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Posiconffict Chechnya: Analysis of the Situation and
Reconstruction Problems (Political Aspects)*
Dzhabrai' Gakoev
Institute of Economic Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences
n April 15, 2000, Russian military and political leaders officially an
pounced the completion of the military portion of the antiterrorist
~ campaign in Chechnya. According to the Russian Federation Gen-
eral Staff, Ministry of Defense units had crushed all major heavily armed
groups and destroyed the rebels' military command structure and unified
infrastructure. According to official sources, up to 13,000 rebel fighters
were killed, including 20 known field commanders, and the same number
were detained and are being held in isolation units for interrogation. The
Russian army lost about 3,000 service members (although these figures
are questioned by many nongovernmental organizations and the media).
According to human rights organizations, about 10,000 civilian residents
were killed during the second Chechen campaign (Ichkerian representa-
tives cite other figures, namely that the federal troops lost 14,000 men,
while the Chechen rebels lost 1,500~. During the campaign, federal troops
occupied all strategically important population centers and for the first
time gained control of the Chechen segment of the Russian-Georgian bor-
der.
With the completion of active military operations, the major burden
of combating small groups of rebels was supposed to fall to the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Services (FSB). However,
in defeating the main rebel forces and occupying the entire perimeter of
*Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.
145
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146
APPENDIX A
Chechnya, the federal troops did not win the war. It is still going on,
gradually taking on the characteristics of a guerilla war. It has already
been six months since the conflict entered into a partisan warfare phase
without an end in sight. According to the estimates of Russian military
leaders, there are about 2,000 to 2,500 fighters left in Chechnya
(Maskhadov states that he has 15,000~. They are attacking Russian troops
on a daily basis and carrying out acts of sabotage, resulting in losses of 50
to 70 Russian servicemen a month. The number of rebels is not declining,
and their leaders Maskhadov, Basaev, Khattab, Gelaev, and Baraev-
are still at large, moving unhindered throughout Chechnya and success-
fully controlling military operations. As a result, the major goal of the
antiterrorist campaign remains unmet.
Army units have proven ineffective against small mobile separatist
groups. They have gone on the defensive, reducing active military opera-
tions to a minimum. This marked the start of a difficult and exhausting
struggle against diversionary warfare operations. The troops are further-
more sustaining heavy losses, especially from kamikaze-type actions.
"During the daytime, we are the bosses, and at night, the rebels are," say
soldiers. The completely ruined city of Grozny, with its crushed and de-
stroyed factories, demolished apartment buildings, and deep ravines, is a
perfect platform for guerilla warfare. According to military sources, there
are several hundred rebel fighters permanently positioned in the city.
During the daytime they hide, and at night they attack checkpoints and
shell and mine targets they have identified. All the attributes of guerilla
warfare are present in Chechnya. Furthermore, it is common knowledge
that a guerilla war lasts as long as the causes that produced it.
Official statements from the Russian military to the effect that the
situation is under control do not truly represent the facts. In fact, the
federal troops cannot ensure their own security or protect the civilian
population. On December 9, General Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of the
general staff, announced the start of a new phase of the antiterrorist cam-
paign. The essence of this phase is that federal military units and the
Chechen militia are planning to take under their protection several hun-
dred major population centers of Chechnya, thus guaranteeing the secu-
rity of the residents. This decision illustrates the no-win nature of the
situation. There are 450 villages in Chechnya, and there will not be enough
military garrisons to cover them all.
Bogged down in a prolonged guerilla war, the Ministry of Defense for
the first time officially expressed its dissatisfaction with the actions taken
by the MVD and FSB. General Valery Manilov, deputy chief of the general
staff, publicly stated that "the effectiveness of the campaign has been
noticeably reduced. Things continue to drag on. Look how the check-
points operate and how clearing operations are performed. It's no won-
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APPENDIX A
147
der that with operations like these the bandits can move almost unhin-
dered across the territory of the republic and set up bases and storage
facilities" (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 17, 2000~. The military lead-
ers correctly believe that it should be the task of the special intelligence
services to destroy small groups of rebels, carry out operational missions,
and suppress terrorist activities. But the facts indicate that the internal
security troops Special-Purpose Militia Detachments (OMONs) and
Emergency Response Composite Detachments (SOBRs) that were tem-
porarily commissioned to the Chechen Republic are not coping with this
task. Furthermore, these special operations, clearing operations, and retri-
bution actions are producing numerous civilian casualties, contributing
to an increase in the number of refugees, and expanding the support base
of the Chechen fighters.
