APPENDIX D
Analysis of Problems and Impediments to Cooperation Between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Ways of their Elimination or Mitigation

Table of Contents

   

Chapter    Title

 

Page

   

  Introduction

 

60

   

1.   Nuclear Proliferation Threats

 

62

   

2.   Scope, Results and Good Practices of the U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Related Areas

 

64

   

2.1.   Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar Program)

 

64

   

2.2.   Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement

 

66

   

2.3.   Export Control

 

68

   

2.4.   International Nuclear Safety Program

 

70

   

2.5.   Joint Verification Experiment

 

71

   

2.6.   International Scientific and Technology Center

 

72

   

2.7.   Transparent Dismantlement of Nuclear Ammunition

 

72

   

2.8.   Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting

 

73

   

2.9.   Inter-Laboratory Cooperation Programs

 

74

   

3.   Impediments to Cooperation Between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation

 

75

   

3.1.   High-Level Political Issues

 

75

   

3.2.   Legal Issues

 

79

   

3.3.   Scientific and Technical Cooperation

 

84

   

3.4.   Program Organization and Management

 

90

   

3.5.   Interactions at Different Levels

 

90

   

3.6.   Legacy of the Cold War Mentality

 

93

   

3.7.   Funding Issues

 

94

   

 Conclusions and Recommendations

 

96

   

Attachment 1   List of Russian Participants

 

101

   

Attachment 2   Issue Summary of Joint Working Group on Overcoming Impediments to Cooperation Between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation (June 2003)

 

102

   

Attachment 3   List of Abbreviations

 

106



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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop APPENDIX D Analysis of Problems and Impediments to Cooperation Between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Ways of their Elimination or Mitigation Table of Contents     Chapter    Title   Page       Introduction   60     1.   Nuclear Proliferation Threats   62     2.   Scope, Results and Good Practices of the U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Related Areas   64     2.1.   Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar Program)   64     2.2.   Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement   66     2.3.   Export Control   68     2.4.   International Nuclear Safety Program   70     2.5.   Joint Verification Experiment   71     2.6.   International Scientific and Technology Center   72     2.7.   Transparent Dismantlement of Nuclear Ammunition   72     2.8.   Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting   73     2.9.   Inter-Laboratory Cooperation Programs   74     3.   Impediments to Cooperation Between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation   75     3.1.   High-Level Political Issues   75     3.2.   Legal Issues   79     3.3.   Scientific and Technical Cooperation   84     3.4.   Program Organization and Management   90     3.5.   Interactions at Different Levels   90     3.6.   Legacy of the Cold War Mentality   93     3.7.   Funding Issues   94      Conclusions and Recommendations   96     Attachment 1   List of Russian Participants   101     Attachment 2   Issue Summary of Joint Working Group on Overcoming Impediments to Cooperation Between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation (June 2003)   102     Attachment 3   List of Abbreviations   106

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Introduction Bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation is principally aimed at strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, as a component of the international collective security system. Further progress in this area depends to a large extent on the results of the bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime comprises a set of legal, organizational, administrative and technical measures to prevent the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear fissionable materials, or undeclared use of technologies by a non-nuclear state for the purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The key elements of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime are as follows: The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT came into force in 1970 and, due to active involvement of nuclear states, was extended in 1995 for unlimited duration. Having been signed to date by 187 countries, the NPT became virtually a universal document, The nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), The nuclear export control system: the Zangger Committee (created in 1971) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (created in 1975), and The International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials During Their Use, Storage and Transportation (1987). There are two major types of nuclear nonproliferation: nuclear nonproliferation in the nuclear-weapon states and that in the non-nuclear-weapon countries. As regards nuclear states, the nuclear nonproliferation issues—and the main subject of the present study—have two dimensions: Commercial peaceful use of their nuclear technologies in non-nuclear countries with no threat of their diversion to military or terrorist purposes (this is an external dimension of nuclear nonproliferation for the nuclear states) Physical protection, control and accounting, including export control, of national fissionable and radioactive materials, relevant equipment and technologies (an internal dimension of nuclear nonproliferation for the nuclear states). The Project entitled ”Analysis of problems and impediments to cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on nuclear nonproliferation, and ways of their elimination or mitigation“ has been developed within the framework of the Joint U.S.-Russian Academies Committee on nuclear nonproliferation headed by J.P. Holdren (U.S.A.) and Academician N.P. Laverov (Russia). Major General W.F. Burns (U.S. Army, ret.) and R. Gottemoeller lead the Project on the U.S. side, and Academician A.A. Sarkisov on the Russian side. Academician E.N. Avrorin (Russian Federal Nuclear Center VNIITF) and Alternate Member of RAS L.A. Bolshov (IBRAE RAS) are the Project participants on behalf of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). In addition to RAS representatives, some leading experts in nuclear nonproliferation of the Russian Federation (R.F.) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom R.F.) and Ministry of

