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OCR for page 47
5
Findings and Recommendations
Finding 1. To perform the statistical analyses presented
in this report, the Stockpile Committee, with assistance
from the Army, expanded the parameters measured or
inferred from existing databases on the chemical stock-
pile condition. These additional data fields may be in-
structive and useful to the Army. The Minitab software
that was used is an example of the statistics programs
used by industry for analysis. Statistical software of
this type can also support an overall program to im-
prove performance, including safety performance.
Recommendation 1. The Army should collect data on
degraded agent and other munition anomalies in a man-
ner that provides for maintaining the parameters in the
data matrix format developed by the committee or in a
similar format. The Army should establish additional
data fields, such as documenting inspection activities
in which no leaks are found. The Army should also
consider the use of a statistical program such as Minitab
or an equivalent program to assist in the overall quality
of stockpile analyses and safety improvement.
Finding 2. The data on leaking munitions and contain-
ers in the chemical agent stockpile from 1992 onward
were obtained using a consistent set of protocols. How-
ever, the information required for doing certain trend
analyses, such as the age of the munition when leaking
was detected and agent subtype, is not readily discern-
ible and often not available.
47
Recommendation 2. The Army should continue using
its current monitoring protocols. It should set up a pro-
gram for acquiring data, maintaining it in a database,
and entering it into a statistical software package. Staff
will have to be given adequate training in statistical
analysis.
Finding 3. The sampling program as currently con-
ducted is biased toward munitions and containers hold-
ing GB agent. What data there are indicate that VX
leaks are relatively rare. However, one concern is that
the stabilizer in VX munitions may be dropping to criti-
cal levels.
Recommendation 3. The Army should verify that VX
leaks are much less frequent than GB leaks by monitor-
ing VX munitions and containers more closely. The sta-
tus of stabilizers in VX munitions should be ascertained.
Finding 4. The database on leaking chemical muni-
tions and containers developed by the Army and ex-
panded to include additional fields by the committee is
useful for predicting leaker trends, but not for predict-
ing trends for other anomalies such as gels and foam-
ing or frothing rounds. The search for causes and ef-
fects of leaks in munitions and for remedial actions to
address them could similarly be applied to other stock-
pile anomalies. End-of-campaign reports are one
source of information on anomalies other than leaks.
OCR for page 48
48 EFFECTS OF DEGRADED AGENT AND MUNITIONS ANOMALIES ON CHEMICAL STOCKPILE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
Recommendation 4. The Army should carefully ana-
lyze the data in end-of-campaign reports from chemi-
cal stockpile disposal operations and any other avail-
able information to determine if a predictive technique
can be developed for anomalies other than leaking
munitions for example, gelled agents.
Finding 5. The agent decomposition mechanisms de-
scribed in Chapter 2 include a number of reactions with
positive temperature coefficients (EaC~ > 0~. Corrosion
reaction rates are also expected to increase with tem-
perature, implying that the occurrence of leaks may
increase at higher ambient temperatures. The available
data did not validate the hypothesis of a temperature
dependence.
Recommendation 5. The Army should consider instru-
menting some existing storage facilities for the con-
tinuous monitoring of temperature, particularly those
facilities where materials most susceptible to degrada-
tion are stored namely, munitions with problematic
GB subtype lot numbers. The temperature data could
then be correlated with leaker rates to identify any tem-
perature dependence. If such a dependence is shown to
exist, the Army could consider mitigating measures,
including temperature control in the igloos and the re-
evaluation of processing sequences for the various GB
munitions.
Finding 6. Pressurized hydrogen gas has formed from
mustard agent degradation in some munitions and con-
tainers. This can present a significant risk to workers
during disposal operations.
Recommendation 6. Special safety measures are re-
quired during disposal of mustard agent munitions and
containers to minimize the risk of hydrogen gas ex-
ploding.
Finding 7. The degradation mechanisms for GB agent
outlined in Chapter 2 imply that degradation can pro-
ceed by autocatalysis once inhibitor is exhausted. Au-
tocatalytic reactions are characterized by a slow induc-
tion period followed by a rapid rise in reaction rate.
While the available data do not support an acceleration
in leaker frequency, the current state of reaction within
GB rockets could still be on a relatively flat portion of
the reaction rate curve, indicating that most prob-
ably only the usual reactions with stabilizer present
are occurring. However, there is a possibility that the
rapidly rising portion of the curve that would be char-
acteristic of an autocatalytic reaction is being ap-
proached.
Recommendation 7. The Army should maintain an
aggressive monitoring and data analysis program, par-
ticularly in the case of GB munitions and containers, in
order to identify any significant upward trend in the
rate of leakers as early as possible. Expeditious dis-
posal of GB munitions can help to avoid an encounter
with the rapidly rising portion of the curve that would
characterize an autocatalytic reaction resulting from
GB degradation.
Finding Ha. Corrosion has been observed on valves
and plugs of GB ton containers. This corrosion could
cause agent leaks or spills.
Finding Xb. The corrosion that has been observed in
burster tubes of 105- and 155-mm projectiles was
caused by agent leaking into the burster as a result of
incorrectly brazed joints. In such cases, corrosion is the
result of a leak, not the source of the leak. In time, this
corrosion may result in the release of agent. Munitions
in this condition may be in the stockpile.
Recommendation X. GB munitions and GB in con-
tainers should be destroyed as soon as possible.
Finding 9. The frequency of monitoring M55 rockets
is based, in part, on observed leakage frequencies.
Given that the number of GB M55 rocket leakers is
greater than the number of VX M55 rocket leakers,
monitoring by the Army focuses on the former.
Recommendation 9. In view of the toxicity of VX, the
Army's monitoring protocols should be reviewed to
increase confidence that the frequency of leakers and
the mechanisms associated with VX degradation are
well understood.
Finding 10. Continuing degradation of M55 rocket pro-
pellant, even when accelerated by agent contamination,
is at present only a minor contributor to storage risk.
However, the expeditious destruction of GB M55 rock-
ets is an effective way to reduce risk to the public since
accidental ignition due to lightning or earthquakes re-
mains the largest contributor to storage risk. Significant
delays in the destruction of GB M55 rockets could ne-
cessitate monitoring the condition and stability of the
OCR for page 49
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
propellant more intensely as agent continues to degrade
and perhaps contribute to propellant instability.
Recommendation 10. If destruction of the GB M55
rockets is significantly delayed, the condition and sta-
bility of the M28 propellant in these rockets should be
closely monitored.
Finding 11. It may be possible to prioritize the destruc-
tion of M55 rockets by GB subtype and thereby reduce
the likelihood of future leaks.
Recommendation 11. If the committee's analyses of
the role of GB subtypes in leaker development can be
substantiated by the Army, consideration should be
given to prioritizing the order of destruction of M55
GB rockets by GB subtype, as long as this process does
49
not adversely impact the overall M55 GB rocket de-
struction schedule.
Finding 12. Currently available records, such as end-
of-campaign reports, do not allow for directly linking
system and equipment downtimes to the processing of
anomalous munitions. The early communication of
anomaly detection by direct contacts between all sites
and by means of the program's lessons-learned data-
base is important for all concerned.
Recommendation 12. The Army should assemble
corrective actions from lessons learned to address
anomalous conditions of all types, including the modi-
fications of process rates, sequences, schedules, and
procedures, and it should ensure the prompt, direct,
and adequate distribution of this information to all
disposal sites.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
leaking munitions
