. 1977. U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological
Warfare Programs, Vol. 1; Feb. 24, p. 7-1.
30 Meselson, M. 1989. Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee, Hearings on Global Spread of Chemical
and Biological Weapons." May 17 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1990), pp. 498-511. See also National Security Council, 1969. "U.S. Policy on
Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents," report submitted by the Interdepart-
mental Political-Military Group in response to NSSM 59, November 10. Available
at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/#docs.
31 Ibid.
32 Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention, however, the BWC does not have formal mechanisms to monitor or en-
force compliance. The BWC also has no international secretariat or inspectorate to
oversee or verify its implementation. Thus, although the treaty enshrines a norm
of international behavior, it lacks the capacity to enforce these prohibitions.
33 Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development
of New Warfare Agents-1996; Executive Summary available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/cp/biotech96/xsum.pdf.
34 This is not recognized by some of those concerned about the proliferation of
biological weapons or bioterrorism resulting from the diffusion of advanced bio-
technology research. The Counterterrorism Act of 2000, for example, which passed
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38
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
the Senate but not the House in the 106~ Congress, cited the recommendation of
the National Commission on Terrorism that "the standards for the storage, trans-
port, and handling of biological pathogens should be as rigorous as the current
standards for the physical protection of critical nuclear materials." Congress, Sen-
ate. Counterterrorism Act of 2000, 106~ Congress, 2n~ session, S. 3205.
35 Meselson, M. 2000. "The Problem of Biological Weapons," remarks at the Sym-
posium on Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism, National Academy of Sciences,
May2.
36 Nixdorff, K., and W. Bender. 2002. "Biotechnology, Ethics of Research, and Po-
tential Spin-off," INESAP Information Bulletin, 19 (March): p. 19-22.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Fauci, A. 2002. "Defining 'Sensitive' Information in the Life Sciences," oral pre-
sentation to the committee, September 9.
4i Gannon, l.C. 2001. "Viewing Mass Destruction Through A Microscope," New
York Times, Section E, p. 10, October 11.
42 Developers of BW agents would strive for the greatest possible degree of predict-
ability in infectiousness, virulence, and other militarily relevant characteristics.
43 Speaking at the conference on the future of weaponry, Professor Kathryn
Nixdorff, of the University of Darmstadt, said that dangerous microorganisms
had already been produced inadvertently during attempts to modify vaccines and
viruses. In the past 30 years biotechnology has been revolutionized by molecular
biology and genetic engineering. These techniques, used to control infectious dis-
eases, can also be used to create more effective biological weapons. See Hearst, D.
2003. "Smart big-weapons are now possible," The Guardian. May 20. Available at
http: / /www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,959473,00.html.
44 Epstein, G.L. 2001. "Controlling biological warfare threats: Resolving potential
tensions among the research community, industry, and the national security com-
munity," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 27~4~:321-354. Epstein defines "conten-
tious research" as "fundamental biological or biomedical investigations that pro-
duce organisms or knowledge that could have immediate weapons implications,
and that therefore raise questions concerning whether and how that research
should be conducted and disseminated."
45 Jackson, R.~ ., Ad. Ramsay, C .D. Christensen, S. Beaton, D. F. Hall, and I.A.
Ramshaw. 2001. "Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia
virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance
to mousepox," Journal of Virology 75:1205-1210.
46 Cello, l., A.V. Paul, and E. Wimmer. 2002. "Chemical synthesis of poliovirus
cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template," Science
Online, July 11. Available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/ontent/full/297/
5583/1016.
47 Shea, D. 2003. "Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns:
Issues for Congress." (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report
Number RL31695), January 10.
48 Racaniello, V.R., and D. Baltimore. 1981. "Cloned Poliovirus Complementary
DNA Is Infectious in Mammalian Cells," Science 214:916-19.
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INTRODUCTION
39
49 Rosengard, A.M., Y. Liu, Y.Z. Nie, and R. limenez.2002. "Variola virus immune
evasion design: Expression of a highly efficient inhibitor of human complement,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99: 8808-8813.
50 Lachmann, A. 2002. "Microbial subversion of the immune response," Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 99: 8461-8462.
5i Wade, N. 1980. "Biological Weapons and Recombinant DNA," Science 208:271;
S. Budianski.1982. "US Looks to Biological Weapons. Military Takes New Interest
in DNA Devices," Nature 297: 615-616.
52 It should be noted that the Asilomar Conference addressed only the accidental
creation of recombinant microorganisms with increased virulence and other dan-
gerous properties. It did not address the deliberate creation of such organisms for
offensive applications in warfare and terrorism.
