6
Recommendations for Improving the Overall Effectiveness of Naval Experimentation

This study identifies many fruitful areas of recent naval experimentation. They include, for example, the evolution of the fleet’s network-centric operations, the Marine Corps’s Urban Warfare doctrine, and the developing concept of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Past and recent efforts are summarized in Chapters 3 and 5. Nonetheless, there are several issues with respect to Navy and Marine Corps experimentation that require resolution if experimentation is to be an enabler for naval force development. These issues, identified as findings, are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

What follows in this chapter are the recommendations of the committee in response to these findings. For the convenience of the reader, a synopsis of the issue leading to a finding and the finding itself precede the associated recommendation. The order of the recommendations follows the order of findings as presented in Chapter 5—with one exception. The committee decided that the recommendation regarding senior Navy oversight is foremost. In the aggregate, the recommendations consist primarily of new or enhanced strategies, mechanisms, and processes and are pertinent to the ongoing and future experimentation programs of the Naval Services in this period of rapid change in their approach to their mission.



The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces 6 Recommendations for Improving the Overall Effectiveness of Naval Experimentation This study identifies many fruitful areas of recent naval experimentation. They include, for example, the evolution of the fleet’s network-centric operations, the Marine Corps’s Urban Warfare doctrine, and the developing concept of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Past and recent efforts are summarized in Chapters 3 and 5. Nonetheless, there are several issues with respect to Navy and Marine Corps experimentation that require resolution if experimentation is to be an enabler for naval force development. These issues, identified as findings, are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. What follows in this chapter are the recommendations of the committee in response to these findings. For the convenience of the reader, a synopsis of the issue leading to a finding and the finding itself precede the associated recommendation. The order of the recommendations follows the order of findings as presented in Chapter 5—with one exception. The committee decided that the recommendation regarding senior Navy oversight is foremost. In the aggregate, the recommendations consist primarily of new or enhanced strategies, mechanisms, and processes and are pertinent to the ongoing and future experimentation programs of the Naval Services in this period of rapid change in their approach to their mission.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces ESTABLISH SENIOR NAVY OVERSIGHT AND ANNUAL REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTATION EFFORTS Issue The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is using experimentation as an enabler for his future vision. He has expectations that experimentation will contribute to building future forces, provide the means for the development of advanced concepts, and facilitate the transfer of capabilities to the field. What the committee sees is a modest program of experimentation managed by an organization—the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)—with insufficient influence over the Navy experimentation program1 and its numerous participants, including the funding and assets required, and with insufficient leverage to move the results of experimentation either into acquisition or into programs of record through the requirements process. This situation exists in a very large institution in which many competing priorities exist and many bureaucracies operate. Given the past lack of control over required funding, assets, and use of results, the committee debated the need for direct alignment of the NWDC under the CNO in order to engender the necessary response to experimentation within the Navy as well as to boost the effectiveness of experimentation. The CNO recently realigned the NWDC under the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), and it is difficult to ascertain if that step will improve the current situation. The committee was concerned that the realignment would give rise to another issue—that of undue focus on near-term and mid-term objectives, resulting in an unbalanced program that would not meet the CNO’s long-term objectives. Given the current situation, the committee concluded that the sustained attention of the CNO and Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) is vital for the overall coordination, direction, prioritization, and execution of the naval experimentation program. Finding for Navy: Continuing Chief of Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations sponsorship, leadership, and attention are vital for the overall coordination, direction, prioritization, and execution of the naval experimentation program. Recommendation 1: To ensure that experimentation is a key enabler of his long-term vision, the CNO should establish and, together with the VCNO, participate in an annual review of the experimentation program with the senior leadership of the Navy. This process should make visible the program content; the balance of near-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives; the progress that has occurred to 1   There is no one formal Navy experimentation program; instead a number of organizations are engaged in experimentation activities that collectively embody a Navy program. In Chapter 3, see the subsection entitled “Organizational Roles and Major Participants in Navy Experimentation.”