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Economic Development and Trade participated in the study and development of this report (Attachment 1). It should be pointed out that all participants of the Project serve as independent experts in nuclear nonproliferation for the purpose of this study. As a consequence, their viewpoints as stated in the report may not necessarily coincide with official positions of their parent ministries or organizations. One should proceed from the fact that the fundamental positions of the U.S. and Russia on nuclear nonproliferation coincide. The U.S., as well as Russia, possess by far the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons and fully realize the huge potential hazards of nuclear proliferation, fraught with making it more difficult to control the process by international agencies, and with higher chances for countries with totalitarian and unpredictable political systems to acquire “nuclear” status. Realizing the need to ensure their own national security and maintain international stability, Russia and the U.S. are equally interested in keeping and consolidating the world nuclear nonproliferation system. Despite many positive and encouraging results in the U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, a variety of problems and impediments have emerged, which reduce significantly the efficiency of joint efforts of both countries focused on the ultimate goal. There are different causes of these impediments to cooperation, which result from political, legal, technical, managerial, bureaucratic, structural, psychological and other issues. The Project is aimed at identifying and analyzing the existing impediments and complications to the whole complex of the U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and elaborating joint recommendations to overcome or mitigate them to be forwarded to the Presidents of the U.S. and Russian Academies. Despite the obvious importance of the problem under consideration, so far it has not been the subject of special analysis and research. Thus, the report is actually one of the first attempts at a systematic examination of such an important problem. The authors fully realize how complex and interrelated the causes of emerging difficulties and impediments to cooperation are, and they are quite aware of the fact that no single remedy will be able to solve these problems. At the same time it seems quite possible and useful to develop and propose a set of recommendations and considerations as well as specific actions and measures based on a comprehensive analysis of the whole problem to be used by governing bodies as an adequate framework for choosing optimal lines of work and for making decisions. The first joint working meeting of the Project participants took place in May 2003 in Moscow and addressed the Project goals, contents, milestones and expected results (Attachment 2). It was agreed that in compliance with basic provisions of this document both sides would carry out independent research and draw up their own versions of a joint report on overcoming impediments to the bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and would submit the documents for discussions at the next working meeting in Vienna (September 2003).

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop The present report is an interim Russian version of the future joint U.S.-Russian Academies report. It comprises the results of the analysis of the impediments and problems to the U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation based, largely, on relevant programs in which the Russian participants of the Project, as well as their departments and agencies, were and/or are involved. Based on the results of the U.S. and Russian interim reports and their discussions in Vienna, further research will be carried out in order to develop and release a joint Final Project report tentatively in January 2004. 1. Nuclear Proliferation Threats It is believed that in the present-day world nuclear weapons serve as deterrents, a sort of the "Sword of Damocles,” that would be an inevitable punishment for a potential aggressor. However, nuclear weapons by their very nature have huge destructive power and the many other deadly effects inherent in weapons of mass destruction. In case of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation there is a potential threat to the established system of maintaining international stability. Therefore, the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon countries (the so-called “Nuclear Club” comprising, among other countries, the U.S. and Russia) for international stability is extremely high. On a very general level, factors that may encourage a non-nuclear country to acquire a nuclear weapon, are as follows: General status of the collective security system (the UN) and the efficiency of the international safeguards to ensure the security of a given country as regards any potential aggressor. However, this first-priority challenge goes beyond the scope of this study. Fulfillment by Nuclear Club countries of their commitments within the framework of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime concerning, first and foremost, the reduction of their nuclear arsenals to the minimum acceptable and sufficient level. This problem is rooted in the cold war, as a relic of the arms race, when nuclear countries (and first of all, the U.S. and Russia) fabricated and accumulated nuclear weapons in such quantities that their destructive potential was many times over the above level. Fundamental obligations of the U.S. and Russia on reducing their nuclear arsenals were stated in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I, 1991) and in the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOP, ratified by the sides in 2003). Among the U.S.-Russian projects dealing with the problem under consideration, the following ones should be singled out: Dilution of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) into Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and shipping it to the U.S. to fabricate fuel for commercial nuclear reactors (HEU-LEU Agreement of 1993)