53 Kennedy, D. 2003. "Two Cultures" and "Statement on Scientific Publica-
tion and Security," Science 299 (5610~:1148-1150. Available at http://www.
sciencemag.org/content/vol299/issue5610/index.shtml.
54 U.S. Department of State. 2001. "New Ways to Strengthen the International
Regime Against Biological Weapons," Fact Sheet, Bureau of Arms Control, Wash-
ington, D.C., October 19. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/bw/fs/2001/
7909.html.
55 All of these reports are published by The National Academies Press. Information
about these and other reports may be found at http://www.nap.edu, which may be
searched by subject matter and by report title.
56 Card, A.H. Jr. 2002. "Action to Safeguard Information Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Documents Related to Homeland Security,"
March 19. Avaliable at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/whO31902.html.
57 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1971. "Instances and allega-
tions of CBW, 1914 -1970," SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological War-
fare, p. 214 in Vol. 1: The Rise of CB Weapons (Almqvist & Wiksell: Stockholm).
58 Ibid., p. 215.
59 Glenn, l. 1989. "Biological weapons proliferation and the new genetics,"
Chairman's Opening Statement; Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and
its Permanent Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. May 17. Senate
Hearing, 101-744; 101St Congress, 1St session.
60 SIPRI, op. cit., p. 215
6i According to one account the plague in Caffa "might have spread naturally
because of unhygienic conditions in the beleaguered city." Frischknecht, F. 2003.
"The history of biological warfare: Human experimentation, modern nightmares,
and lone madmen in the twentieth century," EMBO Reports 4 (special issue): S47.
62 Wheelis, M.2002. "Biological warfare at the 1346 siege of Caffa." Emerging Infec-
tious Diseases 8~9~:1971. Available athttp://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no9/
pdf/01-0536.pdf. See also Wheelis, M. 1999. "Biological Warfare Before 1914," in
E. Geissler and l.E. van Courtland Moon, eds, "Biological and Toxin Weapons:
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945," SIPRI, 18 (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press).
63 Ibid.; see also, Frischknecht, F.2003. "The history of biological warfare: Human
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40
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
experimentation, modern nightmares, and lone madmen in the twentieth cen-
tury," EMBO Reports. 4 (special issue): S47.
64Italian records are potentially very rich but have only begun to be carefully
studied. Cf. Bowsky, W.M. 1964. "The impact of the Black Death upon Sienese
government and society," Speculum, 39:1-34. D. Herlihy.1966. "Population, plague
and social change in rural Pistola, 1201-1430." 0, 18:225-244. Some French towns
also have abundant notarial records that can yield data on plague losses. Cf. Em-
ery, R.W. 1967. "The black death of 1348 in Perpignan." Speculum, 42: 611-623.
Emery estimated a die-off of 58-68 percent among the notaries of Perpignan from
the plague. As cited in, McNeill, W.H. 1976. Plagues and Peoples, (Garden City,
New York: Anchor Press). See also, Wheelis, M. 2002. "Biological warfare at the
1346 siege of caffa." Emerging Infectious Diseases 8~9~:1971. Available at http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no9/pdf/01-0536.pdf. "The claim that biological
warfare was used at Caffa is plausible and provides the best explanation of the
entry of plague into the city. This theory is consistent with the technology of the
times and with contemporary notions of disease causation; however, the entry of
plague into Europefrom the Crimea likely occurred independent of this event." (empha-
sis added).
65 Fenn, E. 2000. "Biological warfare in eighteenth century America: Beyond lef-
frey Amherst." Journal of American History 86:1552-1558, and Fenn, E.A. 2001. Pox
Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-1782. (New York: Hill & Wang Pub-
lishers).
66 op. cit., Fenn, E.A. 2001, and E.W. Steam and A.E. Steam. 1945. The Effect of
Smallpox on the Destiny of the Amerindian. (Boston: Bruce Humphries Publishers),
pp. 45-55.
67 It is also possible that by the time of this intentional introduction of smallpox
among the tribes of the Ohio that there was a concurrent outbreak of smallpox
among these tribes. On the topic of smallpox blankets and Native Americans, see
Wheelis, M. 1999. "Biological Warfare Before 1914," in Geissler, E. and l.E. van
Courtland Moon, eds., "Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development
and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945," SIPRI, 18 (London: Oxford University
Press). Also Fenn, 2000, op. cit.
68 See Wheelis, M. 1999. "Biological Warfare Before 1914," in Geissler, E. and l.E.
van Courtland Moon, eds., "Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Develop-
ment and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945" SIPRI, 18 (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press). Also Fenn, 2000, op. cit.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
biological warfare
