|
Items in cart [4] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 159
Anti-Sate]]ite
6 (ASAT)Arms Con tro
Since Sputnik was launched in 1957, satellites have played an im-
portant role in the military programs of both the United States and the
Soviet Union. Today, satellites serve a wide variety of extremely impor-
tant security functions, including early warning of strategic attack,
intelligence on the current and projected military threat, precision nav-
igation and targeting, communications for command and control, and
verification of arms control agreements. The critical importance of sat-
ellites to U.S. national security has focused special attention on the
evolving threat posed by anti-satellite (ASAT) systems designed to at-
tack satellites. The problem is complicated by the interaction of anti-
satellite and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) developments. Ballistic
missile defense systems have an inherent ASAT capability; ASAT tech-
nology can contribute to ballistic missile defense development; and
space-based ABM systems would be vulnerable to ASAT systems.
The United States and the Soviet Union both initiated ASAT pro-
grams in the early 1960s. The United States maintained a direct-ascent
nuclear-armed ASAT system until the mid 1970s. The Soviet Union has
worked intermittently on a coorbital nonnuclear ASAT system that is
now considered to be operational. The United States is on the threshold
of testing a new dedicated nonnuclear ASAT system with considerably
greater capabilities than the existing Soviet ASAT system.
There is a long history of arms control agreements relating to space.
In 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear tests in space.
In 1967 the Outer Space Treaty prohibited stationing -weapons of mass
destruction in space. In 1972 the SALT ~ ABM Treaty prohibited inter-
159
OCR for page 160
160
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
ference with satellites that helped verify the agreement. In 1978 the
Carter Administration initiated negotiations on an ASAT agreement
with the Soviet Union. An agreement was not reached, and there have
been no further negotiations since 1979. The Soviet Union has contin-
ued to advocate such an agreement and in 1983 presented to the United
Nations a detailed draft treaty banning weapons in space, ASAT sys-
tems, and the use of force against satellites. The Reagan Administra-
tion has formally taken the position that a ban on ASAT systems would
be contrary to U.S. security interests. Nevertheless, in the summer of
1984 the U.S. government accepted a Soviet invitation to discuss the
ban on weapons in space in Vienna in September 1984 but indicated it
would discuss other arms control proposals as well. As of September 1,
1984, the two sides had been unable to agree on an agenda for the
meeting.
BACKGROUND
The Origin of the ASAT Program
The earliest U.S. studies of specific systems designed to attack satel-
lites were commissioned by the U.S. Air Force in the late 1950s. They
focused on two basic approaches: a "killer satellite" interceptor, which
would be placed in orbit and then maneuvered to its target, and a direct-
ascent interceptor, which would intercept the target when it passed
overhead. In 1960, three years after the Soviet Union's successful
launch of Sputnik, the U.S. Air Force began research and development
on the first U.S. anti-satellite program. The program (designated
SAINT), which never reached the test phase and was canceled in 1962,
involved the concept of a coorbital interceptor that could inspect and
destroy a target. The U.S. ASAT program was then temporarily incorpo-
rated into the Army's anti-ballistic missile program, since it was recog-
nized that the Nike-Zeus ABM test facilities on KwajaTein Island in the
Pacific could also serve as a nuclear-armed direct-ascent anti-satellite
system against satellites that came within a range of a few hundred
kilometers. From 1964 to 1967 a few Nike-Zeus interceptors were de-
ployed there as an anti-satellite system.
In response to what appeared to be an emerging threat of a Soviet
system for orbital nuclear bombardment, the U.S. Air Force also re-
sumed its ASAT mission. In 1964 several intermediate-range Thor rock-
ets, which were modified for an anti-satellite mission, were deployed on
Johnston Island in the Pacific. Although the Thor system had consider-
ably greater range than the Nike-Zeus, its kill mechanism, a high-yield
OCR for page 161
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
161
nuclear warhead, meant that its use in peacetime or conventional war
would risk collateral damage to friendly satellites at great distances, as
well as nuclear escalation. When the anticipated threat of Soviet orbital
nuclear weapons never materialized, U.S. interest in an anti-satellite
weapons capability faded and the Thor missiles, which had been exten-
sively tested, were finally retired in 1976. The Thor system reportedly
could still be restored to operational status on relatively short notice.
The early Soviet efforts on ASAT weapons probably began in 1964
with the establishment of a division of the strategic defense forces
whose mission was that of "destroying the enemy's cosmic means of
fighting." By 1967, preliminary tests of a Soviet ASAT system had
begun. The multiton Soviet ASAT system is launched by a modified
version of the Soviet Union's early large ICBM (the SS-91. The ASAT
itself is a coorbital interceptor that uses an active radar to home in on its
target within two orbits after launch and destroys its target with a
nonnuclear warhead. The initial test program of the interceptor from
1968 to 1972 was judged by the United States to have been successful.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States and the Soviet
Union concluded a number of arms agreements limiting the militariza-
tion of outer space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 bans the testing
of nuclear weapons in space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits
the deployment of nuclear weapons and other "weapons of mass de-
struction" in space. The 1972 SALT ~ ABM Treaty bans the develop-
ment, testing, or deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in
space. Both SALT ~ and the 1979 SALT IT Treaty also ban interference
with any satellite providing National Technical Means to verify those
agreements. Although the cumulative effect of these agreements re-
stricts many weapon systems in space and protects intelligence satel-
lites used for verification purposes, none of the agreements explicitly
limits the development and deployment of dedicated anti-satellite sys-
tems unless they involve the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.
The Ford-Carter Years
In 1976 the Soviet Union resumed the testing of its ASAT system
using the same technology upgraded to permit intercept on the first
orbit instead of the second orbit. In response to this development, the
Ford Administration in its final days directed the initiation of a new
ASAT program for the stated purpose of deterring use of the Soviet
system. The directive also called for a study of arms control options.
