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Executive Summary Administered through the Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division (Code 353) of the Office of Naval Research's (ONR's) Naval Expeditionary Warfare Department (Code 35), the Marine Corps Science and Technology (MCS&T) program has three parts: · The Littoral Combat (LC) component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection Future Naval Capability (FNC),~ funded for FY03 at $21.8 million for applied research (6.2) and at $13.3 million for advanced technology development (6.3~; · Core Thrusts, funded at $11.9 million for 6.2 work and at $11.2 million for 6.3 work; and · Basic Research, funded at $3.4 million for 6.1 work. These budget figures are summarized in Table ES.1. As a whole, the MCS&T program, whose mission is to exploit the technology opportunities that will produce enhanced expeditionary warfighting capabilities for the Naval Services, represents approximately 17 percent of Code 35's FY03 budget.2 As a result of its assessment, the Committee for the Review of ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program developed three sets of findings and recommendations. Its general findings and recommendations for the MCS&T program as a whole and for each of the program's three parts the LC-FNC, Core Thrusts, and Basic Research (reviewed in order of program size) are presented below as well as in Chapters 1 through 4. The committee' s recommendations for the more than 80 individual projects it reviewed are presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 1 The other component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC is focused on expeditionary logistics and is administered by ONR's Industrial and Corporate Programs Department (Code 36~. 2The committee noted that the ONR (and the MCS&T program) budget relies heavily (~15 percent for MCS&T) on annual congressional plus-ups. The lack of certainty regarding the availability of these additional funds concerned the committee because of the difficulties this situation presents in establishing long-range planning within the MCS&T program.
2 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM TABLE ES.1 ONR Code 353 Marine Corps Science and Technology Program Budget for FY03 (millions of dollars) Portion of Program 6.1 6.2 6.3 Total Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability 21.8 13.3 35.1 Core Thrusts 11.9 11.2 23.1 Basic Research 3.4 3.4 Total funding 3.4 33.7 24.5 61.6 NOTE: Beginning in FY99, ONR initiated a reorganization of its initiatives to create two primary elements: (1) Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs), which was to receive all of ONR's 6.3 budget and roughly half of its 6.2 budget (currently, not all 6.3 funds are committed to the FNCs), and (2) Discovery and Invention (D&I), to which is allocated the remainder of ONR's 6.2 budget and all of its 6.1 budget. For the purposes of this review the D&I effort of the MCS&T program comprises Basic Research and the 6.2-funded projects of the Core Thrusts. MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM AS A WHOLE General Observations Code 353 has changed in positive and productive ways since the Naval Studies Board's initial review of the MCS&T program in 2000.3 At that time, a significant portion of the program had just been assigned to Code 353 and needed focus. In the current review, the committee was favorably impressed by the quality of many of the MCS&T program's components and by the strength of the interaction that has developed between Code 353 and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,4 as well as by the capabilities and evident motivation of the presenters. Many of the individual projects in the MCS&T program pursue worthwhile objectives; however, their relationship to key Marine Corps warfighting concepts Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW)5 and its components, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)6 and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOMA was often unclear in the presentations made to the committee. Yet, the Marine Corps demonstrates a good understanding of the importance of communicating its vision to and cooperating with the Chief of Naval Research and the personnel in ONR and, as a result, Code 353 is positioned to focus the MCS&T program on supporting the fast-changing missions and operational needs of the future Marine Corps. In general Code 353 is heading in the right direction and is attempting to pursue Marine Corps objectives, although better coordination is always desirable. 3Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 4The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory retains 6.3-funded programs related to demonstration, experimentation, and integration of S&T products in support of concepts and future capabilities development. 5Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 2001. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Department of the Navy, November 10. 6Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 1996. Operational Maneuver From the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- ington D.C., January 4. 7LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Beth. 1997. "A Concept for Ship-to-Objective Maneuver," Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Va., November.