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces date; the results that have been achieved; the use that has been made of the results relative to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), including the transition to requirements, acquisitions, programs of record, and/or capabilities in the fleet; and guidance for the future. STRENGTHEN TRANSITION PROCESSES Issue The mechanisms and processes for transitioning the results of experimentation, including transition planning, need strengthening. For the Navy, despite the transitioning of some concepts, doctrine, and TTPs to the field, there is little evidence that equipment and capabilities resulting from experimentation have transitioned or are directly linked to major acquisitions and programs of record. Although the results of experimentation have had some influence on acquisition designs (e.g., for the Littoral Combat Ship), these instances appear to have evolved through personal connections rather than through institutional mechanisms. In general, institutional mechanisms are preferred because they typically endure beyond personal connections.2 In the Marine Corps, more structured transition planning is evident, as are some successes in moving concepts, doctrine, TTPs, and minor items of equipment into the field. Nonetheless, there was no evidence that major items of equipment from experiments had resulted in major acquisitions or displaced programs of record. Although not all experimental capabilities warrant transition in the context of cost, risk, and military value, the debate should be allowed. The committee also noted that spiral development—a potential enabler for transitioning capabilities more rapidly to the fleet—has not been explored systematically or incorporated as a fundamental method of experimentation. Finding for Navy: The mechanisms and processes for transitioning the results of experimentation directly to the fleet or to an acquisition program of record are inadequate, and they curtail the effectiveness of experimentation in building future naval forces. Finding for Marine Corps: The Marine Corps has been successful in transitioning nonmaterial elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and minor equipment. However, it has not been successful in transitioning to combat forces major warfighting capabilities identified during experimentation. 2   However, there are times when a personal connection is the initial enabler and the CNO can often assign or rotate key personnel to maximize benefits.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces Recommendation 2: To strengthen the transition of experimentation results to the requirements and acquisition processes, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should institute specific procedures to facilitate and accelerate the transition of capabilities identified through experimentation to the fleet. Specifically, for the Navy: The Commander, Fleet Forces Command; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7); Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N8); and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition should collectively formalize a planning process for the transition of the operational and system capabilities emerging from experiments to the fleet. The process should include framing transition issues and identifying potential funding gaps. The N6/N7 and the N8 should develop a process which ensures that the successful results of experiments are adequately evaluated and competed with the programs of record in the context of cost, risk, and military value. The Navy operational and acquisition communities should explore means to accelerate transition of the results of experimentation to the fleet more aggressively. These means should include the expanded use of other transaction authority and spiral development.3 The Navy test community should explore new roles for the Operational Test and Evaluation Force, including its early participation in the experimentation program, with its advisory assessments provided directly to experiment managers. Specifically, for the Marine Corps: The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in conjunction with the Marine Corps Systems Command, should expand early transition planning in order to include the framing of transition issues and the identification of potential funding gaps. 3   The use of spiral development to accelerate deployment of capabilities to the fleet has not been systematic to date, although spiral development is a component of “Sea Power 21.” See Chapter 5 for additional details. Both the Air Force and Army have enjoyed some notable successes by incorporating it into their respective experimentation programs. See Chapter 3 for additional details. Given the Navy’s emphasis on network-centric operations and NETWARCOM’s emerging role, the committee believes that spiral development should be explored through experimentation to accelerate network-centric capabilities into operations. There are also naval infrastructures that may support such an exploration—namely, the Navy’s Distributed Engineering Plant and the Marine Corps’s Tactical Systems Support Activity.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces The Marine Requirements Oversight Council should establish a process which ensures that the successful results of experiments are adequately evaluated and competed with the programs of record in the context of cost, risk, and military value. The Marine Corps operational and acquisition communities should explore means to accelerate transition of the results of experimentation to the fleet more aggressively. These means should include expanded use of other transaction authority and spiral development. The Marine Corps test community should explore new roles for the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity emphasizing its early participation in the experimentation program, with its advisory assessments provided directly to experiment managers. Recommendation 2 strengthens the connections between experimentation and the requirements and acquisition processes in three ways: (1) through early formal transition planning to frame transition issues and identify potential funding (for the Marine Corps it expands the current planning process with early involvement of the Marine Corps Systems Command in issues and funding); (2) through the establishment of a process which ensures that the successful results of experiments are adequately evaluated and competed with the programs of record in the context of cost, risk, and military value; and (3) through the exploration of means to accelerate the results of experimentation to the field more aggressively. Included in the third way of strengthening these connections are expanded use of other transaction authority, use of spiral development, and participation of the test community in experimentation, but in nontraditional roles. The committee used lessons learned about experimentation from the Army and the Air Force. For instance, the committee noted a recent and promising change in funding processes by the Air Force,4 established to ensure that a source of funding is available for experimental capabilities. As part of early Air Force transition planning, promising initiatives are vetted Air Force-wide to focus and pare them and to establish exit criteria for transition. When approved, an initiative is associated with a program element in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) that would subsume and fund the initiative if it proved successful. In addition, the Air Force maintains a modest source of funds to bridge experimentation initiatives until the identified POM funding stream becomes available. This two-part strategy overcomes the lack of programmed resources for implementing initiatives when the results of experimentation prove successful. Another strategy employed by both the Army and the Air Force is that of participation in experimentation by the Services’ operational test communities, 4   In the discussion of Air Force Experimentation in Chapter 3, see the subsection entitled “From Experiments to the Field.”