The Carter Administration undertook a two-track approach to the
ASAT problem. It sought to negotiate an agreement limiting such sys-
OCR for page 162
162
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
tems while concurrently developing the new ASAT system. Moving
quickly to initiate the arms control process in this area, the Carter
Administration agreed with the Soviet Union in March 1977 to estab-
lish a U.S.-Soviet working group on ASAT as one item on the agenda of
arms control issues the two countries would explore. Three rounds of
ASAT negotiations were held between the United States and the Soviet
Union during 1978-79. The first session in Helsinki in May 1978 was
preliminary in nature and devoted to discussion of the scope of a possi-
ble agreement. Two subsequent rounds of ASAT talks were held in
Bern, Switzerland, from January 23 to February 16, 1979, and in
Vienna, Austria, from April 23 to June 17,1979.
The U.S. approach to the negotiations was to seek a treaty banning
attacks on all satellites and to establish an agreed moratorium lasting
for a year or so on the testing of ASAT systems. The moratorium would
provide time to negotiate a more detailed treaty on ASAT testing and
deployment that would deal with the verification problems involved.
The draft texts developed in these negotiations have never been made
public, and there are varying opinions on how close to agreement the
two sides came in the negotiations. Although important progress was
made, it seems clear that several important issues remained unre-
solved. Among these issues was whether the treaty would apply only to
U.S. and Soviet space objects or to those of other countries as well. The
United States considered this an important issue since unless nonsigna-
tories were covered the agreement appeared to legalize attacks on third
parties. The sides also disagreed on whether ASATs could be used for
self-defense against "hostile" acts. The United States objected to a for-
mulation that could again legalize the use of ASATs. The problem was
complicated by ambiguities as to what activities were covered by the
concept of "hostile" acts. The Soviet Union also reportedly proposed
language that might limit the Space Shuttle because of its inherent
ability to rendezvous and capture or interfere with satellites. The U.S.
position was that the shuttle was neither an ASAT nor an ASAT launch
platform. In addition, there was a fundamental unresolved issue within
the U.S. government as to whether a moratorium on the testing of ASAT
systems should include all potential ASAT systems, including those
using directed energy kill mechanisms, or simply those systems using
direct-ascent and coorbital interceptors.
In June 197S, a year after the United States declared the Soviet ASAT
operational, President Carter summarized his Presidential Directive
on National Space Policy, stating that "while the United States seeks
verifiable, comprehensive limits on anti-satellite capabilities and use,
in the absence of such agreement, the United States will vigorously
OCR for page 163
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
163
pursue the development of its own capabilities." The ASAT system cho-
sen for development, which is the system currently in the testing phase,
was an air-launched miniature homing vehicle delivered by a small
two-stage rocket carried on an F-15 fighter aircraft. The rocket is guided
by an inertial guidance system to intercept a satellite whose orbital
parameters have been determined by ground-based sensors. In the final
engagement, the miniature homing vehicle uses infrared sensors to
home in on the satellite and destroys it on impact.
By 1978 the Soviet Union had encountered difficulties in its-attempts
to upgrade its low-altitude ASAT system to permit it to attack its target
on the first orbit. The Soviet Union had also begun testing a more
advanced interceptor with an optical homing device, which would be
less vulnerable to countermeasures such as evasive maneuvering and
jamming. All six ofthe tests ofthis improved system failed. Just prior to
the opening of the ASAT negotiations in May 197S, the Soviet Union
announced that it would undertake a unilateral testing moratorium on
ASATs.
By June 1979 the ratification of the SALT II Treaty had taken overrid-
ing priority in the arms control planning of the U.S. government, and it
was decided not to press ahead with the uncertain ASAT negotiations,
which involved unresolved policy issues, until the SALT IT ratification
was completed. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union
did agree in a joint communique at the signing of the SALT II Treaty
in Vienna "to continue actively searching for mutually acceptable
agreement in the continuing negotiations on anti-satellite systems."
After the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
the United States made no effort to resume the bilateral ASAT
negotiations.
The Reagan Years
The policy agenda of the new Reagan Administration called for a
complete review of arms control policy and objectives and consequently
put any further movement on these issues, including the ASAT negotia-
tions, on the back burner. In March 1981 the Soviet Union, which had
never previously destroyed a target with an ASAT system, successfully
performed a complete operational test of its ASAT system using a radar
homing device. Although the technology used in the Soviet system was
still significantly inferior to the proposed U.S. program, the test
sparked increased interest both in the press and in the government in
ASAT research and development.
Several months after the Soviet ASAT test, Foreign Minister Andrei
OCR for page 164
164
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Gromyko on August 11, 1981, submitted to the UN General Assembly a
draft treaty banning the deployment of any weapons in outer space. He
explained that the proposed treaty would preclude the stationing of
weapons in outer space that were not already covered by the definition
of "weapons of mass destruction." The Soviet draft treaty had a limited
impact on ASAT development. While it would have banned space-based
ASATs, it did not appear to restrict ground-based or air-launched sys-
tems, such as the U.S. system currently under development. The draft
treaty obligated the parties to the agreement "not to place in orbit
around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in
any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an
existing type or of other types" that parties may develop in the future.
The parties also undertook "not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal
functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects" of other
parties.
The U.S. government did not react favorably to the Soviet draft treaty.
The UN General Assembly, however, approved the draft treaty and
referred it to the First Committee. The Committee on Disarmament
was instructed to include on its agenda for negotiations the Soviet draft
treaty as well as the question of negotiating agreements to prevent an
arms race in outer space. The United States was the only country that
opposed the establishment of a working group on the subject, stating
that immediate progress could not be expected and that the area had to
be approached with extreme care. Without U.S. cooperation, the activ-
ity in the Committee on Disarmament stagnated.
