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Appendix E
Abstracts Preparer! by Workshop Panelists
IS A STRONG SPACE PROGRAM STILL IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES?
Donald L. Cromer
In the public view, the space program often equals NASA. Outsicle of NASA, there is a national need
for a strong space program. In the broadest sense, the space program serves to meet national security
needs by providing the military and national security communities with the ultimate high ground; fosters
both a strong and positive image internationally; serves as an important avenue of economic opportunity;
and provides inspiration to the future scientists and engineers who are vital to our national technical
industrial base.
The benefits to our nation from the space program often arise from the co-clevelopment of
technologies equally important to the commercial, national security, and civil space communities. In
acictition, there are often synergies in the application of satellite technologies and services like the
Global Positioning System (GPS), remote sensing, weather, and communications. Communications
satellites provide an excellent example of co-clevelopment and operational synergy. In the development
of Comsat fecleral efforts have outpacect private efforts, and vice versa, in a kind of cyclical manner over
the past 30 years. Currently, the military is clepenclent on commercial communications satellites for
successful operations cluring combat. The military should, however, utilize commercial assets cluring
peacetime and use clecticatect military assets to handle the surge in clemanct cluring combat.
Will space become an economic center of gravity? In the broacler sense it Greatly is. Space spin-offs
are numerous and embeciclect into many products and services (e.g., commercial GPS for timing, location,
and positioning; weather forecasting and reporting; ctirect-to-home television; and cable distribution). As
an industry, the commercial space industry is still emerging. Satellite services Greatly account for
billions of clollars in sales with the clemanct for services expected to grow, particularly in North America
and Europe. In contrast, satellite and launch vehicle manufacturing operations are struggling to make a
profit. These activities could be a major benefit to broacler U.S. interests in tracle and commerce, but
current restrictive policies on export control are stifling the U.S. space industrial base. In this regard,
Congress's decision to place communications satellites on the Munitions List was ill-acivisecl. While
previously there tract been only anecclotal eviclence that this decision tract a negative impact on U.S.
satellite manufacturers, the recent public comments by Arabsat on its decision to choose EADS over
Lockheed Martin has served to reinvigorate this debate. In a broacler context, with respect to our foreign
policy, space activities can become a leverage tool.
RECALLING THE AUGUSTINE REPORT
Daniel J. Fink
In 1990 the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program proclucect its report on new
directions and priorities for the space program. Known as the Augustine Report (for the committee
chair, Norman Augustine), it is still an invaluable resource for guidance in national space policy. The
Augustine Committee tract a very broact charter: to advise the nation on "the future of the civil space
program," including management issues and program content. The committee did its work over the
course of a very intense 120-clay period, conducting more than 300 interviews, clelivering its final report
to Vice President Quayle, who was, at the time, chair of the National Space Council. Incluclect among the
~ Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., December 1990.
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membership were four Space Studies Board members: Laurel Wilkening, Joe Allen, Jim Baker, and Lou
Lanzerotti.
There are several similarities between the time that the Augustine Committee concluctect its work and
the circumstances surrounding this current workshop. There is the tragic Toss of a space shuttle and its
crew, severe criticism of NASA, management turbulence at NASA, institutional aging, and great
successes, particularly in the space sciences. There are differences as well. In 1990 it was a time of
relative peace, "except for an occasional renegade leacler." Now there is a war on terrorism and a plethora
of renegade leaclers. This changes national priorities compared to 1990. Now there may be a greater
consensus on the need for a Tong-term goal of mannect exploration of Mars. Then there was a real
animosity between the science community and manned space, with both sicles playing a zero-sum game.
There was no realization that space science funding would not hoist up if the human exploration program
ctisappearect. This is no longer the case.
The Augustine Report tract several recommendations, the focus of which was a five-part "balancecl"
space program, illustrated by a sketch of a scale. Science is the fulcrum of this scale, and it is given the
highest priority. In fact, giving science a priority for the whole program is the only time priority is
mentioned in that context in the entire report. The supporting arms of the scale were two infrastructure
items: space technology and space transportation. The report recommenclect an unmanned heavy-lift
launcher and the two-way transportation of humans. The space station was viewed only as an enabler for
Tong-cluration mannect flight and other science only if it was easily accommoclatect. The report then
iclentifiect two mission areas: Mission to Planet Earth and Mission from Planet Earth. Unfortunately,
NASA's overall response to the report was negligible.
What might enable a more proactive response by NASA to the conclusions of this new workshop?
Perhaps the growing consensus about and articulation of the need for a specific, micl-to-long-term
destination for human spaceflight and exploration will serve as motivation for NASA. Perhaps the recent
success of the Chinese in space will serve as motivation as well. One constraint will certainly be financial
resources.
The nation needs a thorough technology architecture or roacimap study, defining all the technology
steps, robotic missions, and principles for integrating robotic and human programs as we move toward the
next destination. An important question this workshop can acictress is, Does the nation have the people
and talent necessary to achieve its clesirect goals? Perhaps a mocle! for such a roacimap study is the
Department of Defense study called "Strat-X." Concluctect over the course of several months in the
1960s, the study involved people from government, academia, and industry and was supported by a
strong federally funclect research and development center. How can we reach a national consensus? Who
might be the spokesperson for that consensus? Whatever the answer the space pro cram will require a
very good story cleliverect in a manner than inspires the nation.
7 ~ ~ O
Finally, perhaps the major failure of past efforts is the lack of any follow-up on the part of those who
previously sought to advise the nation. For example, when they completest their work, the Augustine
Committee ctisbanclect. In producing a report of this workshop, the Space Studies Board must do a better
job in following up its observations.
THE NATURE OF EXPLORATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE SPACE PROGRAM
Robert A. Frosch
When considering questions about space policy, one should refer to the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, PL 85-568, as amenclect. In particular, one should pay special attention to Title I, Sec.
102 (cl) and Sec. 103, which set forth basic purposes of the act. The act can fairly be interpreted to mean
that the responsibility of NASA for space (the act gives NASA other responsibilities) is to develop
knowledge of the universe beyond Earth (space), to develop the technological means to get this
knowledge, and to explore. It also implies using this knowledge to learn about Earth. Thus the purpose is
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space science and exploration (the rest of the universe), the technology to do this, and, importantly,
applications to Earth.
There is a clear and accepted implication for exploration, mannect or unmanned, as appropriate.
People explore. It is what we clot We do it in numerous ways:
1. We stroll around the world and see what it is really like, as opposed to what we might imagine it
to be like. We would like to stroll around the universe and do the same, but, so far, we are limited to
extending our senses and using teleoperators and robots.
2. We experiment: We create parts of imaginable universes to see which one we live in.
3. We examine imaginary theoretical and mathematical possibilities to see which are logically
consistent with various assumptions, and we compare these with the results of (1) and (2) above to see
which possibilities appear to describe these results. We straw conclusions about what universe we live in.
This is called science; it is a form of systematic exploration.
While our capability for robotic and teleoperatect scientific observation and exploration has gone very
far, it is still far from being equivalent to human observation and experiment on site. Further, the velocity
of light and the consequent time delays mean that at great distances teleoperation will continue to be an
inadequate means for exploration and experiment. (While robotic and teleoperatect means have become
routine in oceanography, the oceanographic community continues to value, use, and upgrade mannect
vehicles.)
This being so, we need a new partnership arrangement in space between people and their machines
(Norbert Weiner called it the human use of human beings). Robots and teleoperators should be
extensively clevelopect to do large amounts of the work, and people should do what only people can do
best, namely observe and clear with the unexpected and the serendipitous: the opportunity and cianger of
the moment, which people not only see, but also define, at the moment.
This means that as much work as possible should be clelegatect to machines, but no more. As Einstein
saint, "Everything should be macle as simple as possible, but no simpler." The implication is that we
should be making far more use than we do of robots and teleoperation, both in Tow Earth orbit (LEO) anct
creep space; NASA should be a leacler in robotics and teleoperation, not a follower. However, we should
not cleTucle ourselves by thinking that, just because it is difficult and expensive to support people, we can
dispense with them. For many years the space science community has aggressively turned its back on an
important opportunity for human work and supervision of assembly, test, checkout, and adjustment of
.
spacecraft and satellites in LEO, before sending them off to do their work. It is time for more rewarding
working relationships between the space science community and human spaceflight.
We simply do not now know whether people can survive and work in space (low gravity) for Tong
enough periods to do space exploration themselves, or whether we can only send robots and teleoperators.
The Space Act gives NASA the mandate, even the requirement, to find out. The obvious target for such
exploration is Mars, and the obvious question is, Is a Tong human expedition to some destination like
Mars possible and sensible, or must we do it only with robots with teleoperator supervision? If we could
start again, the appropriate space station would be more like a submarine or a "construction shack" than
an all- and every-purpose laboratory. The laboratory/construction shack would be built up slowly as
knowledge and capabilities required. We would separate the movement of people from the movement of
cargo and do more human and teleoperatecl assembly in space. If I couicl "wave a magic wancl," we
would have separate lift systems for humans and cargo and use much more robotics and teleoperation,
reserving for people only those tasks where human intervention may be most beneficial.