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Dismantlement of decommissioned Russian nuclear-powered submarines and ships (Agreement on Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms (SOAE), 1993) Conversion of plutonium-production reactors in Russia (U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) of 199715) Disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, which is no longer needed for defense purposes in the U.S. and Russia (Agreements of 1998 and 2000) The present-day technologies of using nuclear power for peaceful purposes (including the nuclear power industry, research reactors, and power reactor facilities of nuclear submarines and surface vessels) have the following peculiarities: most of the associated nuclear fuel cycle stages are potentially vulnerable (to a variable degree) from the viewpoint of nonproliferation of nuclear materials, which could be used to fabricate nuclear weapons. These are: Uranium enrichment Nuclear fuel fabrication Power generation Interim storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) prior to its ultimate disposal or reprocessing SNF reprocessing with extraction of power-grade plutonium Storage of extracted plutonium Shipping of fresh or spent nuclear fuel. So far this vulnerability has been compensated to a considerable extent by the IAEA international safeguards system and by a set of safeguards arrangements and activities at the national and regional levels. Unfortunately, the current IAEA safeguards are mainly based on inspections, which, in case of a global growth of nuclear power, may become ineffective and excessively expensive. To ensure long-term sustainable development of the world community, nuclear power in the future will have to resolve the problem related to the risk of indirect nuclear proliferation (i.e., due to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes) by the development and large-scale deployment of advanced and innovative nuclear energy technologies capable of ensuring proliferation resistance by an optimum combination of predominantly intrinsic features (technologies and materials) and extrinsic measures (IAEA safeguards, nuclear material protection, control and accounting, export control). When considering extrinsic measures (i.e., IAEA safeguards), use of permanent instrumental monitoring systems to eliminate unauthorized modifications in reactors or fuel cycle facilities will be, evidently, necessary as well. In this context the following initiatives and related opportunities deem important: Bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation on advanced nuclear reactors and fuel cycles (Moscow Summit of the U.S. and Russian Presidents in May, 2002), and 15   The 1994 Agreement has not been ratified, and therefore has not come into effect. Presently the 1997 Agreement is in force.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Multilateral cooperation of the U.S. and Russia within the framework of the international projects initiated by these countries in the year 2000 on the development of advanced “Generation IV” reactors (GIF) and the IAEA project on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles (INPRO), respectively. 2. Scope, Results and Good Practices of the U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Related Areas Besides problems and impediments emerging in U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, useful experience has been gained, and many specific results obtained. Prior to the analysis of problems and impediments to bilateral cooperation, it would be worthwhile to summarize the experience and good practices that could be used in the development of recommendations on overcoming or mitigation of the impediments. When analyzing the achievements, a consideration of some other bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation projects related to nuclear nonproliferation (e.g., in the area of improving nuclear safety at nuclear power plants (NPPs)) is deemed useful for learning lessons in nuclear nonproliferation projects. 2.1 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar Program) An umbrella Agreement on the safe and secure transportation, storage and destruction of weapons and the prevention of weapons proliferation (also known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) Program), signed by the Presidents of the U.S. and Russia in June 1992, provided a framework for implementation of the START I Treaty, initiated large-scale cooperation on this subject, and was especially important for strengthening strategic stability. The initiative focused on Russia and some other former Soviet Union countries, and was initiated on the U.S. side by U.S. Senators Nunn and Lugar; for this reason the Agreement is often called the Nunn-Lugar program. As an extension of the intergovernmental umbrella Agreement, about twenty executive agreements have been signed covering a wide range of bilateral interactions, such as elimination of strategic offensive arms, safety improvements of nuclear weapons transportation and storage, disposal of chemical weapons stocks, improvement of the nuclear material protection, control and accounting system, construction of a storage facility for surplus weapons-grade fissionable materials, and shutdown of weapons-grade plutonium production reactors. When summing up the CTR program implementation results over more than 10 years, it could be concluded that the Agreement made and still makes it possible to address successfully in a relatively short time such important challenges as: Ensuring safe shipping to Russia of nuclear ammunition [warheads] from the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan; Upgrading considerably the safety level in storing both nuclear weapons at R.F. Ministry of Defense facilities and nuclear submarine SNF at the Russian Navy facilities;

