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OCR for page 1
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Advisers to the Nation on Sciente, Engineering, and Medicine
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
Dr. Richarc! Wlezien
Program Director
Vehicle Systems Program
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
Dear Dr. Wlezien:
500 Fifth Street, NW
Keck 1 002-A
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202 334 2668
Fax: 202 334 2482
Email: aseb@nas.edu
www.national-academies.org/deps
January 5' 2004
This letter report summarizes the findings ant! recommendations of the National Research
Council's (NRC's) Pane! on the Vehicle Systems Program (VSP) on the progress made by the
VSP over the past 9 months in formulating ant! directing its program. The panel's review centers
on the technical merit of the projects and tasks in the VSP as well as the planned program
structure and rationale for meeting top-lever goals. This letter report follows the full NRC report
An Assessment of NASA 's Aeronautics Technology Programs, which was authored by the
Committee for the Review of NASA's Revolutionize Aviation Program ant! was releaser! to the
public on November ~ 8, 2003. ~ The VSP pane] was one of three panels reporting to that
committee.
The VSP pane! began its review of NASA's VSP on March 17, 2003, in Washington,
D.C. The review continues! with numerous subpane] visits to the NASA centers where a large
amount of VSP work was taking place. The pane! issued guidance to the full committee on the
state of the VSP as it was ~ief~ned in March 2003, and the committee aclopted the panel's findings
ant! recommendations, inclucling them in its report. The assessments macle by the VSP pane! at
the site visits to NASA centers were cletailect in nature and focuses! down to the task level. Thus,
the top-teve! program assessment was consistent with the timing of these reviews, which were
conducted in March 2003. For complete cietaiis of center visits and detailed Anglings ant!
recommendations, please see the full committee report, issued on November ~ 8.
NASA requested that the VSP panel reconvene after the committee's report had been
released and the main review completed. The purpose of the two-clay meeting, held on
November ~ 9-20, 2003, was to review ant! comment on progress and changes that hac} occurred
in the structure and management of the VSP subsequent to March 2003. The results of the new
review are contained herein. The recommendations contained in this letter report, in almost all
instances, amplify ant] reinforce recommendations and observations contained in the full
committee report. In selected cases, some further observations have been made based on more
recent data, which supersede data provided in the earlier full committee report.
~ The published report is forthcoming from National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., in January 2004.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES · NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING · INSTITVIE OF MEDICINE · NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
OCR for page 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS
This letter report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National
Research Council's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review was to
provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its publisher!
report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional stanclarcis for
objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the stucly charge. The review comments and draft
manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the cleliberative process. We wish to
thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Ear] H. Dowell (NAE), Duke
University; Gordon McKinzie, Uniter! Airlines, retired; Richarc! Petersen (NAE), NASA, retired;
ant! William Agnew, General Motors Corporation, retired.
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and
suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor clid they
see the final ciraft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by
Louis Lanzerotti, Lucent Technologies. Appointec! by the National Research Council, he was
responsible for making certain that an inclepenclent examination of this report was carried out in
accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully
consicierect. Responsibility for the fine] content of this report rests entirely with the authoring
panel and the institution.
UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF NASA'S VEHICLE SYSTEMS PROGRAM
Since the beginning of the review in March 2003 for the full committee report, the VSP
has undergone significant change and restructuring. Seven existing programs, each with a
bottom-up content formulation, were brought uncler the umbrella of the VSP, and NASA
management had the daunting task of bringing cohesion to a diverse array of research tasks. This
letter report provides the VSP panel's assessment of the current state of the VSP research
program restructuring. Because there was so little time between the release of the full committee
report and the November ~ 9-20 review, the pane! ctid not determine how well NASA had
responclect to the guidance in the full report. The panel did, however, use the top-level
recommendations contained in Chapter I, "Top-Level Assessment," of the full report to structure
the assessment here. The pane! has farther explained those recommendations baser! on the
current status of the VSP. Of the 12 top-level recommendations in the full report,
recommendations ~ ant! ~ O are not included here as they are not as directly relevant to the VSP
ant! this new review.