The inappropriate use of force against the civilian population of
Chechnya, based on the so-called principle of collective responsibility,
produces animosity among the people, who initially had been inclined
against the separatists. At times the rebels themselves carry out actions
that provoke retribution operations by the army, but the federal troops
bear all the blame for the consequences. Naturally, military operations
that lead to civilian casualties negate the effects of all social and economic
programs, and this is the major obstacle to the stabilization process in the
Chechen Republic. Outrages and violence on the part of Russian military
structures against Chechen civilians only intensify the emerging tendency
by which the military actions of the federal troops are perceived as "anti-
people," while the resistance of the Chechen rebels takes on the features
of a national liberation movement. A new wave of recruits could become
the dominant force in the Chechen resistance. Together with their new
leaders, they will become ideological crusaders, meaning that they will be
more brutal. It must be kept in mind that the Russian military contingent
in Chechnya is basically uniform in its ethnic composition, and it is fight-
ing in a territory with an ethnically homogeneous population. This is also
an objective precondition for the tension in relations.
World experience shows that an army brought from its barracks into
the field is liable to become degraded quickly. Acts of vandalism and
robberies of civilians become everyday occurrences. Today the command
is facing the following challenge: how to protect troops who have fulfilled
their military duties from being subject to degradation. The soldiers,
mostly paid contractors, who have been put through severe tests and
ordeals, now find themselves with a good deal of spare time. As a result,
this group of some 120,000 servicemen is becoming uncontrollable. An
increase in the crime rate is being registered among service personnel as a
result of drug and alcohol abuse and fraternization. The combination of
guns, drugs, and alcohol is of greater danger now for the troops than the
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148
APPENDIX A
Chechen fighters are. Many soldiers who have survived war and risked
their lives are failing the test of peaceful life and reaching for their weap-
ons on the slightest pretext, using the only argument they know kill-
ing in any conflict situation. In most instances, local residents become
the victims.
The war in Chechnya has become a very profitable business for both
sides in the conflict, and this is the main obstacle to the stabilization
process in the Chechen Republic. Some high-ranking army officers have
an interest in maintaining the stagnating war. The current situation guar-
antees the military a fat line item in the budget and growing authority
with the nation's leadership. Chechnya is needed as a test site, a live
target for building up the army's muscles. In trying to preserve all of this,
the generals impress upon themselves and the public that the "Chechen
problem" will be resolved once the militant leaders are captured or elimi-
nated. In fact, the military leaders are in no hurry to resolve this problem.
According to the newspaper Segodnya (dated August 28, 2000), the Rus-
sian military structures in Chechnya have "two options for actions in the
current situation. The first is to follow the behest of General Vladimir
Shamanov, who thinks that the rebels' family members are not much
different from the rebels themselves. The second is to try to gain as much
personal benefit from the war as possible, even at the expense of treason.
Both options are equally dangerous. While the harm of treason is quite
straightforward and does not require long deliberations, the implementa-
tion of the principle 'a good Chechen is a dead Chechen' is not only
amoral but also creates new participants in the guerilla war."
The war in Chechnya is of a fundamentally criminal nature. Every-
thing, including human life, is bought and sold. The continuation of the
conflict in its present phase is to the advantage of certain forces in Russian
political, financial, and military circles. Their representatives have so-
called business contacts in Chechnya. Mafia structures make their busi-
ness dealing in people, weapons, drugs, and petroleum products. The
clans of certain regional "barons" are involved in this business as well. A
portion of the funds gained from the sale of humanitarian aid sent from
abroad goes to line their pockets (and embezzlement of federal funds
goes without saying). Because of such criminal outrages, Chechnya has
seen the development of an environment in which it is impossible for
people to do good and fulfill their essential human nature.
Human rights violations are occurring on a massive scale in Chech-
nya. Russian laws have no effect, and lawlessness and tyranny reign.
There is still no legislation that would regulate how antiterrorist opera-
tions are conducted. Certain military service personnel (contractors and
OMON and SOBR troops) perform acts of violence, commit premeditated
murders of civilians, and rob local residents during clearing operations.
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APPENDIX A
149
Such robberies are often committed completely openly and furthermore
involve not only small valuables, such as money or jewelry, but also the
organized removal of large cargo. Such robberies may take place only
with the authorization of the commanders of individual units. Systematic
extortion is quite common at the checkpoints.
Today it is not only bandits who are kidnapping and selling people;
legal armed formations are involved in this business as well. During the
conflict, more than 10,000 people have passed through the detention and
interrogation system, with many of them being ransomed by their rela-
tives. According to official data, 467 criminal cases have been filed against
military personnel, but only 14 involve crimes committed against civil-
ians. The problem is complicated by the lack of a judiciary system in
Chechnya. The lack of legal protection during the entire period of military
operations in the Chechen Republic means that the residents of Chechnya
are deprived of the main mechanism for protecting their legal rights.
