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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
8
Technology
INTRODUCTION
It is the mission of the technology program element of the Space Communications Office (SCO) to constantly look to the future in order to find and develop new technologies that will enhance NASA space communications and navigation capabilities, or enable new capabilities that will improve service to NASA exploration and science mission users. The Technology element is funded at $17 million per year and is managed by NASA headquarters. This budget supports a civil service workforce of 32 full-time equivalents and 15 work-year equivalents of contractor support. The Technology element has contracts with Spectrolab Inc., Intevac Inc., OEC Inc., Princeton Lightwave Inc., and General Dynamics.1 Owing to proprietary concerns, details on these contracts were not provided to the committee, which thus did not have further insight into the size of each of these contracts, the work being done, the schedule and tasks planned, the contract length, or how the contractors were selected.
NASA uses the output of the Space Communications Architecture Working Group (SCAWG) and its Technology Assessment Team, described in Chapter 7, to select the technologies on which it will focus its resources. Technologies that serve all of NASA’s mission directorates are included in the SCO’s technology element portfolio.
The unifying challenge in space communications is the need to transport data with higher quality, efficiency, flexibility, and interoperability than is currently possible. This need creates architectural challenges that vary depending on where a NASA mission is going, when it is going, and what it will be doing when it gets there. Table 8.1 shows notional data rates for various communications services.2
NASA has chosen to divide the Technology element into six areas: optical communications, uplink arraying, spacecraft radio frequency technology, programmable communications systems (software defined radio), navigation, and plug-and-play interoperability.3 NASA’s communications and navigation architecture is a service-based infrastructure providing command, telemetry, data return and forwarding, emergency services, and astronaut communications between each other and to mission control. These activities are performed during all phases of a space mission, including launch and transit, as well as for all possible final destinations, including Earth orbit, the Moon, Mars, and anywhere else in the solar system and beyond its boundaries. Table 8.2 shows how these various technology areas relate to these mission phases and destinations.4
For each of these technology areas, NASA identified a key capability that was selected to meet evolving NASA mission needs. The capability is based on assumed data rates, link availability, and quality of service expected. NASA also identified the current state of practice for each capability as well as the estimated development time needed to achieve the capability. Each of the key capabilities with its associated data is shown in Table 8.3.5
ASSESSMENT
Space communications is a critical service that enables NASA to perform its missions; therefore it follows that technology developed for space communications also should be of critical importance. This report’s focus was limited to the Space Operations Mission Directorate’s (SOMD’s) space communications program. However, this program provides only a portion of the overall NASA space communications work, and also, only a portion of the spending for communications technology development. Since space communications is in fact a critical function for any space mission, NASA’s investment is further only a portion of the overall technology investment in this area, with the Department of Defense (DOD) and commercial entities also investing in space communication technologies. Where possible, the committee’s review of the space communications program’s technology development is placed in this larger context.
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TABLE 8.1 Notional Data Requirements
User
Channel Content
Latency
No. of Channels
Channel Rate
Total Rate
Operational
Base
Speech
NRT
2
10 kbps
20 kbps
Engineering
NRT
1
100 kbps
100 kbps
Astronauts
Speech
NRT
4
10 kbps
40 kbps
Helmet camera
NRT
4
100 kbps
400 kbps
Engineering
NRT
4
20 kbps
80 kbps
Human transports
Video
NRT
2
1.5 Mbps
3 Mbps
Engineering
NRT
2
20 kbps
40 kbps
Robotic rovers
Video
NRT
8
1.5 Mbps
12 Mbps
Engineering
NRT
8
20 kbps
160 kbps
Science orbiters
Quick look
NRT
4
1 Mbps
4 Mbps
Engineering
NRT
4
20 kbps
80 kbps
High Rate
Base
HDTV
1 day
1
20 Mbps
20 Mbps
Human transports
HDTV (medical and PIO)
NRT
2
20 Mbps
40 Mbps
Hyperspectral imaging
1 day
1
150 Mbps
150 Mbps
Robotic rovers
Surface radar
1 day
1
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Hyperspectral imaging
1 day
1
150 Mbps
150 Mbps
Science orbiters
Orbiting radar
1 day
2
100 Mbps
200 Mbps
Hyperspectral imaging
1 day
2
150 Mbps
300 Mbps
SOURCE: John Rush and Dan Williams, NASA, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
TABLE 8.2 Technology Area Relationship to Destinations
Capability Support Areas
Technology Areas
Optical Communications
Uplink Arraying
Spacecraft Radio Frequency
Programmable Communications Systems
Navigation
Plug-and-Play Interoperability
Launch
X
X
X
Earth orbit
X
X
X
X
Transit
X
X
X
X
X
X
Lunar
X
X
X
X
X
Mars
X
X
X
X
X
X
Solar system and beyond
X
X
X
X
X
X
SOURCE: John Rush and Dan Williams, NASA, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
However, understanding this larger context and how it affects the technology portfolio has proven challenging for NASA, as was confirmed by the Space Communications and Navigation Architecture presentation to the Strategic Management Council (SMC) on March 17, 2006, that called for the initiation of an integrated strategic communication technology program.6 In that briefing, the need for a multicenter campaign that would involve other government agency participation was identified.
