4
Non-Medical Science and Technology: Specific Findings and Recommendations

INTRODUCTION

As noted in Chapter 2, Box 2.1, all research, development, and acquisition for chemical and biological defense is carried out through a legislatively mandated Joint Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program and is organized around two principal areas—(1) Non-Medical Science and Technology and (2) Medical Defense. Although the committee was tasked to make R&D projections in specific time frames—to 2005 (near term), to 2010 (mid-term), and to 2015 (far term)—it found this practically impossible for two reasons:

  1. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the significantly increased investment by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in medical countermeasures and vaccines are leading to increased activities in these areas, which should in turn impact the Joint CBD Program. The committee believes, however, that its recommendations remain applicable. The Department of the Navy should follow closely and leverage any such future activities to accelerate developments appropriately in the Joint CBD Program.

  2. The Joint CBD Program has been undergoing substantial reorganization and reassignment of responsibilities that should affect current near-, mid-, and far-term plans. The Navy is urged to engage more actively with the program to influence those changes.



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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats 4 Non-Medical Science and Technology: Specific Findings and Recommendations INTRODUCTION As noted in Chapter 2, Box 2.1, all research, development, and acquisition for chemical and biological defense is carried out through a legislatively mandated Joint Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program and is organized around two principal areas—(1) Non-Medical Science and Technology and (2) Medical Defense. Although the committee was tasked to make R&D projections in specific time frames—to 2005 (near term), to 2010 (mid-term), and to 2015 (far term)—it found this practically impossible for two reasons: The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the significantly increased investment by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in medical countermeasures and vaccines are leading to increased activities in these areas, which should in turn impact the Joint CBD Program. The committee believes, however, that its recommendations remain applicable. The Department of the Navy should follow closely and leverage any such future activities to accelerate developments appropriately in the Joint CBD Program. The Joint CBD Program has been undergoing substantial reorganization and reassignment of responsibilities that should affect current near-, mid-, and far-term plans. The Navy is urged to engage more actively with the program to influence those changes.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats However, the committee does offer observations on activities in the context of the near, mid-, and far term based on the technical or development difficulties associated with a particular area. The Non-Medical Science and Technology part of the Joint CBD Program is organized in five “commodity” areas: contamination avoidance, individual protection, collective protection, decontamination, and modeling and simulation.1 The wide range of activities in each of these commodity areas is indicated in Figure 4.1; the commodity areas are further described later in this chapter and in Appendix C. The committee attempted to gain as complete a view as possible in order to understand how well the activities of the Non-Medical Science and Technology Program are meeting the needs of the Navy—and how well the Navy is engaging the Joint CBD Program to ensure that its interests are being addressed. In the committee’s opinion, most of the issues identified in addressing these broad questions arise from a shift in the threat landscape—from an at-sea military adversary of Cold War scenarios to an adversary willing to use asymmetric techniques aimed at both military and civilian targets. It is also the committee’s belief that the Joint CBD Program and most of the Navy have not adjusted to that shift. The most important observations and recommendations relevant to nonmedical science and technology (S&T) and the implications for acquiring improved capabilities are summarized below and elaborated in the following sections. Non-Medical Science and Technology Program. Two aspects of the Joint CBD Program appear not to serve naval needs well and can be ameliorated with appropriate attention by the Navy: The Non-Medical Science and Technology Program has been and remains dominated by a philosophy of “contamination avoidance,” a laudable goal indeed, but one that the committee believes is unrealistic as the driving force, considering the broad range of possible asymmetric attacks (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3). Such a philosophy requires detection to facilitate avoidance and the identification of a threat agent as early as possible, which in turn drives investments heavily toward sensor systems for both standoff and point detection to provide rapid early warning. The committee recommends that the Navy champion a fundamental change in philosophy in the Joint CBD Program—one that moves toward a risk management approach which assumes that contamination will happen and focuses on managing the response. Such a shift should result in a 1   Joint Science and Technology Panel for Chemical and Biological Defense. 2002. DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Non-Medical Science and Technology Program, draft version 2002.01.05, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Biological and Chemical Defense Programs, Washington, D.C.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats FIGURE 4.1 Taxonomy of the Joint CBD Program’s Non-Medical Science and Technology Program.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats more balanced investment portfolio, to also include detection capabilities to support decontamination and diagnostics characterization of agent fate on exposed surfaces; protective equipment in consonance with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that better facilitate operating through an exposure; and rapid and “friendly” decontamination techniques and procedures. A second observation is that the requirements and acquisition processes of the entire Joint CBD Program, as described in Box 2.1 in Chapter 2, have pushed acquisition schedules out far too long into the future for providing capabilities that could significantly improve the current operational posture. Those processes are undergoing revision, with reassignment of responsibilities within the Joint CBD Program and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The committee recommends that the Navy seize the opportunity to ensure that processes are truly revamped to accelerate the introduction of improvements into the fleet. Navy participation. Achieving the changes in the Joint CBD Program recommended in point 1 above would be challenging enough if the Navy were fully engaged in the joint process. But in fact the Navy has been the least aggressive of the Services in its participation. Personnel from the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), assigned to represent naval interests are well informed and committed to their assignments; however, they do not have sufficient support from senior Navy leadership and commands to analyze joint requirements in the naval context and, if need be, to influence the program for it to address Navy-unique needs. It was not clear to the committee how