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces but in nontraditional roles. As an example, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) is involved in development evaluation and now participates at the beginning of experimentation. It provides an assessment of an experimental capability directly to a program manager/developer, but this type of assessment is not the usual operational test for acquisition of a production capability. This earlier development assessment is non-threatening; it points out issues that need resolution through experimentation and identifies key problems such as critical safety issues, while familiarizing the test community with how operators use a promising new capability (facilitating later testing). If the experimental capability is successful, at the appropriate time the AFOTEC evaluates the initiative again and conducts the usual testing and evaluation required to support the formal acquisition process. The Naval Services should also consider expanded use of other transaction authority (OTA)5 for experimentation. It is an acquisition strategy that is applicable to prototype projects, provides streamlined procedures for faster awards, and enables innovative business arrangements that can transition later into the Major Defense Acquisition Program processes. Reaffirmation of Spiral Development A component of Recommendation 2 reaffirms the promise of spiral development that was first articulated in the recent Naval Studies Board report on network-centric operations.6 The use of spiral development by the Naval Services has not been systematic to date. Certainly, given the issues in transition, this is an appropriate reiteration of a prior recommendation. Both the Air Force and the Army have enjoyed some notable successes by incorporating spiral development into their respective experimentation programs. (In Chapter 3, see the subsections entitled “U.S. Army” and “U.S. Air Force” for additional details.) As an alternative to a lengthy and detailed requirements-based process, both Services established integration environments with operators and developers collaborating on experimental capabilities with the intent of delivering a core capability quickly and then fielding additional capabilities subsequently and incrementally. The results are mixed, but there are some notable successes,7 5   Jacques S. Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2001. “Other Transactions (OT) Guide for Prototype Projects,” The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., January. Available online at <http://www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/PK/pkt/OTGuideAug2002.doc>. Accessed October 10, 2003. 6   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 7   For details, in Chapter 3, see the subsections entitled “A Past Example of Army Experimentation,” and “Examples of Air Force Experimentation.”

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces particularly for capabilities heavily dependent on information technologies, such as command and control, communications, and networks. Given the leadership responsibility of the Navy Network Warfare Command in network-centric operations and its emerging role in experimentation efforts related to this mission, the committee believes that spiral development should be intrinsically coupled with experimentation to accelerate network-centric capabilities into operations. There are also naval infrastructure capabilities that could support such exploration—namely, the Navy’s Distributed Engineering Plant and the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity at Camp Pendleton, California. ENHANCE THE NAVAL EXPERIMENTATION PROGRAMS Issue Certain important areas are not yet adequately explored in the naval experimentation programs, although some of these areas are gaining definition.8 For the Navy, these omissions are due in part to its approach to experimentation, which in the past has not been founded on sufficiently robust experimentation campaigns but on an over-reliance on many individual events such as FBEs. Such singular events cannot provide the depth of knowledge required to explore potential concepts and capabilities sufficiently. Not only has the breadth of these programs been limited, but the number of concepts explored has been small, the concepts have not covered a sufficiently broad range, and they have not been systematically chosen and developed. As a result, the experimentation programs have lacked the cohesion and comprehensiveness needed to address the challenges of Sea Power 21 or to deal conclusively with questions about capabilities that will be delivered by the programs of record. Areas that need further investigation include over-the-horizon, time-critical strike; use of extended-range guided munitions for long-distance, high-volume, rapid fire support; expanded applications of network-centric capability to deployable undersea sensor arrays; mine/countermine warfare; and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to locate and identify targets. The Navy’s experimental work to date has brought out overarching issues such as the need to achieve a satisfactory common operating picture; deconfliction; and bandwidth size and 8   In January 2003, the CNO requested that the CFFC—as part of its lead role for Sea Trial in support of Sea Power 21—“[d]raft and implement a comprehensive roadmap (by May 2003) that integrates studies, wargames, experimentation, and exercises with evaluation metrics and an execution timeline.” See Chief of Naval Operations, 2003, CNO Guidance for 2003, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., January 3. Available online at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/clark-guidance2003.html>. Accessed November 9, 2003.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces management. Some important areas not yet explored include Vertical Launch System reloading at sea, assault breaching of mine or obstacle fields near and on the beach, and continued decisive operations under impaired network conditions and unfavorable environmental conditions. In response to the CNO’s guidance, the CFFC, through the NWDC, recently drafted the Sea Trial experimentation campaign plan.9 The committee believes that this is a step in the right direction, although the impact of the plan on the Navy is as yet unclear. For the Marine Corps, there has been a shift in recent years from a balanced program of experimentation campaigns to a program of experimentation based on near- and mid-term objectives. While these immediate challenges are important, there remains a need for continuing investment in long-term experimentation. Examples of areas to examine include sea basing, for which a program of experimentation needs to be designed, funded, and executed with the objective of realizing new capabilities, doctrine, and TTPs; operations in brown-water littorals to negate potential threats; and unconventional warfare, for which current procedures will have to be adapted for use from a sea base in brown-water operations. Finding for Navy: As yet, no cohesive experimentation program exists that will move the Navy’s forces to “future” concepts, processes, doctrine, and capabilities. Finding for Marine Corps: The Marine Corps has moved from a balanced program of experimentation campaigns based on near-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives to one of experiments focused on near- and mid-term objectives. Recommendation 3: To address strategic, long-term objectives of Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, the Department of the Navy should expand its programs for experimentation. Specifically, for the Navy: The Commander, Fleet Forces Command, with the support of the Navy Warfare Development Command, should (1) create and maintain updated experimentation campaigns that address transformation objectives while identifying actionable steps and the organizations responsible for them; (2) ensure a balance in experimentation efforts directed at near-, mid-, and long-term objectives; (3) conduct experimentation sufficient to ensure that the highest-priority operational concepts are explored adequately for incorporation into the fleet and its operations; (4) establish adequate mechanisms for continued improvements and 9   Commander, Fleet Forces Command. 2003. Sea Trial—Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan (U), Working Paper (draft), Norfolk, Va., May (Classified).