By the early 1980s the United States already hack an active program
for developing the technology for more sophisticated ASAT systems,
such as ground-based and space-based lasers. Tests of an airborne gas
dynamic laser for use against tactical missiles had been conducted by
the Air Force, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was
funding a space-based laser program, involving the Alpha 2-MOO infra-
red chemical laser, the Talon Gold pointing and tracking system, and
the Large Optics Demonstration Experiment (LODE). By this time the
Soviet Union also had an active high-powered laser research and devel-
opment program. The press reported that the Soviet Union had, along
with its coorbital interceptor system, ground-based test lasers with
probable ASAT capabilities. l:t was also speculated that the Soviet
Union was conducting research and development in the area of space-
based laser ASAT weapons.
In early 1983 top aciministration officials explained that the U.S.
rationale for developing ASAT weapons was largely to deter the Soviet
OCR for page 165
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
165
Union from using its capability. With the administration's position on
space weapons and with the upcoming U.S. F-15 ASAT test scheduled
for the fall, domestic pressure began to build in Congress and in the
arms control community for movement in the area of space arms
control.
On March 23, 1983, in a major address to the American people, Presi-
dent Reagan escalated the entire debate on weapons in space by calling
on the scientific community to support a major technological effort to
develop a defense against strategic nuclear missiles that would eventu-
ally make these systems "impotent and obsolete." The president's
speech added fuel to the debate over ASAT arms control. Due to the
overlap of technologies, the new Strategic Defense Initiative suggested
that the administration was unlikely to agree to an ASAT ban that
would restrict ballistic missile defense developments. While the Presi-
dent asserted that the program should be consistent with the provisions
of the SALT ~ ABM Treaty, the new initiative raised many questions
about technical developments that could be related to either ballistic
missiles or ASAT systems.
Soviet President Yuri Andropov quickly followed the Reagan Admin-
istration's announcements with further calls for arms control negotia-
tions on these issues. In response to a petition from a group of American
scientists to ban weapons in space, Andropov stated that the United
States and the Soviet Union were approaching a crucial time when
failure to negotiate a ban on weapons in outer space would make an
extension of the arms race into outer space inevitable. The U.S. State
Department indirectly responded to Andropov's call for a ban on weap-
ons in space by noting that the Soviet Union was the leader in develop-
ing an ASAT interceptor and that the Soviet arms control initiatives
were in fact efforts to maintain a monopoly in this area.
By mid-May, with no movement by the U.S. administration in this
area, the Union of Concerned Scientists presented a draft treaty for
arms control in space at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. The draft treaty included a ban on the testing of all anti-
satellite weapons. Its supporters emphasized that an ASAT treaty
would clearly be in the U.S. interest because the United States is more
dependent on space systems than is the Soviet Union. They also voiced
the opinion that if the United States proceeded with tests of its air-
launched ASAT weapon, verifying restraints on these systems would be
made much more difficult.
At the same hearings, the Reagan Administration stated that it was
not considering negotiations on ASAT in the near term. The Director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman,
OCR for page 166
166
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
told the Senate committee that the United States, which was on the
verge of testing its anti-satellite weapon in space, had no plans to re-
sume negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit such weapons.
Adelman said, "We should not rush into negotiations on these subjects
unless we are ready with verifiable proposals that will enhance na-
tional security." Adelman stated that "there are difficult technical prob-
lems, including verification, that constitute fundamental obstacles to
progress in this area." Among his key concerns were Soviet ASAT capa-
bilities, which he said had created an asymmetry that "is a serious
obstacle to achieving an equitable space arms control agreement."
Throughout the summer of 1983, a number of resolutions were intro-
duced in Congress on both sides of the space weapons issue. The most
significant action came on July 26, 1983, when the Republican-con-
trolled Senate unanimously approved Senator Paul Tsongas's (D-Mass.)
amendment to the fiscal year 1984 Department of Defense authoriza-
tion bill stating that no funds could be obligated or expended to test any
explosive or inert anti-satellite warheads against objects in space un-
less the President determines and certifies to the Congress that (1) the
United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate with the Soviet
Union a mutual and verifiable ban on anti-satellite weapons and (2),
pending agreement on such a ban, testing of explosive or inert anti-
satellite warheads against objects in space by the United States is nec-
essary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security.
The fiscal year 1984 request for the ASAT system was $225 million.
This included $19.4 million for components for the first production line
version ofthe ASAT. On August 5, 1983, the House and Senate conferees
included the Tsongas amendment in the defense authorization, making
it law until September 1984. The conferees also specified that the $19.4
million for procurement for the first ASATs could not be obligated un-
less the President submitted a report to Congress on U.S. ASAT policy
and arms control plans no later than March 31, 1984.
Two weeks later, Soviet President Andropov announced for the first
time Soviet willingness specifically to ban all ASAT systems. At a meet-
ing in the Kremlin with a group of Democratic senators in August 1983,
Andropov called on the United States to negotiate a complete prohibi-
tion on the testing and deployment of any space-based weapons for hit-
ting targets on earth, in the air, or in outer space. He stated that the
Soviet Union was also prepared to agree to prohibit the testing and
development of all new anti-satellite systems and to eliminate all exist-
ing anti-satellite systems. In addition to these proposals, Andropov
stated that the Soviet Union "assumes the commitment not to be the
first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon." Shortly
OCR for page 167
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
167
after Andropov's announcement, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a letter
to the UN Secretary General, made public a new Soviet draft treaty on
space weapons entitled the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force
in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth. The draft treaty
incorporated Andropov's proposals but excluded the unilateral morato-
rium on testing, which was transmitted separately.
At the United Nations the new Soviet draft treaty was referred to the
First Committee. The United States was the only member of that com-
mittee to vote against a compromise resolution that would have estab-
lished an ad hoc working group on outer space with a view toward
undertaking negotiations. The U.S. position was that it supported the
establishment of a working group on outer space to address a broad
range of space arms control issues before any conclusions could be
drawn about pursuing negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.