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 LC-FNC Planning and S&T Investment Strategy The LC-FNC's dual-track planning near- and long-term oriented began with an emphasis on STOM.8 The near-term projects (18 to 36 months), intended to produce rapid results in response to critical needs identified by the Marine Corps and Code 353 prior to the creation of the LC-FNC, were designed to get the LC-FNC off to a quick start. Most of the projects presented to the committee were in this category. Longer-term projects (36 to 60 months) are scheduled to receive funding beginning in FY04.9 Presentations on a number of FY04 new starts did not, however, show any direct linkage of these new starts to specific findings of the long-term planning activities. Near-term planning also led to the establishment of four LC-FNC enabling capabilities (ECs) under which the various product lines and projects are grouped: EC 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon- naissance (ISR) for the Amphibious Force; EC 2 Expeditionary Fire Support for the Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF); EC 3 MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals; and EC 4 Command and Control (Cal. These four ECs appear to the committee to provide a reasonable set of topic areas to coordinate and categorize the STOM shortfalls identified by Code 353 in planning activities. The committee believes that the longer-term top-down planning process established by Code 353 to help convert LC-FNC goals into a science and technology (S&T) investment strategy is conceptually excellentparticularly in its heavy up-front involvement with the Marine Corps user community. Nevertheless, improvements in its implementation are needed. To identify and prioritize shortfalls in STOM capability, Code 353 used panels of experts (users, technologists, and so on) engaged in war gaming and other similar concept-generation exercises. These exercises resulted in a series of Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitations seeking innovative technologies to address critical shortfalls. Several teams of potential users then took part in a STOM- based technology insertion game to assess and prioritize the technology improvements proposed in the BAA responses. Although this approach represents an excellent start, the committee expressed two concerns about it: 1. Relying exclusively on BAA responses as the source of candidate technologies for an S&T investment strategy is a fundamental flaw in the process. A collection of BAA responses does not guarantee that all critical issues are being addressed, and simply rearranging the responses does not in itself constitute a strategy. 2. The proposed S&T investment strategy should not be definitively evaluated by a group of users such as the technology insertion group. Users and technologists often have dramatically differing visions of the role of S&T and how best to leverage S&T to support military operations. The gap between users and the S&T community can be bridged by "bilingual" people who have the ability to understand and to listen to users, comprehend what they are seeking, and then communicate those requirements to the S&T community. By understanding the state of the art of the relevant tech- nologies, such people are able to help identify a series of specific projects that support the needs expressed by users. 8Thomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 11, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003. 9See in Chapter 1 the section titled "LC-FNC Planning and Investment Strategy."
4 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Recommendation. Code 353 should take the following steps to strengthen the LC-FNC strategy for investing in S&T. · Avoid relying solely on Broad Agency Announcement solicitations and reorganization of the responses; instead, use a "translation" team of bilingual people skilled in understanding and interpreting the users' concerns and needs as the basis for identifying a series of specific projects representing a final S&T investment strategy. · Ensure that the final review of the resulting S&T investment strate~v is done hv another indenen- dent group of appropriately bilingual (user/technologist) experts. At, Although the committee thought that most of the projects presented during the current review were of interest to the Marine Corps, it also believed that greater cohesion was necessary to develop the balance of effort necessary to support the overall Marine Corps mission. The entire MCS&T program (including the Core Thrusts and Basic Research) would benefit from consistent use of the approach recommended above for developing an S&T investment strategy. Such a planning process should better enable Code 353 to identify critical Marine Corps capability gaps and to systematically plan technology efforts to fill these gaps. Recommendation. Code 353 should develop a robust process for formulating an S&T investment strategy based on planning of the kind recommended for the LC-FNC and focused on supporting Marine Corps capabilities needed for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Code 353 should then apply that strategy to all aspects of the MCS&T program. Effect of the LC-FNC on the Core Thrusts The LC-FNC appears to have greatly benefited Code 353 