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Modernizing the systems of nuclear material protection, control and accounting at more than 25 Russian nuclear facilities; Constructing a storage facility for surplus weapons-grade fissionable materials (Cheliabinsk, commissioning due date for the first phase the beginning of the year 2004); Building power-generating capacities using fossil fuel to replace those of weapons-grade plutonium producing reactors to be shut down in Tomsk-7 and Krasnojarsk-26 (2005-2006). Both sides have been continuously working to enhance the efficiency of the CTR program implementation. It should be especially stressed that the decision of the U.S. Government on active involvement of Russian subcontractors and wide use of Russian special purpose equipment contributed significantly to accelerating the progress and improving the cost-effectiveness of the CTR program. The issue of increasing the share of funds allocated by the U.S. Congress to be received by Russia has been gradually taken care of. At the initial stages of cooperation over 50% of the funds were forwarded to reimburse the costs incurred by U.S. subcontractors and for overhead charges for the U.S. program managers. A mechanism of financial audit of the program costs within contracts with enterprises has been agreed upon and is functioning sufficiently well. In 1992-1993, in the context of the CTR Agreement, supplementary agreements were signed. To date, some of them have been already completed, while others are still under implementation. Special shipping casks for fissionable materials, equipment to mitigate the consequences of emergency situations and related personnel training programs, and protective coatings and sets to reequip railcars and security cars have been supplied to Russia. Both Russian and U.S. specialists designed and began to construct a safe and reliable storage facility for fissionable materials produced in the process of nuclear weapons elimination. In 1995 the U.S. President stated that 200 tonnes of fissionable materials were to be decommissioned from the U.S. nuclear arsenal and never used in future to fabricate weapons. At the 41st session of the IAEA General Conference (1997) a statement of the R.F. President was made public that up to 500 tonnes of HEU and 50 tonnes of plutonium released during the nuclear disarmament process would be withdrawn step-by-step from the Russian defense nuclear programs. In 2000 an Intergovernmental U.S.-Russian Agreement on disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium was signed, according to which each of the sides shall convert 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium into mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel for NPPs. The weapons elimination process caused the need to solve tasks related to safe and secure storage of nuclear materials, disposition of surplus fissionable materials, and restructuring and conversion of the Russian nuclear weapons industries. Under conditions of a terrorism threat, both sides have agreed to initiate work aimed at ensuring physical protection of all types of radiation sources.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Between 1997 and 2000, within the framework of the U.S.-Russian plutonium production reactors Agreement, specialists of R.F. Minatom performed design work on converting three plutonium production uranium-graphite reactors operating at the Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) and the Mining Chemical Combine (MCC). The reactors supply the towns of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk with heat and electricity as by-products. However, the chosen reactor conversion strategy has proved rather expensive and technically complicated. Eventually, a decision was made to construct heat and power generating plants using organic fuel in both Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. After the commissioning of these plants the obsolete plutonium production reactors will be shut down for good. In addition to the CTR and related agreements, some other important bilateral accords have been concluded to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Since 1993, the HEU-LEU Agreement providing for dilution during 20 years of 500 tonnes of Russian HEU into LEU and shipping of the latter to the U.S. to fabricate fuel for commercial nuclear reactors has been successfully implemented. As of 2003 more than 190 tonnes of HEU have been diluted and 5,700 tonnes of LEU shipped to the U.S., which secured power generation at U.S. nuclear power plants amounting up to 10% of the annual electricity production in the U.S. (i.e., about 50% of nuclear electricity). In its turn, Russia received about $3.7 billion of revenues to be spent to upgrade the safety level of the nuclear power industry, “convert nuclear cities”, and conduct research and development work on advanced nuclear reactors and fuel cycles. During 1998 through 2003 an Agreement on cooperation to realize the "Nuclear Cities Initiative" was in force, focused on the creation of new work for the personnel made redundant from nuclear defense programs (the Agreement expires in September 2003). 2.2. Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement The resolution of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar contained a directive to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to assist the former Soviet Union countries in the decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, on the 26th of August 1993 the U.S. DOD and the R.F. Committee for Defense Industries signed the SOAE Agreement. Due to changes in the R.F. executive authority structure, the Russian commitments related to the Agreement’s implementation were transferred to Rosaviakosmos. Since dismantlement of nuclear submarines decommissioned from the Russian Navy was implemented by R.F. Minatom, an amendment to the SOAE was signed by both R.F. Rosaviakosmos and the U.S. DOD in 2003. The history of the Russian nuclear submarine decommissioning within the framework of the Nunn-Lugar Program is summarized below (Figure 1). The decommissioning of nuclear submarines is a large-scale political, engineering and environmental problem involving a multitude of facilities and a large complex of interrelated technologies. Among engineering operations related to the decommissioning, those dealing with SNF unloading, storage, transportation and reprocessing (i.e., directly related to nuclear nonproliferation) are the most sophisticated and important.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop The start of work on the decommissioning of Russian nuclear submarines coincided with political changes in Russia, accompanied with a severe economic recession. As a consequence, some important decisions were based on specific considerations of the moment and were made under severe financial constraints. In compliance with the program during 1996-1999 some specialized equipment critical for the program implementation was supplied, including cutting equipment (e.g., an automatic guillotine to cut submarine hulls into sections) and specialized cutting tools, cable reprocessing facilities, and other specialized equipment. Under the U.S. Government financial support within the program framework a radioactive waste treatment complex was designed and commissioned in October 2000, and a land-based facility for interim storage of SNF unloaded from the decommissioned nuclear submarines was put into operation at the end of 2002. Under this program the U.S. Government is also funding work on the dismantling of strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). For example, the dismantlement of five "Delta"-class nuclear submarines at the state enterprise “Zvezdochka" was financed in 1998 through 2000. It is worthy of notice that the U.S. participates only in the dismantling of the SSBNs and, despite appeals from the Russian government, allocates no funds to dismantle Russian multi-purpose nuclear submarines, the number of which substantially exceeds that of the SSBNs. Such considerations are based on the fact that in the latter case the U.S. security is not affected. At the same time the U.S. side has no objections to using the infrastructure built to dismantle the SSBNs for dismantling the multi-purpose submarines.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Figure 1. Phases of the Russian Nuclear Submarine Dismantling Program (within the Nunn-Lugar Program) 2.3. Export Control Export Control is another important cooperative program between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the R.F. Minatom. This program has been implemented within the framework of both the bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and the Protocol of Intent on joint export control activities of 1997 between R.F. Minatom Department of international and external economic cooperation and the U.S. DOE.