Prologue

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has sought to expand and transform tools of policy and the roles of government agencies to confront and prevail against terrorist threats. Since 9/11, the nation has engaged in what national leadership has termed the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). Its current objectives are outlined in the latest national security strategy of the United States:1

  • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur.

  • Deny WMD [weapons of mass destruction] to rogue states and to terrorist allies.

  • Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states.

  • Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism calls out the principal military objectives:2

  • Protect and defend the homeland.

  • Attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad.

  • Support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism.

1

The White House (George W. Bush). 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., March, p. 12.

2

Office of the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Peter Pace, USMC). 2006. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., February 1, p. 3.



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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror Prologue In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has sought to expand and transform tools of policy and the roles of government agencies to confront and prevail against terrorist threats. Since 9/11, the nation has engaged in what national leadership has termed the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). Its current objectives are outlined in the latest national security strategy of the United States:1 Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur. Deny WMD [weapons of mass destruction] to rogue states and to terrorist allies. Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states. Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror. The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism calls out the principal military objectives:2 Protect and defend the homeland. Attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad. Support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism. 1 The White House (George W. Bush). 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., March, p. 12. 2 Office of the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Peter Pace, USMC). 2006. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., February 1, p. 3.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror That plan also identifies ways to expand foreign partnerships and partnership capacity; strengthen capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD; and institutionalize domestically and internationally the strategy against violent extremists. The GWOT involves multiple operations for the U.S. military, from combating terrorist threats to counterproliferation to providing humanitarian assistance.3 In meeting these new and growing demands that it contribute to the nation’s GWOT efforts, the U.S. military faces a strategic landscape that has changed dramatically over the last two decades and that is likely to evolve for the foreseeable future.4 A complicating factor in that evolution is the fact that the GWOT is not a “war” per se. It is a complex conflict involving many interdependent aspects of political, diplomatic, economic, and military policy. The Committee on the Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror acknowledges that there has been much public discussion of whether the phrases “war on terror” and “Global War on Terror” are appropriate descriptions,5 given the lack of an organized, uniformed, specified hostile force like that experienced in conventional campaigns. However, history has shown that past conflicts have taken on the vernacular label “war” in its most euphemistic sense. For example, the Cold War was not technically a war but an ideological, geopolitical, and economic struggle based on containment and deterrence policies that lasted for nearly half a century. While it came to be focused on the Soviet Union in its later phases, in its early years the Cold War shared a number of commonalities with the GWOT and where we stand in relation to it today: The problem we faced then, as now, was extraordinarily difficult. We had a limited understanding of our adversaries. Technology was evolving rapidly and was available to both sides. The possibility of catastrophic attacks was non-negligible. The confrontation was global. Of course, the specifics of the GWOT differ and seem more complex. In the Cold War, two nominally symmetrical militaries faced each other in a prolonged stand-off; in the GWOT, myriad asymmetric adversaries are involved in a war that is to varying degrees warm and hot. In the Cold War, deterrence was central; in the GWOT, deterrence seems far less promising (but has also been far 3 See, for example, the White House (George W. Bush), 2003, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., September; Secretary of Defense (Donald H. Rumsfeld), 2006, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., February 6. See Box 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a complete list of documents relating to national security strategy. 4 Challenges facing the U.S. military are homeland defense, the GWOT and irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns. See Secretary of Defense (Donald H. Rumsfeld), 2006, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., February 6. 5 For example, see William Safire, “Islamofascism,” New York Times, October 1, 2006, p. 20.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror less studied). Adversary attacks in the GWOT involve both civilian and military targets, and terrorists are not deterred by threats to their survival. Their depth of military capability is not great, but they have demonstrated opportunism and persistence, and they seem to be able to adapt so as to cause effects disproportionate to their military strength. Multiple religious and ideological agendas motivate their efforts. The agendas are mixed with fighting not only against the United States, Western (e.g., Britain, Italy, Spain), Middle Eastern (e.g., Iraq, Saudi Arabia), and Asian (e.g., India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand) interests, but also within their own factions. The terrorists’ efforts are apparent at levels that range from isolated cells, through blurred organizations such as al-Qaeda, to nation-states that supply help ranging from passive sanctuary to active support. Terrorist actions and areas of influence—from