Major Findings and Key Issues
in aligning VSP goals and program
organization structure. The team has begun the process of prioritizing and aligning projects uncler
the VSP. The pane! commencis the VSP for its openness during this review ant! for taking the
initiative to solicit further comments from the pane! ant! other outside sources. The NASA
The VSP team has made significant progress
2
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presenters were refreshingly candid in their presentations and assessments of the work being
conducted.
VSP management explicitly requested that the pane] answer three questions:
What is being done well within VSP?
What needs further attention and improvement?
What has been overlooked and needs to be added to the program?
In answering these questions, the pane} identified four key issues that are discussed in
detail in the 10 top-level recommendations below. These four issues are summarized as follows:
.
The top-down planning and program formulation process being put in place by the
VSP appears sound, and implementation has begun. However, the reporting,
accountability, and other management tools necessary for organizations of this type
and size appear to be disjointed. The Finds management accountability and
responsibility/accountability links between the program and NASA centers are
dysfunctional and seriously jeopardize VSP's ability to successfully transform and
focus NASA's work on vehicle systems.
For many years NASA has had a problem with maintaining aeronautics facilities
owing to declining use and budgets. Although the required paring down of fixed
assets to meet future visions and needs is being implemented, it does not appear to be
progressing in a strategic manner but instead in a reactive way, driven by near-term
budget needs and accounting rules. While full-cost accounting has compounded this
situation by heightening the visibility of NASA's ability to maintain aeronautics
facilities, the reality is that NASA has yet to aclequately address this critical issue at
the headquarters level. The pane! appreciates that the VSP is not responsible for
making the determination of which test capabilities wild be retained and which lost.
However, the pane} points out that decisions on infrastructure may adversely impact
the VSP's ability to successfully demonstrate and transition technologies to an end-
user, a higher technology readiness level (TRL) program, or the commercial
marketplace.
Centers often assign more staff to projects than is required by programs, given the
often limited budgets of the programs. Little if any paring down of tasks has occurred
to date, but the plans shared with the panel call for poorly linked or lower-priority
projects to be closed out over the next 3 to 6 months. However, it is not clear how
reduction in efforts can be done efficiently given the existing limitations on hiring
and firing personnel because, under the new full-cost-accounting regime, programs
must pay for staff out of limited and declining budgets. The pane! strongly urges the
VSP and NASA to do everything within its power to correct this situation. If a
solution cannot be found within a short period of time, NASA will have to consider
the last alternative - initiating a reduction in force (RIF). Something must be done
soon or the VSP may never be successfully transformed into a new, efficient and
effective entity that will allow NASA to regain or retain a position of leadership in
selected capability areas. And, even though NASA faces severe problems in
overstaffing, it is important for the agency to simultaneously implement hiring
practices that ensure a steady flow of new talent.
OCR for page 4
.
While some of the full report's programmatic recommendations have been
implemented, it was not clear if projects had truly been recluced in terms of content or
if centers ant] lower-level managers have simply consoliciated projects and tasks
without significantly reducing their content to match limiter! and declining budgets. In
any case, resources for high-priority programs have not been increaser! as a result of
this consolidation. This gives the impression that some work is being perpetuates}
based on the interests of specific researchers or centers, rather than the needs of the
nation.
Discussion
Top-Leve} Recommendation 2
NASA shop provide Boric! leadership in aeronautics research ant! alevelopment
The VSP has creates! a process for planning projects and tasks that links NASA's national
science and technology policy to the objectives of four aeronautics themes:
Protect the environment,
Increase mobility,
Explore new aerospace missions, ant!
Partner for national security.