According to data gathered by the independent commission of Pavel
Krashenninikov, cases of pillaging and extortion have become more fre-
quent among military personnel. "In just one region of Chechnya, accord-
ing to commission member Ella Panfilova, the commandant had to fire 62
contract soldiers for using forged documents" (Moskovsky Komsomolets,
September 14, 2000~. There are instances in which clearing operations
have been carried out without federal government authorization.
Recently, disappearances have become more frequent in Chechnya.
People detained at checkpoints disappear without a trace. According to
official data, the number of missing people has reached 500. According to
the Pavel Krashenninikov commission, "the names of many detained lo-
cal residents cannot be found in the lists of the MVD, the General
Prosecutor's Office, or the FSB." A serious problem faced by Chechen
residents is that many people do not hold Russian passports, and the
latter are issued very slowly. Without a passport, citizens are deprived of
the right to move about freely, and they face a real danger of being de-
tained during clearing operations in various population centers.
In general, the commission believes that "since military operations
ended, the humanitarian situation in the Chechen Republic has deterio-
rated dramatically" (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 14, 2000~. The
problem of human rights violations during wanton clearing operations,
drug and ammunition search operations, and similar actions was raised
for the first time on such a high level at parliamentary hearings held on
September 21, 2000. Almost all speakers at the hearings, including Vlad-
imir Kalamanov, special representative of the President of the Russian
Federation for the preservation of human rights and freedoms in Chech-
nya, admitted that "human rights violations are still occurring on a mas-
sive scale" (Nezovisimaya Gazeta, September 22, 2000~. According to
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150
APPENDIX A
Aslanbek Aslakhanov, State Duma deputy from the Chechen Republic,
the army and law enforcement agencies are conducting "all sorts of ex-
periments in brutality, unscrupulousness, and immorality" on the resi-
dents of Chechnya. As for the residents who left Chechnya and now
reside in other regions of Russia, "some werewolves with shoulder straps
have turned them into private sources of off-budget financing" (Nezovisi-
maya Gazeta, September 22, 2000~. It is generally agreed by Duma leaders,
analysts, and experts that the problem of providing for the security of
residents and protecting them from both the Chechen fighters and the
federal troops remains the biggest problem in Chechnya. Council of Eu-
rope Secretary General Walter Schwimmer and Council of Europe Parlia-
mentary Assembly representative Lord Judd confirmed this point during
their appearances at the hearings.
Recently the refugee problem has again intensified. The economy and
social sector of the Chechen Republic, which had been partially restored
after the first war and had been functioning to a certain extent, have now
been completely destroyed. Those who left Chechnya before 1999 will not
be able to come back to their homes, as they have been destroyed once
again. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of new forced migrants have
now joined their ranks. And with the onset of winter, 150,000 refugees in
Ingushetia again found themselves in a desperate situation. From the
beginning, the rebels have been using the refugees as a means of putting
pressure on the federal authorities, trying to push them into negotiations
with Maskhadov. Some of the forced migrants are willing to return home,
but they need security guarantees and minimal social support.
The Chechen rebels have recently stepped up their terror campaign
against local residents. For the purposes of intimidation, they shoot local
government officials and carry out conspicuous executions of those who
dared to condemn their actions publicly. A string of murders has oc-
curred in many communities of Chechnya. From March through fuly
2000, 9 heads of local government administrations, 12 Chechen police
officers, 4 staff members of the public prosecutor's office, and 4 imams of
rural mosques were killed. In late August 2000, the rebels executed two
men in the villages of Dargo and Belgatoi and placed their heads on
stakes for intimidation purposes. On September 16, five people (local
residents ranging in age from 15 to 70) were killed in the village of Starye
Atagi. Previously, six people were killed in the same village (local resi-
dents suspect federal troops in this incident). The rebels publicly executed
Lieutenant Colonel Shamil Azaev, deputy commander of the Regional
Department of the Interior in Chechnya's Vedeno Region, and Lieutenant
Colonel Said Bisultanov, chief of the general staff. On October 11, the
separatists carried out a terrorist act against Chechen police officers by
blowing up the building of the Regional Department of the Interior in the
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APPENDIX A
151
Oktyabrsky District of the city of Grozny. A total of 12 people were killed
and 17 wounded; the victims were all Chechen, including women and
children. On October 23, 70-year-old Magomed Saidaliev fell victim to the
terrorists. He was chairman of the Council of Elders in the village of
Goity, Urus-Martan Region and an irreconcilable adversary of the
Wahhabists. On October 31, Isa Yemurzaev, a police inspector from the
Grozny Regional Department of the Interior, was killed at his home in
Alkhan-Kala. On November 9, Isa Tsuev, head of the Alkhan-Kala Village
Administration, was killed along with two female employees. On No-
vember 12, nine civilians were killed in the city of Urus-Martan. On No-
vember 16, Dadalov, head of the Mesker-Yurt Village Administration,
was killed along with his deputy. On December 8, two Chechen police
officers were killed and three wounded as a result of a terrorist act in
Gudermes. In November-December, in Urus-Martan Region alone about
100 Chechen civilians fell victims to terrorists of them, 40 died and al-
most as many were wounded. And this bloody score keeps increasing.