Recommendation: As stated in the NASA Space Communications and Navigation Architecture presentation to the Strategic Management Council on March 17, 2006, a strategic communication technology program should be initiated to improve coordinated technology investment in this critical mission function.
To review the SCO technology element, the committee requested several presentations and supporting documents. Personnel involved with this review included experts previ-
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TABLE 8.3 Status of Key Capabilities
Capability/Subcapability
Mission or Roadmap Enabled
Current State of Practice
Minimum Estimated Development Time
High-data-rate optical technology (1 Gbps from Mars maximum distance)
High data rate from Mars, solar system, and beyond; lower mass, power, volume for lunar mission spacecraft
None
4 years (demo 1 Mbps) 16 years (operational 1 Gbps)
2012 demo lunar capability
Uplink antenna array—initial 12-m antenna array and extended
Deep space, Mars, and transit to both
Single-dish antennas
5-8 years
High-data-rate radio frequency technology (1 Gbps from Mars maximum distance)
High data rate from Mars, solar system, and beyond
Example: Mars Global Surveyor 33 kbps, Mars Odyssey 14 kbps
10 years
Programmable communications systems (software-defined radio)
All missions
Starlight, Electra, and LPT
15 years (25 Mbps landers, 500 Mbps orbiters, full autonomous independent platform software)
Navigation
All missions
Radiometric techniques
5 years (x-ray pulsar navigation)
Plug-and-play interoperability
All missions
Limited protocols for large delays
Delay-tolerant protocols demonstrated on simulation and emulation testbed
Downlink antenna array—initial 12-m antenna array and extended
Decommissioning of large Deep Space Network antennas
Single-dish antennas
3 years
SOURCE: John Rush and Dan Williams, NASA, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
ously tapped for the NRC review of the communications and navigation roadmap conducted in March 2005,7 therefore providing some continuity with that effort. Even after the cancellation of that NRC effort, within NASA an effort continued to create the NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio report,8 which was an important source of information in this assessment.
Formulation of the Program Plan
NASA presented to the committee a top-level overview of the process for determining technology needs in space communications. That process begins with the exploration and science missions (with their associated roadmaps), identifying needed capabilities and the time period in which they will be needed. That information is incorporated into the design of the communications and navigation architecture by the SCAWG as discussed in Chapter 7. The SCAWG in turn determines the technologies needed to support the architecture. This process ensures that the goals and objectives of the technology program are consistent with the NASA strategic plan and lower-level plans of the Science Mission and Exploration Systems Mission Directorates. However, as NASA itself has acknowledged,9 the technology element managed by the SCO has little insight into the overall NASA funding of communications technology efforts, creating a disconnect in this technology portfolio determination process. The technology program element is executed in a collegial fashion with many efforts receiving funds independently from the Space Operations Mission Directorate as well as from the Science Mission Directorate. Presumably, if things were allowed to continue in this manner, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate would become a third uncoordinated funding source.