serious an issue this might be. Lacking a robust, independent assessment of its own, the Navy is captive to equipment and accompanying operational procedures derived largely from the most stressing requirements of environments expected for ground forces in combat, based on conditions at or near the point of agent release. The recommendation in Chapter 3 (in the subsection “Operational Recommendation: Roles for NWDC and MCCDC”) to assign the Navy Warfare Development Command responsibility for developing and promulgating a carefully analyzed and gamed concept of operations would go a long way toward addressing this issue. Here the knowledgeable personnel at NWDC could also provide to naval personnel involved in the Joint CBD Program sorely needed support and expertise for ensuring that naval needs are met. In carrying out this recommendation, the Navy should make good use of Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) personnel who have well-established reputations in the chemical and biological S&T community. Testing and evaluation. The maritime environment introduces unique factors that should be explicitly considered before accepting equipment from the Joint CBD Program and developing procedures for its use. The Navy’s research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) community is limited in its capa-

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats bilities to make such assessments. The committee recommends that a more serious and comprehensive program in testing and evaluation be undertaken by the Navy, to include both modeling and simulation and realistic test environments for chemical and biological warfare defense. The committee, in fact, recommends that the Navy consider dedicating a ship to chemical and biological simulant testing in a fashion analogous to the use of the ex-LSD Shadwell for fire research. In addition to discussing each of the points above in more detail, in this chapter the committee provides an assessment of each of the commodity areas on the basis of presentations (see the section entitled “Committee Meetings” in the preface of the report), discussions, and material received. The chapter emphasizes naval-specific issues and defers to Appendix C descriptions of specific technologies and key demonstration programs. More comprehensive overviews and details of specific systems and detection requirements are available from other sources.2 THE NON-MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Non-Medical S&T Finding: Contamination Avoidance—A Limiting Philosophy Against Asymmetric Threats In order to evaluate the utility to naval forces of non-medical science and technology that is current, in development, and proposed, the committee assessed naval issues from the five operational perspectives described in Chapter 3: (1) ships at sea, (2) ships in the littorals, (3) shore installations and bases, (4) commercial ports, and (5) logistics. Naval operations in these five environments can require different types of support and therefore lead to different priorities for science and technology, but a few general points can be extracted. As shown in Figure 4.2, the earlier a chemical or biological threat can be detected, the less complex the response required—if not to avoid contamination altogether, then to minimize the consequences and therefore the responses to an attack. This importance of early detection has promoted the focus of non-medical S&T on threat discovery and environmental detection—that is, on avoiding contamination altogether so as not to be faced with subsequent situations and with actions needed farther along the time line. Avoiding contamination eliminates or reduces the need for (1) decontamination, (2) utilization of protective equipment (and the associated loss of performance), and (3) medical response, both short 2   For example: Institute of Medicine and Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology, National Research Council. 1999. Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 239-240.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats FIGURE 4.2 A generic time line helpful in evaluating the utility of non-medical science and technology in response to chemical and biological threats. SOURCE: Adapted from “CB Defense Program Taxonomy (slide 16),” of the “DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Overview” presentation to the committee on September 18, 2001, by Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense. and long term.3 The cornerstone of contamination avoidance is the detection and identification of a threat agent as early as possible. If complete avoidance is not possible, detection and identification can be used to minimize the impact of contamination. This emphasis on contamination avoidance has led to non-medical S&T’s principal investment (for decades even before it was joint program) in sensors and sensor systems, at levels as high as about 70 percent of the total. The committee believes that this approach is highly limiting, however, because any sensor shield for warning will have gaps, and trade-offs should be made between better warning and better response. Echoing a theme that runs throughout this report, the committee finds that a much more prudent approach would be based on risk management and early consideration in the operational assessments and in the S&T program of how to integrate both warning and response into the conduct of operations. These considerations will be critical to continuous or rapid return to military operations by forces under chemical or biological weapons attack. The committee’s assessment derives from the fact that the risk from asymmetric, or at least unconventional, attacks has increased. A determined adversary with even a small quantity of chemical or biological agent and a well-executed attack plan could produce significant consequences if supply chains, civilian support operations, and/or deployment schedules were disrupted. For example, the contamination of a ship in a foreign port raises the question as to how a captain should best utilize the non-medical science and technology at his disposal in response to an attack in which no sensor system allowed the avoidance of exposure. The extension of that question for the Non-Medical Science and Tech- 3   If an adversary’s intent can be determined early enough, contamination avoidance also includes the destruction of capability before an agent is actually used. This is the agent-defeat program in DOD’s “active defense” element for countering weapons of mass destruction. It is not discussed here because the committee’s focus, as directed by the terms of reference, was on the “passive defense” element.