By using terror against war-weary Chechen civilians, the rebels are
attempting to intimidate their compatriots who are cooperating with the
Kadyrov administration. In addition, the operations of the federal troops
often turn against civilians as well. As a result, the civilian population of
Chechnya finds itself facing two equally severe dangers, a hostage to the
conflict. Ivan Babichev, the commandant of Chechnya, has admitted that
in some cases civilians are also affected during clearing operations.
Akhmed Kadyrov, the head of the government administration in Chech-
nya, has also stated that continuing the practice of mass-scale clearing
operations could have serious negative consequences and cause intense
public indignation. Should this ever occur, Kadyrov has indicated that he
"will be compelled to admit that the people are right" and that he "will be
on the side of the people" (Nezovisimaya Gazeta, September 19, 2000~.
The appointment of Akhmed Kadyrov as head of the Chechen Re-
public Administration has yet to have a significant impact on the align-
ment of forces in Chechnya. Moreover, the reaction of people in Chechnya
and Russia to this appointment has been quite ambiguous. Not only sepa-
ratists but also the pro-Russian segment of Chechen society have reacted
negatively to the Kremlin's choice, believing that a more authoritative
person capable of consolidating Chechen society could have been selected
from within the Chechen establishment, if the will to do so had been
there. However, the Kremlin had its own logic in backing Kadyrov, a
choice that was based on a number of circumstances. First, it was condi-
tioned by the influence of military circles on the president of the Russian
Federation (Kadyrov is the protege of the military and intelligence ser-
vices and is controlled by them). Second, the foreign policy factor also
played a significant role. It was important for the leaders of the Russian
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152
APPENDIX A
Federation to demonstrate to the international community that a spiritual
leader of the Chechens, a former colleague of Maskhadov who had grown
disenchanted with the policy of separatism, had been appointed as the
head of Chechnya. Third, the appointment of Kadyrov was supposed to
serve as an example of reconciliation with the former followers of Dudaev
and Maskhadov, who for various reasons were not taking up arms at the
time. It was the Kremlin's intention to use the ambiguous and contradic-
tory figure of the mufti to unite all Chechens against the Wahhabists.
Finally, should Kadyrov fail, the federal government could lay the blame
on the Chechen political elite, reasoning that the latter by definition is
incapable of producing and supporting a leader from within its own ranks.
The idea of appointing a Russian governor-general in Chechnya is al-
ready being actively discussed by the Russian media.
Recent events in Chechnya demonstrate that the new administration
is not succeeding in changing the situation. And it is not only that
Kadyrov's popularity rating among the public is not very high; the main
problem of the local authorities lies in the legal outrages perpetrated by
the federal troops and the lack of funds for restoring the economy and the
social sector in the Chechen Republic. Against this backdrop, conflicts
among the major figures of the Chechen administration have reintensified.
This primarily involves Akhmed-khadzhi Kadyrov and his first deputy,
Bislan Gantamirov. That there is still no clear legislative solution regard-
ing the division of authorities among the various government structures
in Chechnya has also contributed to this conflict. According to Kadyrov,
he "does not know himself what authorities he has, what authorities the
president's plenipotentiary representative in the southern district has,
and what authorities the commandant of the republic has."
Some analysts are inclined to view the attempt to team Kadyrov and
Gantamirov as not so much a mistake as a deliberate action of the Krem-
lin. According to these analysts, this is being done with the aim of proving
to everyone that the Chechens are incapable of governing the republic
themselves. General Vladimir Shamanov has confirmed these suspicions
to the fullest extent. He was quick to state that there is "a fight going on
among the ringleaders of local crime families in Chechnya"; therefore,
leadership may be entrusted only to a Russian. It appears no coincidence
that the same idea has been put forth by Mikhail Gutsiriev, head of the oil
company Slavneft. According to local experts, it is the commanders of
federal troops in the Chechen Republic who are promoting this idea to
convince the country's political leadership that the military should gov-
ern Chechnya for the time being. They then proceed to conclude that the
military leadership does not have the goal of bringing the war to an end.