However, the United States did not favor having a working group un-
dertake negotiations.
On January 21, 1984, the U.S. Air Force conducted the first test ofthe
U.S. F-15 ASAT over the test range at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. The missile was fired at a point in space rather than at an
actual target, so that it did not violate the Tsongas amendment. Never-
theless, the Soviet news agency Tass criticized the U.S. government's
test on January 24, 1984, stating that the "tests of the anti-satellite
system carried out by the United States are an open challenge to the
U.N. resolutions directed against the arms race in outer space."
A month after the U.S. test, during a hearing on the fiscal year 1985
defense budget, Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Re-
search and Engineering, told the House Armed Services Committee
that "ambitious tests" were planned during the coming year to demon-
strate the capability of the F-15 ASAT system. DeLauer also disclosed
that work had begun on a comprehensive study to select a "follow-on
system with additional capability to place a wider range of Soviet satel-
lite vehicles at risk" and that research on the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive will also include an anti-satellite component.
The test launching of the U.S. F-15 ASAT, closely following the col-
lapse of the START and INF negotiations, was viewed by critics of the
administration's approach to arms control as a major step toward a
situation in which it would be impossible to negotiate an ASAT agree-
ment. Joining congressional voices for movement on space arms con-
trol, Democratic presidential contender Walter Mondale in February
1984 proposed that the United States initiate a temporary moratorium
on the testing of ASAT systems along with a six-month moratorium on
underground nuclear testing to break the impass on arms control talks
OCR for page 168
168 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
with the Soviet Union. Mondale also pledged that if elected he would
vigorously move forward on negotiations to reach an ASAT treaty.
As the administration was finalizing its report on ASAT arms control
for Congress in March 1984, the new Soviet leader, Konstantin
Chernenko, made his first appeal for negotiations on the militarization
of outer space. In a speech carried by Tass, Chernenko stated that the
United States could prove its "peaceableness" by concluding an agree-
ment renouncing the militarization of outer space. This appeal was
reiterated by Soviet officials in Moscow during a visit by several U.S.
senators in the same month.
In his official ASAT report to Congress on March 31, 1984, President
Reagan formally rejected the comprehensive ban proposed by the Soviet
Union. President Reagan stated in the transmittal letter that "no ar-
rangements beyond those already governing military activities in
outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall
interest of the United States and its allies." The report stated that the
factors that impede the identification of effective ASAT arms control
measures include significant difficulties of verification, diverse sources
of threats to U.S. and allied satellites, and threats posed by Soviet
targeting and reconnaissance satellites that undermine conventional
and nuclear deterrence. The President cautioned Congress that even
though the executive branch would continue to study space arms con-
troT in search of selected limits on specific activities in space, he did not
believe it would be productive to engage in formal negotiations. The
report concluded that verification problems were profound and that the
Soviets had a "destabilizing advantage" with the anti-satellite weap-
ons they already had.
Following the release of the President's report, Soviet leader
Chernenko, while renewing calls for negotiations on space, stated in an
interview in Pravda on April 9, 1984, that "bluntly and frankly, they do
not want to reach an agreement. But going so far as to make a mockery
of common sense, they express readiness to talk with us with the sole
aim of agreeing that accord on this issue is impossible. It is thus that
the people in Washington understand political dialogue and talks in
general."
In response to these developments, Republicans and Democrats in the
Senate and House rallied around resolutions calling for space arms
control. A version of Senator Larry Pressler's (R-S.Dak.) resolution,
which called for a temporary halt in the ongoing U.S. effort to develop
an ASAT, and resolutions challenging the Tsongas amendment, which
was to expire in September, provided the vehicles for debate. In the
House a new umbrella organization, the Coalition for Peaceful Uses of
OCR for page 169
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
169
Outer Space led by Representative George Brown (D-Calif.), was formed
to try to eliminate funding for ASAT testing from the fiscal year 1985
military requests. Democratic presidential candidate Mondale once
again criticized the administration for its space policy and outlined a
five-point proposal that went beyond his earlier call for a "temporary"
moratorium on testing anti-satellite weapons and negotiations with the
Soviets "to get a verifiable ban" on these weapons. This proposal in-
cluded a reaffirmation ofthe U.S. commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty;
a temporary moratorium on the testing and deployment of all weapons
in space; and, following that, negotiation of a "verifiable treaty block-
ing weaponry in the heavens." Other critics of the administration's
report argued that it was simply a laundry list of problems facing ASAT
arms control and failed to compare the advantages to U.S. national
security of an ASAT ban with an unconstrained ASAT race. The NATO
Defense Ministers, meeting in April for NATO's Nuclear Planning
Group session, also reportedly expressed skepticism and anxiety about
U.S. military plans for space, and several allies urged the U.S. adminis-
tration to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union to forestall an
arms race in space.
On May 28, 1984, the House of Representatives approved by a vote of
238 to 181 a ban sponsored by Representative Brown on the further
testing of U.S. ASAT weapons until the Soviet Union resumed testing.
Following the House vote, Soviet leader Chernenko once again called on
the United States to negotiate "without delay" a pact banning the use of
anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet leader said the Soviet Union would
maintain its "unilateral moratorium" on launchings of anti-satellite
weapons as long as the United States abstained "from placing in space
anti-satellite weapons of any type," which he said also covered "test
launchings of anti-satellite weapons." Chernenko also renewed Andro-
pov's offer to "liquidate" all existing anti-satellite systems as part of an
agreement.