These ideas are offered as a basis for development of space policy and implementation into some new
directions that might provide a reasonable evolutionary path for space science and technology.
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ON THE FUTURE OF THE SPACE PROGRAM
Riccardo Giacconi
The Columbia tragedy has forced a re-examination of the entire U.S. space program with a much
more open discussion of its goal and value. There is little question regarding the value and extraordinary
success of the robotic space science program of NASA. The scientific exploration of the solar system and
of the universe has stunned and clelightect scientists and the general public. This effort has its own goals
and rationale within the overall research priorities of the nation. One could, however, articulate one
concern in this matter: the need to design maintenance and servicing capabilities as an integral part of
major scientific enterprises. Transportation costs have not clecreasect and flight opportunities have not
become more abundant; thus a major instrument in orbit (for instance a telescope) should be regarclect as
an important capital asset. Short of this approach we can expect to see major time gaps on the order of
tens of years in capabilities in each discipline. One could hope that greater efficiency in the conduct of
science missions could alleviate this problem. Lastly, the suggestion that a fixed percentage of NASA's
budget, and only that fixed percentage, should be clecticatect to basic science research is ill-conceivect.
The science budget and the human exploration budget each have their own unique justifications and
rationales. The NASA science budget should be seen in relation to overall basic research priorities in the
nation, while the human exploration budget should be set by the support needled to achieve Tong-range
national goals for human spaceflight.
Except for the short-term goal of a race to the Moon, no administration has chosen to articulate a
Tong-term goal, possibly for fear of appearing too futuristic or appearing to impose large new
expenditures. The net result has been to place an extraordinary focus on short-term technical
developments, such as shuttle operations and space station construction, with a somewhat vague
unclerstancting that these were necessary steps toward future exploration of the solar system. It is not clear
at all that in following this roast we have macle any real progress toward exploration of other planets in the
last 30 years. This statement follows from the fact that, not having an actual plan for how to take the next
step (for instance in human exploration of Mars), it is not clear at all how the current infrastructure can
support future programs.
It appears that perhaps two funclamental errors were made with regard to the space shuttle and space
station programs. With regard to the space shuttle, it is clear that attempting to unify the cargo-lifting
capability and the delivery of crew in one reusable vehicle has lect to an exceedingly complicated and
vulnerable system. With regard to the space station, the focus on the International Space Station (ISS) as
a platform for research rather than as an enabler of research and technology development has left us with
a science program of doubtful quality and one possibly irrelevant to future solar system exploration.
The United States has the opportunity to rectify the first mistake with the transportation system with
the development of a small and safe space plane or capsule that can carry astronauts and the development
of heavy-lift expendable cargo systems capable of clocking with the ISS or at other rendezvous points.
With respect to the space station, rather than abandoning its development, restructuring the station's
capabilities with an emphasis on pursuing scientific and technological research compatible with and
relevant to an overall vision of future goals is the appropriate next step to take.
This author believes that our primary Tong-term goal should be the establishment of a small self-
sustaining colony on Mars. The ISS could be the assembly point for an Earth-orbit-to-Mars-orbit ferry or
a direct launch vehicle. The ISS could also be the assembly point and servicing node for any facilities at
the Lagrangian points (L1 and L2) or facilities on the Moon. However, a deviation to L1, L2, or the
Moon anchor asteroids could result, once again, in distracting our attention and resources from what
should be our primary goal.
Mars is the most Earth-like planet in the solar system and perhaps the only one where we can obtain
high leverage by utilizing in situ resources to establish a first extraterrestrial habitat. Pre-positioning
infrastructure, both in Mars orbit and on the ground by automatic heavy cargo vehicles, should precede
and accompany a manned Mars lancting. Of course, the ability of the ISS to support such a program may
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diminish over time, but it is the opinion of this author that the ISS provides the only feasible next step to a
Mars mission in the near future.
Worth a brief review is the relationship between funclamental research, such as astrophysics, and the
human snacefli~ht Program. The human Program is justified indenendentiv of the scientific Program and
1 ~7 1 ~7 1 ~7 J 1 J 1 ~7
cannot be Justliled on the basis ot science. l he etiort to do so distorts both the human exploration
program anti the scientific program. When one discusses "scientific exploration of the planets," it is
remarkable how little relevance that discussion has to human spaceflight and human exploration. The
study of planetary formation and evolution is as fascinating as any other scientific discipline, but should
not be confused with the focused research necessary to prepare us for human exploration. Similarly,
microgravity research may not be relevant to exploration, whereas the physiological effects of partial
gravity are of paramount significance.
In conclusion, this author advocates the continuation of our very productive scientific exploration of
the universe, and the articulation of a clear vision for the human exploration program, with the suggested
primary goal of establishing a self-sustaining colony on Mars. Early technical and financial planning for
this mission should be started with the aim of identifying the architecture necessary to accomplish it. The
United States should proceed with an evolutionary approach basest on current available technology and a
foreseeable funding profile. Lastly, there should be a more careful definition of the role of the
International Space Station and a transportation system, a definition that can be aligned with a newly
articulated vision and architecture.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN A HUMAN
SPACE EXPLORATION PROGRAM
Noel W. Hinners
The post-Columbia examination of policy issues and goals relevant to the future U.S. human
spaceflight program tenets to focus on destinations, means, and budgets, and many at this workshop are
addressing them. Too frequently lost is rational discussion of the question of what the purpose or
function is. When this is acictressect, it is answered with the exploration imperative "it's in our human
nature," or "we are aclventurers." These rank high but suffer from an inherent inability to quantify the
benefit to be clerivect that justifies the large budgets and the goals that may be achieved. Frequently the
exploration goals inclucle the concluct of scientific research and the construction anchor repair of science
facilities by astronauts. Incleect, a previous NASA administrator, Dan Goblin, proclaimed that we would
not see human exploration of Mars until there is a compelling scientific (react "life") or economic reason
to so clot There is no credible economic justification on the horizon. Thus science and scientific
exploration goals dominate whether the target destination be the Moon, Lagrange points, asteroicls, or
Mars. The attraction of a scientific rationale is evident: It is the one that can best be acictressect in terms
that have a convincing semblance of progress and provide a basis for going beyond a cleacl-enclecl vent,
ViQ'i (ViCi.~) approach.
The role of science in a human spaceflight program requires reexamination in the light of two
clevelopments: (1) a recent NASA depiction of the human spaceflight program as "science-c/riven" and a
capability provider and (2) significant but unclerutilizecl progress in robotic technology and information
systems since the clays of Apollo and the space station.
Let us Took at the history of the incorporation of science in human spaceflight programs. One finds a
uniformity of opinion in many clocumentect statements over the past 40 years that a science rationale in
and! of itself aloes not justify the expense of human spaceflight. Yet many in the space science community
recognize that given human spaceflight, there are ab?~nciant science tasks that can be well accomplishes!
by astronauts, tasks that toclay are or were either too difficult or expensive to automate (in the context of
robotic programs). These are the activities that take advantage of the powers of human observation and
decision making in situ and that are worth the cost. Apollo is an example of how science can be
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incorporated successfully in human spaceflight. Apollo was a superb political, technical, and scientific
achievement.
It was not, however, without a supreme effort on the part of the science community that science was
aclequately incorporated as an element of the Apollo program. An analogous struggle continues to this
clay with lesser success; the history of science utilization of the shuttle and the ISS is fraught with a Tow-
procluctivity force-fit of science into the programs. The result has been a suboptimization of the science
and an unnecessary aciclect expense to human spaceflight, sometimes with little relevance to the advance
of the basic goal of enabling Tong-cluration human space exploration. The reports of the NRC Committee
on Human Exploration discuss this in cletaiT and recommenct optimum ways to incorporate science into
human spaceflight programs. We also suggest that an improved, narrowest focus on the legitimate goals
for human space exploration and activity could result in an identification of functions and activities where
the direct human presence is either required or very valuable. This reassessment could result in an
immediate effect of reducing shuttle/IS S costs and freeing up funding that could be better used for
defining and making progress on research directly relevant to Tong-cluration human spaceflight.