These, in turn, flow clown to six long-term strategic technology focus areas. To iclentiiPy
specific projects ant! tasks that should be pursued, the VSP has developer! six vehicle concepts—
comprising multiple vehicle sectors from supersonic to extreme short takeoff to highlight
potential technology applications that align with the technology focus areas. This program
planning activity has producecI a vision that should allow NASA to establish worIct-ciass
leadership in:
L;nvironment-friendly, clean-burning engines,
New energy sources for aircraft ant] power management,
Quiet aircraft for community-friencIly service,
Aeroclynarnic performance for fuel efficiency,
Aircraft weight reduction, and
· Smart aircraft and autonomous control.
Six of the V:SP's seven projects are closely related to these technology focus areas. The
seventh project provides flight and system demonstration services.
The acictition of the vehicle integration strategy technical analysis (VISTA) team near the
top of VSP management provides the important cross-program integration ant! requirements
assessment that were missing when the review started in March 2003. VISTA is an important
capability for prioritizing program activities, assessing return on investment, and monitoring
progress in terms of key performance objectives. Although considerable talent aIreacly exists to
support VISTA, the addition of some senior staff with experience in system integration and
4
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performance would help the VSP to fully exploit the VISTA concept. It is important to have
people capable of creating requirements that can flow down to the technical researcher level in a
way that is meaningful and traceable.
The pane] recommends that the VISTA team also assess the viability of the markets for
the end products of the technologies being developed. Simply put, technology should be
developed only if it is marketable and has an internal NASA customer or external government or
commercial sector end-user. In order to increase the possibility for technology transfer, VISTA
may want to consult with industry marketing managers who are forecasting new product
development.
Top-Leve! Recommendation 3
NASA has many excellent technicalpersonne! ancifacitities to achieve its aeronautics technology
objectives but should improve its processes for program management.
Significant progress has been made in recognizing the need for a VSP-wicie approach to
program management that is consistent at all NASA centers. The pane! commends the VSP on its
reorganization, which it appears will result in better top-down management. However, the pane]
has substantial concerns that NASA's management processes decouple responsibility to meet
goals and accountability for the end results from the authority to manage fiends.
The VSP manager cannot implement the changes needed to make the VSP efficient and
effective unless drastic changes are made to the financial, personnel, and operational
management structure of the NASA centers—an interrelationship referred to in this report as the
"Center-Program Relationship." The funds management accountability and
responsibility/accountability links between the VSP and NASA centers are dysfunctional and
seriously jeopardize the ability of the VSP to successfully transform and focus NASA's vehicle
systems work.
Currently NASA headquarters program managers have responsibility for achieving goals
but do not have the authority to manage the allocation of all funds. This system is not consistent
with standard business practices, which link responsibility for meeting goals with total authority
· ~
over managing finances.
The VSP program manager also has no control over staffing. Centers may allocate more
staff to projects than are required by programs. Since programs are now required to pay for
unneeded staff out of limited and declining budgets, the situation seriously affects the amount of
research and development that can be completed by the VSP. In addition, there is no process to
ensure a steady flow of new talent into the program. The new VSP planning process shared with
pane! members shows that poorly linked or lower-priority projects and tasks will be terminated
over the next 3 to 6 months. However, the pane! was informed that the centers will not decrease
the personnel associated with terminated projects or tasks.
The pane! strongly urges the VSP and NASA to do everything within its power to correct
this situation. If a solution cannot be found within a short period of time, NASA must consider
the last alternative, initiating a reduction in force (RIF). Something must be done soon or the
VSP may never be transformed to a new, efficient and effective entity. And, even though NASA
faces severe problems in overstaffing, it is important for the agency to implement hiring
practices that ensure a steady flow of new talent.
s
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Finally, effective program management requires transparent finances anti schedules and
clear means of measuring progress against key performance parameters. The pane! noted that
there are no effective procedures for enforcing accountability or for providing transparent
reporting on all tasks anti all finances from the centers to the VSP office.
