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The Anthropology of Collective Violence*
Viktor V. Bocharov
St. Petersburg State University
here is no doubt that every act of collective political violence is al-
ways largely irrational. The perpetrator of the violence either carries
out his actions despite all common sense (with his actions gaining
him no advantages), or else the goals he is pursuing ultimately lead to
directly opposite results. For example, almost all the revolutions of the
twentieth century, both social and national-liberational in nature, have
not only not led to overcoming the economic backwardness of their states
as the revolutionaries had planned, but also, as a rule, have further exac-
erbated the economic situation. The very humanistic ideals toward which
they seemingly sincerely strove in the course of their struggle for power
at times were transformed into unprecedented violence perpetrated by
the new power structure against its own population.
It would seem appropriate to focus this project on the study of the
irrational in acts of collective violence. I believe that in order to uncover
the unconscious determinants of such actions, which largely define cur-
rent class or ethnic conflicts, it would be most productive to use anthropo-
logical research methodology, singling out two aspects the social-an-
thropological and the cultural-anthropological.
The social-anthropological aspect involves studying the function in
modern conflict of traditional institutions (or their fragments) that are
associated with the use of violence. These institutions arose at the dawn
*Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.
55
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
of human history during the establishment of the first socium, and they
continue to operate at later stages in the evolution of social life.
This assertion is based on the following methodological premise: The
appearance of new types of relations (social information) in the course of
social-historical progress does not signify the loss of previous types of
relations. The proportional weight of the latter undoubtedly is greatly
reduced in the sharply increased overall volume of social information,
with previous types of relations seemingly dissolving into the overall
volume and becoming less noticeable. Primary behavioral norms were
formed unconsciously as the system selected randomly occurring behav-
ioral acts that promoted its survival to a greater degree than did other
acts. This unconscious process is also characteristic of modern society.
The sense of these acts is coded in human culture, but they can be re-
flected at the conscious level in ideological worldview concepts prevail-
ing at any given moment in time.
The action of such institutions is most clearly seen in peripheral soci-
eties, which preserve a powerful layer of traditional (primary) relations.
As for industrial (postindustrial) sociums, these institutions are present in
latent form but can be activated under certain conditions, coming to the
forefront and determining people's real behavior.
In particular, one such institution of violence that ensured the sur-
vival of the first socium was the institution of vengeance (blood feud).
Fear of retribution restrained the members of one kinship-based collective
from resorting to violence against another collective of the same sort.
Current ethnographic materials on the Caucasus clearly attest to the fact
that the institution of blood feud still exists in its initial form both as a
regulator of the use of violence and as a motive for initiating violent
actions.
An example of the preservation of vengeance as an institution in
postindustrial society and, furthermore, its ability to determine the be-
havior of its members is the tragic events of September 11 in the United
States and the actions that followed in response. At first, as everyone
knows, the proposed U.S. response action bore the name "Operation fus-
tice.''1 In other words, we see that in the given instance, representatives of
one of the most civilized countries turned to the sources of human legal
thought, when vengeance was the keystone in restoring justice according
to the principle "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."
The taking of vengeance was not only sanctioned but also firmly
Translator's note: In the Russian, the author uses the word vozmezdie, the most common
translations for which are "retribution" or "vengeance." The word has been translated as
"justice" here to comply more closely with the actual initial name of the antiterrorist cam-
paign, "Operation Infinite Justice."
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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
57
supported by society. The modern civilized society is not only prepared
for massive violent actions, organizing them in accordance with the tradi-
tional cultural algorithm, but also rigidly follows its logic. In particular,
many political commentators were not without grounds in viewing in the
intentionally unacceptable demands made of the Taliban by the United
States a desire in fact to avoid the hand-over of Osama bin Laden to U.S.
justice. This would lead to a conflict of various legal systems, with West-
ern law on the one side and legal views based on archaic values on the
other. American laws naturally rule out blood feuds as a legal action, and
if bin Laden were to find himself in the hands of justice, he would have to
be tried according to American laws. Under these laws, in the opinion of
jurists, it would be extremely difficult if not completely impossible to
prove his guilt. Most importantly, it would mean an end to "Operation
Justice," which would fundamentally run counter to justice as under-
stood in its primary sense. Moreover, as indicated by public opinion polls
conducted immediately after the attacks, more than 90 percent of the
country's population considered vengeance not only justified, but man-
datory. We note that vengeance has generally become widespread in in-
ternational political-legal practice.