In its 2003 Strategic Plan, NASA describes five prime enterprises: space science, Earth science,
biological and physical research, aerospace technology (largely aeronautics), and education. It depicts
spaceflight and aerospace technology as supporting capabilities. This distorts the argument for and
hinders resolution of whither goest human space exploration: Human space exploration must stanc! on its
own inciepencient merits as an enterprise in which it is recognized that in the arena of science (excluding
human Tong-cluration flight-enabling biological/psychological science), human space exploration will
clepenct primarily on the science enterprises to judge what science is worth the investment. The balancing
act is not trivial; the historical tendency has been to Toact the human spaceflight program with science
objectives and tasks without an inclepenclent assessment of their inherent value and without the benefit of
a tracle-off with robotic accomplishment (or possibly of not cloing that particular science). The situation is
the more difficult in that the space science establishment tenets to shy away from endorsement of the
science component of human spaceflight for fear of being charged with a bill they cannot sunnort or one
that might preempt well-clefinect and important existing science priorities.
To sharpen the debate, it is useful to pose the following question: If human spaceflight ctict not exist
today, would one initiate it? Probably not; there simply is no political imperative such as propelled
Anollo. access-to-space costs remain Prohibitive. and the state of robotic exploration has oro~ressect
, ~ ~
~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 1 ~
immensely in the interim 40 years. Incleect, even cluring the Apollo era the Soviets returned lunar samples
robotically three times and tract rovers that macle traverses longer than we are planning today for Mars.
These superb achievements were totally overshaclowect by Apollo.
It is important to recognize that the human presence in space is the combination of synthetic
environments coupled with robotic systems and that it is unproductive to continue to perpetuate the
human/robot dichotomy as if the human presence were an inclepenclent possibility. The impetus must
come from the human spaceflight enterprise to both use and foster robotic enhancement of human
performance, including applicable parts of information technology. At the same time, the robotic
exploration community should advance autonomy to achieve more productive exploration; e.g., Mars
rovers can traverse no more than tens of meters per clay for want of autonomy systems that are within the
state of the art. The obvious public excitement over the Mars Sojourner rover is testimony to the interest
that robotics can generate. A national human spaceflight program that develops and uses acivancect
robotic systems and artificial intelligence could attract and invigorate a new generation of young people
to enter the fields of technology and science. Concurrently it would reinvigorate the aging NASA staff
and excite and benefit the industrial base in this nation.
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ON FUTURE NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
Wesley T. Huntress, Jr.
NASA's space science program is proceeding on an inspiring, well-managecl, and productive path.
My remarks here are directed principally at NASA's human spaceflight program, which is uninspiring
and marching blindly into a plead encl.
NASA is in fact not a science agency; it is an engineering organization engaged in a business almost
foreign to government—exploration. Exploration provides no direct service to the people, cannot be
quantified or justified in terms of tangible benefits, and is a discretionary activity. Yet the intangible
benefits of space exploration are many and powerful; otherwise, governments would have ctiscontinuect
investment Tong ago.
The imperative to explore is inherent in human beings. We explore to discover and expand the
frontiers of human experience. We explore to unclerstanct what is beyond our current horizons and
remove fear of the unknown. These are survival instincts. Human expansion into space is a continuation
of the ancient human imperative to explore, exploit, and settle. Space exploration has become a part of
our culture. Flying in space is part of who we are as a nation.
Any attempt to ascribe economic benefit to space exploration, particularly beyond Earth orbit, is
futile in the near term. There may be Tong-term benefits resources, power generation, or some other
form of commerce but these are not the imperatives for space exploration. We explore space because
we choose to do so and because we are compelled by an inherent notion of manifest destiny in space. The
immediate benefits of human exploration are cultural and societal. The economic benefits of scientific
exploration are unpredictable but always follow.
Human exploration of space is motivated more by societal factors than it is by science. Science is the
principal product of the robotic space exploration program but historically only a by-product of human
exploration. Any decision on how to proceed with human space exploration will be macle more on
societal and less on scientific grounds. Nonetheless, when a decision is macle to continue human
exploration beyond Earth orbit, it will provide a tremendous opportunity for scientist-explorers and,
unlike in the past, science should be a motivating force in defining human space exploration goals.
Geopolitical factors have been triggers for crucial events in the evolution of space exploration, the
most famous being Apollo and, most recently, the salvation of the space station. The shuttle and the
space station are the legacy of a Tong-past era in which the space program was a weapon in the Coict War.
The Apollo program was not the science or exploration program we are all fond of remembering; it was a
demonstration of power and national will intenclect to win over hearts and mincts around the world and to
clemoraTize the Soviet Union. Exploration is not what motivated Kennedy to open the public purse.
Beating the Russians was. It worked. Apollo accomplished what was intenclect, and the nation moved on
to other priorities, which ctict not include what space enthusiasts and much of the public thought would
happen lunar bases and on to Mars.
The space shuttle and the ISS are the products of NASA attempting over the clecacles to preserve the
Apollo era of human spaceflight already passed by. These are complex, expensive projects that produce
enormous strain on NASA's budget and corresponding stress on the heroic people who work so hard to
preserve the enterprise. The problem is not with human spaceflight; it is with this kind of human
spaceflight. The ISS is not the transportation node for missions beyond Earth orbit that it was supposed
to be; it has become an Earth-orbital end unto itself. And the space shuttle is not the Tow-cost, Tow-risk
operational space transportation system that it was supposed to be.
The legacy of the Columbia accident should be to create a new pathway and sense of purpose for
human spaceflight. We should provide a more robust transportation system for our astronauts and a more
rewarding program of exploration for these heroes. They should be assured of a reliable, safe system for
transporting them a distance no farther than the distance between New York and Washington. And if
space explorers are to risk their lives it should be for extraordinarily challenging reasons such as
exploration of the Moon, Mars, and asteroids and for construction and servicing of space telescopes not
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for making 90-minute trips around Earth. The whole point of leaving home is to go somewhere, not to
endlessly circle the block.
Sooner or later we must have a clear destination for human spaceflight or it will not survive, and
America will be much the poorer for it. A new option floes not have to be funclect like Apollo; it can
proceed at a steady nace. The country needs the challenge of grander exploration to iustifv the risk lift
· ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ . -
our sights, tuel human dreams, and advance human discovery and knowledge. l he human exploration
program needs to go somewhere!
I believe that the nation should aclopt a Tong-term policy to establish a permanent presence in the solar
system beyond Earth orbit and specifically to establish a human outpost on Mars by the micictle of this
century. A progressive, step-by-step approach should be devised for achieving this goal, one that does
not require an Apollo-like spending curve and one that involves cooperation with other space-faring
nations. The stepping stones in this progressive approach are intermediate clestinations, such as the Sun-
Earth Lagrangian Point L2, the Moon, and near-Earth asteroids, where useful scientific exploration can be
carried out.
NASA's Earth-to-orbit transportation and on-orbit infrastructure should be reinvented to support
these goals. The shuttle and the ISS are not on the critical path other than for conducting research on
human physiology in space. The goals of the ISS should be limited and refocused to those specific
purposes required to enable human exploration beyond Earth orbit. The shuttle should be retired after
flying only those missions necessary to complete the ISS. Human transport to and from space, and within
space, should be separated from cargo transport. New simpler, Tower-risk, Tower-cost, Earth-to-orbit
transportation systems should be clevisect that will support requirements for human exploration beyond
Earth orbit.
SEVEN HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE EXPLORATION GOALS
Thomas D. Jones
In response to the Columbia shuttle accident and subsequent investigation by the Gehman board, the
administration and Congress have begun internal studies and public hearings on the future of the U.S.
civil space program. Much of the discussion has focused on destinations: Where should the U.S. venture
next in space? While we should clecicle on a destination (a physical place in the solar system to explore),
the actual location is less important than our ability to explain why we are going there. In selecting a new
space exploration goal, we will benefit from including specific elements common to successful
exploration strategies of the past.
Here are seven characteristics of any future human exploration program that are necessary for broact
and continuing support:
1. Whether we choose to go to the Moon, Mars, or the nearby asteroids, our choice of an
exploration goal must answer the simple question of why it is vital to get there. Our new cleclaration
of purpose in space must include a clear statement of why human beings—and specifically this
nation's citizens—should invest their treasure and energies in achieving such a goal. That rationale
must resonate with our citizens at the taxpayer level. "Beat the Russians to the Moon" was unclerstooct
by every citizen as a highly visible demonstration of our nation's technological competence. Our
goal should thus not be justified solely as a "science project" whose importance can only be explained
by an obscure research community. Developing "enabling technologies" or running a "science-c/riven
enterprise" are examples of goals that are neither well defined nor easily explained to the taxpayers.
Our next challenge in space should engage citizens and reinforce their hopes for a brighter future for
America.
2. To sustain Tong-term funcling, the goal must be understood and supported by both the
administration and Congress. In competing with other domestic initiatives, human (anct robotic)
space exploration must be seen as politically beneficial to law makers and to the executive branch.
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Our success in developing such a consensus will be directly proportional to the strength of the
rationale enunciated in (1) above.