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats nology Program is this: What are the next-generation systems that would add the most value in the current and emerging asymmetric threat environment? Civilian approaches to managing similar situations may offer insight. Managing the problems created by industrial accidents, train derailments, toxic gas leaks, infectious and communicable disease outbreaks, and intentional contamination of victims has become nearly routine for civilian local responders and health agencies. These events are managed using the same systematic planning, training, communications, logistics support, command and control, task analysis, and expertise that the military uses in warfare planning and exercises. Perhaps the most important aspect of the civilian approach is that of grading the response to meet the objectives of reducing the spread of contamination, impact, casualties, and property damage. Understanding the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the suspected agents is a critical science and technology issue. Moreover, a great deal of uncertainty exists in the early stages of a civilian event. Deployment of monitors may or may not be possible, and, if deployed, they may not have the capability to characterize the causative agents or assess agent dispersion. In all cases there is need for scientific knowledge about the possible agents, health risks from exposure, and interaction with materials and the environment. This scientific understanding significantly affects the actions to be taken, including the definition of a perimeter, the levels of protection provided for response personnel, the decontamination measures used, and the treatment of casualties. This close coupling of operational considerations with S&T capabilities should guide the priorities for investment in S&T and training. Non-Medical S&T Finding: An Opportunity for Change The Joint CBD Program’s committee processes—both for setting requirements and for prioritizing research, development, and acquisition (RDA) efforts—have come under scrutiny and criticism by a number of advisory panels in the past few years.4 Two factors contribute to the problem: (1) The “one Service, one vote” approach of the proceedings tends to result in a roll-up of requirements that attempts to meet “the envelope,” or combined worst-case scenario, for all Services’ needs. This objective of meeting the worst-case scenario can produce a difficult challenge and commensurate long lead times for the development of techniques and can lead to systems entering acquisition well behind the state of the art. (2) In addition, the dominance of contamination avoidance as the guiding principle for the program has resulted in requirements that are rarely informed by systems analysis and trade-offs between response time and sensitivity of instruments. Comprehensive end-to-end solutions that address all of the response ele- 4   For example: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2001. Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force on Biological Defense, Washington, D.C., June.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats ments shown in Figure 4.2 in a balanced way have not been a part of the program. The lack of such solutions introduces considerable risk in any number of scenarios typical of asymmetric threats, in which contamination avoidance would never even be possible. The under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics (USD(AT&L)) recently responded to the criticisms referred to above by requesting a revamping of the program’s requirements and RDA processes. To date, that request has resulted in the elimination of the Joint Service Integration Group for requirements setting—it has been replaced with a single accountable individual at the one-star level in the Office of the Joint Staff/Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment for setting joint requirements—an arrangement more in keeping with other joint requirements processes. In addition, the executive agent lead held by the Army for RDA has been largely dismantled. More recently, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to provide managerial oversight, the Joint CBD Program has been reorganized in three major parts: specifically, (1) a newly named joint program executive officer will be responsible for the acquisition of systems, including product development; (2) the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) will be responsible for the S&T base; and (3) the Joint Staff’s Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense will be responsible defining requirements to meet operational needs.5 Non-Medical S&T Recommendation: Promulgating a Risk Management Approach The Navy, and with it the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program, should shift from a philosophy dominated by contamination avoidance toward an approach based on risk management which assumes that contamination will happen and focuses on managing the response. The foundation for a risk management approach should come from the doctrine development efforts at the Navy Warfare Development Command (as recommended in Chapter 3 of this report) and from the results of the operational net assessments in each area of responsibility (as recommended in Chapter 3). Minimizing or avoiding contamination should certainly be part of the strategy, but it may not be pragmatic, or even feasible, to do so in an era of wideranging possible asymmetric threats. Broadening the focus to include decontamination and resumption of operations will drive much of the science and technology in the same direction toward which it is already headed, but with the benefit of 5   Defense News. “Defense Program Implementation Plan Approved.” April 24, 2003. Available onlne at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/b04242003_bt270-03.html>.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats providing a different perspective for trading off parameters such as response time and sensitivity of instruments. Most importantly, and as demonstrated in civilian applications, many of the needed technologies for protection and decontamination exist to support this strategy. The Navy has an opportunity to lead such a shift in the Joint CBD Program with the recent organizational changes for requirements and RDA. Such a shift will require, however, the commitment of knowledgeable personnel to the new Office of the Joint Staff/J8, program executive office, and DTRA, as well as the support of Navy in-house expertise. NAVY INVOLVEMENT Non-Medical S&T Finding: Limited Navy Participation in the Joint CBD Program It appears to the committee that in the years before the Joint CBD Program was established, naval investments in chemical and biological defense S&T at the NRL had led to substantial progress, and that the work had coupled into a commitment in the operational Navy for improving its posture at sea. One of the best examples of that commitment was the move to collective protection systems as a requirement on new destroyers, as a result of recommendations made by one of this study’s committee members in the early 1980s.6 Since the advent of the Joint CBD Program, however, it has been difficult for NRL to sustain continuity and cohesion of effort, given the “decision by committee” process of the program and the tendency toward proposal-by-proposal awards instead of the creation and sustainment of centers of excellence. As part of the Joint CBD Program, the Navy is to be commended for taking the lead in modeling and simulation and for the Artemis standoff detection system. The Marine Corps is to be acknowledged for leadership of the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN). But these efforts represent a sharing of the load for program management among the Services and have not led to maintaining a critical mass of S&T and operational personnel to guide priorities for naval forces in the Joint CBD Program. In short, the committee developed the impression that with the creation of the Joint CBD Program, the Navy “threw it over the fence” to that program or, in effect, took the position of letting the Joint CBD Program take care of its chemical and biological defense needs. Based on the information presented to the committee, the initial percentage of funds transferred from the Navy to the Joint CBD Program has never matched the return to the Navy for program elements that it leads or directs or for the equipping of 6   Lederberg, Joshua. 1982. Memorandum for ADM James D. Watkins, USN, re: Report of the Chemical Warfare Task Force of the CNO Executive Panel (U), Chemical Warfare Task Force, CNO Executive Panel, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. (classified).