The U.S. State Department responded that Washington was ready to
"talk" about anti-satellite weapons but not "negotiate" and that the
government would not engage in formal negotiation on an issue where
it believed there was no reasonable chance of verification. The following
day, July 12, 1984, the Senate passed a compromise amendment to the
fiscal year 1985 military authorization bill that was less restrictive
than the previous year's version of the Tsongas amendment but more
restrictive than the challengers to that amendment desired. Among
other provisions, the amendment stated that no funds could be obli-
gated or expended to test any explosive or inert anti-satellite warheads
against objects in space unless the United States was endeavoring in
OCR for page 176
176
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
fain alternative to an ASAT capability and would certainly risk escala-
tion of a conflict. Thus, it is argued that a U.S. capability to destroy
satellites clearly responds to the need to deter such Soviet attacks on
U.S. satellites.
The U.S. government also argues that the United States must be able
to protect its forces against the threats posed by Soviet satellites. Specif-
ically, a comprehensive ASAT ban would afford a sanctuary to existing
Soviet reconnaissance satellites designed to target U.S. naval and land
forces. The absence of a U.S. ASAT capability to prevent Soviet target-
ing from satellites could be seen by the Soviet Union as a substantial
factor in its ability to conduct a successful conventional attack on U.S.
and allied forces. It might also offset the deterrent effect of superior U.S.
and allied naval warfare capabilities. Conversely, Soviet uncertainty
over the availability of satellites to target naval forces would decrease
Soviet confidence in its ability to attack U.S. naval forces, thereby add-
ing to deterrence and stability. In this manner, a U.S. ASAT capability
would help deter a conventional conflict.
U.S. Evaluation of Soviet Initiatives. The Reagan Administration
has taken the position that the Soviet ciraft treaty and the proposed
moratorium are unacceptable. Tt argues that the motives behind the
Soviet initiatives are suspect. The timing of the Soviet offer suggests
that it is designed to curtail the testing of the new U.S. ASAT program,
thereby leaving the Soviet Union with a unilateral advantage in ASAT
capability. Moreover, in addition to its operational ASAT system, the
Soviet Union currently has other systems with potential ASAT capabil-
ities that would not be constrained by the Soviet moratorium, which
clears only with space-based systems. The proposed moratorium, for
example, would not affect tests of ground-based lasers in an ASAT mode.
Furthermore, according to the administration, a test moratorium
would not necessarily cause the Soviet operational system to atrophy.
After a hiatus of several years in ASAT testing, the administration
points out, the Soviet Union was able to resume testing of its ASAT
system without any apparent degradation in performance. Research
and development programs, such as the U.S. ASAT program, would pay
a much higher price for a moratorium on testing, and even a short delay
in the test program would delay the time that the U.S. ASAT could be
operational.
With regard to the draft treaty itself, the Reagan Administration
argues that it lacks effective verification provisions since it provides for
nothing beyond National Technical Means of verification, which are
deemed inadequate. Specifically, the draft treaty does not indicate how
OCR for page 177
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
177
the elimination of the operational Soviet ASAT system would be
verified. Moreover, the prohibition on the destruction, damaging,
and disruption of other states' space objects could pose verification
problems.
The administration argues that the draft also does not deal with resid-
ual ASAT capabilities. For example, dismantling of the Soviet coorbital
ASAT system would still permit the Soviet Union to use its Galosh ABM
interceptor missiles in an anti-satellite role. In addition, the draft
treaty proposes that "piloted" spacecraft not be used for ''military"
purposes. Since the term "military" does not appear elsewhere in the
draft and would appear to cover such activities as reconnaissance and
communications as well as weapons, the administration suggests that
this provision is intended to constrain the Space Shuttle, which is the
primary U.S. launch system for national security as well as civil space
. .
missions.
The Soviet View
The 1983 Draft Treaty Constraints. The Soviet government has
proposed that U.S.-Soviet talks on space should deal not only with ASAT
systems but also with the broader question of the militarization of space
as addressed in the Soviet 1983 draft treaty. The Soviet draft treaty
specifically calls for a ban on the testing and development of new anti-
satellite systems and for the elimination of all existing anti-satellite
systems. The Soviet Union has also stated that its unilateral commit-
ment not to be the first to put into space any type of "anti-satellite
weapon" is still in force as a first step toward a total ban on anti-satellite
weapons. The Soviet Union has called on the United States to declare a
similar moratorium on its activities before the opening of official arms
control negotiations on space.
The 1983 Soviet draft is broader in scope and more precise in defini-
tion and terms than the 1981 draft, which Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko referred to as simply an extension of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty. The parties to the draft treaty undertake "not to destroy, dam-
age or disrupt the normal functioning of other states' space objects, nor
change their flight trajectories." Along with the more comprehensive
constraints on ASAT systems, which were not included in the 1981
draft, the new Soviet proposals cover a range of activities, including a
prohibition on the use, threat of use, testing, and deployment of any
space-based weapons against targets in space, in the atmosphere, or on
earth.
OCR for page 178
178
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Verification. The verification provisions in the 1983 Soviet draft
treaty call for the use of National Technical Means of verification and
state that the parties will undertake to consult and cooperate with each
other in resolving any questions that may arise with regard to the
objectives of the treaty or its observance. Soviet leader Chernenko has
asserted that a moratorium on anti-satellite weapons tests is verifiable.
He stated on June 12, 1984, "The Soviet Union is convinced that moni-
toring a freeze on anti-satellite weapons tests is possible, and, moreover,
is extremely reliable above all through the national technical means
the sides have at their disposal.... Effective monitoring of the sides'
compliance with a moratorium on orbital anti-satellite weapons could
be ensured by the means both sides have at their disposal for tracking
objects in space. As for suborbital anti-satellite systems, then apart
from the aforementioned facilities it would also be possible to enlist the
use of other radioelectronic facilities of the United States and of the
Soviet Union that are stationed on the ground, in the worId's oceans and
in space." Chernenko continued that consultations, the exchange of
information, or possibly other forms of cooperation could be found to
deal with uncertain situations. Given real interest in finding effective
solutions, he said, any questions relating to the militarization of outer
space could be successfully resolved during negotiations.