In fact, the instability that gives rise to conflicts within the Chechen ad-
ministration helps to prolong the war.
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APPENDIX A
153
It is difficult to predict what actions the Kremlin might take in re-
sponse to a split in the republic's leadership. For the time being, Ganta-
mirov and Kadyrov have been reconciled once again. However, recent
observations made by Viktor Kazantsev and Gennady Troshev as well as
reports in the media indicate that the federal government will very soon
be forced not only to choose between these two leaders but also possibly
to change the very structure of government in the Chechen Republic. The
appointment of Vladimir Yelagin as federal minister for the recovery of
the Chechen economy and social sector is only the beginning of this pro-
cess. It is quite obvious that the Russian president is interested in solving
the Chechen problem; however, the desired results are not yet being
achieved because of the weakness and disunity of the government and
the prevalence of bureaucratic interests.
External factors are also having an extremely negative impact on the
situation in Chechnya. The Chechen conflict is taking on an increasingly
international character, drawing into its orbit new players on the world
geopolitical stage. Chechnya has become a platform for anti-Russian
forces, a staging area for the clash of interests between world and regional
powers seeking to take advantage of the collapse of the USSR and the
weakness of Russia for the purpose of reallocating spheres of influence
and the energy resources of the Caucasus. A broad-scale information war
is being conducted against Russia. In the West and in the countries of the
Islamic Conference, Chechen separatists aided by certain elements of the
Western media are persistently spreading the myth that the Chechen
people support the struggle against the federal troops. The rebels strive at
all costs to inflict maximum losses on the federal troops and to demon-
strate their combat potential to the local population and the West in par-
ticular. They do this with only one intent, namely to compel the federal
government to begin negotiations.
Certain political forces in the United States, for example Zbigniew
Brzezinski; representatives of the left wing forces in France; and radical
Islamic centers in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emir-
ates, and other Muslim countries oppose the positive steps that Russia
has taken towards stabilizing the situation not only in Chechnya but also
in the Caucasus region as a whole. Chechnya has fallen victim to the
sprawling expansion of international mercenaries and terrorists. This is
illustrated by the regular flows of funds and personnel being sent to aid
extremist groups in the North Caucasus. Each influx of dollars brings a
new wave of subversive activities. Units of international mercenaries and
their leaders, such as Khattab and others, have begun to play a dominant
role in the Chechen resistance movement. It is they who are receiving
large funds from abroad, so they make the decisions and are thus gradu-
ally displacing Maskhadov and the Chechen field commanders into a
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APPENDIX A
Tito had been reluctant to deal with past injustices, such as atrocities
towards civilians of a specific ethnic identification, and had instead
glossed over the animosities created by the communal fighting during the
Second World War by his key ideological pillar, Brotherhood and Unity.
The civil wars that ran parallel and intertwined with the larger World
War II in Yugoslavia were never properly dealt with in the official history
after 1945. It operated with two mutually exclusive categories: the Fas-
cists (the evil perpetrators) and the Partisans (the heroic victors and vic-
tims of the fascists). The suffering and injustices of anyone who fell out-
side of these categories were not publicly acknowledged. Civilians who
had been caught in between or those who had suffered at the hands of the
Partisans did not have a place in the official account. No memorial was
ever erected over the graves of these victims. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, "the nameless dead" were in many cases exhumed and given a
religious burial, a burial that imbued these victims with an ethnic identity
(Verdery, 1999~. They became Serb victims of the Croat Ustasha or Croat
victims of Communists (Serbs). Finally, there was public acknowledg-
ment of the suffering and loss that had been silenced under Tito, but the
public acknowledgment was only to the living members of the victims'
ethnic/national groups. It was therefore not a ritual that could be part of
a process of reconciliation; on the contrary, there was another, hidden
message a collapsing of time identifying the victims with all other mem-
bers of the same ethnicity and the perpetrators with all other living mem-
bers of the group they were seen to represent. As argued by Verdery
(ibid.), the underlying message was, "they may do it to you again."
Indeed, the public process of remembering these events from 1989
onwards was not owned by the local communities where the events had
taken place; instead, it was hijacked by national leaders as a tool to ma-
nipulate fear and create a social climate where supporters would rally
behind them for protection.
Manipulation of fear became the most important tool for the national-
ists. Media (controlled by the various nationalist governments) would
dwell on past atrocities committed by members of other nationalities and
reinterpret them in the light of the present political development. Or they
would simply fabricate incidents, such as massacres, perpetrated by the
other group. Such incidents were broadcast repeatedly in the nationalist
party-controlled media. Incidents were provoked in local communities by
police or paramilitaries before the war broke out. Incidents involving one
or a few persons from the enemy group, it was hoped, would lead to
retribution and give an excuse for a more massive attack on the local
enemy population as a whole. Intimidation and provocations could con-
sist of beating up people and bombing shops owned by members of the
perceived enemy group. This happened in municipalities throughout
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APPENDIX A
177
Bosnia. Barricades were put up, people were stripped of their freedom of
movement, war raged elsewhere in the country, and citizens asked them-
selves, are we next? A siege mentality developed with fear of an immi-
nent attack by members of the other group.