through its sustained funding, its atten- tion from the Navy, its strong focus on Marine Corps problems, and its creation of a promising S&T investment planning process. However, establishment of the LC-FNC also appears to have had an adverse impact on the content of the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts. While valuable in themselves, the FNCs are also intended to complement the Discovery and Inven- tion (D&I) portion of ONR's portfolio. However, the committee observed that the necessary separation of time horizons (near- versus long-term) and mission focus (transition versus discovery) between the FNC and D&I elements appears to have been weakened in many of the Core Thrust projects reviewed. In particular, Code 353 seems to have initiated a strong Core Thrust focus on Marine Corps technology needs, but several of the resulting projects have transition plans and short-term expectations similar to those for FNC projects.~° In addition, many of the short-term Core Thrust projects appear to the committee to offer minor improvements to existing hardware or are focused on integration of existing systems, and thus are not developing base-level technologies necessary for significant improve- ments in capabilities. To complicate matters further, Code 353 has planned to allocate approximately $15 million annually through FY07 to non-FNC 6.3 projects; this effort was a source of concern to the committee since it seems to be FNC-like in character and thus confounds the division of mission between the LC-FNC and the Core Thrusts elements of the MCS&T program. 10One example is the tactical unmanned ground vehicle project, which was briefed to the committee as part of Code 353's Core Thrusts yet is also listed on other ONR documents as a project supported through ONR's Autonomous Operations FNC. 1lThomas O'Leary, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Office of Naval Research, "ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program: The Context," slide 14, presentation to the committee on May 13, 2003.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY s The above concerns were first brought to the attention of Code 353 in the 2000 review of the MCS&T program. Among other things, that review recommended that Code 353 "eliminate . . . Efrom the Core Thrusts] activities that do not conform to the usual ONR S&T standards of innovation and technical aggressiveness . . . [and] embark on a discovery program to identify and refine technologies that can have a substantial payoff in achieving OMITS." Although the Core Thrusts need not exclude all demonstration and transition initiatives, those supported should meet ONR's standards for quality and should remain more flexible in terms of program requirements and timelines than is typical for FNCs. Recommendation. Code 353 should ensure that the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts and Basic Re- search components support the mission of discovery and invention, that is, exploration aimed at the long-term development of base-level technologies that could support future FNC and Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory program initiatives. Thus, Code 353 should remove from the Core Thrusts and Basic Research portfolios short-term, transition-oriented initiatives. Aspects of Transitioning Products to Use Transitioning products to use in the field involves a few potential problems that must be avoided. Users who agree to accept a product in transition from the S&T community generally expect to receive something that can be fielded rapidly, that is, a product that is well on its way to providing a full suite of "-ilities," which include such product issues as reliability, availability, manufacturability, maintainabil- ity, and so on (e.g., a product that provides corrosion and shock resistance and comes with detailed drawings, user guides, repair manuals, and the like). It was clear that the need for these capabilities was not being considered in any of the current projects for which presenters described having (or generating) technology transition plans. Evidently it was assumed that such capabilities could be supplied later during acquisition. However, it is the experience of the committee that inclusion of the "-ilities" often has a significant impact on the S&T design goals for a product and must be planned for early on. Another critical aspect of transitioning products within the Navy/Marine Corps development and acquisition communities is that almost all fielded naval equipment is supplied by contractors and not by the Navy or the Marine Corps itself. Thus it is critical that ONR-developed technology and products find their way as quickly as possible into the contractor community. Many of Code 353's projects aim to connect with and transition into this community, as much of the S&T work is performed out-of-house through various, often competing contractors. The committee encourages this effort. Recommendation. For S&T development products intended for transition, Code 353 should develop technology transition plans that include up-front considerations of the "-ilities," such as product reliabil- ity, manufacturability, maintainability, and other capabilities necessary in the overall fielding of prod- ucts to the user community. Responses to Issues from the 2000 NSB Assessment Some of this committee's comments and recommendations correspond substantively to those made in 2000.~3 At the same time, the committee was pleased to see that Code 353 responded explicitly to 12Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 20. 13Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