Soviet analysts point out the impossibility of trying to solve the prob-
lem of verification without even discussing it within a negotiating
framework. The U.S. position on verification has been criticized by the
Soviet Union as a means of undercutting negotiations to permit the U.S.
space weapons program to proceed.
Soviet analysts argue that the technical difficulties involved in the
verification of an ASAT agreement are no more difficult than the techni-
cal difficulties involved in the verification of any other arms control
agreement. They point out that ASAT weapons would be much easier to
control before the systems are deployed rather than after they are de-
ployed by both sides. Concerning the verification problems presented by
residual ASAT capabilities, Soviet analysts acknowledge that there are
various ways of destroying satellites, including such clumsy procedures
as docking with enemy satellites. Nonetheless, they argue that there is
no problem in verifying whether or not a satellite has been destroyed
and that it is much easier to see what is happening in space than it is to
see what is happening on earth from space.
Arguments for ASAT Arms Control. Soviet analysts have argued
that the matter of banning anti-satellite weapons is urgent because the
deployment of such weapons would destabilize the strategic situation.
OCR for page 179
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
179
By being able to destroy early warning satellites, such weapons would
have the capability to blind the other side. Soviet analysts note that an
attack on a single satellite, or even the failure of a satellite, during a
time of tension, could have grave consequences. Some Soviet analysts
emphasize that an attempt to destroy the opponent's satellites would be
regarded as the first step to a nuclear war.
Soviet spokesmen have emphasized that urgent steps are necessary
before the militarization of space becomes irreversible. The U.S. ASAT
systems are viewed as the first step toward a more comprehensive U.S
antimissile system. Because of the link between ASAT and ABM devel-
opments, the Soviets have urged comprehensive bans on the militariza-
tion of outer space. Anti-satellite systems are also connected by Soviet
analysts to the buildup of U.S. strategic offensive systems, including
the MX, the Trident I] missile, the Stealth bomber, and Pershing IT and
cruise missiles. These analysts assert that the U.S. ASAT program is
part of a larger move by the United States to develop a destabilizing
first-strike capability.
U. S. Supporters ofASATArms Control
Although there are different opinions on what may be the best for-
mula for ASAT arms control, domestic supporters of ASAT arms control
agree that the strictest possible limitation on anti-satellite weapons is
in the national security interest of the United States. The following
arguments are usually highlighted in support of urgent ASAT arms
control efforts.
The Importance of Satellites to U. S. Security. Domestic supporters of
ASAT arms control emphasize that satellites are vital to U.S. national
security and strategic stability and that their survival can best be pro-
tected by strict ASAT arms control limitations. To the extent that criti-
cal satellite systems were still considered at risk under an ASAT
agreement, survivability measures such as hardening and redundancy
should be incorporated into future satellite systems. Conversely, unre-
stricted ASAT development endangers the survival of all U.S. satellite
systems. While satellite systems are also important to the Soviet
Union, there is little question that the United States is more dependent
on these systems. In a political crisis, both superpowers would depend
on satellites to assess the actions of the other side and of the rest of the
world as well. These systems serve a critical role in deterring either side
from attempting a preemptive strike in a severe crisis, since the possi-
biTity of effective surprise would be greatly reduced. If hostilities oc-
OCR for page 180
180
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
curred, the information and communications from satellites would be
vital to efforts to keep the crisis from escalating to a nuclear catastro-
phe. If an attack occurred, satellites would provide early warning and
permit the launching of retaliatory forces.
Since satellites play such an important role in deterrence, domestic
supporters point out, ASAT systems are inherently destabilizing. ASAT
systems will inevitably be viewed by the other side as supporting a first-
strike strategy. By having the capability to shoot down crucial military
satellites at the outset of a preemptive first strike, a potential adversary
could be perceived as planning to degrade the effectiveness of an oppo-
nent's retaliatory forces in a crisis.
Some of these domestic supporters point out that ASAT arms control is
also in the U.S. security interest since the United States is more depen-
dent on military communication satellites than is the Soviet Union.
U.S. military forces are spread around the globe and require secure
Tong-range communications. More than 60 percent of Tong-hau] U.S.
military communications are now transmitted via satellites, and it is
argued that there are no alternative facilities that provide a satisfac-
tory replacement for this satellite system. In contrast, Soviet military
forces are mainly on or near to the Eurasian land mass and can readily
communicate by a variety of ground-based and airborne facilities in
addition to satellites. Indeed, one can argue that the Soviet Union uses
its satellites as a backup for its ground-based and airborne communica-
tions and intelligence gathering systems, while the converse is true of
the United States.
These domestic supporters also argue that ASAT arms control is in the
U.S. interest because the United States will be less able to adapt to the
costs of an unrestrained ASAT competition. The United States operates
with fewer satellites than does the Soviet Union since U.S. satellites are
much more sophisticated and Tong-lived than the Soviet counterparts.
Moreover, although many U.S. satellites are currently secure in high
orbits, this situation will not Tong be the case if ASAT technology con-
tinues unconstrained. In contrast, Soviet satellites for the most part ar
relatively short-lived systems in low earth orbit. Soviet practice is to
replace satellites frequently and maintain more in orbit. The Soviet
Union is therefore better situated to deal with a race for satellite redun-
dancy. Since ASAT technology strongly favors the attacker over the
defending satellite, critics argue that advocates of ASAT development
have lost sight of the cost to the United States of developing defensive
capabilities for satellites. Adding survivability features such as armor
plating, antijamming devices, evasive maneuvering capabilities, or
shielding against lasers, or developing active defenses for a satellite,
OCR for page 181
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
181
will markedly increase the weight, and hence the cost, of future satel-
lites while providing marginal protection against improved ASAT
weapons. Deterring a Soviet ASAT attack on high-value U.S. satellites
also would not be achieved by the sure response of destroying a single
Soviet satellite, supporters argue, as that would be a price the Soviet
Union is willing to pay.