The media propaganda and individual incidents of intimidation did
not bring immediate results, and ultimately war proved to be the only
means by which Bosnians could be separated and convinced of the truth
of the doctrine (Bringa, 2002~. On the eve of the war, this was illustrated
by Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader's favorite pro-
paganda line, that they could not live together.
KINSHIP, ETHNICITY, AND MOBILIZATION
Why did nationalist rhetoric and the appeal to ethnic solidarity have
such resonance in Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia)? The issue of politi-
cal representation and the allocation of resources have already been dis-
cussed; a few words about the emotional appeal are now necessary.
First, let it be clear that before the war, Bosnia was neither a society of
ethnic hatreds and incessant intercommunal killings, nor was it the ideal
model of a harmonious multiethnic society free of ethnic prejudices. Be-
fore the war, there were various ways in which people with different
ethnoreligious backgrounds coexisted and accommodated each other's
differences. Social patterns of interaction among people with either Serb,
Croat, Bosniac, or a combination of two or all three ethnic backgrounds
varied across time, place, and social groups. There were urban neighbor-
hoods or workplaces where ethnic identification rarely defined a person
in his/her interaction with his/her neighbors or colleagues; a common
identity relating to place, network, education, or profession was more
important. There were Bosnians who grew up in families whose networks
of friends and family consisted of a mixture of Bosnians and Yugoslavs of
different ethnic backgrounds. Like Bosnians who grew up in "mixed"
neighborhoods they took pride in the diversity and in knowing about the
different traditions and religious rituals of their friends, neighbors, and
relatives with whom they socialized during informal coffee-drinking get-
togethers.
There were also Bosnians who grew up in families whose networks of
friends and family consisted entirely of people from the same ethnic back-
ground, but this in fact seems to have been a rarer situation. In some
villages people from different ethnoreligious backgrounds would live side
by side, socialize over coffee, visit each other to pay their respects at
various ritual events, exchange favors, and sometimes have close friend-
ships, but they would rarely intermarry. In others they would live parallel
lives in separate hamlets and know little about each other. While in some
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178
APPENDIX A
ethnically mixed villages relationships between members of different
ethnoreligious groups were friendly and relaxed, in others there were
tensions, mutual distrust, and separation. In some cases, tensions were
caused by injustices during or immediately after the Second World War
that had not been addressed during the Tito era of Brotherhood and Unity,
in others they were due to neighborhood quarrels over land and property
that had mobilized people along kinship lines. And this leads me to the
point of the emotional appeal of nationalist rhetoric.
In rural Bosnia-Herzegovina (which is where the nationalist appeal is
perhaps the strongest), kinship networks are important; kinship is the
primary bond of loyalty. In rural areas, ethnic intermarriage is rare and
therefore kinship overlaps with ethnicity. In other words, kin are also
members of the same ethnic community. This fact may help explain a
mobilizing potential in a conflict that was based on the rhetoric of nation-
alism, because nationalist discourse uses the idiom of kinship. It is, in
other words, kinship and not ethnicity that holds the primary emotional
appeal and is the mobilizing factor. Having said that, however, it should
be remembered that for most civilians on all sides, the mobilization (the
motivation to fight in a war) was primarily based on fear, and varying
degrees of coercion, and the need to protect one's family and kin and
therefore perceived in defensive terms. Indeed, it could be argued that the
level of fear and violence needed to engage people (or rather to disengage
people, that is, to silence their opposition) is an indicator of the weak
power of ethnic sentiment as a mobilizing factor (see Gagnon, 1996~. Fur-
thermore, for the perpetrators of crimes the motivations were often eco-
nomic gain (through extensive looting), power, and prestige. Prestige was
forthcoming since acts, which in a functioning state governed by the rule
of law would be considered criminal and punished by society as a whole,
were considered heroic by many of those in whose name and on whose
behalf the crimes were allegedly committed; they were portrayed as acts
in defense of the nation. As the nationalist rhetoric of ethnic solidarity
takes hold, it becomes almost impossible to resist because national iden-
tity becomes the only relevant identity, nationalism is the only relevant
discourse, and people who resist are exiled, treated as traitors, or forced
to become accomplices to crimes committed in the name of the group (see
Gagnon, 1996; Bringa, 2002~.
