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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 Part II HOW CHILDREN LEARN SCIENCE In Part II, we present reviews of the research on science learning in early childhood through early adolescence. Over the past 50 years, new tools, techniques, and theories about learning—coinciding with the emergence of computer technology, cognitive and sociocultural learning theories, and new theory-building views of the nature of science—have expanded and focused understandings of the ways in which science learning occurs. The chapters in this part, organized around the four strands of science proficiency (see Box 2-1), synthesize research on learning, science learning, and the dynamics involved in the growth of scientific knowledge. Across the five chapters, we examine the literature on concept learning, scientific reasoning, children’s understanding of the structure of scientific knowledge, and the ways in which communication and representation practices that characterize scientific discourse and decision making impact learning. In most cases, we draw on research that was not explicitly organized around the strands framework but is useful nonetheless in illuminating the process of science learning within and across the four strands. Chapter 3 reviews research on young children and provides an overview of the knowledge and skills they bring to school which provide a foundation for learning science. Chapter 4 reviews literature related to Strand 1: Know, use, and interpret scientific explanations of the natural world. Chapter 5 discusses evidence related to Strand 2: Generate and evaluate scientific evidence and, explanations. Chapter 6 summarizes the research evidence related to Strand 3: Understand the nature and development of scientific knowledge. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses research related to Strand 4: Participate productively in scientific practices and discourse.
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 A major theme across the chapters is how findings from research have increasingly revealed interconnections between the four strands as children develop scientific understanding at all grade levels. The evidence is especially strong that knowledge of the natural world (Strand 1, Chapter 4) and the ability to generate and evaluate evidence and explanations (Strand 2, Chapter 5) are closely intertwined. Work on the connections between Strands 1 and 2 and Strand 3—understanding the nature and development of scientific knowledge (Chapter 6)—is more recent. However, this connection has strong theoretical support, and emergent empirical work documenting the links is compelling. Connections between Strand 4 (Chapter 7), productive participation in science, and the other three strands have less direct empirical support in science. However, work in other subject areas, such as mathematics and reading, supports the idea that there is a connection and that the connection depends on incorporating certain science practices, like modeling, and discourse practices, like argumentation, into science learning environments. Another major theme across Part II is the strong evidence from current research that children are more capable than was once thought and that implementation of the strands framework could begin as early as kindergarten. In fact, basic research in cognitive development over the past few decades has revolutionized the view of how children’s minds develop, from infancy through adolescence. It turns out that children come to school with a great capacity for learning in general as well as for science learning, and they are able to engage in surprisingly sophisticated scientific thinking in the early grades. Finally, across the four chapters we review research on how science reasoning and the growth of scientific knowledge develops in the elementary and middle school grades. The research reveals surprisingly diverse capabilities within a given age group as well as variation within a single individual depending on the nature of the task, problem, or inquiry at hand.
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 3 Foundations for Science Learning in Young Children Major Findings in the Chapter: In contrast to the commonly held and outmoded view that young children are concrete and simplistic thinkers, the research evidence now shows that their thinking is surprisingly sophisticated. Important building blocks for learning science are in place before they enter school. Children entering school already have substantial knowledge of the natural world, which can be built on to develop their understanding of scientific concepts. Some areas of knowledge may provide more robust foundations to build on than others, because they appear very early and have some universal characteristics across cultures throughout the world. By the end of preschool, children can reason in ways that provide helpful starting points for developing scientific reasoning. However, their reasoning abilities are constrained by their conceptual knowledge, the nature of the task, and their awareness of their own thinking. Regardless of one’s theoretical orientation, by the time children enter elementary school, no one would argue that their minds are empty vessels awaiting enlightenment in the form of instruction. They come to school after years of cognitive growth in which they have developed a wide range of ways of understanding and reasoning about the world around them. Our goal in this chapter is to describe the knowledge and skills that children bring to school, beginning with the earliest understandings of infants. The past 20 to 30 years of research paint a picture of young children as surpris-