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Within the program a wide range of subjects has been addressed, which include, but are not limited to: organization of workshops on export control for R.F. Minatom enterprises, development of training documentation for training courses on nuclear export control for Minatom enterprises, development of training documentation for training courses on nuclear export control for the educational system at the R.F. State Customs Committee, and development of appropriate tools to support export control activities (handbooks, databases, glossaries, dictionaries, computer document management and control systems). In 1997 two R.F. Minatom export control laboratories were established at the State Unitary Enterprise "Physics and Power Institute" (IPPE) and VNIITF. These laboratories perform extensive research for R.F. Minatom, do training and work on export control at the R.F. Minatom enterprises, and review export contracts to identify science-intensive export products. Within the U.S.-Russian cooperation program these laboratories fulfilled the following tasks: During 1997-2003 the two laboratories held 25 training and methods courses on export control and nuclear nonproliferation related issues (among them, 16 industry-wide and 9 courses for specialists of individual enterprises). About 400 specialists from 135 R.F. Minatom enterprises as well as from other ministries involved in inter-company export control programs at their enterprises attended the industry-wide training courses. In addition, about 450 scientists, engineers and chief executives responsible for export contracts and International Scientific & Technical Center (ISTC) projects took part in the on-site courses. In 1998 specialists of the IPPE laboratory with participation of VNIITF developed the first draft of “The Manual for Nuclear Export Control.” In the course of the following years "The Manual" was regularly revised and supplemented. In 2003 the 6th edition of "The Manual" was issued. Three training courses on nuclear export control were developed jointly with the VNIITF laboratory for basic and advanced training of customs personnel. The two laboratories also developed: "Nuclear Export Control Desk Reference Book" for R.F. Minatom enterprises (based on "The Manual"), Generic instruction manual on inter-company export control at enterprises, Leaflet for the IPPE export control laboratory on the IPPE web site, English-Russian/Russian-English Glossary and Dictionary-Term Reference Book on export control, "Electronic document management and control concept" to support the R.F. Minatom export control system, and Reference Database on the Internet Information Resources on export control.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop 3.7.6. However, projects where procurement of dual-purpose goods and technologies liable to export control is involved are the greatest impediment in the ISTC projects. In compliance with the R.F. legislation in the export control area, the delivery of nuclear or dual-purpose goods and technologies is only allowed if an export license is available. However, the ISTC’s status prohibits the transfer of such controlled goods and technologies because the latter, due to their specific properties, can potentially be used to fabricate weapons of mass destruction—in other words, to contribute to nuclear proliferation. At the same time it is obvious, that the implementation of projects related to the development of advanced nuclear energy facilities having nothing to do with nuclear weapons programs and contributing to nuclear nonproliferation would allow the redirection of many nuclear scientists from military subjects. Most likely, a similar situation exists in other industries dealing with dual-purpose technologies. Thus, bringing the interests of the international economic, scientific and technical cooperation on the use of nuclear energy in compliance with the requirements of nuclear nonproliferation represents one of the most important and complicated tasks. Conclusions and Recommendations An ultimate objective of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading in the world. Therefore the bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation programs on nuclear nonproliferation and impediments to it should be considered in terms of this international context, i.e., how they affect and reduce the proliferation risk. Bilateral programs with such an objective most meet the interests of both sides, and, therefore, are least subject to the changeable political goals of different administrations, which is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite to make them a success. The U.S.-Russian cooperation programs on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are of key importance for strengthening strategic stability in the world and meeting the vital interests of both countries, and for that reason the linkage of their implementation to political or other conditions having no direct bearing on the objectives and contents of the cooperation is believed to be counterproductive. The coincidence of interests of both sides in achieving the political, scientific, and technical objectives of U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation and the appropriateness and achievability of the scientific and technical objectives are important factors. The practice of thorough joint examination of need and achievability in the early stages of the cooperation programs has proved justified. A cooperation program has a better chance of success, if its major goals, subject scope, organization, and management issues have been discussed and agreed upon in intergovernmental agreements, and, if necessary, ratified by the U.S. Congress and the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Practical implementation of the goals of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime should be based on elimination of incentives for non-nuclear weapon states to possess nuclear weapons by reducing nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapon countries, improving the UN system of collective security and the IAEA nuclear safeguards, and encouraging peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on advanced proliferation-resistant technologies. To this end, extended economic, scientific, and engineering cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy by the U.S. and Russia with third countries, provided the requirements of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime are unconditionally met, is believed to be especially beneficial and effective. Under the conditions when countries that acquired nuclear weapons after the conclusion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) may not be a party to the Treaty, or leave the Treaty without an adequate and certain response from the world community, the effectiveness of such a Treaty becomes substantially downgraded. Apparently, a solution to nonproliferation could be only feasible when possession of nuclear weapons becomes a burden substantially outweighing the benefits. In other words, the political and economic costs of entering the nuclear club should be made high enough to render the entrance too expensive and therefore unjustifiable. Bans are often counterproductive, rather than effective; therefore in order to reduce the proliferation incentives some more attractive alternatives to the use of potentially dangerous nuclear materials should be sought and suggested (such as the highly enriched uranium for low enriched uranium [HEU-LEU] program, disposition of weapons-grade plutonium, etc.), provided that the political, scientific and technical objectives of the programs and the international nonproliferation regime are unconditionally met. In a sense, some basic principles of the “Atoms for Peace” program put forward by President Eisenhower should be revived, especially those related to rendering nuclear power international. In future all nuclear materials and technologies may need to be collected in inter- or trans-national corporations, which would lease nuclear power plants and fuel to the willing countries, reprocess the nuclear spent fuels, and dispose of the wastes. To secure mutually advantageous and fair cooperation (international) nuclear nonproliferation requirements (or standards) should be developed and introduced when conducting joint research of nuclear facilities important for the national security of nuclear weapon states, as well as when they carry out economic, scientific and engineering projects in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy in third countries. These requirements should completely correspond to the NPT and other relevant international and national legislation of the interested countries. A U.S.-Russian Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation is recommended to coordinate the entire spectrum of issues on the implementation of bilateral cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, including, but not limited to, initiation of project proposals, setting priorities, assessment of required resources, information sharing, and confidentiality. For better coordination of all nuclear nonproliferation activities at the national level, special nuclear nonproliferation representatives are proposed for the U.S. and Russia. They would report

