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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
Executive Summary
BACKGROUND
As currently organized, the Space Communications Office (SCO) within the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) at NASA has two primary roles within the agency, both of which are critical to the success and safety of human and robotic space missions. The SCO’s first role is to directly manage two of the communication networks that enable spaceflight operations and research. These two operational program elements include the Space Network and the NASA Integrated Services Network. The SCO’s second role is to integrate agency-wide telecommunications issues that influence policy formulation and to lead the effort to define NASA’s future space communications and navigation architecture. Several program elements within the SCO address this role:
Spectrum management,
Standards management,
Search and rescue,
Communications and navigation architecture,
Technology, and
Operations integration.
In 2005, NASA requested that the National Research Council (NRC) perform a review of the effectiveness of the SCO in carrying out its program responsibilities. The NRC subsequently formed the Committee to Review NASA’s Space Communications Program, which was tasked to assess the overall quality of the space communications program and offer findings and recommendations. In this study the committee has reviewed each of the program elements within the SCO, looking specifically at questions related to the formulation of each program element’s plan, the methodology used to develop the plans, how each program element utilizes its connections to the broader community, and the overall capabilities that exist within each program element. While the primary purpose of the study was to provide a peer assessment rather than programmatic advice, the committee has in some cases commented on programmatic issues where they became apparent in the course of reviewing program effectiveness. Given below are the highlights of the committee’s assessment of the overall SCO program and the individual program elements. Additional findings and recommendations are presented in the main text of the report. Significant portions of NASA’s space communications work are managed outside the SCO, and those programs are not reviewed in this study.
OVERALL PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
After a careful review of each of the program elements in the SCO, it was the consensus of the committee that, despite what appeared to be marginal civil service staffing levels in some areas, the overall program was both well managed and highly effective in carrying out its critical functions. The committee did, however, note some areas of possible concern in the overall program and makes a number of suggestions for avoiding potential pitfalls as the program moves forward.
Prospective Centralized Space CommunicationsManagement
As this study was nearing completion, the committee learned that NASA was considering replacement of the fractionated space communications management structure at NASA headquarters with a more centralized approach. It was not within the committee’s purview to review the advantages and disadvantages of consolidating NASA space communications management functions. However, the committee makes several observations on this issue, noting that:
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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
Executive Summary
BACKGROUND
As currently organized, the Space Communications Office (SCO) within the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) at NASA has two primary roles within the agency, both of which are critical to the success and safety of human and robotic space missions. The SCO’s first role is to directly manage two of the communication networks that enable spaceflight operations and research. These two operational program elements include the Space Network and the NASA Integrated Services Network. The SCO’s second role is to integrate agency-wide telecommunications issues that influence policy formulation and to lead the effort to define NASA’s future space communications and navigation architecture. Several program elements within the SCO address this role:
Spectrum management,
Standards management,
Search and rescue,
Communications and navigation architecture,
Technology, and
Operations integration.
In 2005, NASA requested that the National Research Council (NRC) perform a review of the effectiveness of the SCO in carrying out its program responsibilities. The NRC subsequently formed the Committee to Review NASA’s Space Communications Program, which was tasked to assess the overall quality of the space communications program and offer findings and recommendations. In this study the committee has reviewed each of the program elements within the SCO, looking specifically at questions related to the formulation of each program element’s plan, the methodology used to develop the plans, how each program element utilizes its connections to the broader community, and the overall capabilities that exist within each program element. While the primary purpose of the study was to provide a peer assessment rather than programmatic advice, the committee has in some cases commented on programmatic issues where they became apparent in the course of reviewing program effectiveness. Given below are the highlights of the committee’s assessment of the overall SCO program and the individual program elements. Additional findings and recommendations are presented in the main text of the report. Significant portions of NASA’s space communications work are managed outside the SCO, and those programs are not reviewed in this study.
OVERALL PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
After a careful review of each of the program elements in the SCO, it was the consensus of the committee that, despite what appeared to be marginal civil service staffing levels in some areas, the overall program was both well managed and highly effective in carrying out its critical functions. The committee did, however, note some areas of possible concern in the overall program and makes a number of suggestions for avoiding potential pitfalls as the program moves forward.