Afghanistan and Iraq to critical maritime straits such as Malacca and Hormuz, and to areas holding most of the known petroleum reserves—are also broad. Organizations like al-Qaeda have considerable resources, own ships, use technologies and principles of network-centric operations, and have made serious efforts to obtain WMD. This complex GWOT environment portends a long-term conflict that has extensive maritime dimensions. The committee saw its charter as being neither to endorse nor to replace the term “GWOT,” but rather to describe the scope of the problem to which naval forces should be directed. In the committee’s view, the GWOT refers to national-security-related conflict, offensive operations, and defense tied directly to blunting terrorists threats, whether they are state-sponsored or not. But the committee believes as well that the long-war scope of the GWOT must also be addressed in terms of operations beyond combating terrorism, such as counter-proliferation, strengthening alliances, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief—activities that build a worldwide base for containing and prevailing against terrorism. It is this broader view of the GWOT that the committee has taken in defining roles, missions, and needed capabilities for naval forces.6 6 In this report, the committee focused on the role of the Navy in the GWOT. In several areas the inter-related roles of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard are also addressed. Thus, the term “naval forces” as used here refers to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror Executive Summary At the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Naval Studies Board, under the auspices of the National Research Council, established a committee to assess the capabilities and gaps of naval forces in prosecuting the Global War on Terror (GWOT).1 The Committee on the Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror was established late in the tenure of ADM Vern Clark, USN, the previous CNO, and conducted its work in the first several months of the tour of the current CNO, ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN. During that period, the Navy began to shift priorities toward addressing naval roles in the GWOT. As a result, the findings and recommendations of the committee often support activities recently set in motion. Many areas remain to be addressed, however, because of the breadth and complexity of the GWOT, the interrelationships of political, diplomatic, economic, and military policies and operations, and the fact that the intellectual work to date has not matched the breadth and complexity of their interrelationships. These shortfalls cannot be dismissed. The GWOT is expected to be a long war, and there will be an enduring requirement for naval operations. 1 In the committee’s view, the GWOT refers to national-security-related conflict, offensive operations, and defense tied directly to blunting terrorist threats, whether they are state-sponsored or not. But the committee believes as well that the long-war scope of the GWOT must also be addressed in terms of operations beyond combating terrorism, such as counterproliferation, strengthening alliances, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief—activities that build a worldwide base for containing and prevailing against terrorism. It is this broader view of the GWOT that the committee has taken in defining roles, missions, and needed capabilities for naval forces. In this report, the committee focuses on the role of the Navy in the GWOT. In several areas the interrelated roles of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard are also addressed. Thus, the term “naval forces” as used in this report refers to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror The charge to the committee, as stipulated in the terms of reference (see Appendix A), was therefore broad and complex. Lacking a comprehensive construct from any of the Naval Services that would allow a systematic assessment of capabilities, status, and gaps, the committee found it necessary to develop a Defense-in-Depth framework that became the organizing construct for this report. The committee’s examination of the principal elements of the framework resulted in findings and recommendations that could be grouped into seven priority areas for action. This summary assesses the transformation of naval forces for addressing the GWOT as of the writing of this report, briefly describes the Defense-in-Depth framework, and lists the findings and associated major recommendations for each action area. NAVAL TRANSFORMATION FOR THE GWOT For the U.S. military the strategic landscape has changed dramatically over the last two decades. As national strategy documents have argued, a central feature of this new landscape is uncertainty—about the state or nonstate adversaries that might threaten U.S. security, about their capabilities, and about their intentions. This uncertainty has profound implications for naval planners. They cannot transform naval forces for the GWOT without worrying about how such transformations will work for or against the other transformations needed for non-GWOT challenges (for example, major combat operations [MCOs]). Nor can they tailor the GWOT strategy for a clearly identifiable source or type of terrorist action. Naval planners must link capability development plans to the objectives set by national leadership. Despite uncertainties about the future of this long war, force planners must promote the kinds of adaptations political leaders seek. They must also take a long-term view of the problem and of the solution. This can be, but is not likely to be, a traditional force-on-force application of naval seapower. On the good news side of the ledger, Coast Guard leadership has embraced transformation for the GWOT, and the Marine Corps has moved aggressively to bolster capabilities for GWOT-relevant missions. The CNO’s 2006 guidance2 puts the GWOT at the top of the warfighting priority list. The CNO has followed with taskings and decisions consistent with that priority.3 He has reinforced these taskings and decisions with a strategic plan in support of Program Objective Memorandum 08 that lends detail and commitment to such initiatives.4 Fleet commanders are starting to define needed capabilities through their GWOT- 2 Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael Mullen, USN). 2005. CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., October 30. 3 For example, standup of the Naval Expeditionary Command; standup of the riverine unit; expansion of the foreign affairs officer program; and expansion of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities. 