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces modifications to the experimentation program; and (5) maximize the effectiveness of joint experimentation in accordance with Recommendation 7 (below). The Navy Network Warfare Command and its supporting organizations should play a lead role in coordinating the information network aspects of experimentation and in enabling the realization of network-centric capabilities for the fleet through related concept development or exploration and spiral development processes. Specifically, for the Marine Corps: In collaboration with the Navy Warfare Development Command, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command should augment its experimentation program by developing experimentation campaigns to address its strategic, long-term objectives, such as sea basing, conventional and unconventional expeditionary warfare, and, jointly with the Navy, assured access. Furthermore, its overall experimentation campaign should encompass all levels of force structure and activity necessary to meet the range of potential threats and future operational demands. The committee believes that the expanded use of experimentation campaigns, balanced between near-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives, is a needed shift in strategy. ENHANCE NAVY EXPERIMENTATION PROCESSES Issue Some omissions in the Navy’s program of experimentation, noted above, do result from inadequate methods in building experimentation campaigns and from the underutilization of some experimentation venues. To date, preparing for the event of an FBE has largely (but not exclusively) been a focus of activities. The NWDC needs both to shift focus and to augment processes. The NWDC requires enhanced processes to select concepts for exploration; to integrate more overarching studies and analyses throughout the events of its campaigns; to build, mature, and evaluate concepts, including multiple and competing concepts; and to maximize and apply a full range of experimentation venues (such as games, modeling and simulation, and limited-objective experiments) in a more systematic manner. Finding for Navy: There are significant deficiencies in the end-to-end processes of naval experimentation. Shortfalls include the following:

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces Insufficient use of structured experimentation campaigns; Inadequate breadth in exploration of concepts; Insufficient studies and analysis, including their use to determine the best experimentation venue (games; simulations; small, focused experiments; and so on); Inadequate use of spiral processes to build knowledge iteratively; and Inadequate planning and evaluation. Recommendation 4: To improve the effectiveness of its experimentation efforts, the Navy Warfare Development Command should augment its end-to-end experimentation processes by making the following key changes: Expand the emphasis on experimentation campaigns that use a full spectrum of experimentation activities, with analysis integrated throughout the campaigns as well as applied to determine which venues are most appropriate. Conduct significantly greater amounts of systematic and innovative analysis earlier and throughout the experimentation process in order to select, develop, and broaden understanding of the operational concepts to be explored, including a range of multiple and competing concepts. Broaden the incremental, sequential approach by using spiral methodology. Apply the sequential approach to war games, to modeling and simulation, and to small-scale, more narrowly focused experiments. Build larger-scale experiments on the basis of the results of such a sequential approach. Establish a standing, high-level, independent technical advisory board composed of experts in methods of innovation and experimentation and reporting to the Commander of the Navy Warfare Development Command, as a means to foster more robust experimental processes, maintain their quality, and make recommendations for improvements. The committee believes that building good experimentation campaigns is a key to a more comprehensive naval experimentation program. However, campaigns must be well structured so that they explore concepts in depth, investigate multiple and competing concepts, and “write the book” on knowledge about the concepts and capabilities under investigation. Enhancing current NWDC processes in a few areas will build this more robust understanding. These enhancements include expanded use of analysis throughout campaigns, including the evaluation plan and selection of the appropriate experimentation venue, and the use of spiral processes that build upon each venue to refine or discard preconceived assumptions. The committee notes progress in this direction in the recent Sea Trial Experimentation Plan prepared by the NWDC. These recommended changes shift emphasis onto experimentation events other than FBEs. The committee also applauds the recent Sea Trial Experimentation Campaign Plan for its inclusion of a greater number of small experimentation

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces venues. While large field experiments are important and have value, they should be used only when they are the appropriate event—for instance, when issues of scalability or integration have to be explored, or when warfighters need to interact with potential new capabilities. The changes will achieve better balance across all venues and will build knowledge, such as that gained from a large-scale examination of options or excursions, that cannot be learned in the large field experiments. SUSTAIN AND USE NAVY EXPERIMENTATION RESOURCES MORE EFFECTIVELY Issue The committee questioned whether there are sufficient resources available to the NWDC for experimentation, but it found this difficult to answer for two reasons. One is the past emphasis on large field events, compounded more recently by joint experimentation. Large field events are costly and require many months of effort. The second reason is that the NWDC does not have line-item funding to cover the full costs of its own experimentation program but relies on additional funding from many organizations, such as the Office of Naval Research. These sponsors may reallocate funds in accordance with their own higher-priority efforts. Such perturbations have severe impacts on the planning, preparation, conduct, and evaluation of experiments. The changes in already-programmed funding are frequent and severe enough to make the need for additional funding unclear. This situation leads to a poor return on investment and results in delays and/or some loss of effort. Consequently, the Navy is not making the most effective use of the experimentation resources already programmed. Finding for Navy: The Navy has not made effective use of resources in its experimentation program. Specifically: The Navy has overemphasized large field experiments, when in some cases smaller, better-focused venues would have served equally well and would have avoided the compromise of objectives often associated with experiments conducted in combination with training exercises and maintenance schedules. The Navy has inadequately preserved and protected resources intended for experimentation. Recommendation 5: The Navy should use the resources already programmed for experimentation more effectively, while also resolving resource contention surrounding experimentation. Specifically:

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces Finding for the Naval Services: The naval and joint experimentation programs are not yet adequately aligned and synchronized, nor is there sufficient correlation between them. More synergistic collaboration in joint concept development is needed. Service-unique experimentation has been and could continue to be affected by large-scale joint experimentation, but no formal mechanism exists for striking a proper balance between joint and naval experimentation. Recommendation 7: To ensure better preparation for future joint operations and to maximize the effectiveness of its participation in joint experimentation, the Department of the Navy should establish a set of principles and guidelines to balance experimentation requirements for Service-unique and joint experimentation, and it should then align and synchronize its participation accordingly. Specifically: The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) should actively support joint experimentation on the basis of a clear understanding of the priorities of the various joint concept development and experimentation activities. In addition, they should advocate top-level interest in operational concepts driven by naval force capabilities as well as concepts suitable in other operational environments. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) should conduct enough naval experimentation campaigns to ensure that the highest-priority naval operational concepts are adequately explored. The CFFC and the MCCDC should design all naval experiments with full recognition that the Navy and the Marine Corps will most likely be operating in a joint context; to the maximum degree feasible, the Naval Services should partner with the other Services in experimenting with relevant assets. The NWDC and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory should achieve adequate cross-fertilization of joint and naval-specific operational concepts through substantive interaction of the respective concept development communities. The CFFC and the MCCDC should support and participate in joint experiments to explore the interaction and mutual support of the future operational concepts of each of the Services. These efforts should include staff interactions at the operational level and the “removal of seams” between components at the tactical level. The CFFC and the MCCDC should work with USJFCOM to identify key challenges (e.g., cruise missile defense, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) on which they could welcome joint and/or other Service contributions. The CFFC, N7, N8, and the MCCDC should examine the tradeoffs in the benefits of large, resource-intensive and less well controlled experiments against the opportunities lost by not conducting a greater number of smaller, more focused joint and/or naval experimentation activities.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces The CFFC and the MCCDC should systematically develop programs of joint experimentation with the Combatant Commands and should establish a coordination mechanism to facilitate the development of such programs. The CFFC and the MCCDC should increase cross-Service experimentation, particularly at the tactical level, and should establish a scheduling mechanism to facilitate this experimentation. The committee’s Recommendation 7 expounds on opportunities for joint experimentation, not only through USJFCOM, but also with the Combatant Commands and through cross-Service efforts. In the past both the Navy and the Marine Corps have participated in conducting experiments with the Combatant Commands, usually in conjunction with exercises such as Kernel Blitz. Past experiences have been valuable, particularly with respect to advances in command and control, communications, developing and refining procedures and working with prototype systems, and the involvement of coalition nations. Nonetheless, as noted, there is a need for a coordination mechanism that will operate between the Naval Services and the Combatant Commands to identify and build programs of mutual interest. One alternative is to implement coordination between the Combatant Command and the Service component commands assigned to it.11 The component commands could in turn interact with appropriate elements of their respective Services (e.g., with the NWDC and the MCCDC). More cross-Service experimentation addresses a pressing need to investigate joint interactions at the tactical level, given the growing intensity of such interactions in recent operations. This is particularly important for the Marine Corps. Such future experimentation opportunities would appear to exist—for example, in coordinated operations with Army Special Operations Forces and air support from Navy and Air Force aircraft. Expanding cross-Service experimentation, however, requires a mechanism for coordinating force deployment schedules. It is conceivable that such coordination could be carried out at the top levels of the Services, with USJFCOM serving as an intermediary. The committee’s recommendation above provides a set of principles and guidelines to use in striking a balance between Service-unique and joint experimentation. While these principles are suggestions by the committee, the Navy and the Marine Corps can develop and evolve their own set, and then use it to assess their experimentation activities. The committee’s principles are supplemented with a mission-based approach for determining where to focus joint and naval experimentation, respectively (see the next subsection below). 11   Such as either the appropriate Navy fleet command or the numbered fleet commands under that fleet command.