The Space Communications Coordination and Integration Board (SCCIB) technology working group that spans directorates is officially supposed to coordinate technology efforts, but unofficially NASA stated that the process is fairly ad hoc and informal. Since the SCCIB lacks “control,” it cannot prevent the mission directorates from acting only in their own best interests, and there is the risk that an integrated, efficient approach may not result. This includes the risk of duplicating and misdirecting efforts. For example, NASA cited the fact that optical communications technology efforts have focused on multiple wavelengths rather than concentrating efforts on a single one. NASA remarked that the technology program was more focused when there was a consolidated organization.10 As indicated above in connection with the March 2006 presentation to the Strategic Management Council, NASA has acknowledged the need for its space communications technology development to become a coordinated multicenter effort that spans all of NASA.
A specific program plan document has not been written for the technology element. As a surrogate, the NASA Com-
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munication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio report contains some of what one would expect in a program plan. It discusses the portfolio and the process for determining it without including specific information on allocation of resources and schedule. It also lacks lower-level plans for each of the technology areas. Examples of lower-level plans separate from this portfolio document were given to the committee regarding how different specific technology projects within the technology areas are executed, but there is not a complete set of plans for all of the technology projects, and there was little evidence of a uniform process to plan and assess these efforts. This lack of detail made a complete evaluation of the technology element’s goals and objectives difficult, including whether appropriate time horizons are identified for technology advancement, how risk is managed, and the availability of critical personnel and facilities.
To address questions regarding the adequacy of facilities and personnel, NASA did supply a document11 that stated the following list of facilities and personnel issues needed to support NASA’s communications and navigations capabilities:
Facilities and Assets
Deep Space Network ground stations at Canberra, Goldstone, and Madrid
Ground stations including White Sands Complex, MILA, KSC, WFF, GRGT
Research and test facilities at JPL, GSFC, and GRC
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)
Critical Workforce Competencies
RF and optical communications technologists
NASA: GSFC, JPL, GRC, JSC, KSC and associated contractors
Laboratories: MIT Lincoln Labs, JHU Applied Physics Lab, Naval Research Lab, Sandia National Lab, Air Force Research Lab
Universities
Human Capital Considerations
Critical competencies must be maintained
Improved workforce competency in new and emerging technology areas such as optical communications and programmable communication systems
Although the level of information provided did not allow the committee to assess whether the facilities and personnel to support the technology element are adequate or if and how the personnel issues are being addressed, the committee agrees that this is a comprehensive top-level list. However, it is difficult to see how the leadership of the SCO can influence this large list beyond its organizational boundaries without more formal interagency relationships and increased resources to meet the need for all of these critical workforce competencies.
It was difficult to assess from the data provided whether the technology plans can be accomplished, and whether the planning is adequate and has sufficient decision points, down selects, customer agreements, and/or unallocated out-year funding. Quarterly reviews with each of the centers supported by the SCO technology program are identified, but NASA acknowledged that maintaining the quarterly schedule has been challenging and that the reviews were not always consistent.12 Again without detailed data about each of the technology areas and the projects supported under those technology areas (examples were provided, but not a complete set), it was difficult for the committee to assess specifics regarding deliverables, progress, off-ramps, and sunsets. Risks and risk management were not discussed for the various technologies, and this is a deficiency that should be addressed. A lack of information made it difficult for the committee to completely assess the adequacy of the planning and the process used to complete this planning.
In general NASA’s technology assessment process is described as consisting of four steps: (1) identify system-level issues, (2) identify performance requirements, (3) determine technology and possible performance, and (4) identify transformational technologies and track performance. Out of this process is to emerge the recommendations that determine the technology portfolio composition, schedules, and resource allocation. In determining this portfolio of investments, options are selected by NASA as a function of potential “return on investment,” stated more specifically as an identification of the potential benefit of a technology in terms of reduction of user burden. NASA also tries to avoid duplication of investments made by other U.S. government agencies through dialogue within the large national space communications community as well as by looking for opportunities for partnerships with other agencies and industry. This portfolio is also integrated with NASA Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program investments, which appears to be one of NASA’s primary methods to obtain industry involvement.13
NASA measures progress primarily by using technology readiness levels (TRLs) with each plan and providing a technology maturation plan with TRL milestones aligned with cost estimates for achievement. Technology program performance is measured as a function of planned versus actual TRL advancement.14 Examples of technology plans were provided to the committee, and it appears that the approach is sound if applied uniformly.