4 Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN). 2006. Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program Objective Memorandum 08, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., May.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror related interactions with combatant commands and, in the case of the Pacific Fleet, with special attention to operations inherent to forward presence. However, of the three principal Naval Services—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard—the Navy’s record of innovation and adaptation to address the GWOT challenge is the least advanced in terms of the expectations of national leadership.5 In the committee’s view, its record also falls short of the likely future requirements for success. Hence, this report focuses primarily on the role of the Navy in the GWOT. The most urgent challenge is the question of future requirements. In the committee’s view, the Navy will not have done this job rigorously unless it integrates and balances the demands of the war on terror and irregular warfare, homeland defense, and conventional campaigns. It must also understand the separate requirements of improved performance in the steady state, as the new Quadrennial Defense Review Report defines it,6 and the surge phase. Moreover, given the requirements of maritime security in the new strategic environment, the Navy must become an effective player in, and a leader of, the interagency process bearing on these matters. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH FRAMEWORK A basic tenet of this report—and of national leadership—is that the GWOT will be a long war. Naval forces, particularly the Navy, must therefore institutionalize mechanisms for treating it as an enduring mission. One such mechanism is to create the intellectual base for assessing requirements for the GWOT on its own terms to allow sound prioritization of options, both within the GWOT and across the full mission space of naval responsibilities. The committee believes that an intermediate level of detail, one that bridges the gap between strategic commitment and specific measures that intuitively provide capabilities and capacities for the GWOT, is needed. To highlight this point and to provide an organizing construct for its own assessment, the committee drew up the Defense-in-Depth framework illustrated in Figure ES.1. Three roles for naval forces are critical to forming a defense in depth against GWOT threats,7 operating in and from the maritime domain, including along U.S. coasts. They are forward presence, maritime operations, and homeland defense. There are also three critical foundational capabilities necessary to support naval forces engaged in the GWOT: maritime domain awareness (MDA), which includes increased maritime intelligence; command and control; and naval 5 A discussion of capability gaps in the GWOT is summarized in the section titled “Develop Naval Strategy.” 6 Secretary of Defense (Donald H. Rumsfeld). 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., February 2, p. 4. 7 It is recognized that threats can originate anywhere geographically, and in cyberspace as well as physically.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror FIGURE ES.1 Defense-in-Depth frame work for the Global War on Terror in the maritime domain.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror force protection. Finally, three implementing areas crosscut the GWOT roles and capabilities: (1) technologies unique to the maritime domain; (2) specialized fleet capabilities tailored to the dispersed and elusive nature of the threat; and (3) new, or newly emphasized, personnel skills and training. PRIORITY AREAS FOR ACTION The committee developed its findings and recommendations based on its assessment of each of the elements that constitute the Defense-in-Depth framework, but recognized that the breadth of the topic and the many recommendations that resulted did not provide a useful starting point for Service leadership. It therefore identified seven areas for priority action to which the major and supporting recommendations could be mapped: Develop naval strategy, both top-down as part of the national strategy and bottom-up based on naval capabilities, to address the naval role in the GWOT—and that strategy’s derivatives in terms of the concept of operations (CONOPS), capabilities, and investment—in its own terms. Assign responsibilities for work on the naval approach to the GWOT, including identifying valid requirements, inventorying current and programmed capabilities, and deciding on investment priorities and resource commitments. Strengthen maritime domain awareness and the spectrum of options to deal with the fact that the maritime domain represents an all-too-plausible channel for delivery of terrorists and WMD, especially nuclear. Seize opportunities for forward presence to leverage this traditional naval strength relative both to winning hearts and minds and to conducting operations with foreign partners. Prioritize assets for increased protection to include not only homeland population centers but also homeland and overseas critical infrastructure8 and the forces themselves. Operationalize the Navy/Coast Guard “national fleet” concept as a centerpiece of the national maritime security strategy, recognizing that the complementary strengths of partner nations are especially valuable in the GWOT (consistent with the motivation of the emerging “1,000-ship Navy” concept),9 and planning for GWOT-unique fleet capabilities in the future. Attract, develop, and retain the right people, especially more diversified 8 Recognizing that certain critical economic infrastructure represents maritime targets that have strategic consequence; these warrant increased monitoring as part of maritime security. 9 The “1,000-ship Navy” concept foresees an international, interoperable coalition of naval-related activities, joined by nations allied to or friendly with the United States. The concept further proposes a vastly expanded sensor network to monitor security in the maritime domain and an increased number of responders helping to ensure this security. Ultimately, the objective is to allow the maritime domain to be safely used by all cooperating nations.