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces BOX 6.1 Examples of Types of Mission Areas Antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare. These are predominantly Navy missions, although aircraft of other Services could be used to attack the submarines and ships. Antiair warfare and strike warfare. These missions are inherently joint. The coordinated employment of assets of all Services could be used in them. Operational command, control, and communications (C3) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). These missions are also inherently joint. The C3 will coordinate the assets of all Services, and the ISR data will be shared among all Services. Logistics. This is an evolving area. While it is primarily Service-specific now, there are opportunities for joint considerations (e.g., the sharing of maintenance and supplies). A Mission-Based Approach for Balancing Naval and Joint Experimentation In addition to the principles recommended by the committee, a process is necessary in order to systematically and thoroughly achieve balance between naval-specific and joint concept development and experimentation. This subsection outlines one such process for establishing mission areas that are inherently joint or Service-unique12 for determining how experimentation can be applied to increase combat effectiveness and for prioritizing elements of the experimentation program. The first step in this process is for the Navy and Marine Corps to review all of their missions to determine which ones each Service would largely perform in combat by itself and which ones are inherently joint. Some examples of the different types are provided in Box 6.1. The second step in the process is to determine for each mission area how concept development and experimentation can be applied in order to increase combat effectiveness. This involves articulating current shortcomings in mission execution and identifying where Navy and Marine Corps concepts and capabilities can be brought to bear for addressing both naval-specific and joint shortcomings. Some examples of such opportunities are listed in Box 6.2. As the last step in the process—after the missions have been laid out and the problem areas and potential opportunities for each have been identified—priori- 12   The CFFC/NWDC draft Sea Trial Experimentation Campaign Plan appears to have followed a similar mission-based approach in constructing parts of its campaign plan.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces BOX 6.2 Examples of Effectiveness Opportunities for Mission Areas Antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare. In these mission areas, two threats against which increased capabilities must be developed are, respectively, quiet diesel submarines and the swarm tactics of small boats in littoral areas. Addressing these threats is primarily a naval matter. Antiair warfare (air defense). Developing a joint air picture is still a challenge, involving both technical and procedural interoperability shortcomings. The Navy has worked in this area extensively and can contribute significantly to joint efforts. Strike warfare (joint fires). Attacking time-sensitive targets rapidly can involve detection of the targets by the assets of one Service and attack by those of another. In this context, the Navy has already considered the joint application of its Naval Fires Network to direct strikes. Operational C3. All Services are implementing “network-centric operations” in one sense or another. The Navy has much to offer the joint community, and at the same time should ensure that its concepts and technical capabilities and those of the other Services develop in a compatible manner. ties will have to be established as to which problem areas and opportunities can be addressed. Those decisions can only be made by the senior leadership in the Navy and Marine Corps. Given the committee’s earlier recommendations on methods and processes, additional observations in the context of balancing naval and joint experimentation can be made: All opportunities for joint experimentation should be used—USJFCOM, experimentation within the Combatant Commands, and direct Service-to-Service interaction. Particular opportunities may lie in the greater use of fleet battle experiments for joint purposes and in increased direct interaction between the Navy and Marine Corps combat development centers and those of the other Services. As noted many times, the full spectrum of analysis, wargaming, simulation, and live experimentation should be applied. Joint cooperation can involve not only the use of these venues, but also tools for their development. A campaign approach will be needed, since most of the substantive problem areas will likely require a series of experimentation activities of different types to explore fully and to develop the requisite knowledge. Particular consideration should be given to the command and control aspects of the mission areas being addressed. Joint command and control appear critical in realizing the transformation of military capabilities.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces The newly developed capabilities (procedural and technical) should be inserted into operational forces as soon as possible. As necessary, these capabilities can be iterated upon and improved through a spiral development process. SPECIFIC ENHANCEMENTS FOR THE NAVAL PROGRAMS OF EXPERIMENTATION The terms of reference ask the committee to identify specific areas missing from the current program of experimentation. In two separate findings, one for each Service, the committee identified shortfalls in these programs. For the Navy, the finding focused on a lack of robust experimentation campaigns as well as on areas requiring expansion, and for the Marine Corps, the finding noted a lack of programs with long-term objectives. Below, the committee provides suggested enhancements to the naval programs of experimentation. Some of these are oriented toward a single Service, others involve both, and still others require joint experimentation. Sea Strike One area requiring experimentation is that of over-the-horizon, precise, time-critical strikes, including target recognition, identification, and designation for high-speed weapons with a high rate of fire.13 Exploration of capability concepts and limitations for rapid recognition, combat identification, and the designation of targets up to 200 nm is needed, with a view to complete target detection to weapon within times that are consistent with precision ballistic short time-of-flight weapons. Experimentation should include fusing all source data from GPS-equipped multi-platform, multi-spectral sensors in combination with terrain imagery and commercial terrain-rendering products to provide common-view scenes that can be correlated with fast processors designed for the purpose.14 The Navy is developing extended-range guided munitions (ERGMs) for long-distance surface fire support. It is timely to experiment with how these munitions will be used at a 60-mile range from the guns in mission elements: for example, calling for fire from over the horizon, targeting, coordinating fires with air opera- 13   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2002. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Executive Summary; Naval Studies Board. 2002. 2002 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research’s Air and Surface Weapons Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 14   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2002. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Executive Summary; Naval Studies Board. 2002. 