Finding: Examples of specific technology development plans provided by NASA to the committee exhibited the characteristics of a sound technology planning process; however, there was evidence suggesting that such a process was not applied uniformly to all of the projects, with the most obvious being the inability of NASA to provide this data for all of the projects in the SCO technology element portfolio.
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Connections to the Broader Community
The space communications community is quite vast, spanning not only NASA’s needs, but also those of the DOD and other agencies. It is also a segment of the space market with extensive commercial success and assets that NASA can take advantage of to leverage its efforts. Without details on all of the technology areas it was difficult to assess whether the technology element utilized appropriate technology work already done by the DOD, the U.S. commercial space industry, and others. Knowledge of work done outside the SCO program within NASA as well as in the larger community is gathered informally. Without further detailed review it is difficult to assess the quality of the SCO technology element relative to leaders in the field. A past review by the National Research Council ranked several of NASA’s space communications technology projects as world-class efforts;15 however, a review of this depth was not performed for this report. NASA does have unique technological requirements that need to be addressed, and its track record in communications supports its position as a leader in addressing these unique challenges.
Also, it was difficult to assess, from the details available, whether the strategy for out-of-house work (competitions, partnerships, and so on) was well chosen and well managed. There was evidence that there is out-of-house competition, with the SBIR process appearing to be the primary mechanism. Examples were given of partnerships with other agencies, but a complete overview was not provided. Again, because of the lack of complete information, the benefits (and costs) of increasing interoperability with military space systems, commercial space systems, and the systems of foreign space agencies were not assessed.
It was difficult to assess the role of external peer review in the SCO technology element, as information on how internal and external projects were selected was available only for isolated examples. The committee suggests that the SCO institutionalize a process for external peer review of all of its technology projects, both internal and external. External peer review should serve a role in task selection, ongoing reviews of progress, and a final assessment of results. It is important for this process to be credible, and so a number of non-advocate reviewers should be included. External peer review has proven beneficial in other government technology programs within NASA as well as in other government agencies. If executed properly it can provide a relatively unbiased review that creates defensible results to justify selections. The following recommendation is not new to NASA, having been suggested by the NRC in a previous report.16
Recommendation: The Space Communications Office should establish a formal external peer review process that would assess all aspects of the technology program element, including task selection, progress toward goals, and assessment of final results. This process should be applied to external and internal technology projects.
Methodology
The lack of a complete technology element plan and the challenge of providing the committee with requested information made assessment difficult. Those examples seen by the committee appeared well crafted, but integration seemed to be lacking. The examples shown to the committee of how the SCAWG performed system-level assessments appeared to indicate a sound process (more completely described in Chapter 7). Again, whether system-level assessments were done for all of the technologies considered and how this influenced the selection of the complete portfolio was unclear.
Finding: The connection between the top-down mission-driven technology needs of the NASA missions and NASA’s bottom-up technology planning must be tighter and must be applied uniformly. The process is in place and simply needs to be completely executed.
In an ideal technology planning process, plans (including tasks, priorities, schedules, and resources) are created and accepted by all stakeholders. Periodic reviews are used to assess progress and make project adjustments based on this progress. There is likely no single right answer for portfolio composition, and the optimal composition will certainly change over time, but it is important to try to maintain some stability so that adjustments are minor and done mainly to improve the technology portfolio as a whole. The importance of stability and continuity in technology development should not be underestimated.
Systems analysis is a crucial part of technology portfolio management, enabling competitive task selection and ongoing refinement and redirection as technical progress is made. Systems analysis also leads to an awareness of the system-level impact of individual technologies under development, allowing for a more holistic judgment. The committee observed gaps in system-level analysis in the technology element. It suggests that, for every one of the projects within the technology element, some form of systems analysis capability be applied. The methods can range from low-fidelity, back-of-the-envelope approaches to methods of increased fidelity, including parametric analysis and specific point designs. Encouraging this system-level awareness down to the lowest levels of individual technology projects will serve as a mechanism to ensure that research goals retain their relevance. The fidelity of the method can be appropriate to the level of the project, but even performing a low-fidelity analysis for the lowest-level project is important as opposed to conducting no analysis at all. A recommendation for improving NASA’s systems analysis capability as a tool for technology portfolio management is not new, having been offered before.17
Recommendation: To support technology investment decisions, systems analysis should be strengthened and made
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more uniform across the SCO technology element as a crucial part of the portfolio management and project selection process. The outlined general process of linking technology decisions back up to architectures that are designed to meet mission requirements—which in turn are determined by the missions selected as a part of NASA’s strategic plan—is a good approach, but it needs to be applied uniformly so that all technology projects have this top-to-bottom linkage. This linkage will allow the lowest-level projects to retain their relevance. However, the process must be flexible enough to accommodate changing needs and new technology discoveries.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Through its excellence in mission execution, NASA has demonstrated that many of its efforts in space communications technology are world-class and enabling for the science discoveries it has made. Space communications will continue to be an essential aspect of mission success and will always pose critical challenges that have to be met to enhance missions of the future.
To achieve this success has required critical workforce capabilities and unique facilities. To continue to achieve mission success in the future, NASA must maintain and enhance its workforce and facilities to keep pace. Insufficient detail was available to enable the committee to assess the current state of the workforce and facilities supporting the technology element or to assess whether plans will sufficiently support this critical NASA capability in the future. Further review is merited to ensure that the capability to create world-class technologies to support NASA’s critical space communications function is maintained and enhanced. If the recommendation to the NASA Strategic Management Council to create an integrated NASA communications technology program across all of NASA is executed, then a review of the integrated program will be merited to see if goals are being met and the recommendations provided here have been incorporated. With sufficient information and time for analysis, such a review could explore more deeply the development of the technologies on an individual project level so that the overall NASA space communications technology portfolio can be properly weighed. Unfortunately, the schedule for and the data available during this review were not adequate for exploring NASA’s space communications technology development to the depth that it deserves.
If NASA creates an integrated technology development program, this integration of efforts should go a long way toward addressing shortfalls of the technology element, which appear to involve primarily a lack of coordination. Processes are in place at NASA that, if applied uniformly, could result in a technology program that strives for the ideal technology planning process, whereby plans (including tasks, priorities, schedules, and resources) are created and accepted by all stakeholders. If so, the result could be improved stability and continuity in space communications technology development, the importance of which should not be underestimated. As has been recommended by the NRC to NASA previously,18 performing systems analysis at all levels of the technology portfolio, uniformly executing the strategic management process outlined, and effectively using external peer review can all be methods to ensure successful technology development.
NOTES
1. Rush, John, “NASA Communications Technology,” briefing to the NRC Committee to Review NASA’s Space Communications Program, Washington, D.C., January 26-27, 2006.
2. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
3. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
4. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
5. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
6. Rush, John, “Space Communication and Navigation Architecture,” briefing to the NASA Strategic Management Council, March 17, 2006.
7. The final stage of this study was cancelled as a result of administrative changes at NASA.
8. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, NASA Communication and Navigation Technology Capability Portfolio, August 19, 2005.
9. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, personal communication, March 27, 2006.
10. Spearing, Robert, comment during briefing to NRC Committee to Review NASA’s Space Communication Program, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2006.
11. Spearing, Robert, and M. Regan, NASA Communication and Navigation Capability Roadmap, May 2005.
12. Rush, John, and Dan Williams, personal communication, March 27, 2006.
13. Rush, John, “NASA Communications Technology,” briefing to the NRC Committee to Review NASA’s Space Communications Program, Washington, D.C., January 26-27, 2006.
14. Rush, John, “NASA Communications Technology,” briefing to the NRC Committee to Review NASA’s Space Communications Program, Washington, D.C., January 26-27, 2006.
15. National Research Council (NRC). 2003. Review of NASA’s Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA’s Pioneering Revolutionary Technology Program. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
16. NRC. 2003. Review of NASA’s Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA’s Pioneering Revolutionary Technology Program. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
17. NRC. 2003. Review of NASA’s Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA’s Pioneering Revolutionary Technology Program. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
18. NRC. 2003. Review of NASA’s Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA’s Pioneering Revolutionary Technology Program. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
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