3. The goal must be supported by a simple programmatic roaclmap with highly visible
intermediate milestones. These concrete, incremental steps should clearly and logically enable the
achievement of the final objective. These milestones provide clear evidence of progress, buiTct
momentum, and maintain support for completing the journey. "Lunar orbit test of the Apollo lancler"
is a good example; "building a woricl-class scientific laboratory in orbit" is not, because it is difficult
to know exactly when one has been built. Clearly clefinect milestones also abet confidence to budget
projections for overall program achievement.
4. Demonstrate a steady buiTcl-up of space infrastructure (transportation, propellant, power,
habitable space, scientific capability) cluring achievement of the exploration goal. Such hardware and
capability will be valuable to policy makers for expanclect or alternate activities. The Apollo example
is instructive: Following six successful lunar landings, the only infrastructure left in place was a pair
of Saturn V's, two launch pacts, and a short-livect orbital workshop with no expansion capability. Our
efforts to achieve our next goal should leverage other commercial, scientific, and national security
opportunities.
5. Identify near-term material benefits from conducting an exploration program. For example,
show how building space infrastructure will further commercial activities in orbit. Estimate the
potential value of using in situ resources in place of those cleliverect from Earth. Explain how national
security will benefit from human exploration activity. If the only benefit is an increase in knowledge,
this should be clearly articulated and stated at the outset. That rationale can then be weighed against
the projected costs of the program and other budget priorities.
6. Demonstrate that measurable progress can be macle toward the goal within 5 years. If the
program cannot deliver highly visible achievements within a single aciministration's term, it is
unlikely to garner the political interest necessary to sustain it among other budget priorities. For
example, the ISS survived cancellation only when it gained (tangential) foreign policy relevance to
the last administration. Political relevance is a necessity and just as important as scientific return or
technical feasibility.
7. Remember the bottom line. Any new space policy goal for the nation's civil space program
should be:
.
Understandable The "why" of any space goal should be clear to both the taxpayer and the
politician.
· Achievable A roadmap with incremental milestones should show progression to greater
capability and eventual success.
· Affordable Make use of existing technology to achieve early progress; build momentum
with small successes.
Valuable- The new goal should be of clear, measurable value to the nation, spinning off
benefits even as we strive to reach it.
Choosing a goal is the easy part of the problem. Sustaining the effort to achieve it is the more
difficult task. Learning from our past failed efforts, and our occasional successes, will increase the
likelihood that our nation's next goal in space will be a demonstrable step forward, and not an exercise in
maintaining the status quo.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR CONTINUED SPACE EXPLORATION
Todd R. La Porte
Much of what the workshop has been asked to consider calls out the scientific and technical promise
of sustained space exploration/exploitation. We have hearct a good clear about these parameters and how
they might be prioritized for future efforts. In the background has been an undertone of concern about the
engineering, operational, and political currents that surround our space program now being carried
forward in the face of consiclerable ambiguity. I turn to further sources of this ambiguity—concerns that
should surely be taken into account as future directions are ctiscussecl.
This author's interests are in "the operational and regulatory surprises" that follow from policy and
professional enthusiasms for technologies. For the context of the workshop this interest translates into
questions about the operation of technical organizations. These questions includes What is the
implication institutionally and operationally when the technologies in question are so clemancting or so
hazardous that trial-anct-error learning no longer seems to be a confident mocle of learning? Or when
these technologies are so clemancting that operators (regulators) and the public come to sense that in some
areas, the next error may be your last trial? Asked yet another way, what is the impact on an organization
when technologies are so clemancting that nearly faiTure-free operation becomes a condition for delivering
benefits of a technical system? As it turns out, organizations facing the challenges of such technologies
are often able to operate "nearly failure free" for Tong periods of time, even as Tong as many clecacles.
For NASA (as well as a number of other public technical systems) such Tong-term successful
operations have always been a stunning reach. This is also true for those of us studying large
organizations, where Murphy's law is a general rule of thumb. The operational reach of space programs
has always been "to be better than they should be, given what we know about large-scare organizations,
generally." We know this operational goal is very clemancling, and there is ample evidence of how
difficult it is to attain this goal repeatedly across a number of hazardous technologies (Perrow, Vaughan,
and others) as they are operated from one management generation to another. When one seeks answers
about what it takes actually to manage large-scare systems, responsible for often highly hazardous
operations on missions that imply operational stability for many years, some of the answers are
unsettling; others tenet to erode public confidence if they are not taken into account in program direction
setting and justification. Discussions about NASA often make allusions to the need for safe anct
operationally reliable systems that probably clemanct the organizational properties I am referring to.
In the context of considering possible future directions and characteristics of the U.S. space program,
the institutional requisites of space exploration continue to make remarkable clemancts, for they imply
very-long-term institutional management of both the unmanned and manned aspects of space exploration
and possibly commercial and security exploitation.
When seen from an organizational perspective perspectives that variously color the views of
political decision makers and the public the institutional design challenge is to provide mission structure
and institutional processes and incentives in such ways that they assure highly reliable operations over the
very Tong term perhaps up to a hunctrects of years in the context of continuously high levels of public
trust and confidence.
As future directions are consiclerect, what would be the implications for agencies and
institutions and their leaclers—were attentive publics to expect them to conduct highly reliable, often
very hazardous operations for the foreseeable social future? Given our interests here, "long term," in
institutional terms, expands one's tacit expectations that these activities may be required for the indefinite
future, perhaps a hunctrect years. This is a very tall design order. It should be taken into account in
considering the character and tone of musings about future directions.
If highly reliable, multi-generational, and publicly trusted systems are sought, what are many of the
operational and management properties implied by such a program's reach? These are outlined below.
When these conditions are laid out, it is neither a pretty nor an encouraging picture. These properties
include the following (see tables attached:
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Characteristics of highly reliable organizations (HROs)
a. Internal processes: Strong sense of mission and operational goals, commitment to highly
reliable operations, both in production and safety.
b. Reliability-enhancing operations.
i. Extraordinary technical competence.
1l. Sustained, high technical performance.
iii. Structural flexibility and redundance.
iv. Collegial, decentralized authority patterns in the face of intense, high-tempo
operational demands.
Flexible decision-making processes involving operating teams.
Processes enabling continual search for improvement.
v.
.
V1.
. .
Vll.
c. Organizational culture of reliability, including norms that stress the equal value of
Processes that reward the discovery and reporting of error. even one's own.
reliable production and operational safety.
d. External "watching" elements.
Strong superordinate institutional visibility in parent organization.
Strong presence of stakeholding groups.
iii. Mechanisms for "boundary spanning" between the units and these "watchers."
iv. Venues for credible operational information on a timely basis.
-
i.
. .
II. Characteristics associated with institutional constancy
a. Assurance of steadfast political will.
b. Formal goal of unswerving adherence to the spirit of the initial agreement.
c. Strong articulation of commitments by high-status agency leaders calling on staff in
. .
act sieving constancy.
d. Clear evidence of institutional norms that nurture the persistence of comments across
many generations.
Vigorous external reinforcement from regulatory agencies and public watching groups.
Organizational infrastructure of constancy
i. Administrative and technical capacity to carry out constancy-assurance activities
reinforced by agency rewards.
ii. Adequate resources to ensure the transfer of requisite technical and institutional
knowledge across worker and management generations.
... . . . . .
11.
iV.
e.
f.
III.
Analytical and resource support for future impact analyses.
Capacity to detect and remedy the early onset of likely failure that threatens the
future, with the assurance of remediation if failures occur.
institutional trust-enhancing relationships
a. Interaction with external parties.
b. Early and continuing involvement of stakeholders' advisory groups with frequent contact,
complete candor, and rapid, full response.
c. Timely accomplishment of agreements unless modified through an open process
established in advance.
~ . . . ,, - . .
A, r
d. Consistent, respectful reaching out to state and community leaders and the general public
to inform and consult about technical and operational aspects of agency activities.
e. Active, periodic presence of agency leaders (e.g., being visible and accessible to citizens
at important agency field sites).
Unmistakable local agency and program residential presence that contributes to
community affairs and pays through appropriate mechanisms its fair share of the tax
burden.
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to new endeavors. Yet the difficulties with those endeavors in large measure arose from the absence of a
Tong-range plan.
Lacking a guiding purpose, NASA officials were obliged to buiTct broact coalitions for new human
spaceflight initiatives. The coalitions proved easier to construct than actual facilities. To win support for
the space shuttle, NASA officials promised to construct a vehicle that would serve many functions. The
shuttle program was clesignect to provide a vehicle that could transport commercial payloads, deliver
military reconnaissance satellites, establish a short-cluration orbital laboratory, repair and return satellites,
transport civilians, increase reliability, cut the cost of spaceflight "by a factor of ten," and produce a fleet
of spacecraft that would fly 500 missions over 20 years.4 The original 1984 space station was conceived
as a multi-functional facility from which astronauts could service and repair satellites, observe Earth and
the heavens, conduct life science and materials research, undertake military research and development,
manufacture alloys and pharmaceutical products, welcome international partners, and prepare spacecraft
for missions beyond Earth orbit. The existence of multiple and often conflicting functions significantly
complicated development efforts on these two initiatives and ensured that few of the functions were ever
performed well.