2002 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research’s Air and Surface Weapons Technology Program, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces tions, and coordinating multimission operations of ships engaged in multiple activities (e.g., that may be simultaneously performing some or all of the following: antisubmarine warfare, long-range fire support, cooperative engagement capability (CEC), and mine warfare). These issues can be better understood through a series of experimentation activities, perhaps ending in an FBE with a multiship task group. There are serious issues in flying UAVs to locate, identify, and communicate targets. Some were resolved ad hoc in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but many need further exploration. This concern can be extended to joint Navy/Marine Corps/ Air Force operations, with techniques expanding and changing as new weapons (e.g., the Navy’s SM2 land attack missile and the various uninhabited combat air vehicles) begin transition. Time needs to be provided for learning how to use these new capabilities before they enter the fleet, rather than having personnel learn about them in actual war situations. Ultimately, the results would affect the Naval Fires Network as well as FORCEnet. The development of ship-launched fire support weapons and launch and support systems will stress the current systems for reloading ship magazines beyond their capability. Especially if missiles are launched in rapid fire from Vertical Launch System (VLS) bays on guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) and guided-missile cruisers, the ships would have to retire to port for reloading. Rapid at-sea reloading capabilities for ships with VLS bays have been demonstrated but not fully implemented. There is a need for experiments with engineering developments that allow for at-sea resupply and expeditious handling of short time-of-flight strike weapon reloads.15 The Navy will acquire four cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), each of which can launch well over 100 missiles, many times the number that current attack submarines can launch. How will these SSGNs fit into fleet operations? By what criteria will firepower be allocated to the submarines and to surface forces? How will firepower be coordinated in the absence of extensive, large-bandwidth communication links with the submarines? These questions provide a fruitful area for experimentation. There is need for joint experimentation with the Air Force to explore the techniques of in-stride methods—and the effectiveness of these techniques—to clear the path to the beach using the Harvest Hammer technique (line charge analog using simultaneous, high-explosive charges precision-delivered from the air). Such experimentation is also recommended in the report of the Naval Studies Board on mine warfare.16 15   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Volume 1: Overview, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 66-67. 16   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2001. Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces There is a continuing need to explore Marine operations in built-up areas (MOBA). Special attention should be directed to on-scene responsiveness to surprise enemy tactics.17 Many future scenarios may involve MOBA; in such situations, rapid combat success will minimize both military and civilian casualties. Such scenarios may well involve the use of nonlethal weapons, the TTPs for which have yet to be worked out in detail. Also, joint experimentation is needed to examine the effectiveness of various means of calling in and providing fleet-based surface and air fire support to Marines fighting in close, built-up quarters, with and without their artillery on scene. The issues to be investigated include the coordination and allocation of organic and called-in fire support. Much is already known by the Marines in this area, but new questions have surfaced as a result of lessons learned in recent conflicts and changing concepts of operation under Ship to Objective Maneuver/Operational Maneuver from the Sea (STOM/OMFTS). Sea Shield Joint Service simulations and exercises are needed for practicing and improving combat identification capabilities across Service and system interfaces, including handoff problems, in which many errors occur.18 Work is going on in this area, particularly with respect to CEC in concert with Navy theater missile defense (TMD) experiments and Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Office (JTAMDO) single integrated air picture efforts. However, combat identification of both ground and air targets remains an issue, in addition to deconfliction in cluttered littoral battle space, where air superiority does not ensure control in the eventuality of overland cruise missile and ballistic missile attacks on expeditionary forces or on the ships that support them.19 The Department of the Navy’s technology investment program will have to develop sensors, weapons, and battle management command, control, and communications (BMC3) architectures and algorithms that are adaptive and flexible enough to allow responding to unexpected threat capabilities and characteristics. Such elements of the ballistic missile defense system should be combined into experimental systems for evaluation and refinement. The mature technologies from the program could conceivably be incorporated into future spirals of the Navy theater-wide missile defense systems.20 17   Such exercises would have to give a “red team” free play, as well as allowing free-play responsiveness to the Marines. 18   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 1996. Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 10. 19   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2001. Naval Forces’ Capability for Theater Missile Defense, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 11. 20   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2001. Naval Forces’ Capability for Theater Missile Defense, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 12.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces There is a need for joint operations experiments in cruise missile defense using networked, all-Service surveillance and track assets in order to maximize effectiveness in the littoral environment in which expeditionary forces will enter a theater. Joint experimentation should be leveraged to develop the operational concepts and technical capabilities necessary for joint missile defense operations.21 The application of network-centric capability to deployable undersea sensor arrays and low probability of intercept (LPI) transponders, together with autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), can provide the ISR to create and monitor a “single integrated undersea picture” and “sterilization” of undersea littoral waters in which asymmetric methods, cheap mines, intelligent mine fields, and quiet, small, diesel-electric submarines can otherwise deny access to U.S. naval forces.22 A relatively neglected area that would benefit from experimentation, both with individual submarines and with fleet units, is that of learning how the Navy would handle a breakout of opposition submarines in littoral waters, in