The pane] recommencis that NASA follow industry's lead and construct an operating
mode] that links responsibility for meeting goals, and accountability for the ens! results, with the
authority to manage functs. The goal is to give the program manager the authority to direct and
account for funds ant! personnel effectively and transparently.
Top-Leve! Recommendation 4
MESA should eliminate arbitrary time constraints on program completion and schedule key
milestones baser! on task complexity and technology maturity.
The recently restructurer! VSP plans shares! with the pane! predict that measurable
progress will be macle in 3- to 5-year windows. As such, the plans have effectively acldressect the
panel's earlier concern that the sunset manciatec} by the Office of Management ant! Budget wouIc!
preclude clevelopment of high-risk, high-payoff technologies that might span more than the 5-
year sunset Winslow.
A remaining concern is that program plans at the task level often have no clear exit criteria that
specify when research is complete or really for transition to industry or other agencies, yet such a
specification is absolutely necessary for cleaning decision gateways. While a milestone tracks
progress, that is, gives a measure of plannecl technical success against a specific schedule, a
gateway should be a precleterminec! point at which research is assessed ant! a decision is made
about a project's or task's continuation, cancellation, or redirection. It was not clear to the pane!
that all the NASA managers know the distinction between milestones ant! gateways.
The VSP has acknowledged the neec! for exit criteria and decision gateways and has
oracle some attempts to establish them. However, they are neither uniformly established across
all projects nor effectively implemented.
The pane} recommencis that individual PIs set exit criteria and decision gateways for their
tasks, as long as the criteria ant! gateways define clear levels of achievement ant! are approved by
upper-level program managers. It further recommends that these decision gateways be
incorporated in the restructured VSP program plans and that VSP management clefine a common
gateway ant} milestone template for use across all projects under the VSP.
Top-Leve! Recommendation 5
NASA shouic! reduce the number of tasks in its aeronautics technology portfolio.
Strategic technology focus areas have been clefinect and are described under
recommendation 2, above. However, as states! in the full report on page ~ 3, the VSP "has not yet
reclucecl the [number of tasks] in the face of changing market needs and reduced budgets for
vehicle systems throughout the ~ 990s and early 2000s. Rather, NASA has left the same broad set
of capabilities in place, with each portion of VSP research forced to operate on ever smaller
budgets. As a consequence, some (not alI) of the current VSP projects ant! tasks find themselves
on budgetary 'life support."'
1 J -
6
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The pane] again recommends that the VSP create a rank-orclerect set of core competency
areas, as describer! in detail under "Key Issue I: Core Competencies" in Chapter 2 of the full
report.
There are indications that the NASA centers are addressing the neec! to recluce the
number of projects and tasks. However, it was not clear if projects hac! truly been recluced in
terms of content or if centers and lower level managers have simply consoliciated projects and
tasks without significantly reducing their content. In any case, resources for high-priority
programs have not been increaser! as a result of this consolidation.
For example, the funds used for the pulse detonation engine project (also known as the
constant volume combustion engine) shouic! be redirected! to other, more important efforts. The
pane! acknowleciges that even given the short time between release of the full report and this
review, the VSP die! an excellent job of responding to the panel's concerns about engine noise in
connection with the pulse detonation engine project. However, the cletailect response raised
additional serious technical issues that recluce the likelihood of success for this high-risk
technology project. The panel reiterates its recommendation that the project be cancelled.
One newly apparent technical issue arising cluring the panel's November meeting is that
turbine inlet temperature will rise by ~ 000 degrees as a result of constant volume combustion. No
materials exist today that can function successfully in this environment, and the likelihood that
they will appear in the future is small. In addition, pulsing the gas stream will greatly increase
the number of fatigue cycles accumulates! by the blades, adversely affecting blacle durability and
reliability. The consequences of unsteacly-flow physics for performance, cooling neecis, and
cooling forcing function appear to be overwhelmingly necative. so research in this area should
be discontinued.
c, , ~ . ,
The VSP managers have not yet effectively reducer! the content of the VSP overall, ant! it
was not clear to the pane! that this step will be taken even given the careful planning from the
program management level at NASA headquarters. Incleed, the pane! does not believe that
reducing the VSP's overall content can be accomplished unless the problems with the Center-
Program Relationship cliscussec! above under recommendation 3 are corrected.