6 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM many of the 2000 assessment's recommendations. Listing and discussing issues raised in 2000, the presentations indicated which recommendations had been implemented, and to what degree. The 2000 review identified a number of high-level technical deficiencies in the overall MCS&T program. By and large the current program is in the process of addressing these issues some vigor- ously and effectively, others less so, but all are being addressed. MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM THE THREE PARTS LC-FNC The LC-FNC planning process described above explicitly emphasized the STOM concept as a focus point for identifying shortfalls in Marine Corps capabilities. Recently, the Marine Corps and the Navy co-authored the overarching Naval Operating Conceptfor Joint Operations,~4 which contains EMW as a critical naval concept. The committee was concerned that the LC-FNC seems not to be responding strongly enough to implications of EMW beyond those contained within STOM; sea basing, in particu- lar, is emphasized in EMW as well as in the Navy's capstone concept, Sea Power 21,~5 and has recently been called out by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as one of his top priorities. However, sea basing receives no direct or leveraged support through the MCS&T program. Following the establishment of the LC-FNC, the Department of the Navy's Science and Technology Corporate Board,~7 which approves and prioritizes all FNCs, also established Expeditionary Logistics (ExLog) as a separate component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC to address critical logistical capability gaps, including deployment from and reconstitution of a sea base, for naval forces engaged in expeditionary operations. Both the LC-FNC and the ExLog-FNC are intended to support S&T that will enable future expeditionary military operations, but the two have separate integrated product teams, separate performing organizations (the ExLog-FNC S&T lead is ONR Code 36 Industrial and Corporate Programs), and separate funding. The committee saw little or no interaction occurring between these two FNC efforts. Considering the critical role logistics plays in enabling OMFTS and STOM, this separation seems unwise. Recommendation. The Department of the Navy's Science and Technology Corporate Board should (1) expand the LC-FNC's mission to include Marine Corps capability needs for all of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and (2) provide a means for strongly coupling the integrated product teams for the 14ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen Michael W. Hagee, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2003, Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, Department of the Navy, March; Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy; ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2002, Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision, Department of the Navy, October. 1SADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2002. "Sea Power 21," Proceedings, Vol. 128/10, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., October, pp. 32-41. Special Projects Directorate, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters. 2003. "The Marine Corps General," Vol. 15, April 14. 17The Department of the Navy Science and Technology Corporate Board is composed of the Vice Chief of Naval Opera- tions, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. 18Expeditionary Logistics (ExLog) component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection Future Naval Capability (FNC). 2002. Expeditionary Logistics, Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Va., June 3. Available online at <http:// www.onr.navy.mil/explog/explog/overview.asp>. Accessed on August 20, 2003.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 Littoral Combat and the Expeditionary Logistics components of the Littoral Combat and Power Projec- tion FNC. At a minimum, it should assign Code 353 the co-S&T lead of the ExLog-FNC (with full voting rights) while retaining Code 353 as the S&T lead of the LC-FNC. The committee's general recommendations for each of the program areas in the LC-FNC portion of the MCS&T program Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Amphibious Force (EC 1), Expeditionary Fire Support for the MAGTF (EC 2), MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals (EC 3), and Command and Control (EC 4) are listed in Table ES.2 and discussed in Chapter 2. Core Thrusts The Core Thrust projects 6.2 and 6.3 activities not contained in the LC-FNC were generally of high quality and seemed to address valid topics of interest to the Marine Corps. In many cases, however, it was difficult to see a rationale for the organization, prioritization, and support of these individual projects, which struck the committee as little more than a collection of "targets of opportunity" rather than topics related to significant shortfalls in EMW or STOM capabilities. In