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 ingly competent and able to engage in learning across all four strands of scientific proficiency from the very beginning of their science education. We begin with a discussion of young children’s knowledge of the natural world. This knowledge can emerge as a consequence of a child’s everyday interactions with the world as well as a result of the ways in which the culture and its adult members explicitly impart information to children. In some areas of instruction, such as reading, the role of preexisting knowledge and understanding may be relatively modest, but in the area of science education, children bring a great deal that is relevant. A major challenge is to build on students’ existing knowledge of the natural world to help them understand and use scientific knowledge. Next we identify aspects of young children’s thinking that can serve as the foundation for developing scientific reasoning in the elementary grades. For example, young children understand that one thing can represent another (such as a toy airplane or a scale model), which provides a starting point for modeling. Finally, we consider precursors to children’s understanding of how scientific knowledge is constructed. We include here their understanding of the ideas and beliefs held by other people and their ability to assess the credibility of different sources of knowledge. ORGANIZING THEMES Several themes run repeatedly through the research on young children’s emerging understandings of natural systems and their reasoning. The following three themes help organize the research summaries that follow: Concern with explanation and investigation are central to children’s learning and thinking at all ages. Even the youngest children are sensitive to highly abstract patterns and causal relations. They use this information to guide the ways in which they generalize, make inferences, and make sense of the world. There is increasing recognition of the richness and variability of children’s understandings that involve implicit and explicit, nonsymbolic and symbolic, associative and explanatory components. There is no simple concrete to abstract progression in children’s development. Children develop explanatory insights in specific domains. Some key domains of understanding may have a privileged status in helping with the emergence of science. These include mechanics, folk biology, some aspects of chemistry (e.g., an initial understanding of different substances), and folk psychology, as explained below. These four domains have universal shared components throughout the world and for children from all backgrounds in the United States. They form an important cognitive common ground on which to build more sophisticated scientific understandings. Roots of these
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 domains extend back to preverbal thought and are therefore a legacy of infancy. Not only does the growth of scientific understanding involve a sense of the patterns special to such domains as physics and biology, but it also requires much broader cognitive skills that cut across domains. These include an ability to stand back and look at one’s knowledge and learning, heuristics that enable one to efficiently process large amounts of information, and strategies for acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting information. This interplay between domain-specific forms of learning and domaingeneral ones is central to any account of the emergence of scientific thought. This chapter illustrates these three themes and how they are central to recent research findings concerning how many of the building blocks of scientific understanding emerge prior to school. Much of the current science education curriculum is based on dated assumptions about the nature of cognitive development and learning, assumptions that lead to suboptimal teaching of science (Metz, 1995). It has been common to view younger children as deficient in some manner, resulting in a focus on what they cannot do rather than what they can do (Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983). That focus is a legacy going back more than 85 years to Jean Piaget’s early studies of the ways in which normal children failed on early versions of the standardized tests that later became widely used as intelligence tests. It asks what children are “missing” and leads to analyses asking when they acquire a certain component of thinking. As a result—in a somewhat distorted interpretation of Piaget’s work (e.g., Bruner, 1964; Werner and Kaplan, 1963)—cognitive development has often been understood as a series of artificial dichotomies in which children do or do not have a particular skill. The transition from being without the skill to having the skill is understood as going through a developmental stage. Problems with this perspective have long been recognized (Flavell, 1971; Linn, 1978; Pulos and Linn, 1978; see also Metz, 1995, for an extensive discussion of the misapplication of Piagetian ideas). The emphasis on deficits and stages of abilities tends to look at highly general characterizations of children’s capacities, emphasizing global deficits that apply to almost all areas of thought. For example, preschool children have often been claimed to be concrete, preoperational, precausal, prelogical, and lacking the ability to think in relational terms. Only during the elementary school years, or in some cases not until adolescence, were children thought to transition to “higher” forms of thought. If these claims were true as absolute deficits, they would suggest that children bring a radically different way of understanding the world with them when they enter the elementary school classroom.