In theory, the approval of a Tong-range plan for human spaceflight would provide the focus necessary
to concentrate resources for near-term initiatives on a few, workable objectives. In spite of the apparent
logic of this approach, however, few incentives exist for its pursuit. A recent Houston Chronicle poll
revealed little public support for Tong-range endeavors such as colonies on Mars.5 Officials in the
Congress and the White House are notoriously skeptical of Tong-term commitments, favoring the
enhanced oversight that the frequent review of small, incremental steps provides. Little money exists for
a boict, new initiative. Conditions supporting the approval of a Tong-range plan are more favorable than
they have been in many years, but historic commitment to small, successive steps remains as attractive to
political leaclers as the broact rationality of a Tong-range plan.
SPACE POLICY AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Norman P. Neureiter
After World War II the United States sought to assert its global leadership and achieve foreign policy
goals with gestures of cooperation in the clevelopment of acivancect technology. Cooperation in space
became part of that effort when NASA was established. NASA was intentionally set up as a civil space
organization when it was founclect, with the military aspects of space left to the Defense Department.
International cooperation was always intenclect to be a key element of its operations, though it would be
basest on NASA leadership of any given project.
To oversimplify, U.S. foreign policy goals are to build and sustain peaceful, constructive relations
between the United States and other countries. The space program has helpect to do that in different
ways. In the 1 960s, during the height of the Apollo program, our embassies abroad showed films of the
Saturn 5 launches and the flights to the Moon. For instance, in Poland the public could attend films that
played all clay Tong and clemonstratect the great technical capabilities of the United States. It was a
tremendous instrument for projecting into the communist world the image of the United States as the true
space leacler and also for trying to buiTct relationships with people in those countries. Over the course of
the nation's progress in manned spaceflight, acicting foreign astronauts to U.S. missions on the space
shuttle has also helpect buiTct better relations. In Japan and Brazil, their astronauts became national
heroes. One major cooperative effort strew on the space program to highlight the "detente" period with
the USSR in the 1970s. It started with the signing of seven science-relatect agreements in 1972 at the
Nixon-Brezhnev summit. One of them was the first space agreement with the Soviets, which lect to the
4 Press conference of Dr. James Fletcher and George M. Low, San Clemente Inn, California, January 5, 1972.
5 Tony Freemantle and Mike Tolson, "Majority Wants Spaceflight Halted Until Goals Set," Houston Chronicle, July
20, 2003.
-
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joint clocking project and eventually evolved into close cooperation on the ISS. Former fighter pilots,
who trained to fight each other, are now cooperating as astronauts and cosmonauts in joint missions.
A new challenge is posed by the recent successful mannect spaceflight by China. Many in the foreign
policy community see the U.S.-China relationship as the most important bilateral relationship for the
United States in the coming years. China's recent successful launch of a man into space may be basest on
comparatively oict technology, but the Chinese will now seek to position themselves and their technical
prowess as a mocle! for the rest of the developing world. China will continue to pursue human spaceflight
programs and has reportedly expressed an interest in cooperating with the United States.
The Arab world poses another challenge. The Zogby Brothers polling group recently published
survey data from several Muslim nations. In Iran and a number of Arab countries, the perception of U.S.
science and technology was exceptionally favorable, even when opinions of other aspects of American
life and policy were very Tow.
Can we take advantage of China's interest in space cooperation or the Arab woricl's positive view of
our technological capabilities to further our foreign policy and public diplomacy goals? Can the space
program be an effective instrument for building newer and better relationships with those countries,
unlikely as that may sound? Possibly, but using the space program as a too! for public diplomacy is
hinclerect by two dominant elements of U.S. foreign policy todays nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and homeland security, both related to the broacler war on terrorism and vital for the
protection of the American people. The nonproliferation issue, in particular, affects space cooperation
because space activity relates to missiles that can deliver WMD. All cooperative proposals with any other
country will be carefully screened for proliferation risks, and very cautious decisions will be macle in the
present environment.
A further issue affecting our ability to carry on effective international cooperation in science and
technology involves the new visa regulations and procedures instituted after 9/11. It is affecting the entry
of students, researchers, and visiting scientists to the United States. In acictition to creating a negative
impression among those whose visas are cleniect or clelayect, in the Tong term it could also have a serious
impact on U.S. research if the best and the brightest graduate students and postdoctoral researchers, who
have traditionally come to the United States, choose to go to other countries where they fee! more
welcome. We must find the proper balance between our tradition of openness and the needs of homeland
security.
The ISS is important for two reasons. First is concern about our image as a reliable international
partner in major technology programs with multiple partners. Second is that our partners have macle large
(for them) investments over many years in the ISS, and no major decision on its fate should be macle
without their involvement. While it is true that the United States has tract many successful international
programs, we have a mixed record as a reliable partner in big, multlyear technology programs.
Particularly when we are seeking to work with other nations and buiTct global coalitions in the fight
against terrorism, it is not desirable to cut off a peaceful civilian program in which the international
astronaut partners have truly become national heroes in their home countries. It can do great damage to
America's image as a world technology leacler.
There are those who may wish to cut, in its entirety, the human spaceflight program. To do so would
take away a powerful instrument for public diplomacy and international cooperation, but more
importantly would project an image of technological retrenchment and retreat at a time when the Chinese
are celebrating their first manned flight and announcing boict plans for the future. The image of American
space leadership has been generated by manned flight. This is not the time to take such a decision,
regardless of what the final resolution is for the ISS. Certainly a successful completion of the ISS on a
partnership basis would be the best solution, but if that is not possible, it must be worked out together
with the partners. A failure to do so could have a serious impact on future attitudes both in the United
States and abroad toward big science or technology projects—which in fact will become increasingly
necessary as the costs of large facilities such as particle accelerators continue to rise and exceed the
capacity of any nation to buiTct alone.
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CONSIDERING EXPLORATION AND THE NECESSITY OF HUMANS IN SPACE
Dava Newman
NASA's mandate is exploration as well as to develop knowledge of the universe and the technical
means to achieve exploration. The three themes highlighted herein include education, human-robotic
missions, and societal opportunities. Acictitional attention is paid to NASA's organizational structure and
the role of the International Space Station (ISS); these two topics need to be acictressect in any near-term
space policy if the United States is to realize any future Tong-term goals for space exploration. I end with
statements proposing that the universe should be accessible to all and that we should never underestimate
the impact of gaining new perspectives and new knowledge.
Exploration is synonymous with educations space exploration is synonymous with inspiration,
motivation, excitement, ctreams, discovery, imagination, and creativity. Every one of us has been touched
by space exploration. We have gained vast knowledge, each and every one of us, through space
exploration. Future generations, our students and children, stanct to be the beneficiaries from an
exhilarating, Tong-term space policy or the heirs of a bureaucratic, short-term space policy. The choice of
endowment is ours. We should have an explicit national goal to educate the woricl's best mathematicians,
scientists, and engineers (starting in elementary school and continuing through college). A space policy
that embraces the challenges of exploration would fuel such a goal. A related issue is producing the
future work force of innovators, engineers, scientists, and humanists. A Tong-term commitment to
exploration through sound space policy will result in a highly eclucatect and trained workforce. What
motivates learners? The extreme challenges that space exploration creates.
Should humans explore space? Yes. That is what humans do—humans explore. Are robots essential
to space exploration? Absolutely. The question becomes, What is the location we want to explore and
how do we explore it? The answer to the second part of this question is, with human-robotic exploration
missions. The location will have to be cleterminect and, clepencting on what is chosen, the specific mocle
of human-robotic exploration may vary. We may choose humans assisted by robotic explorers (if our
location is the Moon, Mars, L1, L2, moons of outer planets) or robots/probes assisted by humans who are
not co-locatecl. Humans solve problems, are creative, and bring unequallect knowledge, experience,
vision, mobility, and dexterity to exploration. We might say that robots enable exploration and that
"humans enable serendipity." It is clear to me that a human-robotic partnership is paramount for
exploration-class missions. We should discuss the symbiosis of human-machine capabilities as enablers.
It is senseless to pit humans versus robots when setting policy for space exploration. We need to attain
the correct balance between human-robotic capabilities to enable exploration. Finally, for human
spaceflight endeavors costs must be reclucect, safety must be enhanced, and risks should be minimized.
More importantly, the high risk of human spaceflight for truly challenging missions (i.e., beyond Tow
Earth orbit) should be articulated and then accepted. But acceptance relies on educating the public.