On the whole, it seems obvious that civilization holds within itself a
memory of the past, a memory that under certain circumstances comes to
life and becomes dominant in determining the behavior of its representa-
tives. Emanating from the depths of the human psyche, such behavior is
today formed in public discourse with the help of modern political-cul-
tural symbols.
In this regard, the dynamics of the symbolification of the current
antiterrorist action are illustrative. Whereas the earlier name was condi-
tioned by the predominantly emotional response of Americans to the
events that occurred and therefore reflected these reactions in the most
archaic form ("Operation fustice"), the name was later changed to bring it
into maximum accord with Western political-cultural values ("Enduring
Freedoms.
It would be of interest to study and calculate the conditions under
which archaic models oriented toward collective violence are activated in
modern society. For example, we might mention the following points.
First, these models are activated when society, just like the first
socium, finds itself in a situation requiring it to mobilize its forces for its
own survival. In particular, one might suppose that the spark of archaic
consciousness in the United States following the well-known events was
conditioned by the fact that Americans really sensed a threat to the integ-
rity of their societal system.
Second, the activation of archaic models of violent behavior is also
characteristic of systems undergoing modernization, in which the life of
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
society is predominantly regulated not by market mechanisms but rather
by political-administrative methods. Here, intergenerational contradic-
tions, which according to a great deal of ethnographic data represented
the main source of conflicts in traditional societies, determine the socio-
political mobility of individuals. In other words, the process of modern-
ization entails conflicts characteristic of traditional society but arising in
another cultural form.
Indeed, to neutralize such conflicts, which always involve a biological
component, a traditional society has in particular sanctioned youth vio-
lence, channeling it against outsiders (in the form of raids on neighbors,
intervillage fights, and so forth). If this is not done, youth aggression
could be directed within the socium that is, against their elders. Such a
course of events occurred in colonial Africa. By forbidding intertribal
warfare, the European colonizers largely defined the violence vector, but
caused it to take the form of a national liberation movement that was
aimed not only against them but also against the older generation. The
age aspect was reflected in the names of the political parties that arose:
Young Kikuyus, Young Kavirondo, and Young Algerians, among others.
The violent practices of youth were regarded positively by society
and ensured high social status. (Among Russians, for example, the insti-
tution of intervillage fights involving young unmarried men has been
documented by ethnographers up to the present time.) By sanctioning
youth violence and directing it outside the bounds of the socium, the
elders strove painstakingly to regulate such violence, justifiably fearing
that it could lead to strengthening the social position of young people in
society. Such indeed was the case. Data have been collected on the youth
revolutions in Africa in the colonial period. In this instance, a youth sub-
culture seized all of society, and war became the main enterprise of its
members.
Presumably, an analogous situation has developed in many regions
of the world where prolonged interethnic or social conflicts have been
observed, with armed adolescents representing their main driving force.
In such societies, the traditional authority of age has devolved, and the
most successful military ringleaders become the actual leaders of society.
This type of activity allows young people to achieve high social status in
society rather early. The conditions of instability that are characteristic of
these sociums give rise to a high demand for charismatic leaders, who in
turn always rely on youth, as the phenomenon of this type of leadership is
congruent with adolescent psychology (rejection of traditional values,
ideologies, authorities, and so forth).
The youth subculture also dominates in totalitarian states, where the
authorities use violence against external and internal enemies. Moreover,
by striving to find support among the young, the authorities exacerbate
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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
59
the conflict between the generations. In the USSR, Pavlik Morozov, who
denounced his own father, became a national hero.