The pane} appreciates that the VSP is still in the midst of transforming itself. VSP
management inclicatec! that the number of VSP tasks will be reduced over the next 3 to 6 months
as the remainder of the new program planning process is put in place. The choices and changes
aheac! will be difficult, but they are essential if the VSP program is to do the best it can for the
national good with the Angling it has at its disposal. The pane! recommencis that NASA make
these hard choices. Without them, money will continue to be spread across too many programs,
and NASA will become a follower rather than a leacler in many of the areas it today considers to
be its core competencies.
Top-Leve! Recommendations 6 and 7
NASA shouldpursue more high-risk, high-payoff technologies.
NASH should reconstitute a long-term base research program, separate from the other
aeronautics technology programs and projects
7
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VSP management expects to allocate at least 20 percent of VSP funding as seed corn for
basic research, from which large-scale activity wild spring. VSP currently plans to have the basic
research fending and funding decisions resicle at the project level.
To improve the basic research that takes place under the VSP, the pane] recommencts that
the 20 percent be viewed as a separate long-term investment portfolio for the VSP as a whole, in
orcler to create synergies across the program. VSP top-level management should use this Angling
as an incentive for the projects to ensure that the research is consistent with NASA's national
science and technology policy and is directed toward high-risk, core research areas. The basic
research portfolios can be managed within each of the six technology project portfolios but must
be measurable and manageable from the top level of the VSP. If the funding for basic research is
centralizer! at the VSP manager level, the overall goals and objectives of the VSP will be
automatically built into the basic research program.
The panel also notes that university research is an important part of a high-risk, high-
payoff investment strategy and should therefore continue to receive appropriate funding.
The pane! is concernec! that although current VSP planning specifies a 20 percent target
level for basic research, there is no way to know what is actually being spent in these areas given
the Center-Program Relationship. Unless the NASA centers are given a top-clown process that
requires bottom-up reporting, the 20 percent objective may never be met.
The VSP's current approach integrating the basic research program into the strategic
focus areas is not responsive to Recommendation 7. The approach suggested here by the panel,
which will still allocate at least 20 percent of each area's budget to acivanced technology
projects, is a different method of meeting recommendation 7, but this approach will require
discipline on the part of both center and program office personnel to ensure the intent is met.
While perhaps a fine distinction to some, the VSP's current program management plan,
as presented to pane} members, uses strategic focus technologies as a surrogate for basing the
technology development plan on core competencies. The panel acknowledges that this
substitution may accomplish the clesirec! effect of embedding worIcI-cIass expertise at NASA.
However, there is concern that the division of responsibilities between the NASA centers and the
VSP office may prevent the {lesirecl core competencies from being established within NASA.
A key example of a NASA core competency is the agency's ability to generate highly
valued analytical tools that can be applied to a broad spectrum of disciplines, including materials,
aerodynamics, ant! structures. These tools have traditionally been made available to, ant! are
wiclely used by, researchers and industry.
Top-Leve! Recommendation ~
NASA 's aeronautics technology infrastructure exceeds its current needs, anc! the agency shouic!
continue to dispose of unclerutilizec! assets anciffacilities.
For many years NASA has hack a problem with maintaining aeronautics facilities,
including wind tunnels, engine turbine facilities, ant! large test rigs, owing to declining use and
budgets The aeronautics budget was cut by more than 33 percent in the past 5 years, and is no
longer sufficient to sustain all of NASA's aeronautics facilities. Full-cost accounting has
heightened the visibility of the problem and has shifted the majority of the facilities'
maintenance costs from the NASA centers to the projects that fund tasks using the facilities.