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 One review has characterized three false and outmoded views about limitations in elementary children’s thinking that are still widely embraced by education practitioners (Metz, 1995): (1) Elementary schoolchildren think in concrete as opposed to abstract terms. (2) Elementary schoolchildren can make sense of their world primarily in terms of ordering and classifying objects and relations and not in terms of explanatory understanding or the building of intuitive theories. (3) Elementary schoolchildren cannot use experimentation to develop their ideas. All three of these views, as well as other views of broad cognitive limitations of elementary schoolchildren, and even many preschoolers, are no longer accepted by the cognitive developmental research community (see Carey, 1985; Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983; Gelman and Kalish, 2005; and Metz, 1995, for reviews). EARLY CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF NATURAL SYSTEMS In all cultures, whether they are highly technological or profoundly traditional, there are natural systems that everyone encounters in common and must explain. These form our point of departure for discussing what children bring to school in terms of scientific understanding. Four systems have been extensively studied in infants and young children: the simple mechanics of solid bounded objects, the behaviors of psychological agents, the actions and organization of living things, and the makeup of substances and materials. Infants throughout the world seem to understand these four natural systems in the same way and, to the extent that cross-cultural work has been done with older children, there are considerable commonalities for preschoolers as well. Although these common sets of understandings may diverge more and more in the elementary school years and beyond, they do represent a shared understanding that is a critical foundation for the teaching and learning of science. In older children, there has also been considerable study of their understanding of cosmology and larger scale earth systems, such as weather, ecology, and such processes as volcanic eruptions, tides, and mountain formation. Beliefs in these areas can vary dramatically across cultures and form an interesting contrast to systems that seem to be partially grasped at a much earlier age, but even with large-scale earth systems, there are important common threads. Naïve Physics Simple and universal rules govern the behaviors of the physical world, or at least seemingly simple ones at a macroscopic scale. Consider, for example, bounded solid objects, such as rubber balls, wooden doors, and rigid sticks. One knows that solid objects cannot move through each other, that
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 any changes in their movements are the result of forces outside them, either through direct contact, such as in a collision, or through gravity. One knows that action at a distance between two objects, such as with magnets, is unusual. One also knows that objects tend to endure over space and time. They cannot blink out of existence and then reappear at a different time or in a different place, except in science fiction. It might seem that knowledge of this sort takes years to acquire. A baby and a young toddler would have to carefully observe the behaviors of physical objects and gradually, from this observational data, induce a set of beliefs that would become their intuitive theory of physics. Given that the simple and elegant rules of Newtonian mechanics were not apparent until Newton himself labored over the topic for many years, how could one expect an infant or a toddler to have any set of coherent expectations about the physical world? It now is clear that, well before their first birthday, infants do have such expectations and they continue to develop in the preschool years. They are definitely not in the form laid down in Newton’s Principia, but they do enable infants and children to anticipate and interpret many aspects of their physical worlds. The research literature on infants’ conceptions of physical objects has burgeoned in the past two decades and cannot possibly be fully surveyed here (see Baillargeon, 2004; Cohen and Cashon, 2006; Mandler, 2004; Munakata, Casey, and Diamond, 2004, for discussions of large segments of this literature). Instead, we provide a few examples of the ways in which infants are and are not successful. One set of studies concerns intuitions about object permanence and solidity. It now appears that, at least by the fourth month of life, infants “know” that solid objects cannot interpenetrate and that they continue to exist over space and time even when out of sight. One now classic line of studies in this area had infants observe a flat barrier swinging both toward and away from them through 180 degrees of arc on a surface, such as a table. Infants were shown the 180 degree event several times until they became disinterested (i.e., habituated) to the stimulus. They were then shown a small solid object that was placed behind the barrier in such a way that would prevent the barrier from swinging through the full 180 degrees (see Box 3-1 for diagram). Infants looked longer at displays in which the barrier went through the full 180 degrees (the hidden object disappeared through a trap door) than at displays in which the barrier stopped, for the first time, at say 110 degrees, a novel stopping position but one that was consistent with assumptions about object solidity and permanence (Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman, 1985). In other studies, infants expected that a small vehicle moving behind a barrier would reemerge only when a block behind the barrier was not directly in its path (Baillargeon, 1986). In still other lines of work, infants looked longer when a vertically dropped object seemed to end up in a
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 BOX 3-1 Infants’ Understanding of the Physical World The diagram above shows the kind of apparatus used to study infants’ understanding of the barrier phenomena. Infants are first habituated to a screen that rotates through a 180 degree arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. Next, a large box is placed behind the screen. In the possible event, the screen stops when it encounters the box (112 degree arc); in the impossible event, the screen stops after rotating through the top 80 percent of the space occupied by the box (157 degree arc). SOURCE: Baillargeon (1995).