The stability of the political regimes in these states depends on the
ability of the ruling powers to ensure the social growth of young people
and define the vector of their violent strivings. In the USSR, where a youth
subculture reigned, all socioeconomic life abounded in violent symbols of
"taming the virgin lands," "battling for the harvest," and "conquering
outer space." International sports took the form of a virtual "war against
the capitalist system." Not only urgent "shock" construction projects but
also local wars (Afghanistan) served as channels for diverting youth ag-
gression. By taking part in these violent actions, young people gained
opportunities for proving themselves and raising their social status.
The main objective of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes is the regula-
tion of age-based social conflict within their own cores, especially within
their party-state hierarchies. By periodically giving rising layers of the
bureaucracy (youth) the opportunity to increase their social status, the
ruling powers reduce tensions within this organization. The repressions
of the Stalinist period are viewed as a periodic removal of an older gen-
eration of leaders from power, as a result of which young people (the next
generation of leaders) gained prospects for social growth. In China, Mao
Tse-tung removed the older generation from power at the hands of the
younger generation itself (the bun wei bin) during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Mass violence on an analogous scale is characteristic of many devel-
oping states.
The revolutionary nature of political cultures in systems undergoing
modernization is also explained by age-based social conflict. In these
states, there is a constant overproduction of the intelligentsia, which, given
the overall undeveloped nature of the socioeconomic infrastructure and
in accord with the priorities of the traditional mentality, sees prospects for
its own social mobility exclusively within the framework of the state-
bureaucratic hierarchy. The state is not in a position to fulfill the social
claims of numerous young people with diplomas. The next revolution
comes with the maturation in society of a new generation of intelligentsia
alienated from power as a consequence of the state-bureaucratic machine
being filled with representatives of the older generation.
Indeed, both the revolution at the beginning of the century in Russia
and perestroika represented the resolution of this sort of conflict. A con-
centration of aggressive potential arises in society from a social excess of
young "unneeded minds," who use social and ethnic symbols in the
struggle for power.
With regard to the cultural-anthropological aspect, the attention of
the researcher should be focused not so much on the social causes of
various conflicts (ethnic or social) as on the specific form of its develop-
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
ment that is, its symbolic realization. The concept of violence is cultur-
ally determined and cannot be reduced to the social content it has ac-
quired in Western European culture. In this culture, violence is treated
primarily as the infliction of physical damage by one party on another,
that is, by the violator against the victim, which society views negatively
from a moral and legal standpoint. Such an approach to understanding
violence is conditioned by the relationship between the individual and
society that has formed in this culture, a relationship that is rather unique
in human civilization, namely, that the interests of the individual are
primary in relation to the interests of society. Indeed, whereas in the first
days after the events, 90 percent of Americans unequivocally supported
Operation Justice, only 50 percent of them supported it a week or two
later. There is every reason to suppose that over time this percentage will
become even smaller. In other words, a return to archaic cultural strata
occurs under conditions of emotional upheaval, which leads to the activa-
tion of more ancient cultural strata.
At the same time, in peripheral societies in which the value of human
life is determined not on the basis of developed social individualism but
rather in connection with various sorts of collective and religious concep-
tions, similar actions by a subject with regard to an object could be both
justified and encouraged by the socium. In Russia, it is not the legitimacy
of power that determines its right to violence; on the contrary, its capacity
for violence serves as the basis for its legitimacy. Therefore, the events in
Chechnya did not prevent President Yeltsin from being elected to a sec-
ond term, and largely determined Putin's victory in the presidential elec-
tions. In other words, the concept of violence should be viewed within the
framework of cultural pluralism. Otherwise, the researcher is doomed to
misunderstand the logic of the actions of representatives of other cul-
tures.
Despite the uniqueness of any culture and its understanding of vio-
lence, one may discern identical mechanisms by means of which each
culture legitimates mass violence. These primarily include attaching de-
monic supernatural qualities to the object of violence (the "enemy of the
people" or "enemy of mankind"), who is understood as the main agent of
destabilization (chaos). The elimination of this enemy thus represents the
main condition for the creation of harmony in society.
Today, following the events in the United States, the strivings of poli-
ticians and respectable scholars to divide the world into civilization (the
"realm of harmony") and barbarism (the "realm of chaos") are attracting
attention. We observe a process of mythologizing the image of the enemy,
a process that in traditional (barbaric) societies always precedes the use of
violence against one group or another. The danger here lies in the fact
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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
61
that, in contrast to civilization, barbarism is currently characterized by its
very diffuse nature, both territorially and culturally.