We have not tract national leadership to realize space policy with Tong-term exploration goals in
clecacles. NASA has a recent vision (to improve life here, to extend life to there, to find life beyond) and
mission (to unclerstanct and protect our home planet, to explore the universe and search for life, to inspire
the next generation of explorers . . . as only NASA cans) as well as 10 goals. NASA suffers from lack of
executive and congressional support for the newly proposed strategic plan.
We are a global people, but very split as a global community currently. I am committed to realizing
peaceful cooperation in space exploration, and I think that the United States should assume a leadership
role in a global effort. The benefits to humanity would become apparent through collaborations and by
inspiring and educating future generations.
6 Mankins, J.C., 2002, "The Exploration and Development of Space: The International Space Station and Beyond,"
from Beyond the ISS. The Future of Human SpaceJflight, Advanced Programs Office, NASA, Washington, D.C.
7 NASA Strategic Plan, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 2003.
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The Rogers Commission and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reports clearly depict
NASA's organizational and management shortcomings and offer recommendations. It is fair to question
if the current NASA bureaucracy is structurally capable of implementing its bold strategic vision. This
author, for one, does believe that NASA and the larger community of investigators, engineers, and
managers are intellectually capable of achieving the stated vision and mission.
The ISS is best used as a testbed for technology development, demonstrations, and applied research
focused on human (and animal) performance during long-duration spaceflight. We are gaining valuable
experience in operations, and the international cooperation is also a step in the right direction.
Breakthrough science is possible on the ISS, and in time it will occur. However, many results may be
realized in hindsight, and the speculation about such scientific results is not sufficient justification for an
Writing laboratory. An eti1c1ently run station that serves as a stepping stone tor tuture space exploration
could be justified.
In closing, our national space policy should focus on the goal of making the universe accessible to all.
Exploration provides humans a fresh perspective and new knowledge. Paraphrasing and editing Soren
Kierkagaard, "to dare (explore) is to lose one's footing momentarily. To not dare (explore) is to lose
oneself."~°
DO THE LIFE SCIENCES HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN NASA'S RESEARCH?
Mary Jane Osborn
The life sciences include (1) fundamental biological processes whose development and/or function is
dependent on gravity; (2) those aspects of human (and animal) physiology and behavior that are
significantly affected by microgravity environments; and (3) medical science and applied biosciences that
are relevant to safety considerations or necessary for long-term human survival and function in space.
Research in these aspects of the life sciences should indeed be given high priority at NASA, provided that
a national consensus is achieved on a national space policy that contains a real commitment to the human
exploration of space.
At the present time, the U.S. commitment to human exploration of space, which for many years has
been fragile at best, appears to be in mortal danger. Prospective federal budgets are unlikely to look
kindly on new initiatives for NASA, such as the space plane, much less serious planning for human
exploration beyond low Earth orbit. The International Space Station (ISS) was in a parlous state even
before the loss of Columbia, and that disaster has apparently solidified a perception, correct or not, that
the nation is risk-averse to the point that any activity is unacceptable if it cannot be guaranteed to be safe.
In contrast, it is the adding of unnecessary and avoidable risk to inherently and necessarily risky activity
that is properly unacceptable.
In this context it is difficult to argue that life sciences research should have priority in the currently
feasible NASA portfolio. NASA is arguably the major player in space science, and its contributions have
been spectacular both to the scientific community and the public. No such past success can be claimed
for NASA biological or biomedical research. On the contrary, the relevant scientific community remains
by and large skeptical, and the public indifferent. In major part the problem lies with the lack of a
research platform in which sophisticated, well-controlled long-duration experiments could be mounted.
In part, however, some poor programmatic choices in the past led to flight experiments that the
community deemed trivial. In truth, however, much of the biomedical research relevant and necessary for
prolonged spaceflight is not intrinsically attractive in spite of the hype it has sometimes received.
~ Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission Report), Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1986.
9 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume I, August, 2003.
° Personal communication and thanks to M.L Cummings.
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It is obvini~s that NASA'S biomedical research program will not solve the problem of human aging, or
cancer, or neurological disease. And the probability that NASA-sponsored research will lead to any
major advancement in knowledge in these areas is, in my opinion, Tow. However, as has been stated
repeatedly by NRC and NASA advisory committees, continued biomedical research is essential to
understanding and ameliorating problems that may limit astronauts' health, well-being, and performance
during prolonged spaceflight, and NASA's program should be directed explicitly to this goal. If, then,
human exploration of space is consigned to a future that is never realized, the rationale for NASA's
overall biomedical research program essentially evaporates.
Is there. however. important biological research that can oniv be done in the context of snacefli~ht
7 7 1 ~7 ~ 1 ~7
and, specifically, long-durahon spacell~ght, even ~t human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not a
goal for the civil space program? The answer is certainly yes. There are a limited set of biological
phenomena and processes that are fundamentally dependent on gravity. These include gravitropism in
plants and in animals, development and maintenance of weight-bearing bone and muscle, and
development and function of the neurovestibular system. The mechanisms whereby these processes sense
and respond to gravity are not well understood, and critical mechanistic studies can only be carried out
under conditions in which gravity is an independent variable and Tong-duration experiments are possible
that allow Tong-term developmental studies. And will such studies require human presence rather than
purely robotic control? Yes. Unlike purely observational research, biological experiments very
frequently require changes in protocol as experiments progress the human eye to recognize the need to
modify and the human mind and hand to solve the problem or grab the opportunity.
Hence the need for the ISS, and, parenthetically, the need for trained scientific investigators to carry
out experiments. However, if the ISS is to be maintained as a platform for relatively Tong duration
experiments in the biological and physical sciences, then problems of astronaut health and performance
in- and nost-fli~ht reemerge as issues of major concern. and NASA's biomedical research Program
~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~
regains immediate relevance and priority. Whether the station can in the relatively near term be brought
into condition to function as a laboratory for sophisticated biological and biomedical research is another
question. Even before the present hiatus, reduction and delays in necessary facilities have significantly
compromised the research potential of the station and the interest of the relevant investigator community
to committing to station experiments.
The present outlook is bleak, but there is reason for optimism. For myself, human exploration of the
solar system is as necessary and as valuable for this age as was the circumnavigation of the globe and the
exploration of the continents in previous ages, endeavors that were, if less costly in money, infinitely
more costly in lives.
THE FIVE FRONTIERS OF SPACE
Edward C. Stone
NASA was formed at the dawn of the Space Age as part of the U.S. investment to create a space-
laring capability. Today the United States is indeed a space-faring nation, and it is hard to imagine a
future in which it does not remain so. Even if there was no longer a NASA, we would continue to
develop and deploy more advanced global positioning, communications, weather, reconnaissance, and
defense systems in space.
Given that the United States is and will be a space-faring nation, what is the role of NASA in space
today? Although the Space Age began 46 years ago, it is still the newest realm of human activity. There
remains much to learn. A primary role for NASA is to expand the frontiers of this new realm in order to
foster increasing activity and broader involvement. Expanding the frontiers of space also serves the
national interest by providing opportunities for international partnerships.
There are five frontiers to this new realm of human activity:
The physical frontier going where robotic systems or humans have not been.
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2. The knowledge frontier~iscovering and unclerstancting natural phenomena.
3. The engineering/technology frontier~eveloping the innovative engineering and technology
required to expand the other frontiers.
4. The human frontier acictressing the physiological, psychological, and other aspects of effective
human activity in space.
5. The applications frontier~eveloping and demonstrating new uses of space.
These frontiers are immense, so choices must be macle. Among the criteria for such choices is the extent
to which a program or project significantly expands one or more of these frontiers, thereby contributing to
the achievement of a Tong-term goal.
The actual rate of learning or pushing the frontiers is another important measure of the value of
inctiviclual programs. This is an important criterion for choosing a program. It is also important in
clecicting to discontinue an activity when the important questions have been answered and the rate of
learning has become only incremental or is no longer commensurate with the cost and risk.
In general, space science has Tong-range goals and roacimaps that are periodically revisited in the light
of new knowledge, new capabilities, expected rate of learning, and estimated cost and risk. It also has
processes for identifying the best ideas for acictressing those goals. Therefore the following focuses on
human spaceflight.
The human exploration of Mars would clearly expand the physical frontier for human spaceflight and
could serve as a Tong-range goal in determining the value of specific investments in the human spaceflight
program. With proper planning and preparation, the human exploration of Mars would also expand the
science frontier. This should be an international goal with a general time frame but not a commitment to
a specific clate.
Sending humans to Mars would require significantly expanding the engineering/technology and the
human frontiers while continuing the scientific exploration of Mars with precursor robotic missions. In
the near term this suggests that the human frontier should be a high priority for the International Space
Station. The capabilities and use of the ISS should be optimized to achieve timely and significant
progress in unclerstancting the most important factors affecting human effectiveness and safety cluring
Tong exposures in space. There will also be opportunities for the ISS to contribute to the science and
applications frontiers.