Prospective Centralized Space Communications Management
As this study was nearing completion, the committee learned that NASA was considering replacement of the fractionated space communications management structure at NASA headquarters with a more centralized approach. It was not within the committee’s purview to review the advantages and disadvantages of consolidating NASA space communications management functions. However, the committee makes several observations on this issue, noting that:
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Centralized headquarters management and funding of space communications worked well for NASA for more than 30 years until 1996.
The proposed reorganization apparently would centralize space communications requirements and architectures and realign the associated budgets, thus affecting visibility into and management of very large current and future NASA programs for generations to come.
Changing management structures is not a panacea. Reorganizations are often disruptive, countering the expected benefits. For instance, the last shift in space communications management resulted in the loss of 90 percent of the space communications program management experience base that had previously existed at NASA headquarters. Most personnel either retired or were reassigned to unrelated programs.
Recommendation: Major changes in modus operandi, such as realigning top-level management and funding responsibilities, should be preceded by a transition plan that outlines the objectives of the changes and ensures that past corporate knowledge is considered by the new organization. The committee recommends a thorough review of the lessons learned from past reorganizations so that NASA can avoid repeating unsatisfactory consequences.
Limits of Review
Only the programs currently managed by the Space Communications Office at NASA were reviewed in this study. However, a significant portion of NASA’s space communications work is managed within other parts of the agency, such as the operation of the Deep Space Network in the Science Mission Directorate. The committee believes that NASA would benefit from a comprehensive review of all of its space communications work and notes that NASA’s proposed consolidation of all communications functions under a single management structure may offer a timely opportunity for such a review.
TDRSS Replenishment and Long-Term Communications Requirements
The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) is considered to be a national asset, and it supports, in addition to NASA, numerous users ranging from the Department of Defense to the National Science Foundation. A gap in TDRSS capability to support projected NASA user requirements will begin in 2015. NASA plans to include funding in the FY 2008 budget cycle for a preformulation phase 1 effort and expects to develop a compelling case for a FY 2008 start for TDRSS satellite replenishment1 and thus avoid a gap in NASA user coverage. NASA is also working with non-NASA users that will have a gap in TDRSS support projected to start as early as 2010. Historically, when issues have arisen concerning prioritization of TDRSS support for NASA missions versus other missions, the resolution has often not been favorable to NASA.
The committee observes that the planned reorganization of space communications management could greatly alter the future approaches that will be available for supplying the near-Earth communications support that is currently provided by TDRSS.
Recommendation: A restructured space communications management organization should undertake a detailed analysis of alternative approaches for satisfying long-term terrestrial, near-Earth, and exploratory space communications requirements and select the most beneficial for implementation. This recommendation does not presuppose that the current approaches are wrong, but it does suggest that there may be attractive alternatives worthy of reconsideration that may have been eliminated due to organizational boundaries.
Recommendation: The committee believes it would be responsive and proactive for NASA to work with the broader TDRSS user community to examine programmatic alternatives that could accelerate TDRSS satellite replenishment in order to address the projected service gap for non-NASA users.
Centralized Space Communications Contracting
In 1996 NASA centralized its space communications contracting by having Johnson Space Center issue a single completion type contract to replace 18 contracts that had been awarded by the other NASA centers. This was the Consolidated Space Operations Contract (CSOC). NASA provided the committee with several documents on CSOC lessons learned revealing why the centralized contracting concept had failed. The committee observes that contracting strategies are critical to the success of the space communications program as it moves forward.
Recommendation: The planned reorganization of NASA space communications management at NASA headquarters provides an opportunity to benefit fully from the lessons learned from contracting approaches used under the Consolidated Space Operations Contract. The committee recommends an early and thorough examination and internal agency discussion of CSOC lessons learned to ensure that past errors are not repeated. NASA should also review approaches used prior to 1996 to take advantage of past successes.
Requirements Validation Process
While some program elements of the SCO (such as the NASA Integrated Services Network) have a requirements
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validation process, others do not formally vet or document user and operator needs. Possible problems that can arise as a result include disconnects between validated needs and the formal planning and budgeting process, added uncertainty in the acquisition process, confusion over key performance goals and threshold requirements, and an inability to establish metrics for measuring success in terms of user and operator needs. In turn, these problems could make it difficult to accurately establish and defend the levels of appropriated funding required by NASA and the reimbursable funding needed from outside the agency.
The committee notes that the projected reorganization of space communications management at NASA offers the opportunity for an end-to-end review of the requirements validation process across all space communications programs and the development of consistent best practices that can address these potential issues.