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop to the respective presidents of the countries and head inter-agency councils on nuclear nonproliferation. Accelerated development of large-scale bilateral U.S.-Russia economic, scientific, and engineering cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy would undoubtedly contribute to better mutual trust and confidence. The earliest conclusion of the proposed bilateral agreement on cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the U.S. and Russia would establish necessary political and technical framework to translate this potential into practice. Joint development of advanced and innovative nuclear energy technologies resistant to proliferation of nuclear weapons is deemed to be an especially important and promising opportunity for U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and related subjects. Both countries have substantial scientific and engineering potential in this area, but to the detriment of long-term interests of both countries (including nuclear nonproliferation) it may not materialize without governmental support due to tightening competition in the world and national energy markets, as well as constraints on national resources and investments available for the development and demonstration of science-and-engineering intensive technologies. The results of the May 2002 summit of the presidents of the U.S. and Russia in Moscow paved the way to take advantage of the opportunity. The above area of cooperation is believed to be no less significant on a multilateral level. Scientific, engineering, and financial involvement and leadership of the U.S. and Russia in two large independent international projects (GIF and INPRO) on development of advanced and innovative nuclear energy technologies to meet the international requirements of the future, including the resistance to nuclear proliferation, prove the importance that both countries attach to this long-term issue. On the other hand, having two international projects with similar goals and less than sufficient coordination between them on the strategic and tactical level may be fraught with unjustifiable duplication of work and inadequate use of available resources, and lead eventually to degraded competitiveness of nuclear energy in the world energy markets of the future. In the present-day world proliferation risk assessments, including the risk of nuclear terrorism, are one of the most important, but insufficiently studied areas related to nuclear nonproliferation and the proliferation resistance of nuclear power fuel cycles. Joint development of an internationally acknowledged nuclear proliferation risk assessment methodology and its introduction into international practices related to the use of nuclear energy would substantially reduce the subjectivity when estimating this important criterion. Both the U.S. and Russia have some advanced applied studies in this area. The National Academies of the U.S. and Russia appear to be well positioned to take the initiative and suggest a joint project with high scientific content and practical implications. When implementing programs of U.S. technical assistance to Russia, well-coordinated approaches by the sides to legal matters, including taxation and nuclear liability issues, are of high importance. The fundamental position of Russia consists of the need to strictly follow the national legislation of the countries and established international law and practices in this area.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop The legal basis and current practices of tax exemption in relation to funds, goods, and services received by Russian participants in the U.S. technical assistance programs on nuclear nonproliferation deserve thorough scrutiny. This is especially important for relatively small short projects (a few months long), because current procedures and practices make the tax exemption (or refund) in many cases hard to do or even impractical. The grants from the ISTC, CRDF, and other similar organizations and funds to a large extent solve the problem of tax exemption. However, the requirements for export control for the procurement of dual-purpose goods and technologies within such projects, the complexity and duration of the formal project review-and-approval processes, as well as established caps on project costs, substantially lessen the efficiency of attaining project goals. Provided the recovery of the Russian economy continues, given the commensurate nuclear potential of the U.S. and Russia and the high international nuclear nonproliferation profiles of the two countries, the development and implementation of bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation programs in this very sensitive area should be increasingly converted from programs of U.S. economic, scientific, and engineering assistance to Russia towards cooperative programs based on equal partnership and balanced inputs of intellectual, material and financial resources. The recent highest-level declaration of Russia’s intent to contribute about $2 billion to the success of the “Global Partnership” program within 10 years has started the transition of Russia from the category of a recipient country to a partner, which undoubtedly should have a positive impact on Russia’s cooperation with other countries, including the U.S. A combination of large-scale high-visibility projects managed by administrations of the presidents of the U.S. and Russia with relatively medium and small projects (down to the level of national laboratories and research centers) should ensure the attainment of the strategic political goals of the two countries on nuclear nonproliferation, and also encourage the initiative and meet the specific interests of project participants. The quest for easier access of specialists to the sites and simplified immigration rules of the countries in relation to the participants of the U.S.-Russian nuclear nonproliferation programs without sacrificing the national security interests of the sides should continue to be on the lists of things-to-do of respective U.S. and Russian authorities. The employment and social security of acting and retiring Russian nuclear weapon scientists in order to lessen the likely incentives for them to seek employment matching their qualifications in the third countries and, therefore, reduce the risk of getting employed by potential proliferators, should remain one of the goals of the U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, and first of all, for the ISTC projects. Extended exchange and utilization of the lessons learned from the experience gained in the U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and other areas related to the use of nuclear energy will enhance the organization, management, and coordination of the nuclear nonproliferation programs, and improve the interactions at all levels.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Establishment of ministerial joint coordinating committees and joint consultative and coordinating groups comprising lead scientists and specialists of both countries, as well as transparency of project implementation based on wide access to related scientific, technical, organizational, administrative, and financial information are considered to be good practices to emulate. Despite some mistrust between the sides inherited from the past (relics of the Cold War), the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. and Russia in nuclear nonproliferation converge and should prevail over the short-sighted subjective considerations and interests of some managers. To this end education, training, and promotion of specialists and managers belonging to the new generation of people who are free of the negative heritage and capable of working efficiently in realities of the changed world should be one of the priorities of the bilateral programs. In particular, expanded and more balanced exchanges between the students of military and civil universities and colleges, groups of officers, scientists, and professors are believed to contribute to improving the effectiveness of the interactions and cooperation of the sides in solving nuclear nonproliferation issues. Bi- and multilateral scientific conferences and workshops on nuclear nonproliferation should be conducted on a systematic and regular basis. The goal of educating, training and promoting a new generation of specialists and managers goes far beyond the scope of the current project and requires long-term, large-scale and concerted efforts of the governments, political, scientific, and cultural institutions of both countries. It could become one of the strategic goals of the U.S. and Russia for the foreseeable future. Only a new generation of people free of negative stereotypes of the Cold War with a fundamentally changed mentality can eventually nurture the relations of confidence, friendship and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, emerging not without difficulties, and guarantee their irreversibility.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Attachment 1 List of Russian Participants 1. Acad. A.A. Sarkisov Project manager, Counselor, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) 2. Prof. L.A. Bolshov Alternate RAS member, Director, Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE RAS) 3. Acad. E.N. Avrorin Scientific Director, VNIITF 4. Dr. R.I. Voznyuk First Deputy Director, VNIITF 5. Prof. V.I. Rachkov Deputy head, Department for Science and Technology, Minatom 6. Dr. Y.F. Zabaluev Deputy head, Department of Export Control, Ministry for Economic Development and Trade 7. Dr. V.I. Rybachenkov Counselor, Department of Safety and Disarmament, Foreign Office 8. Mrs. N.A. Klishina Head, Division of Cooperation with the U.S., Canada and Latin America, Department of International and External Economic Relations (DMVS), Minatom 9. Mrs. M.P. Belyaeva Head, Division of International Organizations and Multilateral Cooperation, DMVS, Minatom 10. Mr. S.V. Ruchkin Deputy Director, Development of International Programs, IBRAE RAS