One of the challenges for human spaceflight is choosing programs that will significantly increase the
rate of learning associated with expanding the frontiers critical to human spaceflight so that it is
commensurate with the investment and the risk. An effective way to increase the rate of learning is to
proceed with a series of smaller steps rather than with the occasional, much larger step represented by a
single system designed to address many different and often competing objectives. Each step should focus
on an aspect of the engineering/technology or human frontier that is crucial to making a human mission to
Mars feasible, affordable, and safe. The exact steps will evolve as we learn, but the overall direction will
be guiclect by the Tong-term goal of the human exploration of Mars.
Expanding the frontiers means learning by going new places and trying new things. Doing what has
not been clone before will entail risk, but that will be acceptable if we are learning what is critical to
expanding the frontiers, rather than only incrementally improving what we already know and clot That
floes not mean, however, that institutionally striven risks are acceptable.
Aclclressing challenging engineering/technology issues on reasonable time scales (e.g., 5 years) will
motivate students and attract the talented workforce needled to tackle hard problems. This is important
because there are now many more challenging opportunities in engineering and science than there were at
the beginning of the Space Age. As a result, there is much more competition for the brightest and best,
and the human spaceflight program must offer a higher rate of learning to attract a new generation of
technical staff.
Experience with the space science program also suggests that if the human spaceflight program was
structured to produce more learning, aclclitional funding would follow because the value to the Tong-range
goal of human presence on Mars would be apparent and the progress visible. The challenge for the
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human spaceflight program in the next two decades is to take the steps on the frontiers of space that will
make human exploration of Mars not just a dream but inevitable.
CONSIDERING A RATIONALE FOR THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM
James R. Thompson
How should one weigh the interactions between national security, military, and civilian efforts in
space? The goals may differ substantially, but the technology derived benefits all. The most evident
examples are in launch vehicle technology, global positioning, and remote sensing. NASA is in a
position to drive new technologies and their applications. Over the last decade, NASA's contributions
have become muted and less meaningful due to internal problems and cost issues related to poor program
execution. Obvious examples are Columbia, space station growth, and the "faster, cheaper, better"
mantra. The country is being deprived of the technology benefits of a healthy NASA. One example is
NASA's aeronautics program, particularly research into hypersonics. NASA's goals should be defined
by imagination and should push the limits of achievement, not operate a shuttle system for the one-
hundredth time or continue to add to a space station of dubious return.
Will space become an economic center of gravity? The answer is probably not. Space is already a
budding economic contributor, however, through satellite services in the form of TV broadcasting. global
positioning, weather forecasting, and others.
Am, ~
What are the contributions of space activities to U.S. foreign policy objectives? Space can be a
powerful messenger communicating the capabilities and power of U.S. technology and will. Today, our
message can be seen as one of confusion and weakness, as discussed above—a grounded shuttle program,
a deteriorating space station, and so on. We should be very careful in setting new initiatives that can be
unrealistic and poorly executed. Our national priorities are focused elsewhere. The money is probably
not there. We should not rush into an orbital space plane program. We should take whatever time is
required and get it right, if we do it at all.
AMERICA'S FIVE SPACE PROGRAMS
Albert C. Wheelon
The U.S. space program has five quite distinct and separate components. They speak to different
national needs and are funded separately: (1) the National Reconnaissance Program, (2) military space
programs, (3) commercial space programs, (4) unmanned science programs at NASA, and (5) the NASA
manned space program. To plan the future of one component, it is necessary to understand the other four
and where they are headed. This abstract discusses the five components briefly together with their cross-
couplings. As a matter of national policy, all programs were once committed to exclusive use of the
shuttle as their launch vehicle. That policy has been discarded in the wake of shuttle accidents and
unsustainable launch cost increases. Moreover, the first four components have concluded for valid
technical reasons that manned participation in their missions is not only unnecessary but also
undesirable. The result is that NASA's manned space program now rides exclusively on the shuttle and
space station, which in turn must provide all of its financial support. As the shuttle fleet ages and Tosses
are incurred, it is time to plan the future of this component as a freestanding activity. A new grand
challenge is needed to harness our nation's imagination and capabilities. Some suggestions are presented
below and an important role for the national academies identified.
The space era began with the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 and was followed by a string
of other Soviet firsts in space. The first response by the United States was creation of the CORONA
reconnaissance satellite Program at the Central Intelligence Agency in 1959. NASA was created
thereafter In 1958 with its defining challenge presented by President Kennedy in May 1961. There is
often a tendency to confuse NASA's human spaceflight programs with the full portfolio of the nation's
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activities in space. In fact, NASA's human spaceflight efforts are one of five separate programs that in
total define the nation's activities in space. These five activities include the following:
1. National Reconnaissance Program (approximately $8 billion in 2003),
2. Other military space programs (approximately $8.5 billion in 2003),
3. Commercial programs (for example, expenditures on communications satellites; approximately
$7.5 billion in 2003),
4. NASA's Earth and space science program (approximately $5 billion in 2003), and
5. NASA's human spaceflight program (approximately $7 billion in 20034.
. . - . · . .
it is valuable to review the cross-couplings among the five programs and areas where the National
Academies can influence them.
The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) is arguably the most consistently successful component
of our space efforts. It was certainly the most influential element of our strategic posture cluring four
clecacles of the Coict War. It has enjoyed clear and sustained policy support plus the consistent
commitment of adequate resources to meet them. An executive committee has met regularly to give the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) policy guidance for both ongoing and new programs. It is
composed of the director of Central Intelligence, the deputy secretary of defense, and a White House
official (sometimes the presiclent's science advisor). American presidents have been involved in key
decisions, both to proceed with new programs and to suspend others (e.g., real-time system, CORONA,
and the SAMOS cancellation). The first CORONA film was recovered 18 months after President
Eisenhower gave the program its initial go-aheact. This was followed by 145 successful flights spread
over 12 years (167 capsules), then by two successful seconcl-generation systems, and the present near-
real-time system. The National Reconnaissance Program also fielclect families of satellites in Tow Earth
orbit and synchronous orbit to intercept communications and telemetry signals. The NRP tract enjoyed
unusual privacy and flexibility until 1992 when it became a public institution. The NRP has tract four
important connections to manned activities:
.
Manned Orbital Laboratory Program: Its primary mission was reconnaissance, but camera
stability was thwarted by human presence (terminated in 19694.
· An NRO program and its contractor team provided the spacecraft and camera foundation for the
Hubble Space Telescope program.
NRO programs were committed to an exclusive reliance on shuttle launchings prior to the
Challenger Toss.
The shuttle bay size and payload requirements were set by NRO spacecraft.
Scientists and engineers were crucial in starting and guiding these programs, but the Academies
have played no organizing role.
Military space programs began unsteadily before 1957 with SAMOS but were followed by two
magnificent successes. One is a series of missile-warning (infrared) satellites in geostationary orbit.
These became the second most important stabilizing element in the Coict War, behind only the CORONA
satellites. Second is the Global Positioning System, which has proclucect a most important benefit to
society—even greater than communication satellites. By contrast, military communication satellite
programs began slowly the Advent collapse in 1962 shook the confidence of the Department of Defense
(DOD). The DOD decision to support Comsat and Intelsat with its traffic was an important decision.
The enormous potential of the private band at 7 and 8 GHz was finally exploited. In acictition, mobile
services at UHF bands are extraordinarily useful for woric~wicle deployment of Army, Navy, and Air
Force units. Military programs also suffered from an exclusive commitment to the Space Transportation
System (i.e., the space shuttle), but they are now firmly committed to unmanned missions and expendable
launchers because the STS orbit is wrong, its duration too short, its cost too great, and its launches too
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uncertain in view of the Challenger and Columbia disasters. The DOD is now unwilling to become
entangled again. The National Academies can help advise next steps, when requested.
When describing commercial space activities, the primary exemplar is communication satellites.
These programs began with the AT&T Tow-altitucle system, Telsat, in 1962, and then with Hughes's
synchronous demonstration of Syncom in 1963. The Comsat Act of 1962 established Comsat and Intelsat
as monopoly providers, thereby limiting AT&T' s role in satellite communications. Comsat and Intelsat
acloptect a geosynchronous solution and went on to fund almost all communication satellite technology
clevelopments. Vigorous communications satellite programs began in 1970 and flowered until the mict-
1990s. NASA played a useful early role in this technology clevelopment with demonstration flights (like
the Applications Technology Satellite series) but withdrew in favor of Intelsat in 1973. The space shuttle
rescued and returned two Hughes HS-376 spacecraft in 1984 and repaired one of the Navy's Leased
Satellite (Leasat) spacecraft in 1985. However, these satellites were insured and could have been
replaced in a timely manner without shuttle retrieval. Operators of communication satellites were shaken
by the Challenger Toss in 1986 and the subsequent decision to bump commercial spacecraft from the
shuttle launch manifests. These customers shifted to the French Arianespace launch vehicle, as well as
Chinese and Russian rockets, for access to space.