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats naval forces. In addition, non-Service aligned participants in the Joint CBD Program view the Navy as the least aggressive participant. The committee also interviewed highly committed and knowledgeable personnel at NAVSEA, ONR, and CFFC who participate in the joint process; to a person they admitted that chemical and biological defense appears close to the bottom of the list of concerns for senior Navy leadership, and the committee heard as much from CFFC and warfare integration (N70) leadership directly. While this may not be the intent of senior leadership, it is the message being conveyed. Without a more in-depth assessment and analysis of the adequacy of the Joint CBD Program’s products for meeting Navy needs, the committee cannot judge how serious an issue the relative lack of Navy participation in the program is. What is clear is that the Navy has no basis for judging how well the requirements and priorities of the Joint CBD Program address its needs—indeed, how well the Navy understands those naval-unique needs at all. Non-Medical S&T Recommendation: Reaffirming the Role for NWDC The Navy should recognize and strengthen the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) in its role of developing—through analysis, experimentation, and testing—and promulgating a concept of operations and the supporting policies for describing how naval forces will execute their warfighting and force protection missions in an environment that has been or may be contaminated with chemical or biological agents. In this role, NWDC should also provide consultation to Navy participants in the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The corresponding recommendation from Chapter 3 (see the subsection “Operational Recommendation: Roles for NWDC and MCCDC”) regarding NWDC responsibility for developing and promulgating a concept of operations (CONOPS) would go a long way toward addressing the issue of the Navy’s participation in the Joint CBD Program. In undertaking the important elements of analysis, experimentation, and testing that would lead to well-formulated CONOPS, NWDC would develop the cadre of expertise needed to support Navy participation in the Joint CBD Program as a “smart buyer.” In carrying out this recommendation, NWDC should make use of NRL personnel who have wellestablished reputations in the chemical and biological S&T community, and of members of the analytical community who have provided direct support to fleet commanders. The committee notes that the Marine Corps has been much more aggressive in its engagement of the Joint CBD Program and has put appropriate pressure, when needed, on the program to have critical operational needs addressed. However, the Marine Corps also lacks a strong analytical base through which requirements can be assessed.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats NON-MEDICAL TESTING AND EVALUATION Non-Medical S&T Finding: Lack of Realistic Testing and Evaluation for Accepting Chemical and Biological Defense Equipment The committee believes that deploying to the fleet or fleet Marine force (FMF) equipment that is either operationally ineffective or unsuitable for the operational purpose for which it is intended can have a detrimental effect on unit readiness. The committee believes that only realistic testing will ensure that the fleet and fleet Marine force receive equipment which is consistent with operational needs and environments, and that some systems now in development or being readied for procurement may confront operational effectiveness challenges similar to those cited above. For example, the technological approaches underlying the next generation of biological detection systems address only a narrow range of the potential threat spectrum, because the underlying biochemistry will identify a particular bacterial genus but not a specific threat species. In addition, agent dispersion and aggregation phenomena particular to a marine environment are not understood. The only way to ensure that the fleet receives the equipment it needs, together with the requisite operational training and maintenance support, is for the system in question to undergo thorough operational testing by fleet sailors in the operational environment in which the system is intended to be employed. The preceding, of course, merely restates long-standing DOD policy on the testing and evaluation (T&E) of new acquisitions. The problem in this case is twofold: (1) the T&E policy is not consistently applied, and (2) operational testing of potential fleet systems in environments contaminated by chemical or biological agents is very difficult to achieve. A common example of a system development path that bypasses the normal T&E requirements is the advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs). The advent of ACTDs has served to speed potential solutions and new capabilities to the operating forces; but in the process, the operational forces frequently are paying the price of receiving equipment that may not have been adequately tested through normal developmental and operational testing practices. Equipment and capabilities demonstrated in an ACTD may have inadequate supply support, operators may have received little or no documentation or training on the equipment, and these warfighters may have limited knowledge of what a system actually will (and will not) do, even if it is working to the stated specifications. ACTDs are essentially prototypes, not operational hardware, and they should undergo thorough operational T&E before follow-on production versions are procured and installed on fleet units. Replicating realistic, representative operational scenarios for T&E in contaminated environments presents a different, but no less important, challenge.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats minute counts. However, in a CONUS attack, the restoration of operations would likely be measured in hours (or days), owing to other factors such as estimating the route taken by a plume and restoring order in surrounding civil communities. The 15-minute reduction in decontamination time is unimportant in such cases. In the short term (5 years), studies should be able to determine the operational importance of agent fate and should establish the basis for answering operational questions such as, “When and where is decontamination likely to fail?” “When can protective gear be shed with acceptable risks?” and “Should point sensors be placed near specific (problematic) substrate materials?” This committee recommends that the Navy increase its physical presence at and interaction with Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command to ensure that Navy- and maritime-related issues are more visible to those formulating and executing the research and development programs. Leveraging Civilian Best Practices The tactics, techniques, and procedures developed in the chemical process industries for responding to the release of toxic industrial chemicals are well developed and should be fully exploited in the process of redefining Navy readiness planning. The Navy should identify and employ the best of these industrial practices (which generally satisfy the civil regulatory requirements) and expertise in its plan for responding to asymmetric attacks on CONUS bases, ports, and the