NASA Workforce
At NASA headquarters and at the centers, the committee found a highly experienced staff operating from an efficient matrix organization to support multiple programs. The committee also found strong working relationships with customers, contractors, and external organizations and judged that these relationships had been critical to the current success of the SOMD space communications program. The committee noted, however, that some elements of SCO have minimal civil service staffing and were relying heavily on contractors to accomplish the program’s mission. The committee was unable to identify opportunities for further government personnel reductions in these elements.
The committee also noted that much of the civil service workforce for communications, and particularly its leadership, is nearing retirement. NASA has young, very talented professionals awaiting their turn to move up in the organization, but they are too junior to fill the vacuum that could well occur in the next few years as the current leaders retire. In addition, it is likely that as the agency’s veterans of space communications retire, the interpersonal relationships that currently help facilitate their success will no longer exist, and higher staffing levels will be required in the future to accomplish the same tasks with more junior, less experienced replacements. Further, in presentations made to it the committee heard many comments on the difficulties caused by the manner in which funding for government staff is accounted for in budgets. The committee did not review this issue, but the comments indicate fairly widespread concern within the workforce.
Recommendation: One of the early reviews to be conducted by the newly centralized NASA headquarters space communications management should include a detailed analysis of the personnel needs of the space communications program. This review should consider the minimum civil service staffing levels needed, likely upcoming retirements, availability of comparable replacements, the impact of full-cost accounting on the ability to hire civil service replacements, and the proper mix of civil service and contractors required to perform the mission.
Program Plan
NASA spends a great deal of money on space communications in order to provide a capability that is critical to the success of human spaceflight and science missions. The committee found that formal planning documents exist for a number of individual elements, or aspects of elements, within the SOMD space communications program. However, there was no overarching plan for the conduct of that space communications program.
Recommendation: The committee recommends that NASA take the opportunity presented by the impending reorganization of space communications to develop a program plan and vet this plan with the participating centers and NASA headquarters elements to ensure that it is executable and fits within the vision expressed in the NASA strategic plan. In addition, those elements of space communications that currently do not have formal element-level planning documents should develop plans that are tailored to the size and complexity of the activity in that element.
PROGRAM ELEMENT ASSESSMENT
In reviewing the individual program elements within the Space Communications Office, the committee considered each of the questions in its statement of task (Appendix A) that was applicable to the given element. Although in some cases there was insufficient data to fully answer a particular question, the committee considered that it had adequate information to perform a quality review of all of the program elements. The committee made numerous observations and developed suggestions intended to provide guidance to NASA in the future conduct of these program elements, and a few of the key points are summarized here.
Space Network
Consisting of a constellation of tracking and data relay satellites and a series of ground tracking and relay stations, the Space Network provides global-coverage tracking and data acquisition services during launch, early orbit, and operations in low Earth orbit (LEO) to NASA, other government agencies, and commercial and international customers. The current TDRSS constellation consists of six first-generation (F1 and F3-F7) and three second-generation (F8-F10) satellites, with three of the nine satellites being stored on orbit.
The most significant issue associated with the Space
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Network program element is the absence of a definitive plan and appropriate resources for ensuring continuity of service (TDRSS satellite replenishment) to both NASA and non-NASA users.
Finding: A NASA TDRSS satellite replenishment decision is needed not later than the FY 2008 budget cycle in order to ensure continuity of communications support for NASA missions.
Finding: There appears to be a “caveat emptor” mind-set when it comes to consideration of communications service continuity (TDRSS satellite replenishment and longer-term continuity of service) for the non-NASA user community.
Recommendation: If in fact TDRSS, plus its follow-on, is truly a national asset, NASA should take the lead in identifying the appropriate policy, the required resources, and the planning, implementation, and requirements validation process necessary to serve all TDRSS user communities’ needs for communications services.
Finding: Commercial satellite communications systems may have limited ability to meet some of the mission needs currently being supported by the Space Network.
Finding: Reliance on reimbursable funds from non-NASA users as the major component of the funding needed for the operations and maintenance of the Space Network is an unhealthy basis for long-term planning and stability.
Recommendation: NASA, in conjunction with the user community, should examine alternatives for providing long-term, stable funding at the level required for operation and maintenance of the Space Network.