Communications satellites have been slowed more recently by deregulation, undermining Intelsat's
role as a customer for spacecraft and a supporter of communications satellite technology, the
extraordinary and unwarranted installation of fiber-optic cables, fooTharcly system investments like
Iridium (which caused a $4 billion Toss to Motorola), and the proliferation of cell phone services.
Satellite television remains competitive with cable TV, but there is a good clear of excess spacecraft
capacity in orbit and in factories. Spacecraft are becoming a commodity with decisions being striven by
market forces and competition. Frankly, there are few ways in which the National Academies can
influence these business decisions that are macle primarily by MBAs rather than engineers.
NASA's science programs have lect the world in exploring our solar system and the universe, yet it
seems like they have always been a poor cousin to human exploration initiatives. There is still so much
that can be done in the space and Earth sciences. In space science, most of this is best done with robotic
. .
missions Because
A human's presence unavoidably disrupts the measurements,
Humans impose a short-duration limit on such missions,
Humans cannot go to the orbits usually required, and
Humans add a large overhead cost to the program for safety.
Although Hubble was designed to be serviced by astronauts, it probably could have been replaced
with new spacecraft for about the same cost. One should notice that the basic NRO spacecraft from
which Hubble was derived (i.e., 2.4-m aperture class) were replaced regularly, rather than being serviced
and modified in orbit.
The four great observatories have now been launched, and a golden age of astronomy is upon us. A
number of ground-based telescopes with 10-m apertures have been deployed and are operating at optical
and infrared wavelengths. With adaptive optics, they produce resolution comparable to that obtained with
Hubble but with greater light-gathering capability. With a 30-m aperture, the California Extremely Large
Telescope (CELT) will provide 10 times the light gathering of the Keck Telescope. There is a need for
optical interferometers on the ground and in space to see distant planets. The Academies have played a
vital role in guiding the space and Earth science programs at NASA.
NASA's human program has a unique history. The Mercury and Gemini programs demonstrated
U.S. ability to respond quickly to the Russian challenge in space. The Apollo program reestablished U.S.
technological superiority, which has subsequently been reconfirmed by (1) PCs and software, (2) high-
tech weapons, and (3) biotechnology. There is no need today to repeat the Apollo demonstration of U.S.
technological prowess. The end of Apollo represented a turning point, as we went from trying to achieve
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a specific goal to simply creating useful capabilities. Support for a large scale next-step ctict not exist.
President Nixon would only approve the shuttle, while the space station tract to wait for the Reagan
Administration. NASA sought to make the shuttle the centerpiece of the entire space program and
aggressively sought a monopoly grant to carry all U.S. spacecraft into orbit. To this end, NASA clesignect
the shuttle to meet everyone's requirements (i.e., bay size and payload to meet NRO neects). To enforce
this monopoly, NASA began closing production lines for Delta, Atias-Centaur, and Titan in 1984. This
decision was appealed in 1985 to President Reagan, who ctirectect that 10 acictitional Titans be purchased
to backstop the NRO programs, despite objections from NASA and its congressional allies
NASA generated an economic mocle! in 1972 that promised shuttle launches for $ 10 million by
projecting launch rates that would rise from 6 to 60 per year in 3 years. The reality is quite different: 6
flights a year for $600 million each. NASA further argued that the country would need 600 shuttle flights
between 1980 and 1991, although this was soon reclucect to 165. NASA promised a reliability of one Toss
in 10,000 launches; the actual ratio is 1/50. In 1977 NASA persuaclect sympathetic defense officials to
adopt a policy that all NRO and military spacecraft fly exclusively on the space shuttle. To launch
spacecraft into high-incTination orbits the Air Force also agreed to buiTct a shuttle facility on the West
Coast at a cost to the Air Force of $3 billion. The merging of spacecraft lifting and manned piloting
necessarily increased the risk to astronauts and increased the cost to military missions. The diverse
requirements of so many users pulled the shuttle design in too many directions and was responsible in
part for striving the clevelopment cost form $5 billion to $40 billion.
Most missions were not clestinect for the shuttle's Tow orbit near the equator and needled to be lifted
much higher or flung out of Earth's gravity entirely. The problem was that no funds remained to develop
the acictitional rocket stages that were required to reach higher speects and altitudes. NASA then
persuaclect McDonnell-Douglas to develop with its own funds the Pam A and Pam D stages, with a
promise of future business. NASA also persuaclect the Air Force to buiTct the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) to
take DOD payloads to high orbits. To meet all the DOD mission requirements, IUS launch costs rose
from $2 million to $80 million, representing the enormous penalty of building a common stage to serve
all users. In 1985, the country was on a course to launch all its spacecraft with the shuttle, and the
production lines for alternate launch vehicles were almost closest clown. The United States was about to
learn a cruel lesson.
On January 28, 1986, Challenger exploclect, and with it the policy of putting all our eggs in one
basket. The shuttle would be grounclect for 2.5 years to make it safe for operation. The 10 acictitional
Titans approved by Reagan kept the NRO and military payloacls flying. The Air Force promptly
increased the Titan order from 10 to 23 and vowed never again to become clepenclent on NASA's launch
vehicle programs. The then-completect shuttle launch facility in California was mothballect and
abanclonect. NASA canceled its own plan to carry the hyctrogen-oxygen Centaur stage in the shuttle bay
after Challenger. Commercial customers were cropped from the manifest and toict to fenct for
themselves. This caused major economic harm and resulted in the move of these payloads to the French,
Russian, and Chinese vehicles. As time went on, the production lines for Delta and Atlas Centaur came
back to life. They then continued their steacly performance improvements. NASA was left with a
machine clesignect to do all things, but few customers. With this reality, the space station became vital to
the shuttle's survival. It became the raison cl' etre for the shuttle because it was needled to buiTct, man, and
re-supply it.
The space shuttle and space station have since become Siamese twins. However, a compelling case
for the space station has yet to be established. Certainly it is not justified on the basis of science. One
.
could argue that both the shuttle and the space station are being pursued primarily to keep our human
spaceflight capability alive this is the right thing to clot If we were to ctisbanct the human spaceflight
institution, it would be very difficult to reconstitute it. However, both programs took another blow when
Columbia ctisintegratect cluring reentry. Like the Challenger accident, this accident raised serious
questions about NASA's ability to establish and maintain the technical discipline needed to fly the shuttle
reliably. Thev also highlighted its extraordinary complexity a complexity that is a legacy of the original
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attempt to serve all users with a single machine. In thinking about what comes after the shuttle, let us see
if we can articulate all of the issues that lie before us.
If our only need is to support the space station, we can do so without the space shuttle. We can carry
building materials and supplies to the station using stanclarct rockets fittest with clocking mocluTes. These
rockets need not be human-ratect. Astronauts can be carried up and back in special crew capsules (like
Soyuz) on human-ratect rockets. This is the strategy the Russians proved out Tong ago for their own
successful space stations. If this approach is acloptect, we need not and should not replace the shuttle. The
question is rather, How do we implement this two-prongect strategy?
We probably do not need very much new technology to carry astronauts up and clown. After all, we
have been sending capsules into space and retrieving them since 1960, some with men, most with film.
We know how to do this job reliably using symmetrical reentry vehicles that dissipate heat by ablation.
This is the technology that was used in Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and the NRO programs. Yet this
approach floes not provide a compelling case for the manned spaceflight program as we know it today.
To put it differently, if the American people want a challenging and exciting program, the space station
plus shuttle is not it. To use a movie analogy, it is more like a clay-time soap opera than "Gone with the
Wincl."
The country can respond to another grand challenge, as it once ctict to the Apollo Moon mission. But
when we will be really to do so is an important question to ask. At the moment, our country is
preoccupied with remaking the Micictle East and fighting terrorism. One should ask what qualifies as a
grand challenge. Certainly Mars, or one of its moons, or the intriguing moons of Jupiter are exciting
challenges. We may be able to do such missions by assembling a transfer vehicle in Earth orbit, using the
original Saturn V as the primary lifter. Perhaps we need a much larger rocket to reach interplanetary
trajectories in a single launch, or maybe we need to develop entirely new types of propulsion for such
journeys. We certainly need to know a Tot about astronaut survivability. There are evidently a great
many scientific and engineering studies to be clone before a specific mission is chosen and an
implementation plan selected. Those are tasks that the Academies are richly enclowect to examine.
It is the judgment of this author that the scientific and engineering community can best support the
manned space program by thinking hard about the grand challenges, not fine-tuning the existing program.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
space station