logistical supply chain. It is not necessary, and it would be a mistake, for the Navy to try to reinvent this capability independently. Instead, the Navy should acquire this knowledge and adapt it to specific Navy needs. Careful consideration should be given to the balance between centralized doctrine and local planning. Navy-wide standardization favors centralization, while recognition of site-specific threats (e.g., a nearby chemical plant producing chlorine) favors more local planning. A balance should be struck. Developing Operational Guidelines for Decontamination The Navy should develop operational guidelines for the effective decontamination of its ships, bases, ports, airfields, and logistical chains—that is, make specific the joint doctrine expected as a product of the new Joint CBD Program requirements office in Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff/Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (OJCS/J8). Future Navy doctrine should discuss acceptable risks and evolve operational guidelines as to levels of decontamination and the levels of personnel protection that should be employed in order to minimize restoration time after contamination and maximize operational viability. In the commercial world, in responding to chemical or biological events the objectives are to reduce the spread of the agent, the impact and casualties, and

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats property damage. Pre-deployment of response equipment, training of responders, establishing expert advisers and resources, establishing command, control, and communications functions, and, most importantly, grading the response to fit the need are all essential to meet these objectives. Understanding the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the suspected agent is critical. A great deal of uncertainty often exists during the early stages of an event. The causative agents (e.g., the concentrations, dispersion, and so on) are open to debate and speculation. In many cases, there is a need for scientific understanding of the array of possible agents and their properties. This understanding will significantly affect the actions taken, such as defining of the perimeter of response; levels of protection taken for responding personnel; decontamination and treatment of casualties, equipment, facilities, and terrain; and, in general, how to define the event (as major or minor). As the response advances and the situation is managed, the on-scene manager needs continuous expert advice on how to adjust the protection levels for personnel in various working modes and on how and when normal operations can be restored. In a similar vein, as described in Chapter 3 on CONOPS development, the Navy is urged to make use of the Army and Marine Corps experience in establishing pre-event working relationships with the civil authorities who would be key resources in the event of both CONUS incidents and attacks on overseas bases and ports. Guidelines should be established a priori so that base commanders can make informed decisions regarding where best to obtain assistance (e.g., from the Navy surgeon, Army chemical corps, civil responders, Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, the chemical industry, and so on). Necessarily, the operational concepts will vary depending on the attack scenario (e.g., involving ships at sea, littoral operations, CONUS base, supply chain, and so on) and situation. In all cases, however, doctrine must clearly define the operational concepts and specify performance standards, providing logical and clear guidance that can be applied in each situation. The doctrine must be risk management–based. This approach implicitly acknowledges that characterization of the contaminated areas and their subsequent decontamination will not be perfect, and that residual chemical or biological risks will probably linger as operations are restored. Doctrine must provide the performance requirements (e.g., “How clean is acceptable?”), the definition of testing and evaluation techniques, and ultimately, what research and development needs remain. With the doctrine in hand, the investments in effective decontamination technology and procedures then can be clearly linked to Navy-specific needs. Summary of Findings Related to Decontamination The decontamination story is multifaceted, as evident in the preceding discussion, but capabilities sorely lag those in the areas of contamination avoidance and individual and collective protection. Recapping the findings noted in the discussion above:

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Effective decontamination materials and procedures should be viewed by the Navy as critical parts of a risk management–based, layered defense against chemical and biological agents. The Navy should develop a doctrine about decontamination that sets guidelines, procedures and methods, standards of cleanliness, and sources of technical guidance that apply to ships and shore-based facilities. No guidelines exist for what are acceptable or “safe” long-term exposure levels of chemical or biological agent that remains after decontamination. Studies should be undertaken to set the appropriate levels for short- and long-term exposures and address whether standards should differ between civilian and military environments. No field instruments are capable of measuring to the concentration of a chemical or biological agent on decontaminated surfaces consistent with acceptable long-term exposure levels. Work should be started to develop equipment and test procedures that become a part of the decontamination toolkit. Most desirable would be a standoff surface scanning capability. Little data exist on chemical or biological agent fates. Studies are needed to understand the consequences of the interactions of agents with substrates common to Navy ships and shore facilities. This information is critical for guiding an intelligent approach to decontaminating a site as well as for providing information about the long-term safety of decontaminated surfaces. There also appear to be little data available on the health effects of longterm exposures to low-level concentrations of either chemical warfare agents or biological warfare agents or toxins. This information would be very helpful in establishing realistic standards for decontamination. Progress is being made in research and development for significantly improved decontaminating reagents (low toxicity, low corrosiveness, environmentally benign) for both chemical and biological agents; these reagents should be able to address key Navy needs. In particular, the Joint Services Fixed Site Decontamination (JSFSD) Program is addressing the critical Navy need for a low-toxicity decontamination system for airbases, ports, and fixed base logistics nodes. The program is scheduled to deliver nontoxic and noncorrosive decontamination materials and application equipment. Toxins, new-generation nerve agents, and toxic industrial chemicals have chemical properties different from those of traditional chemical agents. Fielded decontamination materials may not be effective against some of these threats. It is therefore important that the DOD program continue active surveillance, assessment, and countermeasure development against new chemical and biological threats and that the Navy understands in particular which toxic industrial chemicals might pose a threat to its installations. Development work in the commercial sector and in other federal agency laboratories has resulted and/or will result in promising new products that may be