addition, presenters rarely mentioned Marine Corps needs or capability shortfalls, and when they did, the links appeared ad hoc rather than the result of a planned process. The apparent lack of an overall S&T investment strategy for the Core Thrusts concerns the committee. A planning process similar to that recommended for the LC- FNC, but focused on the long-term development of technology areas, would strengthen the Core Thrusts part of the MCS&T program. A number of Core Thrust projects presented were leveraged against much larger U.S. Army or Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) programs, but the extent of the Code 353 contributions was in many cases unclear. In addition, in most Core Thrust areas committee members were aware of directly relevant activities in the Navy, other Services, and/or DARPA, of which the presenters, when asked, seemed to have little or no knowledge. The apparent lack of coordination concerned the committee, particularly in regard to potential duplication of efforts. Recommendation. To better structure its support for the underpinnings of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare as well as Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, Code 353 should establish an S&T planning process for the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts, similar to that recommended above for the LC-FNC, that is suitably focused on the long-term capability needs of the Marine Corps. Recommendation. In its Core Thrust projects, Code 353 should enable broad coordination of efforts beyond Code 35 (and beyond ONR), where possible and practical, with relevant S&T activities in the other Services and in government agencies. The committee's general recommendations for each of the Core Thrusts areas Maneuver; Fire- power; Mine Countermeasures; Logistics; Human Performance, Training, and Education; and Com- mand, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance are listed in Table ES.2 and discussed in Chapter 3. Basic Research Established in FY00 to support the discovery of new technology for enabling future capabilities in support of the individual Marine Corps warfighter, the Basic Research portion of the MCS&T program appears to be a useful addition to the larger Navy 6.1 program. However, some of the work presented to the committee as basic research, although potentially useful, was not "basic." Much the same observa-
8 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM TABLE ES.2 Summary Listing of Recommendations for Program Areas Within the Marine Corps Science and Technology Program's Three Parts Program Area Recommendation Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability Enabling Capability 1, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Amphibious Force Enabling Capability 2, Expeditionary Fire Support for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Enabling Capability 3, MAGTF Maneuver in the Littorals Enabling Capability 4, Command and Control (C2) Core Thrusts · The Department of the Navy's Science and Technology Corporate Board should (1) expand the LC-FNC's mission to include Marine Corps capability needs for all of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and (2) provide a means for strongly coupling the integrated product teams for the Littoral Combat and the Expeditionary Logistics components of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC. At a minimum, it should assign Code 353 the co-S&T lead of the ExLog-FNC (with full voting rights) while retaining Code 353 as the S&T lead of the LC-FNC. . . . Code 353 should reexamine EC 1, ISR for the Amphibious Force, and seek to expand its funding options beyond sensors and platforms tied to Tier II UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] development. Code 353 should establish better coordination between EC 1, ISR for the Amphibious Force, and EC 4, Command and Control, as well as better coordination with related intelligence community, joint, and other Service research and development programs. Before FY04, Code 353 should assess the feasibility of integrating the expeditionary fire support projects with those of other Service components and should review relevant prior Army and DARPA studies. Code 353 should continue to pursue situational awareness efforts with vigor. Code 353 should accelerate efforts to support the needs of mine countermeasures and military operations in urban terrain by systematically addressing the many identified shortfalls. Code 353 should review all C2 enabling capability projects to ensure coordination with ISR enabling capability projects and alignment of the outputs of both enabling capabilities to Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. · To better structure its support for the underpinnings of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare as well as Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, Code 353 should establish an S&T planning process for the MCS&T program's Core Thrusts, similar to that recommended above for the LC-FNC, that is suitably focused on the long-term capability needs of the Marine Corps. In its Core Thrust projects, Code 353 should enable broad coordination of efforts beyond Code 35 (and beyond ONR), where possible and practical, with relevant S&T activities in the other Services and in government agencies. .