NASA Integrated Services Network
The NASA Integrated Services Network (NISN) project provides terrestrial networking for the agency. There are two separate networks: (1) a mission network for transmission of flight-mission data between NASA ground stations and mission operations control centers and (2) an institutional network to support more general NASA activities. The committee based its evaluation of NISN on discussions with NISN management, site visits to several NASA centers, customer assessments of NISN services, and documents governing project activities and responsibilities. Key findings and recommendations include:
Finding: Further outsourcing for the NASA Integrated Services Network appears to be infeasible, without negatively impacting the project, since network circuits are already provided commercially and the civil service staff is minimal.
Finding: The problem of having NISN equipment that is no longer serviceable is being resolved by replacing outdated equipment as funding allows.
Recommendation: NASA should structure future NISN support contracts to ensure that critical equipment is updated in an ongoing manner, with the minimum requirement being that equipment will be replaced before vendors cease maintenance.
Finding: NASA’s mission network has more stringent requirements for reliability and availability than does its institutional network. However, given the improvements inherent in state-of-the-art network technologies, any network with such technology will satisfy the more stringent of the two sets of requirements, so that it is not necessary to differentiate between the two networks with respect to this issue.
Recommendation: NASA should reevaluate the possibilities for sharing a single network infrastructure for its mission network and institutional network.
Spectrum Management
NASA has extensive communications and remote sensing systems, and the availability of adequately protected electromagnetic spectrum2 is essential to the implementation of NASA’s overall mission and to its vision relating to space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research.
NASA’s Spectrum Policy and Planning organization at NASA headquarters and at its field centers plays a key role in ensuring access to the electromagnetic spectrum, complying with U.S. and international spectrum regulations, and advocating for NASA’s electromagnetic spectrum needs in national and international spectrum regulatory forums. In addition, it provides technical advocacy in support of U.S. commercial aerospace industries, facilitates private-sector use of spectrum, and encourages commercialization of space. All of these goals and objectives require an ongoing and long-term commitment of funding.
The committee found that NASA has been very effective in advocating for and protecting its spectrum management needs. The committee did note that there is continuing demand for access to spectrum for mobile voice, high-speed data, and Internet-accessible wireless services that subjects NASA crosslinks and downlinks to potential interference from other services. Two examples are the TDRSS Ku-band crosslinks and downlinks and the deep-space S-band uplinks. In this regard, the committee offers the following finding and recommendation:
Finding: NASA has been very effective in protecting its access to the radio frequency spectrum needed for space com-
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munications. In addition, the potential interference from a proliferation of Ku-band non-geosynchronous orbit (NGSO) very-small-aperture terminals (VSATs) has not been realized because these systems have not, as yet, been deployed, and NASA is reducing its use of S-band uplinks from its Deep Space Network sites.
Recommendation: Although there is no compelling reason for NASA to vacate the Ku band, it would be prudent for NASA to consider relocating its future Ku-band downlinks to a band with a primary allocation and to encourage users to transition from the Ku band to the Ka band. This approach would provide insurance against unacceptable interference arising from the future proliferation of commercial very-small-aperture terminal uplinks and could offer the secondary benefit of a higher-capacity downlink.
Data Standards Management
The primary role of the data standards management program element is to represent NASA in a national and international collaborative activity, the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), which develops space-associated standards to facilitate more cost-effective missions by sharing common components, procedures, and infrastructure. Historically, NASA has played a leadership role in the CCSDS. The committee found that the standards management program makes especially valuable (though somewhat subtle) contributions to all space programs, as demonstrated by the increasing adoption of its products—standards. Given that adoption of standards is voluntary, both by NASA flight programs and by the other nine member agencies, this accomplishment is particularly meaningful. Another important metric of this program element’s contribution is the value of adopted standards: in 2005, the CCSDS surveyed the dollar value and reached a consensus that it exceeded $24 billion per annum3—an extremely impressive return given the quite modest level of resources devoted to this program element.
Finding: It appears that the expected services are being successfully provided by NASA’s space data standards management program element, as evidenced by the continuing development of standards that are being adopted by space activities around the world. The relatively modest funding allocated seems stable, and no funding threats are foreseen.