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Attachment 2 Issue Summary Joint Working Group on Overcoming Impediments to Cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on Nuclear Nonproliferation (Moscow, June 2003) The United States and Russian Federation are working closely together in many ways to address the threat of nuclear proliferation, in order to enhance both their mutual security and the security of the international system. But just as scientists in different countries need to work together more closely to address the technical challenges of the new security environment, new impediments to international scientific collaboration are emerging. Impediments to the implementation of joint nonproliferation and threat reduction programs are particularly problematic and counterproductive. These impediments to cooperation, and the political, bureaucratic, and structural problems that are behind them, are so complex and interwoven that no one solution will solve the problems. Instead, decision-makers need a variety of options upon which they can draw to address specific problems. This joint U.S.-Russian academies project will identify and analyze existing impediments and problem areas in the whole set of relationships between U.S. and Russia on nuclear nonproliferation, and will explore how best to overcome those impediments in support of shared goals and the commitments made at the June 2002 meeting of the G8 nations. Instead of offering a series of specific recommendations to be adopted in toto, the report will provide policymakers—and those charged with implementing policy—with a set of tools that will facilitate their efforts to reduce the impediments to scientific cooperation. The following notes summarize the comments made and issues portrayed as needing attention in early project meetings. Government and non-government experts participated in the discussions in both Washington and Moscow. I High-level Political Issues and Interests A. Coordination of the U.S.-Russian bilateral projects on nuclear nonproliferation with the international system of collective security (UN) and the international multilateral cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation (IAEA). B. U.S. and Russian relationships with third countries in support of peaceful uses of nuclear energy: The existence of such relationships has hindered bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperation in the past, but might present opportunities for more positive directions in the future, if differences in approach can be resolved. C. High-visibility U.S.-Russian technical cooperation on nuclear energy and other topics: Could become a mechanism for building confidence in the relationship. D. Residual Cold War mentality on both sides: In both countries, many of those who now run these programs spent much of their careers fighting the Cold War and mutual mistrust is still a problem. Setbacks and errors that occur in cooperative efforts often seem to vindicate negative stereotypes. E. (For the U.S.) Appropriateness of using defense budget funding for nonproliferation and defense conversion programs.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop II Communications A. Inadequate communication between Washington and Moscow on implementation of programs as a source of political problems (e.g., impact in Washington of Russian difficulty in getting permits for heptyl fuel destruction plant; impact in Moscow of U.S. conditions imposed on DOD programs). B. Use of transparent managerial tools and mechanisms with equal access for all participants to enhance communication and trust (e.g., budget matrices, clear project lists, well-maintained project web sites). C. Close interaction between U.S. and Russian project managers and with the federal and regional authorities to avoid misunderstanding and facilitate progress. D. Establishment of new joint training and exchange programs and enhancement of current efforts: Exchanges of military personnel, scientists, and students (including officers in training), and joint programs for training specialists on nuclear nonproliferation would build mutual understanding. III. Structure of U.S.-Russian Cooperative Programs A. “High-profile” vs. “low profile” approaches to program design: diversification of the status and scale of the U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation—provision of large highly visible global programs requiring substantial resources and controlled by the countries’ political leadership, alongside relatively small technical and scientific projects, for example, on the level of national laboratories. B. Balance between flexibility and structure: Programs need to be flexible enough to deal with unpredicted events or trends, but must have enough structure to enforce decisions. C. Differences in political / administrative structure and culture: Approaches that work in one country may not work in the other because some areas of responsibility are not parallel between U.S. and Russian ministries/agencies, because of differences in programmatic implementing authority, and because of differences in approach to planning and implementing programs. D. General issues of bureaucratic / administrative structure 1. Matching of program design and goals to the capabilities and strengths of the implementing organization. (example: ISTC might have trouble trying to implement cooperative programs when it is set up to award research grants) 2. Flexibility in applying broad rules to nonproliferation programs: Rigid, literal interpretation of broad rules restricts flexibility and reduces effectiveness. (example: export controls on dual-use technology) 3. Interagency rivalries: In both countries, rivalries generate roadblocks and reduce effectiveness. 4. Incentive as a tool to support a program’s effectiveness: A program is more likely to succeed if its success is clearly in the interests of the countries involved. Both sides must be interested to achieve the political and technical objectives. 5. Momentum: planners and managers should acknowledge the importance of establishing and maintaining momentum as a project moves forward. 6. Role of clear organizational mechanisms: The technical assistance program on nuclear safety benefited from a coordinating committee and program office, striking a proper balance in implementation between high-level collaboration and specific technical expertise. E. Specific legal and procedural issues related to implementation: there are many specific problems that require specific solutions. Once those solutions are implemented, significant progress can be made.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop 1. Issues include: liability, access, taxation, contracting (see pt. 2) and acquisition procedures. 2. Increased flexibility in contracting procedures: Such procedures tend to be clearly defined and rigid on the U.S. side, but not on the Russian, where the preference is for freedom in the selection of contractors (non-mandatory tenders / sole source contracts). IV. Funding / Money / Economics: Financial issues are central to cooperation, which brings both problems and opportunities. It is important to attain a sufficient level and balance of resources (financial, intellectual) from both sides for project implementation / management to succeed. (includes part of May 29 Sarkisov paper#8) A. Problems 1. Risk that program goals will be subverted to financial goals: if those responsible for implementing a program are primarily interested in spending funds up before the end of the fiscal year (“pumping the money out”), they are likely to subvert the program’s goals if real progress is not achieved. 2. Risk that political needs and goals will overtake program goals. B. Opportunities 1. Diversification of the funding sources (stakeholders) may improve chances for success and increase project managers’ control over the use of resources. Programs funded from multiple sources come with their own built-in constituency of people and organizations for whom successful cooperation is in their own best interest. 2. If a program is funded by private, non-profit groups, it can have a distinct advantage, particularly when it only involves work in the FSU and can be successful independent of U.S. government action or inaction. 3. As Russia’s economy slowly grows stronger, opportunities for cost-sharing between the U.S. and R.F. will increase. 4. The incentive to proliferate may be reduced via creative methods of reducing or eliminating the profitability of proliferation. The “HEU Deal” might be seen as an example of this approach. 5. The pro-business, anti-government stance of the U.S. administration predisposes it toward commercial approaches to addressing problems. Advocates of cooperation should therefore look for opportunities to accomplish goals through commercial endeavors. But such programs are only successful in situations where the paths toward accomplishing program goals and making a profit are indistinguishable. It is unrealistic to expect this to be true in most of the cooperative threat reduction work that remains to be done. 6. Programs are most effective when the U.S. is willing to spend the money necessary to accomplish goals and is prepared to pay fairly for work that gets done. Program staff should be aware of their Russian colleagues’ perspective about money, be able to see through Russian modesty to the roots of a funding request, and be as supportive as possible. Missed cues can lead to setbacks in cooperation that are much more costly than the requested help would have been. V. Leadership and Management Issues A. As it regains its economic and political strength, Russia is growing weary of being treated as a welfare recipient. Cooperative efforts will be much more effective if Russia is treated as a partner. Such a change in approach should not only happen at the highest political levels, but at the level of individual relationships and interactions. B. Forms of cooperation—encouraging a transition from largely contractual relationships within the U.S. Government technical assistance programs to Russia (where the U.S.G. is the