Thus, even Europeans may use mass violence, legitimating it using
methods taken from their own cultural archives. As for representatives of
the periphery, such methods represent to them a living matter, linking
violence with such concepts as sacred duty, honor, and so forth. The
mastery of European models by these cultures does not have a substantial
impact on the behavior of the bearers of these cultures.
Therefore, it would be interesting to study the process of adaptation
of Western political-cultural values, especially by the peripheral intelli-
gentsia. Though they assimilate these values on the verbal and declara-
tive level, the real behavior of these intelligentsia members continues to
be determined by their own cultural imperatives. For example, if classical
Marxism understands the liquidation of the capitalist class as the depriva-
tion of their rights to private property, then in Russia this process took the
form of the physical elimination of property owners.
Sociopolitical practice attests to the fact that it was the peripheral
intelligentsia that was the yeast that spurred the rise of mass violence in
developing states; they headed all social and national revolutions in the
twentieth century. Studies of colonial Africa clearly show that only with
the appearance on the continent of an intelligentsia did we see the rise of
the phenomena of ethnic identity and, largely as a result, interethnic con-
flicts.
Clearly it is by no means mandatory that European humanist ideals
must triumph everywhere as peoples join civilization. It is the violent
imposition of Western cultural standards, which is being done every-
where with the best intentions, beginning with the era of colonization,
that evokes a violent (and at times fierce) rejection from other cultures.
Furthermore, the initiators of the struggle against the Western way of life
are educated people, often graduates of prestigious universities in the
"civilized" world.
These individuals, it seems, should attract the attention of researchers
studying mass violence. The appearance of these people is directly linked
with the process of modernization that is, with the interaction of cul-
tures, which has given rise in their form to a rather unique phenomenon.
Their activities associated with mass violence are often ascribed to merce-
nary interests tied to the seizure and exercise of power. In particular, it is
felt that they manipulate traditional or religious symbols in the aim of
achieving the political mobilization of the masses to attain their own goals.
However, an acquaintance with the biographies of these political leaders
unambiguously attests to the fact that they value neither the lives of oth-
ers nor their own.
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CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
It appears that the modernization process engenders a special cul-
tural-psychological phenomenon. (Russian philosophers of the early
twentieth century as well as Frantz Fanon wrote on the consequences of
the influence of Western rationalism on traditional thought.) Being reli-
gious in its content, the traditional mentality not only easily absorbs ideas
of world religions but also adapts Western political-cultural values in
accordance with its own inherent algorithm of mental activity. As a result,
these values necessarily acquire all the signs of religiosity, including its
inherent conceptions on life and death.
Therefore, in this regard, political leaders always stand as sacred per-
sons, embodying either "God's anointed" or even God in human form.
Their actions are not regulated by ethical or moral considerations, as they
themselves are the measure of morality. Such people are sincerely in-
clined to self-deification, which frees their psyches of agonizing feelings
on the use of violence against the masses and gives them internal legiti-
macy. Like those they govern within the framework of this culture of
thought, they themselves experience no fear of physical death, as life to
them is the service of a sacred (immortal) idea (teaching), embodied as a
rule in the image of a specific person.
REFERENCES
The ideas discussed in this paper are presented by the author in the
following works:
Bocharov, V. V. 1992. Traditions and Government: an Attempt at a Historical Analysis of
Current Political Cultures of States of Tropical Africa. Moscow: Nauka, 300.
Bocharov, V. V. 2000. Age-based social conflict and political cataclysm in Russia. P. 197 in
The Anthropology of Age. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University.
Bocharov, V. V. 2001. The intelligentsia and violence: the socio-anthropological aspect. P. 80
in The Anthropology of Violence, V. V. Bocharov and V. A. Tishkov, eds. St. Peters-
burg: Nauka.
Bocharov, V. V. 2001. The anthropology of violence. P. 65 in The Anthropology of Violence.
V. V. Bocharov and V. A. Tishkov, eds. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 65.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
multiethnic societies