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 position that implies it must have moved through an intervening, but occluded, solid platform (Spelke, 1991). Longer looking by infants is widely accepted as an indication that they have seen an event that violates their expectations. There is also, not surprisingly, considerable learning about the physical world during infancy. For example, younger infants are sensitive only to large and obvious conflicts between the barrier and obscured block and will not notice smaller discrepancies, such as when the barrier stops 30 degrees too early (Baillargeon, 1995). Thus, they need to learn to calibrate the geometry of physical events with their consequences. Similarly, an appreciation that an unsupported object will fall down takes time to develop (Spelke and Kyeong, 1992). Other researchers argue that competing ways of thinking about objects during infancy are resolved only gradually, over a period of several months (Munakata et al., 1997). Regardless of the details of how quickly infants gain a single clear view of the nature of the physical world, there is substantial agreement that, by the end of the first year of life, they have expectations about objects that fit with many principles governing the behaviors of bounded physical objects. By 12 months of age, infants are capable of taking into account physical dimensions and magnitudes and their consequences for events. As noted earlier, they consider the angle of movement of a swinging barrier as it relates to the size of an object behind it. They also understand that bigger objects in motion are likely to have bigger consequences. For example, when 11-month-olds observe a cylinder roll down a ramp and move another object through collision, they infer that a larger novel cylinder will move the object more and that a smaller cylinder will move it less (Kotovsky and Baillargeon, 1994). More broadly, while starting early with some very general ideas about solidity and spatiotemporal continuity (Spelke et al., 1992, 1995), infants are constantly refining those ideas into forms that enable more subtle inferences about objects and their behaviors over intervals of time and space (Baillargeon, 2004). By the end of the first year, infants also have a clear sense of causation as opposed to mere correlation or contiguity. Thus, even if one event reliably occurs before another one, infants may not infer causation unless there is also some degree of plausible mechanism, such as one object launching another through collision (Leslie and Keeble, 1987). They can also make inferences about unreasonable versus reasonable hidden causes of the motion of an inanimate object (Saxe, Tenenbaum, and Carey, 2005). Ongoing research is now asking how a 1-year-old’s mental representations of the world should be best characterized. Should her ability to anticipate the behaviors of physical objects be seen as her having beliefs like those of an adult, or could it reflect mental processes that are less explicit and belief-like in nature? (See Leslie, 1994, for further discussion of these
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 issues.) To what extent can the 1-year-old flexibly use those mental representations to understand more novel problems with physical objects? Answers to these questions will help to clarify not only how older children’s physical knowledge becomes more explicit but also how that explicit knowledge interacts with earlier preverbal forms. One intriguing example of the limits of physical understanding in infancy is seen in tasks in which toddlers fail what seem to be the same solidity problems that infants pass. In one task, children observed a display in which several wooden boards could block a ball rolling down a ramp on which the blocks were placed. A low wall was put in front of the blocks and ramp, occluding most of the ramp but keeping the tops of the blocks visible, and a ball was then put into motion on the high part of the ramp that was still visible. When 2-year-olds were asked to open a door where they think a rolling ball will be, they often open the door that would require the ball to move through a salient solid barrier (Keen, 2003). The same children do much better when the two doors are opened simultaneously by another person and they merely have to react to expected and unexpected outcomes. Such actions as retrieval or catching add new levels of complexity in terms of representing the spatial arrangements of hidden objects, levels that can overwhelm 2-year-olds (Freeman et al., 2004; Hood, 2004; Kloos and Keen, 2005). More broadly, one sees that, in certain tasks, some elements of physical object knowledge are emerging very early, but that the ability to use this knowledge in a wider range of tasks, including those that require planning or coordinating sequences of actions on the part of the child, takes considerable time to develop. In addition, children through their own actions often provide critical feedback that adults might not normally provide. Thus, while adults rarely put objects on surfaces from which they will topple off because they aren’t adequately supported, younger children and infants (e.g., Baillargeon, 2004) will do so and will therefore gain valuable new information concerning the mechanics of physical objects. Finally, knowledge can sometimes be implicit in a child’s action before it is accessible for other, more explicit uses. For example, 5-year-olds will adjust the angle and strength of their throws of a ball in ways that nicely anticipate the trajectories needed for projectiles to hit particular targets, at the same time showing strong errors in their guesses of correct launch speeds for the same targets (Krist, Fieberg, and Wilkening, 1993; see also Shanon, 1976). Over the next several years, their explicit ability to predict projectile trajectories gradually improves, although even in adults there are vestiges of the kindergarten errors (Krist et al., 1993; Shanon, 1976). Indeed, a large literature has shown that several naïve errors about physical trajectories persist in most adults (Bertamini, Spooner, and Hecht, 2004; Carmazza, McCloskey, and Green, 1981; Clement, 1982; Hecht and Bertamini, 2000).