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats good fits to Navy decontamination needs. The committee recommends that the Navy explore these options in addition to participation in the Joint CBD Program. In summary, the committee believes that the perception that chemical and biological incidents can be largely avoided by better vigilance and greatly improved sensors is flawed. The risk to the Navy of an asymmetric attack with chemical or biological agents or toxic industrial chemicals is serious. The tools and methods of decontamination should be viewed as an integral part of the suite of weapons and capabilities that are necessary to survive attack and quickly bring operations back up to tempo. With improved materials, tools, protocols, and training, decontamination can be made much more efficient and effective. To achieve an adequate state of readiness to counter an attack with chemical or biological agents, the Navy should significantly improve its decontamination agents, methods, technical understanding, training, and doctrine, as outlined above. Modeling and Simulation Over the past 10 years, much of the emphasis in the chemical and biological modeling community has been on plume modeling—which includes estimating the dispersion and fate of plumes generated from explosive air or ground bursts, agent transport within enclosed spaces (e.g., high-value facilities), semienclosed spaces (e.g., subway systems), and plume migration and deposition within the urban landscape. In addition, high-fidelity modeling around the superstructure of specific ships has been conducted. The use of models in fixed-site locations to guide the placement of sensors is also being explored. Work in modeling and simulation for chemical and biological agent dispersion has been performed under the auspices of the DOD (NRL and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) within the Navy), DOE, and academia. The models in use may be cast in terms of a variety of mathematical formulations and may employ different computational schemes; thus, one finds models based on Gaussian puffs, computational fluid dynamics, and random walk Lagrangian particle codes. In addition to the use of finer computational grids (directly related to available computational power), the models are continually being refined to include more realistic descriptions of local wind fields, solar heating/nighttime cooling, source and sink terms, droplet aerodynamics, and evaporation. With the goal of verifying, validating, and accrediting DOD modeling tools, the deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense for chemical and biological defense has established a council to provide advice on modeling and simulation and associated data needs. The Joint Service Integration Group convened a “requirements” panel to define programmatic requirements. (It remains to be seen if this panel will continue under the new Office of the Joint Staff/J8.) Similarly, the

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Joint Service Materiel Group has also defined a business commodity area for modeling and simulation, with the Navy serving as the lead Service. Based on the information made available to the committee, the following summary observations describe the committee’s impressions:11 The immediate capability need is for modeling and simulation tools that will enable a commander to estimate exposure levels as a function of location and identify the areas that will likely suffer further contamination. Accurate estimates of plume dispersion and deposition of agent are unlikely using real-time computations. The accuracy of models will ultimately be limited by practical considerations. These include uncertainties both in the input data (time and precise location of release, initial plume characteristics, or interior dispersion characteristics) and in the local meteorological conditions. High-fidelity models are a useful tool for predicting flow over and around the superstructure of naval vessels under a variety of meteorological conditions; as such, they provide useful guidance for the optimal placement of onboard sensors. Less work has been done on predicting flow at ports and bases. Threats from industrial manufacturing sites or those using industrial chemicals are viable and potentially crippling to operations. Relatively smallscale releases involving toxic industrial chemicals could have a major impact on operational capability if executed with precision. For biological attacks, the time lag between exposure and symptoms and the current lack of reliable, deployable sensors suggest that a model-based system formulated from the perspective of tracking agent dispersion and distribution and the location of the exposed individuals may be the most useful approach for some time. The possibility of genetically altered agents, which introduces the potential for many more scenarios, suggests that model-based approaches to identify and track biological attacks for estimating who might be exposed will be prudent for some years. Emerging efforts to link chemical fate prediction and/or measurement with operational decision-making tools (battlefield management information systems) is a promising direction for new modeling and simulation efforts. The observations above lead the committee to the following assessment: Rather than trying to improve the accuracy of poorly characterized input parameters, the details of which will likely remain uncertain, it might be more 11   Appendix C elaborates on descriptions of current chemical and biological modeling approaches.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats productive to use simplified plume dispersion and deposition models in conjunction with sensor arrays to give an operationally predictive capability. For this purpose, a simple dispersion model could be used to give an indication of the shape of the dispersion plume as a function of time and location, and then the magnitude of release could be estimated by normalizing to distributed sensor readings. Efforts to integrate computationally simplified models and sensor arrays can provide a means of sidestepping the need for highly accurate initial release data and precise knowledge of local meteorological conditions and thus could provide a valuable capability for consequence management. Additional high-fidelity modeling of releases in and near ports and bases is warranted. As with individual ships, predictive simulations will guide sensor placement. Furthermore, detailed modeling of plume transport and deposition about each major port or base under a wide variety of conditions could be condensed into a simplified form (nomographs or computerized expert systems) and made available to the commanders for use in real time. Some work along these lines has been conducted at NRL. This is a significant undertaking, since simply establishing detailed computational grids for a large port requires much work. Validation of the models will also require considerable effort. Nevertheless, the investment should provide useful operational tools for incident response and consequence