Time Urgency for ASAT Arms Control. Domestic supporters of
ASAT arms control emphasize that there is now a unique opportunity
for agreement since the tested but rudimentary technology of the Soviet
ASAT system and the untested but more advanced technology of the
U.S. F-15 ASAT system do not provide either side with a really threaten-
ing ASAT capability. When fully developed the U.S. F-15 ASAT system
will pose a much more serious threat to satellites. The Soviet Union
must be expected to move quickly to cluplicate the more advanced tech-
nology of the U.S. system. Of particular concern is the fact that once
tested and deployed, the small size and mobility of a jet-launched minia-
ture homing vehicle system will present a very difficult verification
problem for future ASAT agreements. This will take on particular sig-
nificance given the greater capabilities of the F-15 ASAT system.
The result of an unrestrained ASAT weapons clevelopment, according
to domestic supporters of ASAT arms control, would be an extremely
expensive, destabilizing arms race in space from which neither side
would gain any security advantage. Currently, all anti-satellite weap-
ons deployed or undergoing field tests have a maximum altitude of
several thousand kilometers or less. Hence, they could attack satellites
only in Tow or highly elliptical orbits. Since the early warning, naviga-
tion, attack assessment, and communications satellites essential to the
U.S. strategic forces are all in very high orbits, they are not at risk in the
near term. The Soviet Union faces a somewhat greater potential threat,
since some of its essential communications satellites and all of its early
warning satellites are currently in highly elliptical MoIniya orbits that
the new U.S. F-15 ASAT system could attack from bases in the general
area of the orbits' perigees.
These domestic supporters argue that it is logical to constrain the
Soviet program now, while the system is slow-, only marginally reliable,
and capable of attacking only a few satellites at a time. The technology
of the U.S. F-15 ASAT system, on the other hand, would potentially
present a prompt threat against a large component of deployed satel-
lites. Achievement of this capability, which could represent a signifi-
cant military threat if fully exploited, constitutes the crossing of an
important threshold leading to an arms race in space.
OCR for page 182
182
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Arguments Against the Military Utility of ASATs. Domestic sup-
porters argue that, contrary to the administration's assessments, devel-
opment of ASAT weapons will not improve but rather undermine
deterrence. If both countries achieve an ability to destroy the opponent's
early warning, communications, and navigation satellites, they argue,
each would have considerable incentive to initiate such an attack dur-
ing a time of acute crisis. The existence of significant ASAT capabilities
on both sides would therefore decrease crisis stability and increase the
threat of war. If past experience is any guide, supporters argue, the U.S.
ASAT program, far from discouraging the Soviet Union from further
ASAT developments, will only stimulate these developments.
Domestic supporters also challenge the administration's rationale
that ASATs are needed to deny a sanctuary to Soviet ocean reconnais-
sance satellites capable of guiding aircraft and submarines to impor-
tant U.S. naval ships. It is argued that the Soviet Radar Ocean
Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT) is not an extremely threatening
system and that the capability to destroy Soviet reconnaissance satel-
lites is neither necessary nor sufficient to protect the U.S. fleet. Coun-
termeasures against such a system, such as jamming from ships, are
available and fairly straightforward.
Verification. Supporters of ASAT arms control do not accept the ad-
ministration's conclusion that a comprehensive ASAT agreement poses
impossible verification problems. They argue that when the verifiabil-
ity of a comprehensive ASAT ban is examined in detail, the risks to U.S.
security of possible violations are small compared with the dangers
inherent in unlimited development of ASAT capabilities.
Supporters emphasize that the United States has a very effective and
redundant intelligence system for keeping track of Soviet activities in
space. Moreover, these capabilities will increase significantly in the
future. As evidence of past capabilities, they point out that the United
States has successfully monitored Soviet ASAT activities for the last 15
years even though the Soviet Union has never acknowledged the exis-
tence of its ASAT program.
Supporters argue that the prohibition on attacks on satellites can be
verified with high confidence, since the operation of U.S. satellites is
closely monitored and sensors can diagnose the cause of failure. While
direct evidence of the source of the attack might not always be immedi-
ately available, circumstantial evidence would be overwhelming, since
no country other than the Soviet Union will have the capability or
motivation to undertake such attacks against U.S. satellites in the
foreseeable future.
OCR for page 183
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
183
Supporters argue that, while problems exist, a ban on dedicated ASAT
systems can be adequately verified. Specifically, a ban on the further
testing of the existing coorbital systems could be verified with high
confidence. Such tests are easily identified and would be monitored
from launch to intercept, as they have been in the past. Any effort to
upgrade this system to give it a high-altitude capability would be partic-
ularly obvious, since it would require an extremely large booster to get
the heavy payload into a geosynchronous orbit. Without additional
tests it would not be possible to upgrade the capability of this system
significantly.
Supporters acknowledge that the complete elimination of the existing
Soviet ASAT system cannot be verified with high confidence since some
payloads might not be destroyed. But they argue that if launchers for
the specialized SS-9 boosters are eliminated or kept to small numbers
for other missions, a covertly reconstituted system would have limited
capabilities and would not endanger the most critical U.S. satellites in
geosynchronous orbits. In the absence of further tests, Soviet confidence
in the system would decline and retained payloads could not be used
with other boosters.
With regard to new systems employing directed energy (high-energy
lasers or particle beams) as kill mechanisms, supporters argue that
deployment of such systems would be a major undertaking and would
require an extended test program that would be easily identifiable.
While ground-based high-energy lasers might present a more difficult
verification problem, supporters argue that use of such a system
against U.S. targets would certainly be identified. Testing it with coop-
erative Soviet satellites could also be detected by monitoring the illumi-
nation and heating of the target, they contend.