However, regardless of full-cost accounting issues, NASA has yet to aclequately aciciress this
8
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critical problem. The pane! appreciates that the VSP is not responsible for making the
determination of which test capabilities will be retained and which lost. However, the pane!
points out that decisions on infrastructure may adversely impact the VSP's ability to successfully
demonstrate and transition technologies to the marketplace.
Aeronautics infrastructure reduction activities to ciate indicate that, although some action
is being taken to pare clown fixed assets, the infrastructure reduction is apparently being
implementer! in a reactive way, in response to budgets ant! accounting rules, rather than in accord
with strategic planning baser! on long-term national needs. For instance, there is a possibility that
the clual-spoo] turbine facility at NASA Glenn, which was identified in the full report as a
national asset, may be in jeopardy clue to budget considerations. The pane! recommencis that
reduction in facilities be aciciressed on a strategic basis so as to keep ant! maintain required
national assets, rather than by an indirect process in reaction to annual budgets ant] near-term
program plans.
Top-Leve} Recommendation 9
NASA should implement full-cost accounting in a way that avoids unintenclec! consequences
harmful to the long-term health of the aeronautics program.
In the full report, the pane] expressed concern that under a full-cost accounting scheme
the cost of flight testing, wine! tunnel testing, or the use of full-scale test rigs wouict be
prohibitively expensive for projects. As a result, projects would be tailored towards less
ambitious, lower-level TRL pursuits for test analysis or computational investigative methods so
as to avoid paying the full cost of maintaining the facilities that enable tasks and technologies to
reach a higher TRE. Another unintended consequence of full-cost accounting is to disturb the
critical balance between empirical and numerical methods that reacts to technical maturity. The
end result is that the project cleliverables will be less attractive to industry and less likely to be
implemented into actual flight platforms, threatening the successful completion of VSP
investments in a variety of technologies. The pane! reiterates Top-Leve] Recommendation 9
from the full report and recommends that the NASA associate administrator for aerospace
technology put policies into effect that acIdress the recommendation.
Top-Leve} Recommendation Il
NASA shoulal seek better feedback from senior management in industry and other government
organizations.
VSP managers spoke of how they have started interfacing with top-level executives at
U.S. aeronautics companies. This interaction is commendable, and the pane} believes it is
required and should continue. By the same token, VSP management should not be responsible
for initiating this interaction on their own; rather, the associate administrator for aerospace
technology should create mechanisms at the highest level to ensure that this interaction is taking
place. The pane] therefore recommencts that the NASA associate administrator for aerospace
technology aciciress the issue by reestablishing a tiered} advisory system that gives NASA input
on aeronautics issues from both technical ant} business managers. This issue is ac3dressect in
cletai! in the full report.
9
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Top-Leve} Recommendation 12
NASA shouic! conduct research in selective areas relevant to rotorcraft.
The pane! commencts the VSP for taking positive action in rotorcraft research. The
current plan inclucles rotorcraft research that leverages investments by the Army and by other,
relater! NASA programs. The pane] urges the VSP to tailor these tasks so that they are consistent
with the NASA theme objectives and strategic technology focus areas as presented by VSP
managers to the panel.
On behalf of the NRC's Pane} on the Vehicle Systems Program, T wouic} like to thank you
and your team for the hard work you put into these reviews and for your open and frank
responses during our many question-and-answer sessions. Working with you and all of the VSP
personnel these past several months has been a pleasure. ~ hope that our work is helping you to
achieve your objectives.
Sincerely,
A_
4 ~
Thomas L. Williams, Chair
Panel on the Review of
NASA's Vehicle Systems Program
cc: Victor Lebacqz
Terry Hertz
Peter Blair
Elizabeth Panos
Janice Mehier
George Kevin
Douglas Bennett
Maureen Mellocly
Attachments:
1. Pane] Member Biographies
2. Final Review Agenda
10
Representative terms from entire chapter:
vsp management