A FINAL WORD
In all societies at all times there exist both the potential for conflict
and the potential for peaceful coexistence. What will become dominant or
prevail is very much dependent on what a given society's political and
economic elites political leaders, academics, media, and others choose
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APPENDIX A
179
to stress. Societies in states of radical transition and severe political crisis
are more vulnerable to individuals and organizations that seek to exploit
the potential for conflict. The nationalist political leaders that (aided by
the media and armed forces they controlled) instigated and drove the
wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, consciously exploited the potential for con-
flict. Manipulating fear of the threat of the other within became the most
important tool in holding onto power and quelling the forces of democra-
tization. Tellingly, all the nationalist leaders who had been voted into
office because they had promised their people better living conditions in
a time of severe economic social crisis brought a complete economic and
social state of disaster onto their respective people.
SUGGESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
A few points for emphasis in a discussion of lessons learned in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that could be applied to conflict management in other multi-
ethnic societies that have experienced ethnic conflict and war are sug-
gested.
Societies in economic and political regime transition are in a danger
zone and in great need of attention. It is important to consider how to
avoid marginalization of certain strata or groups (particularly the old
elites) in such societies. An effort is needed to bring the old elites into the
restructuring process as a constructive force.
The issue of old grievances also deserves focus, including
· the responsibility of media and political leaders in publicly ac-
knowledging past injustices, suffering, and loss of "the other"
· the need for the states involved in the war to cooperate with inter-
national legal institutions (such as the Criminal Tribunal in The Hague)
· a general process of acknowledging and assigning individual re-
sponsibility for crimes committed so that responsibility is decollectivized;
both processes above would contribute
· a need to commemorate all war dead independent of ethnic/politi-
cal affiliation
In addition to actions taken by postwar authorities to ensure that
citizens guilty of crimes are identified and brought to justice, media and
respected public figures should also focus on those people who resisted
the pressure to turn against their neighbor or fellow citizen of another
nationality and helped without regard to ethnic identification. Once the
fears and pressures associated with conflict and war recede such a focus
may be a spontaneous response by ordinary people who want to try and
overcome the past and live in peace with their neighbors.
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180
APPENDIX A
In thinking about the future structure of a multiethnic society like
Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is a mistake to institutionalize the kind of division
that ethnic cleansing and ethnonationalist wars create. Instead we need a
Bosnia that embraces all the different ways in which people in Bosnia
accommodated differences and coexist described above. Soft boundaries
are needed that will allow people to establish relationships with fellow
citizens free of the pressures and dictates of bigots. To put it simply:
Those who do not want to live together should not be allowed to force
their preference onto everyone else. Policy makers and mediators in con-
flicts in multiethnic societies (that are based on the rhetoric of ethnicity)
need to gain insights into and encourage the practical ways in which
people deal with the issue of identity on the ground. Ethnicity is just one
identification among the many that constitute a person's identity. It may
be emphasized or de-emphasized depending on context. Multiethnic so-
cieties should be structured in ways that allow for a multiplicity of forms
for coexisting in accordance with the contexually shifting and flexible
approach of ordinary people who interact in an atmosphere free of
cohersion and fear.
Lastly, governments' approach toward local politics should be based
not on the assumption of a commonality of ethnic ties but on the commu-
nality of experience. In postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina there are many ex-
amples of people who share a common understanding with Bosnians of a
different ethnicity than their own. This is an understanding based on
shared war-time experiences. For insance, Sarajevo Serbs who lived there
during the almost four-year-long siege and shelling campaign by Bosnian
Serb forces may feel emotionally and socially as well as politically closer
to their Bosniac or Croat neighbors who were in the same situation as
them than to their Serbian relatives elsewhere (who do not share the siege
experience and may have a very different perception of what happened
based on what their government-controlled media told them).
Instead of measures that help to reify boundaries and separation be-
tween the three ethnic communities, arenas and fore should be created
and ecouraged to develop so that citizens of different ethnic backgrounds
who share similar experiences and nonethnic identifications can meet. In
other words, arenas where people can relate to each other with reference
to identifications other than those of ethnicity are needed.
REFERENCES
Bringa, T. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central
Bosnian Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bringa, T. 2002. Averted Gaze: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995, in Annihilating
Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, A. Hinton, ed. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
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APPENDIX A
181
Bringa, T. 2003. The Peaceful Death of Tito and the Violent End of Titoism, in Death of the
Father: An Anthropology of the End in Political Authority, J. Borneman, ed. New
York: Berghahn Books.
Gagnon, V. P., Jr. 1996. Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia. Cornell Univer-
sity, Institute for European Studies Working Paper, 96 (1~. (http://www.ithaca.edu/
gagnon/articles/demob/index.html).