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE ES.2 Continued 9 Program Area Recommendation Maneuver Firepower Mine Countermeasures Logistics Human Performance, Training, and Education · Code 353 should transition the reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting vehicle project and the tactical unmanned ground vehicle project out of the Maneuver thrust as planned, but should continue support of initiatives in hybrid-electric and unmanned vehicles. · Code 353 should immediately transition near-term projects in the Firepower thrust to an appropriate FNC. Code 353 should establish leveraging opportunities to support broad ONR and/or DARPA initiatives in the area of naval surface firepower support. . · Code 353 should seek to leverage research on development of wide-area surveillance detection systems for use in mine countermeasures. · Code 353 should collaborate with DARPA; the Army; Naval Sea Systems Command, PMS-210; Coastal Systems Station (CSS) Panama City; Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-263; and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Organic Mine Countermeasures FNC, and the other ONR codes to address mine countermeasures at the Naval Enterprise level with a view beyond the 3-year horizon that seems to pervade current MCM efforts. The S&T planning process described in Marine Corps Order 3900.15A contains the structure to allow such collaboration. · Code 353 should develop an overall mine countermeasure strategy involving all research and development programming levels. . · Code 353 should coordinate with the Expeditionary Logistics component of the Littoral Combat and Power Projection FNC regarding implications of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare for Marine Corps logistics. · Code 353 should support new Logistics thrust projects in expeditionary on-shore fuel logistics and on-shore materials transportation. · Code 353 should, in a timely manner, transition relevant MCS&T Basic Research projects on lightweight power sources into 6.2- and 6.3-supported programs. Code 353 should keep abreast of ONR and other Service investments in training and education in order to be able to influence them. In addition, programs in intelligent tutoring systems by ONR and the Army (especially the FY04 Science and Technology Objective in this area managed by the Army Research Institute) could offer significant benefits to the Marine Corps if appropriate personnel from Code 353 were placed on the relevant integrated product teams. Continues
10 TABLE ES.2 Continued 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Program Area Recommendation Human Performance, Training, and Education (continued) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Basic Research . . . . . On a very basic level, the Marine Corps should monitor the reorganization of all Navy education and training and the deployment of asynchronous distributed learning capabilities by both the Army and the Navy. The Marine Corps will probably have to develop some content that is specific to its doctrine and training needs, but the payoff from appropriate leveraging could be very large. Code 353 is strongly urged to leverage and influence research on human performance assessment, both within Code 353's current portfolio and in relation to all Marine Corps training and education. Research on human performance assessment should be an integral part of all human performance, training, and education research sponsored by Code 353, could be accomplished with relatively small investments, and would certainly yield large dividends in terms of the feedback provided to current and future programs. Code 353 is encouraged to become familiar with the Commandant of the Marine Corps's Special Projects Directorate programs in training and education. Code 353 should also solicit the active participation of senior Marine Corps leadership in the S&T development process for training and education to ensure that innovative ideas and systems can be rapidly readied for testing by operational forces. Code 353 should continue to invest its research resources in C4ISR areas that are tightly coupled to the Marine Corps operational concepts of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and Operational Maneuver From the Sea. Especially in the domain of C4ISR, a small investment in a critical area, coupled with other Service and Department of Defense investments, could produce significant results for the Marine Corps. Code 353 should broaden its Basic Research focus areas to create a more robust and sustainable series of efforts. The new focus areas should result from a careful assessment of Marine Corps needs. A suggested reorganization of focus areas and sample topics is provided in Table ES.3. Code 353 should strive to set aside a small amount of uncommitted 6.1 funds (perhaps a few hundred thousand dollars) to foster additional flexibility in program support and to enable quick looks (e.g., a few months to a year) at new, unforeseen, novel concepts that arise from time to time. Code 353 should establish a formal mechanism to allow continuing feedback of 6.2 and 6.3 findings to the 6.1 office to help identify fruitful new areas of 6.1 research. Code 353 should work aggressively to expand the funding base for Basic Research so that a coherent set of significant Marine Corps-related projects can be supported.