With regard to the potential future threat posed by "space mines,"
supporters argue that this development could be monitored with confi-
dence, since all satellites are tracked and a Soviet satellite following a
critical U.S. satellite closely in the same orbit would be immediately
apparent. This threat could be contained by including in the agreement
"rules of the road" that prohibit such trailing activities.
Finally, supporters argue that various indirect ASAT capabilities
that are inherent in other military and civil space activities are not in
fact serious threats at present. Moreover, efforts to upgrade these sys-
tems for an ASAT role would be easily verified, they assert. Specifically,
while the existing Soviet ABM system deployed at Moscow and inter-
continental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads have an
inherent capability against Tow-altitude satellites, it is extremely un-
likely that they would be used for this purpose in peacetime or in a
OCR for page 184
184
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
conventional conflict due to the risk of escalation and the danger to
Soviet satellites. Supporters argue that any attempts to arm these sys-
tems with nonnuclear homing warheads would require extensive test-
ing that could be easily detected. With regard to civil systems such as
the U.S. Space Shuttle or the Soviet Progress resupply vehicles that
have a rendezvous capability, supporters argue that the capabilities of
these systems are very limited in an ASAT role and that efforts to
operate them in this manner would be easily detected.
Breakout. Supporters of ASAT arms control also disagree with the
assertion that under an arms control regime the Soviet Union would be
in a unilateral position to constrain a new U.S. ASAT system because
the Soviet system is tested whereas the U.S. system is not. It is argued
that the United States has already conducted enough engineering tests
of its own ASAT interceptor to be ready for immediate space tests, if a
moratorium or ASAT agreement were terminated. It is also argued that
incorporation of reasonable survivability measures in U.S. satellites
would erode Soviet confidence in its ASAT system in the absence of
tests. Supporters also disagree with the government's assessment that
since U.S. satellites are so few in number, Soviet possession of only a few
ASAT interceptors after a breakout would pose a prohibitive risk. They
note that most of the important U.S. satellites are out of range of the
present Soviet ASAT system, which would be the only Soviet capability
available after a breakout from an agreement.
Breakout using an entirely new ASAT weapon that had been tested
only on the ground or covertly would involve prohibitive technical risk.
Breaking the ASAT system down into component parts for covert test-
ing entails a high risk that the whole system may not work. Without
tests the Soviet Union, which has experienced many failures in its space
technology plans and performance over the years (particularly in the
ASAT field), could not confidently predict how soon a new device could
be made to work after breakout. Soviet attempts to conduct a series of
full-system ASAT tests in space would almost certainly be detected even
if deceptive tactics were attempted.
ASAT Link with ABM. Another reason for ASAT arms control, ac-
cording to some supporters, is to assure that the SAI,T ~ ABM Treaty
limitir~g anti-ballistic missile systems is not undermined. These critics
are concerned that the lack of restrictions on ASAT development poten-
tially provides a way to circumvent the ABM Treaty. Either side can
claim that a weapon system under development is intended to be de-
ployed as an ASAT when the Tonger-term objective is really ballistic
OCR for page 185
ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
185
missile defense. Conversely, a program that really is intended only to
achieve an ASAT capability may be perceived by the other side as a
nascent ABM system, sparking fears of ABM breakout. In this context
some supporters charge that the real reason the United States does not
want to negotiate ASAT controls is because they could interfere with
the government's Strategic Defense Initiative.
Comprehensive Versus Partial Limitations. Many supporters of
ASAT arms control emphasize the criticality of achieving comprehen-
sive limitations on ASAT development as opposed to partial limitations
designed to avoid problems raised by a comprehensive proposal. For
example, one of the partial limitations that is reportedly under consid-
eration by the Reagan Administration is a ban on ASAT systems capa-
ble of attacking satellites in high (geosynchronous) orbits. This would
allow both sides to develop their Tow-altitude ASATs while protecting
the most vital U.S. satellites, which are in high orbits. An argument for
this approach is that it will avoid some ofthe verification difficulties of a
comprehensive ban, including the elimination of existing interceptors,
while giving the United States a chance to match the Soviet Union with
an operational ASAT system. However, supporters of ASAT arms con-
trol oppose this limited approach on the grounds that it would not pre-
vent the development of dangerous and destabilizing ASAT capabilities
that would threaten some critical satellites on each side. They argue
that this limited approach would undercut the ABM Treaty in the same
manner as unrestricted competition. Finally, they question whether it
would in fact resolve the verification problem, since it might be difficult
to distinguish permitted activities from developments leading to a high-
altitude capability.
The Soviet Draft Treaty. Some supporters of ASAT arms control dis-
agree with the administration's negative assessment of the Soviet 1983
draft treaty. They argue that it is a significant improvement over the
much less comprehensive 1981 Soviet draft and a sign that the Soviets
mar have a serious interest in negotiating a ban on space weapons,
including ASAT systems. While cautioning that the Soviet draft treaty
should not be taken as the final word and that deficiencies, such as the
apparently discriminatory handling of manned space vehicles (the
Space Shuttle), need to be resolved satisfactorily in negotiations, these
supporters believe that the U.S. government should respond positively
to this proposal. They note with approval that the Soviet Union has
announced an ASAT moratorium, and that the new draft treaty i
broader in scope and includes more precise definitions of the types of
OCR for page 186
186
acbvibes and systems that are limited than the 1981 drain. For the first
bme the Soviet Union teas indicated ~ ~iHingness to Thee to dismantle
As existing ASK system. The new drag Spears to brave ehminated
lan~age Tom the earher ASK negotiations that some interpreted as
legalizing the use of AS~s against , satelUtes and third par-
ties. In short, these supporters see the Soviet drag treaty as providing
basis Or serious negotiations.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
asat arms