Gagnon, V. P., Jr. 2001. The Yugoslav Wars of the l990s: A Critical Re-examination of
"Ethnic Conflict" the Case of Croatia. Presented at the annual meeting of the Asso-
ciation for the Study of Nationalities, April 2001.
Gordy, E. 1999. The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alter-
natives. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Loud, J. F. 1996. Andric on Bosnia: The 1924 Dissertation, in Ivo Andric Revisited: The
Bridge Still Stands, W. S. Vucinich, ed. Berkeley: University of California Research
Series, International and Area Studies, 92.
Macek, I. 1999. War within: Everyday life in Sarajevo under siege. Uppsala studies in cul-
tural anthropology, 29.
Povrzanovic, M. 1997. Identities in war: Embodiments of violence and places of belonging.
Ethnologia europaea, Journal of European ethnology 27~2~.
Rhode, D. 1997. Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre
since World War II. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux.
Sells, M. 1996. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Verdery, C. 1999. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change.
New York: Columbia University Press.
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States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic
Conflict: Russian and International Perspectives
AGENDA
DECEMBER 18-20, 2000
MOSCOW
Monday, December 18, 2000
Opening of the Symposium: Welcoming Comments
Opening Remarks
States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
Robert McC. Adams, University of California at San Diego
Session 1: Characteristics of Peaceful Management and Reduction of Tensions
Within Multiethnic Societies
The Global Context for Addressing Multiethnic Issues in the Age of
Millennial Capitalism
John L. Comaroff, University of Chicago
Socioeconomic Parameters of Interethnic Stability and Tension
Leokadia Drobizheva, Institute of Sociology
182
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APPENDIX A
Peace Enforcement in Ethnic Conflicts
Anatoly Dmitriev, Department of Philosophy, Sociology,
Psychology, and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences
Lessons Learned from Managing Conflict in Countries in Political
and Economic Transition
Allen Kassof, Project on Ethnic Relations
Session 2: Violent Conflict and Methods for Resolution
Ethnic Ideologies/Narratives: Causes and Consequences of
Conflicts
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de Mexico
Ethnopolitical Conflict and Paths to Its Resolution
Arkady Popov and Vladimir Mukomel, Center for Ethnopolitical
Research
Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations
Ronald Suny, University of Michigan
The Chechen Conflict and Paths to Its Resolution
Dzhabrail Gakaev, Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology,
Russian Academy of Sciences
Tuesday, December 19, 2000
Session 3: Postconflict Reconstruction: Political, Social, Psychological, and
International Aspects
Lessons from Post-Soviet Conflicts
Fiona Hill, The Brookings Institution
Interregional Cooperation of Federal and Local Executive
Authorities
Khasan Dumanov, Institute for Humanities Research of the
Kabardin-Balkar Republic
183
Sociopsychological Aspects of Postconflict Situations
Galina Soldatova, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian
Academy of Sciences
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184
APPENDIX A
Session 4: Postconflict Reconstruction: Problems of Economics, Education,
Health, and Refugees
Power, Fear, and Ethnicity: Forging Nations Through Terror in
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Tone Bringa, University of Bergen
Ethnic Tension in Russia and Forced Migrants in the Territory of the
Independent States
Galina Vitkovskaya, Moscow Carnegie Center
Political and Economic Aspects of the Disintegration of Russia's
Internal Market
Daniel Berkowitz, University of Pittsburgh
Experience in Social Readaptation of Forced Resettlers Returning to
Their Places of Former Permanent Residence
Aleksey Kulakovskiy, Representation of the Russian President,
Vladikavkaz
Wednesday, December 20, 2000
Session 5: Paths to Peaceful Multiethnic Relations in the Twenty-first
Century: Risks, Opportunities, Trends, and Needs for Long-term Strategies
Ethnopolitical and Ethnoregional Factors in the Post-Soviet
Territory
Vitaly Naumkin and Irina Zvyagelskaya, Institute of Oriental
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories
Charles Tilly, Columbia University
Ethnic and National Conflicts in the Twenty-first Century
Anatoly M. Khazanov, University of Wisconsin
Perspectives on Multiethnic Accord Within a Federal Government-
the Example of Russia
Rafael Khakimov, Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of
Tatarstan
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Discussion and Closing Remarks
Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology,
Russian Academy of Sciences
International Symposium Participants
Leading scientists of academic institutes and other scientific centers,
members of the Russian government, officials of the Administration of
the President and the Security Council, Deputies of the State Duma, mem-
bers of the Council of Federations, and leaders of nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), migration services, and conflict reduction centers
185
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
federal troops
