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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
General Issues
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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
10
Overarching Issues and Recommendations
In the course of reviewing the overall quality of the space communications program of NASA’s Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), the committee made observations on a number of issues that seemed to be significant to the overall program.
LIMITS OF REVIEW
The statement of task for this study called for the committee to assess the quality and effectiveness of the SOMD space communications program, and the report has thus necessarily focused on the various elements that fall within the Space Communications Office (SCO). However, as noted elsewhere, much of the space communications work at NASA takes place in directorates other than SOMD and therefore was outside the purview of this study. As a result, the committee did not review the Exploration Communications Architecture, Deep Space Network Interplanetary Communications Architecture, Alternate Communications Approaches under the Science Mission Directorate, and several communications technologies managed by other directorates. This limited scope of work eliminated significant communications programs that the committee believes would have benefited from a review, and also prevented the committee from providing a comprehensive review of the overall architecture of NASA’s work in space communications. As discussed further below, NASA has recently begun making plans to consolidate all of its communications functions within a single office or directorate. Once this consolidation is accomplished, NASA might wish to consider carrying out a more complete review that covers all of the agency’s space communications programs.
CENTRALIZED SPACE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT WITHIN NASA HEADQUARTERS
In March 2006 the SOMD presented a decision briefing to the Senior Management Council (SMC) recommending that the fractionated space communications management structure within NASA headquarters be replaced with a more centralized approach. The resulting SMC decisions have not been finalized; however, the SOMD recommendations seem to have been accepted. Final SMC decisions are expected to be in place in late spring 2006. It was not within the committee’s purview to review the advantages and disadvantages of consolidating NASA space communications management functions. However, the committee made several observations in this area, noting that:
Centralized NASA headquarters management and funding of space communications worked well for NASA for more than 30 years until 1996.
The planned reorganization apparently will centralize space communications requirements and architectures and realign the associated budgets, thus affecting visibility into and management of very large current and future NASA programs for generations to come.
Changing management structures is not a panacea. Reorganizations are often disruptive, countering the expected benefits. For instance, the last shift in space communications management resulted in the loss of 90 percent of the space communications program management experience base that had previously existed at NASA headquarters. Most personnel either retired or were reassigned to unrelated programs.
Recommendation: Major changes in modus operandi, such as realigning top-level management and funding responsibilities, should be preceded by a transition plan that outlines the objectives of the changes and ensures that past corporate knowledge is considered by the new organization. The committee recommends a thorough review of the lessons learned from past reorganizations so that NASA can avoid repeating unsatisfactory consequences.
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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
CENTRALIZED SPACE COMMUNICATIONS CONTRACTING
NASA centralized its space communications contracting in 1996 by having Johnson Space Center issue a single completion-type contract to replace 18 contracts that had been awarded by the other NASA centers. This was the Consolidated Space Operations Contract (CSOC). NASA provided the committee with several previously compiled CSOC “lessons-learned” presentations indicating why, according to NASA, the centralized contracting concept had failed:
A completion contract was inappropriate. The NASA mission model was far more dynamic than the new managers at JSC had expected, resulting in a high volume and cost of changes to the contract. Causes of changing requirements included launch delays and spacecraft operating beyond stated lifetimes. Also, operating degraded spacecraft placed increased demands on the space communications infrastructure to recover data.
Space operations activities at each NASA center were more distinct than had been appreciated, and the centralized management of CSOC proved unwieldy.
There was deep-seated internecine rivalry among centers, which resulted in most users of space communications services becoming very unhappy customers.
The contract structure resulted in a lack of local decision making, slow response times, and lack of cost visibility.
Even though CSOC combined 18 contracts under one, the contract did not save money, was too inflexible to support users’ needs, overwhelmed the contracting system with changes, and caused a groundswell of opposition from the using community. All this contributed to its failure.
The committee observes that contracting strategies are critical to the success of the new space communications program as it moves forward.
Recommendation: The planned reorganization of NASA space communications management at NASA headquarters provides an opportunity to benefit fully from the lessons learned from contracting approaches used under the Consolidated Space Operations Contract. The committee recommends an early and thorough examination and internal agency discussion of CSOC lessons learned to ensure that past errors are not repeated. NASA should also review approaches used prior to 1996 to take advantage of past successes.
TDRSS REPLENISHMENT AND LONG-TERM COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) is considered to be a national resource because it supports many NASA and non-NASA users. A gap in system capability to support projected NASA user requirements will begin in about 2015. NASA plans to include funding in the FY 2008 budget cycle for a preformulation phase 1 effort and expects to develop a compelling case for a FY 2008 start for TDRSS replenishment and thus avoid a gap in NASA user coverage. NASA is also working with non-NASA users that will have a gap in TDRSS support projected to start as early as 2010. Historically, when priority issues have arisen between TDRSS support of NASA versus other missions, the resolution often has not been favorable to NASA.
The committee observes that the planned reorganization of space communications management could have major ramifications for alternatives to supplying the near-Earth communications support that is currently provided by TDRSS. For instance, a single management organization might consider the requirements of exploratory space as well as terrestrial and near-Earth communications to develop a series of alternatives that could provide greater benefit at lower overall cost and risk to NASA. Such a radically different review could result in very different alternatives and could completely change the current approach to maintaining low-Earth-orbit communications service.
Recommendation: A restructured space communications management organization should undertake a detailed analysis of alternative approaches for satisfying long- term terrestrial, near-Earth, and exploratory space communications requirements and select the most beneficial for implementation. This recommendation does not presuppose that the current approaches are wrong, but it does suggest that there may be attractive alternatives worthy of reconsideration that may have been eliminated due to organizational boundaries.
Recommendation: The committee believes it would be responsive and proactive for NASA to work with the broader TDRSS user community to examine programmatic alternatives that could accelerate TDRSS replenishment in order to address the projected service gap for non-NASA users.
REQUIREMENTS VALIDATION PROCESS
The committee observed that while some elements of the SOMD space communications program, such as NISN, have a requirements validation process, others do not formally vet or document user and operator community needs. This can create disconnects between validated needs and the formal planning and budgeting process. It can also inject uncertainty into the acquisition process, create confusion over key performance goals and threshold requirements, and can bring into question the ability to establish metrics for measuring success in terms of user and operator needs. These problems could make it difficult to accurately establish and defend the levels of appropriated funding required by NASA
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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
and the reimbursable funding needed from outside the agency.
The committee notes that the projected reorganization of space communications management at NASA offers the opportunity for an end-to-end review of the requirements validation process across all space communications programs at the agency and the development of consistent best practices that can address the potential issues cited above.
NASA WORKFORCE
The committee’s review revealed an overarching concern regarding the NASA workforce. At NASA headquarters and at the centers, the committee found a highly experienced staff that was efficiently supporting multiple programs from an efficient matrix organization. The committee also found strong working relationships with customers, contractors, and external organizations and judged that these relationships had been critical to the current success of the SOMD space communications program. The committee noted, however, that some elements within the SCO had minimal civil service staffing and were relying heavily on contractors to accomplish the program’s mission. The committee was unable to identify opportunities for further government personnel reductions in these elements.
To the contrary, the committee noted that much of the communications workforce, and particularly its leadership, is nearing retirement. NASA has young, very talented professionals awaiting their turn to move up in the organization, but they are too junior to fill the vacuum that could well occur in the next few years as the current leaders retire. In addition, it is likely that as the agency’s veterans of space communications retire, the interpersonal relationships that currently facilitate their success will no longer exist, and higher staffing levels will be required in the future to accomplish the same tasks with more junior, less experienced replacements. This problem is not unique to NASA space communications work, but it is one that must be dealt with if the agency is going to continue to provide the superior level of performance that the public has come to expect.
In presentations made to it the committee heard many comments on the difficulties caused by the manner in which funding for government staff is accounted for in budgets. The committee did not review this issue, but the comments indicate fairly widespread concerns within the workforce.
Recommendation: One of the early reviews to be conducted by the newly centralized NASA headquarters space communications management should include a detailed analysis of the personnel needs of the space communications program. This review should consider the minimum civil service staffing levels needed, likely upcoming retirements, availability of comparable replacements, the impact of full-cost accounting on the ability to hire civil service replacements, and the proper mix of civil service and contractors required to perform the mission.
PROGRAM PLAN
NASA spends a great deal of money on space communications in order to provide a capability that is critical to the success of human spaceflight and science missions. The committee found that formal planning documents exist for a number of individual elements, or aspects of elements, within the SOMD space communications program. However, there was no overarching plan for the conduct of that space communications program.
Recommendation: The committee recommends that NASA take the opportunity presented by the impending reorganization of space communications to develop a program plan and vet this plan with the participating centers and NASA headquarters elements to ensure that it is executable and fits within the vision expressed in the NASA strategic plan. In addition, those elements of space communications that currently do not have formal element-level planning documents should develop plans that are tailored to the size and complexity of the activity in that element.
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Review of the Space Communications Program of Nasas Space Operations Mission Directorate
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
technology element