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 Preschoolers have a quite sophisticated sense of the sort of mechanical causality that is intrinsic to the motion of simple physical solids. For example, when two events precede another one, they will usually correctly sense which is more physically plausible and then prefer it as the cause (Bullock, Gelman, and Baillargeon, 1982; Gelman and Lucariello, 2002). When preschoolers’ spontaneous explanations of various entities are examined in large transcriptions of everyday speech, the children flexibly and easily employ causal reasoning, using different kind of explanations depending on whether the events are thought of as physical, psychological, or biological (Hickling and Wellman, 2001). They show similar distinctions in more experimental tasks (Heyman, Phillips, and Gelman, 2003). Indeed, when asked to explain anomalies in physical regularities, children use very different patterns of reasoning than when explaining anomalies in social conventions of moral rules (Lockhart, 1981). Preschoolers are also adept at inferring hidden causes. Thus, they assume that similar external motions of animate and inanimate objects are governed by radically different internal causes (Gelman, Durgin, and Kaufman, 1995). They understand that unseen factors must be linked to observable ones in systematic ways that are mechanistically mediated (Yoachim and Meltzoff, 2003). Moreover, preschoolers are quite sophisticated at using complex patterns of covariation over time to infer hidden causes and not just correlations (Gopnik et al., 2004), although often such inferences may be constrained by prior mechanistic theories that they are applying to those tasks (Griffiths, Baraff, and Tenenbaum, 2004). Finally, preschoolers will track a sequence of events occurring in causal chains and infer that the first event in that chain is most likely to be the most important cause (Ahn et al., 2000), a strategy frequently used by adults as well. A vast literature on science “misconceptions” argues that erroneous beliefs about the physical world are held by many, ranging from preschoolers to adults. And many of these beliefs are highly resistant to change by instruction (Chi, 2005). Much of that literature, especially in the area of mechanics, has focused on high school and college students (e.g., Brown and Clement, 1987; Carmazza, McCloskey, and Green, 1981; Minstrell, 1983, 1988; Clement, 1982); there have been many fewer studies of younger preschool or elementary schoolchildren (Doran, 1972; Ioannides and Vosniadou, 2002; Viennot, 1979). This literature makes clear, however, that the elegant theoretical construction of Newtonian mechanics (including its three primary laws of motion) is by no means obvious even to high school or college students who have had courses in introductory mechanics. Student misconceptions are sometimes revealed in tasks in which they are asked to predict the trajectories of objects or evaluate whether an observed trajectory is possible or impossible, but even more often when they are asked to identify and explain the forces acting on an object in a given
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 those corresponding to physical mechanics, cognitive and motivational processes, matter, the living world, and cosmology. They are not always correct and often have huge gaps in their understandings, but they certainly aren’t mere bundles of misconceptions. Instead, they are more profitably construed as active exploratory agents who have successfully learned about regularities in these broad domains in ways that help them interpret, anticipate, and explain their worlds. They do have misconceptions, and some persist into most adults’ mental lives, but these misconceptions are more revealing and better understood in the broader context of considering children’s positive abilities. In conjunction with their knowledge of the natural world, young children are also able to engage in reasoning that can be used as starting points for supporting the generation and evaluation of evidence. For example, young children’s understanding of symbols and scale models can be used to help them engage in modeling activities. Likewise, their ability to distinguish cause and effect is a critical foundation for designing informative experiments. These early reasoning abilities are constrained, however, by the depth of children’s conceptual knowledge, the nature of the task, and their awareness of their own thinking (metacognition). The latter, metacognition or the ability to think about one’s own thinking, is recognized as critical to learning in general (see National Research Council, 2000) and emerges again and again as important to science learning. Finally, children’s early beliefs about knowledge may serve as precursors to developing an understanding of how scientific knowledge is constructed. During the preschool years, children develop an awareness of other people’s minds that reveals a growing understanding of the active role of the knower in knowledge construction. This ability to consider ideas and beliefs as separate from the material world is foundational for engaging in debates about the interpretation of evidence. Children’s beliefs about knowledge also encompass some aspects of the nature of knowledge, such as its degree of uncertainty and the relative credibility of knowledge sources. These epistemological beliefs can function as a starting point for learning about the nature and development of science knowledge in the classroom, providing rich resources on which to build, as well as limitations. Many questions remain about the mental representations that children use to help make sense of their world, such as how different they are from the more formal theories of science and how easy it is for them to access information for use across a wide range of contexts. It is important for science educators to balance a deep appreciation of what is genuinely conceptually difficult, “non obvious,” and novel about many central principles of modern science, with an equally deep appreciation of the many intellectual resources that children bring to the science learning task. It is these resources in combination with the new knowledge and tools provided in sci-
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Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8 ence instruction itself that will make successful science learning possible. There is now abundant evidence that, along with whatever misconceptions they may appear to have, children also bring to the classroom a rich and valuable set of knowledge structures and processes that should be exploited more fully as points of departure for science education. Furthermore, their reasoning abilities and understanding of knowledge mean that they can engage in and profit from instruction that incorporates relatively complex scientific practices from the very beginning of their schooling. REFERENCES Ahn, W., Gelman, S.A., Amsterlaw, J.A., Hohenstein, J., and Kalish, C.W. (2000). Causal status effects in children’s categorization. Cognition, 76, 35-43. Atran, S., Medin, D.L., Lynch, E., Vapnarsky, V., Ucan Ek’, E., and Sousa, P. (2001). Folkbiology doesn’t come from folkpsychology: Evidence from Yukatec Maya in cross-cultural perspective. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 1, 4-42. Au, T.K. (1994). Developing an intuitive understanding of substance kinds. Cognitive Psychology, 27(1), 71-111. Backscheider, A.G., Shatz, M., and Gelman, S.A. (1993). Preschoolers’ ability to distinguish living kinds as a function of regrowth. Child Development, 64, 1242-1257. Baillargeon, R. (1986). Representing the existence and the location of hidden objects: Object permanence in 6- and 8-month-old infants. Cognition, 23, 21-41. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3.5- and 4.5-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655-664. Baillargeon, R. (1995). A model of physical reasoning in infancy. In C. Rovee-Collier and L. Lipsitt (Eds.), Advances in infancy research (vol. 9, pp. 305-371). Norwood NJ: Ablex. Baillargeon, R. (2004). How do infants learn about the physical world? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3, 133-140. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E.S., and Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191-208. Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bartsch, K., and Wellman, H. (1989). Young children’s attribution of action to beliefs and desires. Child Development, 60, 946-964. Bertamini, M., Spooner A., and Hecht, H. (2004). The representation of naive knowledge about physics. In G. Malcolm (Ed.), Multidisciplinary approaches to visual representations and interpretations. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Bertenthal, B.I. (1993). Infants’ perception of biomechanical motions: Intrinsic image and knowledge-based constraints. In C. Granrud (Ed.), Visual perception and cognition in infancy (pp. 175-214). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Asociates. Booth, A.E., Pinto, J., and Bertenthal, B.I. (2002). Perception of the symmetrical patterning of human gait by infants. Developmental Psychology, 38(4), 554-563.
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