management. Additional investment in discrete event simulations focused on elucidating the operational bottlenecks during a recovery operation may also prove fruitful. These tools can assist decision making with respect to a myriad of possible scenarios that involve considerable uncertainty. Recognizing that aspects of the problem are stochastic in nature (e.g., sensor failures and fluctuations in the meteorological conditions), such computer simulations may offer the best approach for doing systematic trade-off studies for incident response and consequence management, at least in a statistical sense. An example of a structure for such a simulation is outlined in Appendix C. This example is offered not for completeness, but to illustrate the methodology and basic concepts. At another level, operationally focused simulations could also be used as a guide in determining how to allocate resources to the various aspects of the Joint CBD Program itself (e.g., sensors, models, protective equipment, decontamination techniques, vaccines, medical treatment, and so on). COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS: FINDINGS, ASSESSMENTS, AND ANALYSIS The committee believes it important to include comments on the critical system-level issues related to command, control, and communications (C3) for chemical or biological defense. The discussion is limited to the physical C3 structure needed to support operations in a chemical or biological environment, that is, the interconnection of sensors, databases, and decision makers.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats The committee was pleased to learn that the Joint CBD Program is aware of the importance of adequate command, control, and communications, and in the form of the JWARN has begun to address the problem. The Marine Corps is the lead Service for the network. JWARN today appears to be in an early stage of development (having been restructured after a false start a few years ago)—defining concepts and standards and developing and demonstrating prototype hardware and software. Several contractual efforts have been funded over the past several years for hardware and software suitable to provide sensor connectivity between various host computers and interfaces with a number of legacy and proposed sensors—chemical, biological, and otherwise (e.g., automatic chemical agent detector alarm (ACADA); Global Positioning System (GPS); joint biological point detection system (JBPDS); improved point detection system (IPDS); JSLSCAD; JCAD; radiation, detection, indication, and computation (RADIAC) nuclear detector; and so on). It appeared to the committee, however, that JWARN is being viewed as a self-contained system that will provide the warfighter with sensor connectivity, analysis, and warning and reporting capabilities specific to a biological or chemical threat environment. This appears to be dangerously like another stovepipe approach to C3. JWARN should be fully integrated into the overall battle management system in use. Unfortunately, battle management systems are continuously evolving under the combined stimulus of the exponential growth of computers and modern communications technology, and there is no single battle management system currently in use by all the Services. Thus, JWARN faces enormous obstacles to achieving broad interoperability. The Navy should pay close attention to JWARN, since such a capability is sorely needed. As a participant in the joint process, it should ensure that JWARN is compatible with whatever Navy battle management systems are currently in use and that it is as free of “stovepipe” limitations as possible. As network-centric concepts evolve into future battle management systems with ForceNet, the Navy must ensure that chemical and biological sensors of all types are fully included in the sensor grid concepts from the start and not added as an afterthought. SUMMARY OF NON-MEDICAL S&T FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FIVE COMMODITY AREAS Box 4.1 provides a summary of the findings and recommendations in this chapter. Recommendations are directed to the Navy’s technical community, principally at the Office of Naval Research and the Naval Sea Systems Command, involved in the Joint CBD Program.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats BOX 4.1 Summary of Findings and Recommendations in the Five Commodity Areas Commodity Area: Contamination Avoidance Chemical Point Detection Findings Existing contamination avoidance (CA) point sensor technology is relatively mature for vapor phase threats. Decontamination requires sensors with characteristics different from those being developed for CA—and little work is addressing that need. Recommendations for the Navy Develop system concepts for CA balanced through risk assessment with post-exposure consequence management. Work with the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program to reconsider the requirements and technologies for decontamination applications. Institute a “tech watch” by the Office of Naval Research of novel developments in microfabricated concepts suitable for very small dosage monitoring and multiple, distributed sensor arrays for area or perimeter monitoring. Biological Point Detection Findings No biological weapons sensor (or sensor network) can realize the goal of CA in the foreseeable future. Most biological weapons sensors are either antibody- or nucleic acid-based. Both types need more capability to detect and identify a broader range of biological warfare agents. Antibody-based instruments have had significant field use, but false-positive issues remain. Nucleic acid approaches are promising, but sample preparation and overall cost challenges need to be addressed. Other techniques, such as mass spectrometry, have promise, but are a long way from being moved into the field. The Joint CBD Program focus on CA fails to address risks and responses end to end, and as a result, science and technology investments in biodetection do not provide a balance among CA, exposure diagnosis, and contamination assessment/decontamination.   Recommendations for the Navy Undertake a combined analytic and experimental evaluation to prioritize additional investments in biological point detection science and technology. To enhance sensor performance, expand the number of biological agents that can be detected and improve sample preparation for representative naval environments.