Search and Rescue
The program element for search and rescue (SAR) provides distress alerting and location information to SAR authorities anywhere in the world for maritime, aviation, and land-based users. COSPAS-SARSAT (C-S), an international and multi-U.S.-agency system, is operational today. The Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS), a U.S. program to upgrade C-S capabilities by improving timeliness and accuracy for locating users in distress, is in its proof-of-concept phase and is achieving technical expectations. NASA has been and continues to be the lead U.S. research and development agency for SAR programs. Next-generation international SAR programs are also in development and will be integrated with DASS as upgrades to the C-S system to provide worldwide life-saving search and rescue services. The proof of concept phase of DASS will be followed by a NOAA-managed demonstration and evaluation phase and subsequent incorporation of DASS into the C-S alerting system.
Finding: NASA has exceeded its agreed-to budget for DASS. Considerably more funds are needed to complete the proof-of-concept phase, and this additional budget may not be supported by NASA headquarters. If the FY 2008 budget cycle results in changes in NASA program funding, it is uncertain whether the DASS proof of concept can be completed in a form that reflects the plans and agency agreements the committee reviewed in this study. The impacts on the plans of participating agencies are also not known.
Recommendation: As chair of the DASS Management Working Group, NASA should assemble the interagency participants in the DASS proof of concept, review the program’s progress toward meeting technical, operational, and programmatic requirements, review interagency and international commitments, and negotiate a plan for the future of DASS.
Communications and Navigation Architecture
The communications and navigation architecture program element is responsible for defining the space communications and navigation architecture to support NASA’s science and exploration missions through 2030. This architecture must evolve through 2030 and beyond to keep pace with the needs of future science and exploration users, and, potentially, non-NASA users. The Communications and Navigation Architecture program element accomplishes its task through NASA’s agency-wide Space Communications Architecture Working Group (SCAWG). SCAWG’s membership includes representatives from the communication networks, the user community, NASA centers, and each NASA mission directorate.
Recommendation: NASA’s top management should implement a management structure that involves the affected science and mission programs and other users and ensures support for, and compliance with, the long-term communications and navigation architecture.
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Technology
The technology element of the Space Communications Office is chartered to identify NASA communications capability needs across the agencies’ missions, track candidate enabling concepts and technologies, and develop those promising technologies through focused investment. The SCO uses a dedicated technology assessment team within its Space Communications Architecture Working Group to generate focus areas, direct technology development investments, and manage and track projects for infusion into future NASA systems.
The committee found a solid program management foundation that, if fully executed, would provide effective management of the technology development program. Several perceived limitations were identified in the execution of the overarching program, including a potential lack of uniformity in planning project executions and an occasional decoupling of top-down NASA mission needs and the bottom-up development of enabling technologies. The committee’s conclusions for this element can be summarized as advising that a more formal, integrated management effort be undertaken across the technology element, to include peer review evaluations with stakeholders and partners and a uniform application of systems analysis to provide inputs for investment decisions, including selection, continuation, and termination of project efforts.
Operations Integration
The operations integration program element is charged with the task of managing communications activities for human spaceflight. This role requires the operations integration team to coordinate with the Space Shuttle program, the International Space Station program, and the contractors that serve them. The operations integration team oversees the combined efforts of a distributed set of contractors who must work together seamlessly to support a common mission, coordinates with a wide range of domestic and international entities, manages requirements between the Mission Control Center and the various components of the space communications infrastructure, and reviews and certifies the readiness of communications-related hardware, software, and personnel for human spaceflight. In reviewing this element, the committee’s key findings included the following:
Finding: NASA missions that involve human spaceflight rely heavily on the skills and influence of several highly experienced individuals to manage their communications activities and provide readiness assurance.
Finding: NASA’s center-based contract structure makes it critical for operations integration team members to be both highly experienced and widely respected across many organizations within NASA.
Finding: The individuals responsible for managing and executing the operations integrations program element do an excellent job in the eyes of their customers, the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs.
NOTES
1. TDRSS replenishment as used in this report refers specifically to the next acquisition of replacement spacecraft needed to maintain some (currently unspecified) level of service to users as the on-orbit spacecraft reach the end of their useful life. Neither the planned capabilities/configuration of these replacement spacecraft, nor possible alternative approaches to provide comparable service, have been developed as yet and therefore were not assessed by the committee.
2. In spectral bands allocated for passive and active space research, space operations, passive and active Earth-exploration, and meteorological satellite, intersatellite, radionavigation, and deep-space research services.
3. Kelley, John D., NASA SOMD, personal communication, March 1, 2006.
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