which conventional antisubmarine warfare is especially difficult. Although some Office of Naval Research work with low frequency active (LFA) is ongoing, this is largely in the 6.2 applied research funding area.23 Operating with ships, UUVs, and a real undersea opposing force to simulate enemy submarines would help the Navy learn how to deal with the problem before it presents itself in real hostilities.24 It is not too soon to plan experiments in mine countermeasures (MCM) warfare to understand how the new organic MCM systems that are in development can be used in a coordinated, integrated fashion. Also, there is a need to determine how ships such as DDG-51s, the newly planned Littoral Combat Ship, and ship commanders will function in multimission modes when mine warfare is added to the already large mission mix of air and missile defense and surface fire support. Sea Basing Sea basing for naval forces ashore is a radical new concept designed to avoid the sovereignty issues and delays attending the establishment of shore bases 21   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2001. Naval Forces’ Capability for Theater Missile Defense, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 7. 22   Naval Studies Board. National Research Council. 2000. An Assessment of Undersea Weapons Science and Technology, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 23   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Volume 7: Undersea Warfare, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 31-33. 24   The British fleet spent large amounts of fleet time hunting an Argentine submarine that may or may not have put to sea during the Falklands War. We should not have to spend our scarce resources that way in future conflicts.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces when rapid expeditionary landings are necessary. While the Marine Corps has given a great deal of thought to the operational opportunities that sea basing will offer and to related issues, an extensive program of experimentation (and conceivably spiral development) will be required to bring capabilities to the field over time. Sea basing will require new ship configurations to provide the ability to selectively move, repackage, and/or offload containers; to support at least limited flights of heavy, vertical-lift cargo aircraft; and to load and unload lighters and landing craft, air-cushioned (LCACs) from ships and at the shore or beach in high sea states (sea states up to and including sea state 3 and 4). It may eventually be found necessary to resort to large, movable, offshore platforms that can handle fixed-wing aircraft such as the C-130 or even the C-17. Ships involved in providing the sea base may not be able to stay near enough to shore to support the current pipeline and pumping distance of 2 miles for water and fuel. They may have to avoid or move away from shore defenses, including mines, ballistic missiles, and antiship missiles, to points over the horizon that are 25, 50, or even 100 miles from shore. It is essential to understand logistics ship configurations with loadable containers that can be selected and moved about on demand, and that can be moved to a flight deck for air transport ashore, or moved to LCACs or other kinds of lighters for surface transport in seas that are not calm. It is important to evaluate the pluses and minuses of various ship configurations, as well as operations with and handling of the cargo within them, under various sea state conditions—this information is fundamental to the entire sea basing idea. It is also essential to address the following critical issue—that the enemy’s defenses (mines, missiles, submarines, and so on) may not have been suppressed adequately to protect a multibillion-dollar asset (the amphibious fleet) within 2 miles of a hostile coastline (the distance for pumping fuel and water under current capability), or even 25 miles out (the distance that current doctrine says is needed for protection of the fleet during the initial landing). The Marine Corps concept of operations (CONOPS) for sea basing must inevitably degrade as the required standoff distances grow from 25 miles to, say, 100 miles. Experimentation with a surrogate sea base is needed as it is positioned, say, 25, 50, and 100 miles from a coastline, to ascertain what happens to its ability to support forces of a given size at a given range inland. Will more airlift capability be required? Will it be necessary to make a sea base large enough to accommodate fixed-wing aircraft such as a C-17? The experimentation campaign plan for forcible entry from a sea base should address the need for and explore the feasibility of new CONOPS, architectures that are not dependent on the advanced, amphibious, assault vehicle (AAAV), the Osprey tiltrotor (the V-22), or other systems having large daily logistics requirements.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces At some point the Navy and Marine Corps will have to move large, heavy things over the shore from lighters and LCACs, or set up over-the-shore pipelines—water and fuel are among the biggest logistics items. There has not been a great deal of experimentation in this area, especially in overcoming the sea state 3 barrier. This area is ripe for extensive experimentation, spiraling toward viable concepts and capabilities. Another area for experimentation is that of joint Navy and Marine Corps cooperation involving a landing over the shore in OMFTS/STOM mode, with simulated firepower support. There are problems in exercising force-wide command and control during such a landing; and in sustaining the movement and its support from the sea base for a week, or even a month, of uninterrupted operations. The results of experimentation on logistics ship configurations are also relevant to this area of investigation. The sea-basing issues discussed above, including advanced support and logistics concepts for OMFTS and Sea Basing, would benefit greatly from extensive study through a spectrum of experimentation activities, among them modeling and simulation of these operations, to assess logistics flow needs, capabilities, and alternative support concepts.25 Ultimately, experimentation at the ship and multiship/air wing level will be needed to provide answers to such questions as the ones posed above. The Marine Corps is moving in the direction of adapting the network-centric concept to delivery-as-needed logistics management. Because of the complexity of these issues, at some point the modeling and simulation that supports the concept development will also require validation as part of joint experiments and field events to assure that the simulation models are matched by reality. 25   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 1999. Naval Expeditionary Logistics: Enabling Operational Maneuver from the Sea, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 10.

OCR for page 181
The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces This page intentionally left blank.