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Chemical Standoff Detection Findings Both active and passive concepts have been developed, but grow rapidly in size, complexity, and cost as the range requirements are increased. The Navy’s current chemical weapons standoff detection system, the AN/ KAS-1, is neither user-friendly nor robust to the full range of agents and probable background. Recommendation for the Navy Fully support the current development programs in the Joint CBD Program, paying particular attention to naval operating environment and false-positive issues. Biological Standoff Detection Findings Biological weapons standoff detection is difficult because of the characteristically broad and generally featureless spectral signals of biological molecules, coupled to the low concentration of agent needed for an effective attack and its presence among higher concentrations of naturally occurring background. Ultraviolet lidar fluorescence, although inherently short range, may have some potential for shipboard warning, but more likely, for decontamination assessment. Recommendation for the Navy Evaluate requirements—and campaign within the Joint CBD Program—for a real-time, short-range system with good classification/identification capabilities to detect the presence of biological warfare agents. Commodity Areas: Individual Protection and Collective Protection Findings Sustained military operations in full protective individual gear are unlikely, owing to heat and respiratory loads. This will remain the case for some time. Current Navy practice apparently dictates either no individual protective gear or full protection. In response to some asymmetric attacks, intermediate levels of protection may be acceptable and could minimize the impact on operations. The availability of individual protective equipment within the Navy is severely limited if one considers the expanding needs associated with protecting not only deployed forces but also personnel at bases and shore installations, ports outside the continental United States, and civilian and logistics support. Adequate protection against the broad spectrum of toxic industrial chemicals and materials that might be employed in asymmetric warfare is currently lacking.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Recommendations for the Navy Prioritize the acquisition and distribution of additional protective garments and masks to the fleet, bases, installations, and port facilities. Acknowledge the operational need for several levels of individual protection, consistent with varying levels of risk, and develop the appropriate guidelines for commanders. Champion the development, testing, and fielding of regenerative filters for collective protection systems. Adapt portable protective systems for vessels without collective protection systems and at fixed naval sites. Commodity Area: Decontamination Findings Effective decontamination materials and procedures should be viewed by the Navy as critical parts of a risk management–based, layered defense against chemical and biological agents. No guidelines exist for what are acceptable or “safe” levels of chemical or biological agent remaining after decontamination. No field instruments are capable of measuring to acceptable long-term exposure levels the concentration of a chemical or biological agent on decontaminated surfaces. Little data exist on chemical or biological agent fates, but such information is critical for guiding an intelligent approach to decontaminating a site and providing information about the long-term safety of decontaminated surfaces. Little data are available on the health effects of long-term exposures to lowlevel concentrations of either chemical or biological warfare agents. Progress is being made in research and development for significantly improved decontaminating reagents (low toxicity, low corrosiveness, environmentally benign) for both chemical and biological agents. In particular, the Joint Services Fixed Site Decontamination Program is addressing the critical Navy need for a low-toxicity decontamination system for airbases, ports, and fixed base logistics nodes. The program is scheduled to deliver nontoxic and noncorrosive decontamination materials and application equipment. Toxins, new-generation nerve agents, and toxic industrial chemicals have chemical properties different from those of traditional chemical agents. Fielded decontamination materials may not be effective against some of these threats. Development work in the commercial sector and in other federal agency laboratories has resulted in or will result in promising new products that may be good fits to Navy decontamination needs. Recommendations for the Navy Develop doctrine for decontamination that sets risk-based guidelines, procedures, and methods, standards of cleanliness, and sources of technical guidance that apply to ships and shore-based facilities. To support doctrine development: Undertake studies to set the appropriate levels for short- and long-term exposures.

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Naval Forces’ Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats Building on work by special units in the Marine Corps, develop equipment and test procedures that become a part of the decontamination toolkit. Investigate the use of seawater washdown for the decontamination of Navy facilities enjoying ready access to seawater. Undertake agent fate studies to understand the consequences of the interactions of agents with surfaces, coatings, and subsurfaces common to Navy ships and shore facilities before and after washdown. Explore the options for decontaminants emerging from other agencies and the commercial sector in addition to participation in the Joint CBD Program. Commodity Area: Modeling and Simulation Findings Modeling and simulation tools are needed that will enable a commander to estimate exposure levels as a function of location and identify the areas that will likely suffer further contamination. Accurate estimates of plume dispersion and deposition of agent are unlikely using real-time computations. The accuracy of models will ultimately be limited by practical considerations, such as uncertainties both in the input data (time and precise location of release, initial plume characteristics) and in the local meteorological conditions. High-fidelity models are a useful tool for predicting flow over and around the superstructure of naval vessels under a variety of meteorological conditions; as such, they provide useful guidance for optimal placement of onboard sensors. Less work has been done on predicting flow at ports and bases. Threats from industrial manufacturing sites or those using industrial chemicals are viable and potentially crippling to operations. Relatively small-scale releases involving toxic industrial chemicals could have a major impact on operational capability if executed with precision. For biological attacks, the time lag between exposure and symptoms and the current lack of reliable, deployable sensors suggest that a model-based system formulated from the perspective of tracking agent dispersion and distribution and the location of the exposed individuals may be the most useful approach for some time. The possibility of genetically altered agents suggests that model-based approaches to identify and track biological attacks will be needed in the long term as well, since the sensors may not be robust to these new agents. Emerging efforts to link chemical fate prediction and/or measurement with operational decision-making tools (battlefield management information systems) is a promising direction for new modeling and simulation efforts. Recommendations for the Navy Use plume dispersion and deposition models in conjunction with sensor arrays to give an operationally predictive capability rather than trying to improve the accuracy of input plume and meteorological parameters, the details of which are likely to remain uncertain. Invest in high-fidelity modeling of releases in and near ports and bases to guide sensor placement and to form the basis for simplified operational tools. Develop discrete event simulations focused on elucidating the operational bottlenecks during a recovery operation to assist decision making in the face of uncertainty.