expanded security restrictions. This sparked substantial concern about ensuring that the scientific quality of the laboratories could be sustained, and several organizations made proposals they believed would provide an appropriate balance between openness and security, these including¹⁶

• Engage S&T personnel in the development and implementation plans for security measures.

• Continue to accept non-US citizens as visitors and in some cases staff, expedite security reviews for visitors, and more generally work to avoid prejudice against foreigners.

• As with recommendations for other situations, focus and limit security efforts to address the most important security situations.

Beyond attracting S&T personnel, it is essential to engage the broader S&T community in efforts to bring the latest S&T to bear on security problems. Much of the relevant research and many of the best ideas seem likely to come from outside the government and its own network of laboratories. Tapping these resources involves meeting several needs. One is ensuring an attractive climate for undertaking security-related R&D in universities and the private sector. Another is engaging the S&T community in a variety of advisory capacities and communication channels. Some observers have recommended a variety of new mechanisms or expanded and revised roles for existing mechanisms, including the following:

• Encourage communication among the diverse communities involved in security issues—policy, S&T, national and homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence—so that policies regarding scientific communication are both effective and broadly accepted.

• Build bridges among these communities, particularly in areas of S&T, such as the life sciences, where there is little history of working with the government on security issues.¹⁷