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE ES.2 Continued 11 Program Area Recommendation The Marine Corps should be involved in all aspects of the Code 353 research and development process, including the strategic development of the Basic Research part of the MCS&T program. In support of this goal, Code 353 should participate in (or encourage the Marine Corps leadership to participate in) meetings of the Defense Committee on Research, which currently has representatives from all the Services except the Marine Corps. As a means of fostering leveraging with basic research efforts outside ONR, Code 353 should regularly review the biennial Department of Defense Basic Research Plan. tion was made in the 2000 review. Intended to explore fundamental questions for potential future developments that are not yet fully formulated, basic research might also be used to assist development work that is handicapped for want of some fundamental knowledge. In both cases feedback from 6.2 and 6.3 activities to 6.1 is essential to highlight critical technical areas. Also needed in the Basic Research component is better coordination for transitioning 6.1 results into 6.2 and 6.3 applications. Marine Corps personnel could assist in strategic planning for 6.1 work by helping to steer it not into projects, but rather into technology areas likely to support long-term combat needs. The current Basic Research focus areas communications, lightweight power sources, information efficiency, landmine detection, human sensory enhancement, enhanced lethality, laser eye protection, sensing, and corrosion prevention could be strengthened by reorganizing along the lines suggested by the committee in Table ES.3. In addition, to be effective, the small Marine Corps-oriented 6.1 part of the MCS&T program must be leveraged as much as possible. Code 353 is well aware of the need for leveraging, but the current Basic Research effort is handicapped by the low funding levels. Recommendation. Code 353 should broaden its Basic Research focus areas to create a more robust and sustainable series of efforts. The new focus areas should result from a careful assessment of Marine Corps needs. A suggested reorganization of focus areas and sample topics is provided in Table ES.3. In addition, · Code 353 should strive to set aside a small amount of uncommitted 6.1 funds (perhaps a few hundred thousand dollars) to foster additional flexibility in program support and to enable quick looks (e.g., a few months to a year) at new, unforeseen, novel concepts that arise from time to time. · Code 353 should establish a formal mechanism to allow continuing feedback of 6.2 and 6.3 findings to the 6.1 office to help identify fruitful new areas of 6.1 research. · Code 353 should work aggressively to expand the funding base for Basic Research so that a coherent set of significant Marine Corps-related projects can be supported. · The Marine Corps should be involved in all aspects of the Code 353 research and development process, including the strategic development of the Basic Research part of the MCS&T program. In
12 2003 ASSESSMENT OF ONR'S MARINE CORPS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM TABLE ES.3 Suggested Reorganization of Basic Research Focus Areas and Sample Topics Focus Area Sample Topics Command, Controls Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Energy Sensing Materials Human Factors Oceanography and Environment Weapons Ad hoc wireless networking Beyond-line-of-sight communications Short-range, high-density, low-power communications Antijam protection Information assurance Lightweight power sources and rechargeable electric storage devices Energy-efficient devices and techniques High-energy-density storage Sensors for situation awareness (pre-attack) Sensors for damage assessment (post-attack) Sensors that work in an urban environment Mine detection: fundamental physical mechanisms and phenomenology in surf and on land Unmanned surveillance/reconnaissance vehicles Non-communications use of ultrawideband radar Materials and structures Sensing materials Corrosion prevention Non-lethal weapons Psychological profiling to identify potential terrorists Human sensory enhancement Shallow-water oceanography: bottom structure in the surf zone, bottom interactions, and surf and current characteristics Effects on warfare of hostile or unusual climates (weather) Enhanced lethality Aim-point accuracy support of this goal, Code 353 should participate in (or encourage the Marine Corps leadership to participate in) meetings of the Defense Committee on Research, which currently has representatives from all the Services except the Marine Corps. · As a means of fostering leveraging with basic research efforts outside ONR, Code 353 should regularly review the biennial Department of Defense Basic Research Plan.~9 These recommendations for the Basic Research portion of the MCS&T program are also listed in Table ES.2. 19Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology). 2002. Basic Research Plan (BRPJ, Depart- ment of Defense, Washington, D.C.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 Summary Listing of General Recommendations and Suggestions In addition to the general recommendations presented above for each of the MCS&T program's three parts the LC-FNC, Core Thrusts, and Basic Research the committee developed for each part's primary areas additional general recommendations that are presented in Chapters 2 through 4. Table ES.2 is a summary list of all these general recommendations. Table ES.3 presents the committee's sugges- tions for reorganizing the focus areas in the Basic Research part of the MCS&T program and lists sample topics in each area. The committee's recommendations for the more than 80 individual projects it reviewed are presented in Chapters 2 through 4.