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop paymaster, and Russian companies and organizations—the contractors) to equal partnership relations [balanced inputs of financial, material and intellectual resources from both sides, including selection of subjects for joint research (sites in both countries), symmetrical information exchange, etc.]. C. Clear goals and objectives should be agreed by both sides at the commencement of new projects and updated jointly as necessary over the life of the project. D. The need to introduce a dedicated high-level policy post, reporting to the respective Presidents and coordinating the whole range of issues related to the implementation of U.S.-Russian bilateral projects on nuclear nonproliferation. E. Interaction between the federal authorities in the countries; issues of interagency coordination. F. Need to address at a broad level the problem of confidentiality. Cooperation is hindered repeatedly by the need to renegotiate confidentiality agreements for each activity. G. American program managers should find serious, competent Russian counterparts and then treat them with seriousness and respect. The culture of Russian bureaucracy is much more personal than is true in the U.S., so Russian colleagues need personal and close interaction. American program managers will be most successful if they take their interlocutors’ individual and institutional perspectives into consideration and put more emphasis on personal communication, trust, and networking than they would normally do in the U.S. H. Personnel issues. It is important that advocates of cooperation find young, knowledgeable leaders, researchers, and managers in the FSU to assume the mantle of cooperative threat reduction from the aging current leadership; pay, benefits, training all are lacking, providing an incentive to take expertise out of the military and nuclear sectors and into private business.

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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Coorperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop Attachment 3 List of Abbreviations AMDT Anti-Missile Defense Treaty CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CRDF Civilian Research and Development Foundation CTR Program Agreement on the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation (Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program or CTR Program) GIF Generation IV International Forum HEU Highly-Enriched Uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBRAE RAS Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences INPRO IAEA's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles INT Innovative Nuclear energy Technologies INSP International Nuclear Safety Program IPPE State Unitary Enterprise "Physics and Power Institute" (Obninsk) ISTC International Scientific & Technical Center LANL Los-Alamos National Laboratory LEU Low-Enriched Uranium LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory MNEPR Multilateral Nuclear Environment Program in the Russian Federation MPC&A Nuclear Materials Protection Control and Accounting NPP Nuclear Power Plant NPT Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NW Nuclear Weapons PPRA U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement R&D Research & Development R.F. Minatom Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation R.F. MOD Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel SNL Sandia National Laboratories SOAE Agreement on Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms (SOAE Agreement) SOP Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials SSBN Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines START Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) UN United Nations U.S. DOD U.S. Department of Defense U.S. DOE United States Department of Energy VAT Value Added Tax VNIITF All-Russian Research Institute for Theoretical Physics (Snezhinsk-town) WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction