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OCR for page 72
4
Purposes of Risk Communication
and Risk Messages
In this chapter we distinguish two types of settings public de-
bate and personal action in which risk decisions and risk communi-
cation occur, and we show how the risk communication process and
its participants vary in these settings. We then discuss two distinct
purposes of risk messages informing and influencing-that coexist
in risk communication, sometimes even in a single risk message. Fi-
nally, we address the thorny ethical problem of the appropriateness
of influencing as a purpose of risk messages, particularly messages
that public agencies distribute to citizens.
SETTINGS OF RISE COMMUNICATION
Public Debate
In a setting of public debate such as congressional hearings,
congressional debates, formal regulatory adjudication, and notice-
and-comment rule making democratic risk communication includes
a wide range of messages, sources, and audiences. Interested groups
raise questions for the experts, who respond; experts from different
perspectives dispute with each other; and citizens and their represen-
tatives dispute using, among other things, the experts' findings and
criticisms of each other's results. Messages describing and surnrnariz-
ing scientific knowledge about risks and benefits are important, as are
72
OCR for page 73
PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 73
critiques of those messages and that knowledge. In the United States,
regulatory decisions must generally be based on the best available
scientific knowledge to be defensible against legal challenges. As a
result, much risk communication in the regulatory context clears with
the adequacy and proper interpretation of scientific evidence. But
risk communication also includes expressions of opinion, concern,
frustration, and the like by all participants, directed at whomever
will hear and might act. Such decision making tends to be adver-
sarial, with political actors making the strongest possible case for
their positions, overtly expressing their interests and values or cit-
ing expert judgment and analysis depending on which arguments
seem most effective. Recipients of risk messages understand that
those messages are guided by interests and political positions and so
do not expect any single source to offer an unbiased assessment of
available scientific knowledge.
Public policy about tobacco smoking illustrates the range of risk
messages that come out of public debate. The policy options for
risk management involve decisions to be made in different bodies,
each using different rules of debate and assigning different roles to
the general public within those rules. For instance, the federal gov-
ernment has considered increasing excise taxes on cigarettes, placing
warning labels on cigarette packages, funding antismoking advertis-
ing campaigns, distributing informational pamphlets on the health
hazards of smoking, and banning smoking in various public places.
Other options that might be considered for cigarettes, and that have
been used for other health hazards, include outright prohibition on
manufacture or sale and restriction to use by prescription only. In
state and local governments, debates have also proceeded on op-
tions such as banning cigarette advertisements in some public places,
raising the minimum age for purchasing tobacco products, banning
smoking in municipal buildings, and requiring no-smoking sections
in restaurants.
Risk communication varies from one of these decision-making
arenas to another. Citizens participate in legislative settings by at-
tempting to influence their representatives directly or by affecting
the general climate of opinion and thus achieving indirect influence.
In federal regulatory decision making, there is also wide latitude
for participation, although the Administrative Procedures Act and
agencies' practices constrain the time and type of participation and
the kinds of arguments that can be introduced (Greenwood, 1984~.
Agency procedures differ, particularly in terms of how much two-way
OCR for page 74
74
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
communication they allow and how much they do to provide expert
knowledge to the citizenry at large. Nevertheless, public debate in
the regulatory or legislative context allows for risk messages and
other related messages from a large number of sources.
We consider risk communication in a setting of public debate
successful to the extent that it raises the [eve! of understanding of rel-
evant issues or actions among the affected and interested parties and
those involved are satisfied that they are adequately informed within
the limits of available knowledge. As noted in Chapter 1, successful
risk communication does not imply optimal risk decisions; it only en-
sures that the decisions are informed by the best available knowledge.
Also as noted in Chapter 1, raising the level of understanding requires
more than making accurate information accessible to the interested
parties. Success requires increased understanding of the issues to
the extent that the parties involved desire to understand. Although
individual risk messages may contribute to increased understanding,
the net effect of risk communication on understanding depends on
all the messages individuals receive and their interpretation of them.
Therefore, the designers of risk messages who wish to increase the
recipients' understanding need to take into account the recipients'
willingness and ability to receive and understand the messages as
well as the effects of other, sometimes conflicting, messages that they
may also receive.
Success for risk communication does not require that every citi-
zen be informed about the risks presented in every regulatory deci-
sion, but people need to be confident that some person or group that
shares their interests and values is well informed and is representing
those positions competently in the political system. Public debate,
in a traditional view in the United States, implies a pluralism of
constituencies, with "consent of the governed" consisting of trust
that the relevant views are represented, that the procedures do not
disadvantage important constituencies, and that the people are able
to hold public officials accountable for their actions.
The requirement that interested parties believe they are ad-
equately informed is worth explanation. It stems from recognition
that in several arenas of public debate risk decisions are intensely con-
troversial and many message sources are widely mistrusted. This sit-
uation imposes requirements, particularly on those message sources
and in those policy arenas, that may seem unfair to officials who
OCR for page 75
PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 75
believe their responsibility to the public extends only to making wise
decisions and providing complete, accurate information. But if a
message source is widely mistrusted, its messages will be rejected by
many regardless of completeness or accuracy. If accurate information
is rejected by recipients, it does nothing to increase their knowledge
base hence the requirement that recipients of information for public
debate be satisfied that they are adequately informed.
Both of the above-mentioned requirements for successful risk
communication were factors in the public debate that resulted in the
successful siting of the ECOFLO hazardous waste facility in Greens-
boro, North Carolina. This siting case also illustrates an instance in
which understandable and sensitive messages from an individual risk
communicator (ECOFLO) contributed to the success of the overall
risk communication process involving the Guilford County Hazardous
Waste Task Force, environmentalists, and other concerned citizens
(see accompanying story, pages 76-77~. Nevertheless, it should be
emphasized that open and free communication will not necessarily
ease conflicts in all situations.
With respect to a designated decision maker, such as the head of
a regulatory agency, risk communication is successful only if it ade-
quately informs the decision maker. A decision maker is adequately
informed within the limits of available knowledge if provision of all
remaining available information would add nothing to justify a mod-
ification of his or her choice. Decision makers need] to be informed
about the managerial and political aspects of the choice at hand
as well as about the state of technical knowledge. And, as already
noted, the relevant knowledge should be understood by the decision
maker, not merely made accessible.
It is important to emphasize that a successful risk communication
process is different from a risk message that is successful from the
standpoint of its source. In a public debate (like that in the ECOFLO
case), participants produce risk messages aimed at changing minds
and influencing political outcomes. From their perspective a risk
message is successful to the extent that it contributes to the outcomes
its sponsor desires. Sometimes a risk communicator will make false
or deceptive statements or will withhold pertinent information to
achieve a political effect. Such activities, if they are not revealed,
may achieve the ends of the message source but not the social goal
of an adequately informed debate.
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76
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
ECO1?IO HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING
GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA
The successful siting of the ECOFLO hazardous waste facility
in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1985 is an example of good risk
communication and effective risk messages. Although represent-
ing a situation somewhat less problematic than those encountered
elsewhere the company proposed a treatment facility to reduce
the overall amount of toxic material in that locale it does illus-
trate the role of communication efforts in the siting of a hazardous
waste facility. The siting of such plants is notoriously difficult. As
a result of ECOFLO's efforts, however, the final public hearing to
site the facility lasted only 15 rn~nutes and led to the permitting
of the plant with the blessing of local government officials and
environmentalists (Lynn, 1987~.
ECOFLO began operation in Greensboro in September 1983
with a license as a waste transporter. It worked mainly with
small companies that produced about 20 drums of waste a month.
Although ECOFLO was a new company, its owners had previ-
ously worked for other hazardous waste companies. In July 1984,
ECOFLO submitted its plans for a hazardous waste treatment
facility to the state of North Carolina. The plant was designed
to~serve primarily local and intrastate markets and would not
handle PCBs, dioxins, cyanide, radioactives, biological wastes, or
explosives. The treatment processes to be used were neutraTiza-
tion and centrifugation. Wastes that had to be burned would be
transported elsewhere (Lynn, 1987~.
A year and a half prior to ECOFLO's application, another
company had tried to site a hazardous waste facility in Greensboro
and failed. Local citizens, unable to receive information or to have
their concerns addressed, had successfully organized opposition to
that facility.
The Greensboro area had a group of citizens well versed in
hazardous waste issues. As a result of an EPA grant to the North
Carolina League of Women Voters in 1979, the Guilford County
Hazardous Waste Task Force was formed. The task force spon-
sored short courses on toxic materials and workshops and displays
to educate and organize the community. By 1985 the task force
and its chair, Carolyn Allen, had good working relationships with
the local government staff and elected officials.
OCR for page 77
PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 77
When ECOFLO decided to site in Greensboro, the task force
invited neighborhood leaders from the part of the city where the
facility might be located to a series of education meetings on
hazardous waste. These workshops included the chemistry of haz-
ardous waste, disposal processes, and a session with Tom Bar-
bee, ECOFLO's vice president and the Greensboro plant manager
(Lynn, 1987~.
This was not Barbee's first contact with the task force. He
had been attending task force meetings since 1979, as a profes-
sional waste manager with another firm. He was also a native of
North Carolina and a longtime Greensboro resident. He did not
see the environmentalists as the enemy. In a local TV interview
he said that ECOFLO "honestly wants to be a service to the
community.... We want to help local companies handle their
waste as responsibly as possible.... We are on the side of the
environmentalists" (quoted in Lynn, 1987~.
From the time ECOFLO decided to site a facility in Greens-
boro, Barbee had been contacting relevant groups and individuals.
He went to the local police and fire departments to ask what they
thought he needed to do to ensure a safe site. He talked with
ministers, neighbors, the planning and zoning department, and
county commissioners. He gave candid and detailed answers to
questions by citizens. He and his staff took the press, state and
local officials, and neighbors on plant tours. He even sponsored
his own public meeting before the state held its public hearing.
Barbee's meeting was cohosted by Bruce Banks, a local chemistry
professor and Audubon Society member; Carolyn Allen, chair of
the task force; ant! Jim Rayburn, chair of the Guilford County
Advisory Board on Environmental Affairs (Lynn, 19873. At this
meeting Barbee detailed how he had made changes in his original
proposal based on feedback from the fire department, the planning
commission, and the task force, among others. He invited public
participation and took the public's concerns and suggestions into
consideration in ECOFLO's revised plan.
This willingness on the part of ECOFLO to involve the com-
munity, to share information, and to implement changes based
on community input proved effective. The ECOFLO waste treat-
ment facility was approved and the citizens were satisfied it could
be operated safely (Lynn, 1987~.
OCR for page 78
78
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
Personal Action
Risk communication regarding personal action is quite different
from risk communication regarding public decisions. At minimum
the setting is more limited because most risk messages are addressed
to individuals rather than to a spectrum of participants in public de-
bate. Sending messages to an individual is in one respect like sending
them to the head of a regulatory agency: both have the ultimate au-
thority to act. But the two situations are also different in important
respects: few individuals have staffs of experts paid to answer their
questions, and individuals seldom want the amount of detail that is
justified when a federal regulator is about to make a decision for the
whole population (see Figure 4.1~. Much of risk communication in
this setting takes the form of messages directed at the public offering
information, advice, warnings, or recommendations regarding risky
individual actions. Both public agencies and private organizations
sometimes design such risk messages. But personal action is also
influenced by a variety of risk messages, usually informal, from other
individuals. People want to know how hard it was to stop smoking,
or whether low-fat meals can be made to taste good, or in what
ways other people feel better after losing weight. Such risk-related
messages, regardless of whether they accurately represent the likely
outcomes of alternative actions, can be critical in individual decisions
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980~.
Tobacco smoking also illustrates the kinds of risk communica-
tion issues that arise in the context of personal choice. Despite the
restrictions created by recent policies, people still choose whether,
how much, when, and where, within limits, to smoke. But Congress
has decided that it is in the public interest to influence smoking
behavior in various ways short of directly restricting tobacco use.
Cigarette taxes and advertising restrictions are two policies that
constrain individuals and the tobacco tracle. Other policies, such as
the requirement of warning labels and widespread dissemination of
the surgeon general's findings on the risks of smoking, rely on risk
messages as an alternative to direct control of the substance. Such
policies create a risk communication setting much different from that
of public decision making, particularly because they call for special-
ized risk messages. Congress has sanctioned efforts by government
officials, including the surgeon general and other medical experts,
to design and disseminate messages aimed at changing individual
behavior.
We consider risk communication in the setting of personal choice
OCR for page 79
PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 79
A /,
4-~: ~
I\
/
11
'if
it,
I
NEXT \
. _ ,
1 ~
FIGURE 4.1 For personal action to reduce risks, a simple warning sign (e.g.,
Chills and Curves Next 10 Vilest may be sufficient; a report of a formal risk
analysis could be counterproductive. SOURCE: Courtesy of Paul Stern.
successful only If it adequately informs the individual for making
a choice among alternatives. Adequate information, to reiterate,
must be understandable for risk communication to succeed; it is not
sufficient that it be available. Part of the debate is about going
further, so that the recipients are somehow brought to understand
the material. But we have not gone so far as to include this an a
criterion for success.
Getting recipients' attention and comprehension poses signifi-
cant barriers to risk communication, especially in the arena of per-
sonal action, where many recipients customarily act without care-
fully considering risks and benefits. It should be noted that from the
standpoint of the designers of risk messages, the goal may or may not
be to inform choice. Often a message is intended to influence choice,
a very different matter, even if experts believe that the choice they
desire to elicit is in the audience member's interest. Thus some risk
OCR for page 80
80
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
messages from government agencies are designed to inform choice
(e.g., nutritional information on food packages), but at other times,
occasionally after open debate in a legislative setting, an explicit
decision is made to influence beliefs or behavior in a particular direc-
tion (e.g., anti-drunk-driving campaigns). Although risk messages
are sometimes judged against a criterion of behavior change, this is
not an appropriate test of whether an individual has made an in-
formec! choice. It is possible for an individual, fully informed of the
risks, to choose to engage in hazardous behaviors such as smoking,
skydiving, or leaving seat belts unbuckled.
Sometimes risk messages are intended to inform or explain rather
than to be used as direct input to a choice. This can be the case when
the risk manager is in the position of explaining a decision that has
already been made. It can also occur in situations when individuals
or groups are unavoidably exposed to particular hazards. It may be
necessary to explain why a decision has been made that is injuri-
ous to the recipients of the message or that has other undesirable
consequences.
INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE: THE PURPOSES
OF RISE MESSAGES
We have noted that successful risk communication, such as that
described in the ECOFLO case, makes for better-informed decision
makers, both individuals and public or private officials. A "success-
ful" risk message, in contrast, is not always one that increases the
understanding of decision makers. For risk messages success is com-
monly interpreted in relation to the goals or purposes of the message
source. The sources of risk messages sometimes aim to inform the re-
cipients, but sometimes they aim to influence their beliefs or actions.
A risk message designed to influence may be judged successful even if
it does nothing to add to the audience's understanding. An antidrug
campaign that relies on exhortations from prominent sports figures
is successful if it keeps some teenagers from addiction, even if they
learn nothing new about the health effects of heroin or cocaine.
We recognize that efforts to influence through risk messages do
not always have such noble purposes. The sources of risk messages
may set their own criteria of success but attaining them does not
always advance a public good. Sometimes "effective" risk messages
are inconsistent with promoting substantive public good, as when
they mislead people about what is in their interest. At such times
OCR for page 81
PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 81
they are in conflict with the public goal of successful risk communi-
cation. (Sometimes, however, audience members gain understanding
even from biased risk messages. For instance, judges, elected officials,
and interested citizens often gain understanding on matters of public
controversy by comparing messages from various sources that they
realize are trying to influence them. They inform themselves, despite
the efforts of message sources to influence rather than inform.)
Serious confusion can arise because any given risk message may
be intended to inform or to influence. It can be difficult for a recipient
to tell which aim a particular message has; message sources, aware
of this difficulty, sometimes attempt to persuade in the guise of
informing. That tactic is likely to be most effective when it goes
undetected, but it can backfire seriously if revealed, undermining
the credibility of the message source and creating resentment and
mistrust. The problem of dual purposes is compounded by the fact
that the designers of risk messages are often called on to both inform
and influence the same audience with the same message. Regulatory
agency employees, for instance, are routinely asked to prepare a
document to support a decision at the end of a formal ruTe-making
process that both summarizes the evidence on which the decision was
based (thus informing the audience) and justifies that decision (thus
endeavoring to influence the audience to believe the right choice has
been made).
The dual purposes of risk messages complicate defining respon-
sible behavior for the designers of the messages. In order to arrive at
some criteria for the acceptability of attempts to influence, we begin
by describing a dimension along which one can array techniques for
the construction of risk messages. At one end of the dimension is an
ideal, pure information, free of techniques of influence; at the other
end is deception. Although the purpose of informing is consistent
with the goal of successful risk communication to raise decision
makers' level of understanding-the use of techniques that aim to
persuade, deceive, or otherwise influence decision makers implies
that a different goal is being pursued.
l~fo~mation
To inform someone about an issue or choice is to assist that
person to apprehend the relevant propositions or statements that
describe the issue or choice. Ideally, the result is that the person or
persons informed gain a full or complete understanding of the issue
OCR for page 82
82
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
or choice. This appears to have happened in the ECOFLO case. In
practice, however, full understanding does not exist for most impor-
tant choices about risk (see Chapter 2), so it cannot be conveyed. A
practical goal for information is for the recipient to gain understand-
ing, within the limits of available knowledge' that is adequate to make
appropriate choices given his OT her values. Adequate understanding
does not require knowing everything that is known about an issue,
only enough to be able to make choices in one's own best interest.
If more precise information would enable members of the audience
to make choices that better approximate their desires, it should be
provided; if it would not aid in decision making, more precision is
unnecessary.
Influence
A spectrum of techniques is available for designing risk messages
that go beyond pure information and that can be used to influence an
audience. The most extreme techniques involve outright deception:
strategies such as "lying, withholding of information, true assertion
that omits a vital qualification, and misleading exaggeration to cause
persons to believe what is false" (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986:363~.
But many influence techniques do not do such violence to the truth.
In order to consider the appropriateness of different techniques, it is
useful to identify them. The following paragraphs describe different
techniques, beginning with some that stay close to the facts and
moving to some that do not depend much on factual information.
Some of these techniques can be used either to inform or to influence.
It is this possibility that makes it difficult for recipients of risk
messages to determine their intent and therefore to interpret their
content.
Highlighting Facts
Risk messages cannot include all the details known to science
and still be read and understood by most nonexperts. Therefore the
designers of messages omit some information and highlight other in-
formation. For instance, message designers choose whether to sum-
marize knowledge about both possible deaths and illnesses arising
from a risk or only about deaths, about both direct and synergistic ef-
fects or only direct effects, about effects on subpopulations including
sensitive groups or just on whole populations, and so forth. Having
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PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 83
chosen what to present, message designers must also make choices
about what parts of the message to emphasize with visual aids, vocal
emphasis, underlining, color, and other techniques. Although high-
lighting may be employed only to emphasize the essentials of what
is known, decisions to highlight which are unavoidable- involve
judgments about what is essential. A large psychological litera-
ture demonstrates that highlighting information, or making it more
"available," affects the understanding and the decisions of those who
receive the messages (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Kahneman et al., 1982;
Tversky and Kahneman, 19733. Thus highlighting can influence the
audience's beliefs about what aspects of a risk decision are important
in the direction desired by the message designer.
Framings Information and Decisions
Different ways of presenting the same facts can create different
impressions. When a risk estimate is uncertain, it can be described
by a point or "maximum likelihood" estimate or by a range of pos-
sibilities around the point estimate. But estimates that include a
wide range of uncertainties can imply that a disastrous consequence
is "possible," even when expert opinion is unanimous that the like-
lihood of disaster is extremely small. The amount of uncertainty
to present is a judgment that can potentially influence a recipient's
judgment.
Another example of "framing" involves the choice between al-
ternative ways of presenting the same numerical information. One
study, for example, found that a hypothetical vaccine that reduces
the probability of contracting a disease from 0.20 to 0.10 is less
attractive if it is described as elective in half the cases than if it
is presented as fully effective against one of two virus strains that
strike with equal probability and that produce the same disease.
This finding suggests that people favor full protection against an
identified risk over equivalent but probabilistic protection (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981~. Sirn~lar differences in presentation have been
identified with respect to whether outcomes are presented in terms
of "sure Toss" or an "insurance premium" (Fischhoff et al., 1980) or
"lives lost" as opposed to "lives saved" (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981~. It has even been demonstrated that when two versions are
presented sequentially people often reverse their preference from the
first presentation to the second (Hershey and Shoemaker, 19803.
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84
Risk Comparisons
An important instance of framing is the use of risk comparisons.
Comparing one risk that is not well understood to another that the
audience comprehends may be a useful way to convey information
about the former risk. It is often difficult, however, to find risks that
are similar on enough attributes to carry the comparison. But risk
comparisons can also be used to influence or even misread, because
a risk comparison may improperly carry the implication that if a
person is willing to take the larger of two risks he or she should
accept the smaller as well (Covello et al., 1988; Fischhoff et al.,
1981a). The uses of risk comparisons are discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5.
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
Persuasive Use of Facts
Risk messages often involve a selection of the facts to make a
point. Messages aimed at convincing recipients of a point of view can
use techniques of highlighting and framing but can also employ other
rhetorical techniques: selective presentation of evidence, creation
and destruction of "straw-man" arguments, judicious placement of
the various arguments within a message for maximum effect, listing
of supporting arguments by number to make the argument look
stronger, and so forth. Such techniques can enhance the persuasive
effect of messages, sometimes without any alteration of the content
(Cialdini, 1984; Eagly and Chaiken, 1985; McGuire, 1985), and they
can be quite difficult for a recipient to detect.
Appeals to Authority
Nonexperts often want to know who has taken what position
on a difficult choice before them. When they do not know enough
to make an informed choice themselves, or believe it too expensive
or time consuming to become fully informed, they may choose to
adopt the position of a person or organization they consider expert
and trustworthy. Thus risk messages can be influential by supplying
information about who has taken positions on an issue. They may
be balanced in their references to authority or they may not: a
message may quote some scientists in support of a position but omit
quotations from similar scientists who disagree. They may quote
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PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 85
relevant authorities who have specialized knowledge or they may refer
to sources widely trusted on other issues but ill informer] on the issue
at hand. And they may be accurate or inaccurate in representing
the views of the authorities. Clearly, appeals to authority can fall at
many different points along the dimension from pure information to
deception.
A ppeals to Emotion
Risk messages sometimes appeal to fear, pride, guilt, commu-
nity spirit, parental concerns, or other emotions to spur people to
action. Sometimes emotional appeals are made in the context of
a presentation of information. Thus, saying that cigarette smoking
causes emphysema conveys the same information with or without
an accompanying film of an end-stage emphysema patient, but with
the film the message will have a different effect. Appeals to emo-
tion are not always more effective in inducing behavior change than
less emotional appeals: the psychological research shows that the
effect depends on other aspects of the message as well (Petty et al.,
1988~. Nevertheless, appeals to emotion can be effective influence
techniques under some conditions. Sometimes the use of emotional
appeals is widely accepted, but often it is considered manipulative
and irresponsible. The conditions under which emotional appeals are
considered acceptable are not well understood.
~. ~. ~
USE OF INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES IN
RISE COMMUNICATION
Achieving Balance
Risk messages often employ some of the above influence tech-
niques; indeed, it is difficult to imagine a risk message that could
attract the attention of nonexperts without making use of at least
highlighting or framing. A paradox arises for risk communication:
How can messages be made to improve the recipients' base of in-
formation if, in order to be effective, they must use techniques of
influence? The paradox disappears when one realizes that there are
strategies for controlling the use of influence techniques consistent
with the goal of successful risk communication. Substantive guide-
lines should be established for the content of risk messages that
responsible message designers, including government officials, can
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86
IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
to keep influence techniques under control so as not to bias recipi-
ents' understanding. Because available knowledge is inadequate to
provide highly detailed substantive guidelines, procedural approaches
that keep message designers in bounds are also critical to achieving
successful risk communication.
The strategy of substantive guidelines is highly demanding. As
already noted, the language of risk messages and even the measures
used in risk analysis often embody value judgments or otherwise tend
to lead the recipients of messages toward particular conclusions. We
have noted several examples, but not enough is known to identify
all the ways a risk message might bias a recipient's understanding.
Thus it is not now possible to devise a complete guide to sources of
potential bias that would allow risk messages to be evaluated for bal-
ance. Moreover, research on communication strongly suggests that
the most effective message design for any particular purpose varies
with the subject matter at hand, the decision alternatives, the in-
tended audience, and other factors. But very little is known about
the key situational variables that alter the effects of risk messages.
Thus at present any guidelines for balanced risk messages would lack
situational specificity. Existing knowledge can help message design-
ers by identifying some potential pitfalls, but it cannot yield highly
specific guidance. Responsible message designers need to interpret
available advice, keeping in mind that knowledge is incomplete and
that general principles may not apply to certain specific situations.
Since there is no clear best way to make such judgments, substantive
guidelines are not enough to ensure balance in risk messages, even
when the sources are doing their best to achieve it.
The procedural strategy, which relies on a system of checks and
balances to control the possible biases in risk messages, is applicable
without regard to the state of knowledge about the effects of risk
messages. The strategy assumes that available guidelines will never
be perfectly correct or clear-cut and that vested interests or strongly
held values will often induce ingenious message designers to find
ways around guidelines. It therefore relies on systems of scrutiny
and criticism, and the discipline of competing messages, to keep
message designers within bounds.
Examples of procedural strategies applied to individual messages
are the procedures of the National Center for Toxicological Research
(NCTR) Consensus Workshops and those of the National Research
Council (NRC) for review of its reports. The NCTR Consensus
Workshop Series involves scientists from academia, government, in
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PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 87
dustry, and public interest groups gathered to resolve toxicological
issues, usually concerning the hazard posed by particular substances
(Gough et al., 1984~. Consensus is sought, not by formal voting,
but through the chairman's guiding discussion toward agreement.
Careful procedures ensure that all panelists have an opportunity to
submit statements and to evaluate and comment on reports. These
procedures ensure that reports focus on those areas where consensus
is reached and present the major factors in reaching agreement. The
NRC, many of whose reports are detailed messages about risk, does
not rely on guidelines for the use of language, graphics, and so forth.
Rather it relies on a balanced choice of committee members and an
independent review process. The NRC presumes that a dialogue of
well-informed individuals with varying perspectives will yield a first
approximation of a balanced assessment. The outcome of this pro-
cess is double-checked by submitting it to an independent review
process involving experts who also represent a range of perspectives.
In these two procedures it is not substantive guidelines but the
process of dialogue and criticism that is used to ensure a balanced
message.
Achieving Influence
Even more difficult than the problem of achieving balance in
risk communication is the problem of deciding whether balance is
the wrong objective. Advocates whose clear purpose is to influence
their audiences may experience no problem, but the issue can be
particularly acute for public officials who sit in a relation of public
trust to the recipients of their messages. When should messages aim
at merely informing the public, or government decision makers, and
when should the goal be to influence the recipients?
Government officials are commonly expected to follow a more re-
stricted standard of behavior in the area of risk communication than
are advocacy groups, private citizens, or corporations. Similarly, cit-
izens apply a stricter standard to messages paid for with public funds
than to privately funded messages. We judge that such standards
are justified because government officials hold a public trust. But
the specifics of such standards are not easily defined.
After considerable debate focusing on the appropriate use of risk
messages by public officials, we concluded that no explicit guidelines
can be drawn defining which techniques are appropriate or inappro-
priate in particular situations or for particular message sources. We
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IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
agreed that informing is always an appropriate goal in the design
of risk messages and that deception is never appropriate. But we
recognize that messages that employ influence techniques or that
have influence as an objective are often considered acceptable, even
coming from public officials. We believe that more extensive public
debate is needed to arrive at standards for responsible behavior by
public officials in the design of risk messages. As a contribution to
that debate, we offer the following observations about the conditions
under which influence techniques seem most likely to be considered
appropriate by various audiences.
First, the acceptability of influence as a purpose of risk messages
seems to depend in part on which beliefs or actions are being influ-
enced. Consider the range of actions and opinions that government
agencies have tried or might try to influence with risk messages. Here
are some examples:
.
swine influenza;
Inoculating children against diphtheria, polio, pertussis, or
Using condoms to prevent AIDS, gonorrhea, or pregnancy;
Avoiding or reducing consumption of heroin, alcohol by
drivers, tobacco products, alcohol by pregnant women, aspirin by
children, or animal fat;
Using seat belts, motorcycle helmets, or masks for painting
or working with fiberglass;
. Supporting drug enforcement activities, AIDS research, EPA
enforcement activities, or the repeal (or passage) of particular pieces
of legislation.
.
Depending on the action or opinion in question, the likely re-
sponse to government-sponsored influence attempts may vary from
general acceptance to extreme controversy. Within each of the cat-
egories just listed, we believe that efforts to influence the action or
opinion mentioned first would be relatively uncontroversial compared
with similar efforts to influence the actions given later in each cate-
gory. It is important to recognize, however, that observers, including
members of our study committee, differ on the appropriateness of
influence techniques in certain of the contexts listed. Some variation
in judgments concerns scientific knowledge: the more clearly it has
been established that an activity is dangerous or that it may harm
persons generally considered to deserve societal protection (e.g., chil-
dren), the more acceptable influence attempts seem to become.2 But
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PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 89
because of scientific uncertainty, informed observers sometimes dis-
agree about how well established the relevant knowledge is. Another
central issue seems to be the compatibility of governmental influence
with individual autonomy and related values (Fader, 1987; Faden
and Beauchamp, 1986~. When a class of personal action (such as
drunk driving) affects a large portion of the populace or threatens
to inflict substantial monetary and other costs on society or on in-
dividuals who do not engage in that action, people are more willing
to accept, and even to demand, that government agencies be proac-
tive and try to influence beliefs and actions. Under such conditions,
people are more willing to compromise the autonomy, privacy, or
freedom of some individuals for the good of others.
Second, the acceptability of influence seems to depend on the
techniques employed. Generally, the farther an influence technique
lies along the dimension from information to deception, the harder
the message becomes to justify and the clearer and more explicit
must be the legitimate public purpose being served. To influence
people to use condoms to prevent AIDS, government might appeal
to authorities (the surgeon general recommending use of condoms
to avoid AIDS) or respected or admired individuals (fiIm and popu-
lar music stars hosting a TV special encouraging use of condoms in
AIDS prevention), post warning signs (in lavatories of establishments
frequented by homosexual males), present selected risk and risk re-
duction information ("use of condoms can reduce the transmission of
AIDS by 95 percent"), or appeal to emotion (photographically depict
the late stages of AIDS or state that "you sleep with your partner's
whole sexual history"~. Observers differ on the appropriateness of
such techniques for a particular purpose, even when all agree that
the purpose justifies some form of governmental influence.
We conclude that public values about the importance of par-
ticular public purposes and the acceptability of particular influence
techniques are not well understood. Generally, the more an influ-
ence attempt would compromise important values such as personal
autonomy or constitutional guarantees such as freedom of speech or
association, and the more closely the influence technique approaches
deception, the more it needs to be legitimated in order to be accept-
able. Legitimacy is what makes people consider a particular influence
attempt either responsible or irresponsible and either appropriate or
inappropriate for government officials.
But there are no clear a priori guidelines that can tell a govern-
ment official or other designer of a risk message when the message's
~1 . ~·.
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IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
purposes are sufficiently legitimate to justify a particular technique
that goes beyond informing. Government officials will likely find
their efforts to influence contested if they stray from accepted scien-
tific views or if they challenge popular consensus. It is for this reason
that decisions about governmental use of influence techniques in risk
messages are often debated in overtly political arenas rather than
being left to unelected officials' unscrutinized discretion. We believe
that political arenas are the proper place for deciding the appropri-
ateness of governmental efforts to influence citizens. Governmental
attempts to influence citizens' beliefs and actions can be justified only
to the extent that some legitimate public process has culminated in
a decision that using risk messages to influence behavior serves an
important public purpose.
Influence and Personal Action
The clearest example of politically established legitimacy for risk
messages occurred in the congressional debate on persuading people
to stop smoking. A congressional act codified language-a set of risk
messages that now appears on cigarette packages. The process of
debate and approval by elected officials granted legitimacy to the
messages.
Such explicit public (rebate rarely occurs to give clear prior jus-
tification for governmental attempts to influence personal behavior.
Nevertheless, an agency or official can sometimes act legitimately
on general authority. For example, public health officials have fairly
general support in the mandates of their agencies for influencing
people to take action to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
As a result, the surgeon general's 1988 mass mailing of a risk mes-
sage about avoiding AIDS was met with wide public acceptance and
even gratitude. Sometimes executive branch officials justify Influence
attempts within the spirit of their legislative mandates. The U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency's efforts to inform the public about
the health risks of indoor radon, and to convince people to have their
homes tested and sometimes modified at considerable expense, are
not justified by anything stronger than the EPA's general mandate
for environmental protection. Yet this attempt to influence behavior
in the setting of personal action was widely welcomed.
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PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 91
InJ7uence and Public Debate
Sometimes executive branch officials rely on their general man-
date to influence beliefs in the setting of public debate. Such efforts
tend to be more acceptable after a risk management decision than
before (e.g., when regulators are expected to justify their decisions
to the public). But even before a decision is made, there are situ-
ations in which some kinds of efforts to influence public debate are
appropriate. Regulatory officials sometimes argue that they have an
obligation to evaluate new risks and, when public action is needed,
to persuade elected officials of that fact. It is not enough, they say,
merely to inform the public of the latest knowledge. Thus some pub-
lic officials, on receiving evidence on the risk to the earth's ozone layer
from chiorofluorocarbons, attempted to influence the highest levels
of government to support an international treaty to cut production
of that class of chemicals.
But it is easy for a public official to overstep the bounds of
acceptability. This happens most readily when the subject matter
of the influence attempt is already politically controversial or when
government can be seen as trying to influence free political expres-
sion. When the San Francisco office of the Energy Research and
Development Administration distributed 78,000 pamphlets defend-
ing the safety of the nuclear power industry during a 1976 California
referendum campaign on the future of nuclear power, the result was
a critical report from the General Accounting Office and strong ex-
pressions of congressional outrage (Burnham, 1976~. Not only was
the message unacceptable, but its dissemination and the agency's
evasive response to criticism harmed the agency's credibility. With
many influence attempts it takes fairly explicit debate and agreement
to make them legitimate: vague appeals to an agency's mandate are
not sufficient.
The judgment of whether public officials have or have not ex-
ceeded their proper role in a particular attempt to influence public
debate is difficult to make. But it is a matter of judgment. Clearly,
the freedom of public servants to influence decision makers must be
kept within bounds. We considered and rejected the position that
advocacy is always inappropriate for executive branch officials in the
setting of public debate. There are situations in which such officials
are in the best position to alert the public to a hazard that may
deserve governmental action. But it is difficult to define the proper
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IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION
limit. Scientific analysis is indispensable to successful risk commu-
nication. It~can show what is known about risks and the attendant
choices and can identify the limits and uncertainties of that knowl-
edge; it can therefore indicate what can be said. Science can also
advise on when and how best to say it in order to improve an audi-
ence's understanding or to influence beliefs and actions. A decision
to engage in advocacy, however, involves judgments about which risk
management option is appropriate and about how much to influ-
ence audiences with other than information judgments that must
be based on values as well an knowledge. We concluded that natural
and social sciences cannot provide guidelines for when to engage in
advocacy in risk communication. Although empirical research can
determine which beliefs Americans consider acceptable for influence
by government and which influence techniques they consider most
extreme and therefore most in need of legitimation, there is no prac-
tical way to tell in advance whether enough legitimation exists in the
political system to justify a particular attempt to use risk messages
to influence recipients. Advocacy messages from executive branch
officials must therefore be judged against the legitimate role of the
officials in question, as set forth in the relevant legislation and judi-
cial interpretations and as argued by elected officials. The decision
of what are legitimate bounds for governmental risk messages is and
ought to be made through the political process.
We recognize that the boundaries for advocacy in the political
process often are clear only after a public official has overstepped
them, leaving public officials in an unpleasant position. However,
such boundaries usually can be discerned in advance by careful anal-
ysis. In any case, when officials judge that the public welfare depends
on a specific change in policy or individual behavior, they must also
judge how far they can go before overstepping legitimate constraints.
Advocacy can be politically risky for public officials. It may be
widely applauded or widely condemned, and types of messages that
may be widely accepted on one subject matter or from one govern-
ment source may be criticized when the topic or source changes. A
public official should be aware of the political risks and of the legiti-
mate constraints placed upon government in advocacy and, where an
unusually strong degree of advocacy seems warranted, seek political
approval of such action.
Risk communication may be difficult because the purposes of
messages are not clear or because they have multiple, perhaps con-
flicting, purposes. The next chapter describes several misconceptions
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PURPOSES OF RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MESSAGES 93
about risk communication that may also contribute to confusion and
frustration on the part of risk communicators and recipients.
NOTES
1. Generally, persuasive messages are less effective when recipients have
the opportunity to "anchor" their preexisting beliefs against persuasion in the
following ways: by defending them against a prior persuasive message, by
considering their other beliefs or values that are supported by the belief subject
to persuasive communication, or by training in the ability to question or argue
against persuasive messages or to be suspicious of the source (the evidence is
reviewed by McGuire, 1985:292-294~. Persuasion that does not appear to be
persuasion might not evoke such defenses.
2. For instance, public support for persuasive messages about AIDS pre-
vention was minimal when the disease seemed to threaten only homosexual
males, Haitians, and intravenous drug users but increased rapidly when chil-
dren, hemophiliacs, adult heterosexuals, and hospital patients receiving blood
transfusions were seen to be at risk. Shilts (1987) gives an extensive account
of how public concern about AIDS has related to the identity of the groups
believed to be" at risk.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
risk communication