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror special operations personnel and skilled specialists who are attuned to local and cultural norms in forward deployed areas—people who can build the enduring personal and professional relationships that are at the heart of creating an effective GWOT force. Develop Naval Strategy Finding: The Navy’s strategic plan of May 200610 makes good use of the new force planning construct in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to structure its discussion of focus areas and mission sets, but it needs to exploit that construct to assemble a vision of how to prevail (one that goes beyond what to do) in the GWOT. Such a vision can help motivate a broad set of activities and illuminate the gaps in current capabilities as this committee has come to understand them. Specific concerns of the committee about the Navy’s May 2006 strategic plan are as follows: The strategic plan is too “Navy” and not enough “naval.” The Navy plan conveys only a modest appreciation of how to integrate a Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team to prosecute the GWOT. The concept of joint forces reflected in Navy strategy is too constrained. In the new strategic landscape, jointness expands to include coalition operations. It must encompass the full spectrum of partner capacities. Motivating partner capacities is an important function of strategy as reflected, for instance, in the emerging concept of a 1,000-ship Navy. The Navy strategy is generally written in the language of “defend” and “defeat.” It needs to reflect the objectives of assurance, dissuasion—and especially deterrence. Reassuring U.S. partners is central to enlisting their participation in the capability-building effort; that requires more than simply strength and presence. Dissuading potential future challengers, which is central to prevailing in complex contingencies, requires more than simply a notion of military victory. As national and DOD strategy documents point out, deterrence is especially important. Partners are deeply concerned with deterrence—they want to know how improvements in operational art and incremental capability can make a meaningful difference in terrorist behavior. While the Navy’s May 2006 strategic plan acknowledges this, the strategy gives no answers to how the programmatic guidance connects to this critical objective. There is too little focus in the strategy on the WMD threat posed by terrorists. The Navy’s May 2006 strategic plan makes a significant commitment to countering the WMD threat, but the contribution of particular measures is not yet 10 Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN). 2006. Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program Objective Memorandum 08, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., May.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror clear because substantive analyses like those conducted for MCO capabilities and capacities have not yet been done. Combatant commander (COCOM) priorities are not reflected in the Navy Strategic Plan. Yet the COCOMs have some very clear ideas about shortfalls in current naval capabilities and capacities, and their preferences need to be explicitly reflected in the Navy’s view of its emerging requirements. Major Recommendation 1: The Chief of Naval Operations should develop and promulgate a strategy for the GWOT that begins with first principles and then explains how present and future naval forces can be organized, trained, equipped, and positioned to achieve national objectives. The required vision should: Begin with a view of the integrated nature of the “one game”; it is not a “home game” and an “away game”—but “one game.” Articulate synergies among the three missions of the QDR. Encompass the combined roles of the nation’s naval assets. Adopt a broader view of the Joint Force. Address the deterrence question more thoroughly in terms of the values and nature of the opposition. Address the WMD threat more effectively. Reflect combatant commander priorities. Build a firm foundation from the national strategy architecture. Develop GWOT planning scenarios that are analogous to MCOs that guide planning for conventional warfare capabilities and capacities, incorporating concepts of assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence as well as defense and defeat. Assign Responsibilities Finding: The Navy and its Marine Corps and Coast Guard partners have not defined the requirements of success in the GWOT in the GWOT’s own terms. The committee believes that this will require a good deal of intellectual work, which is just beginning.11 As stated above, the committee believes that an intermediate level of detail is needed to bridge the gap between strategic commitment and specific measures that intuitively provide capabilities and capacities for the GWOT. The Navy does not yet have such an operational construct, nor has it assigned responsibility for advocacy of the roles and requirements for naval forces in the GWOT needed to improve capabilities. In association with this finding, the committee makes three interrelated recommendations. 11 See, for example, Department of the Navy, 2005, Navy’s 3/1 Strategy: The Maritime Contribution to the Joint Force in a Changed Strategic Landscape, Washington, D.C., April 12 (draft); Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN), 2006, Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program Objective Memorandum 08, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., May.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror Major Recommendation 2: The Chief of Naval Operations should use the force planning construct in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review12 to size and shape its forces for both the GWOT and MCO. This requires coming to terms with the different requirements of steady-state and surge, as defined by the QDR, and with the need to improve institutional capabilities to compete with an adaptive adversary. Major Recommendation 3: The Chief of Naval Operations should develop or adopt an operational framework similar to the committee’s Defense-in-Depth framework to structure force planning and analyses of the value-added of various candidate capabilities and capacities, and should assign advocacy responsibility to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) for each segment of the framework.13 The support of NWDC and MCCDC should be enlisted. (The foundational MDA capability is specifically called out in Major Recommendation 5.) Major Recommendation 4: As part of the Navy accepting the leadership role required to support the maritime GWOT missions, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) should address capability needs and technology shortfalls. To this end, the CNO should assign advocacy responsibility within N8 and support the development of assessment methods that will allow prioritization of GWOT investments, both among themselves and relative to other mission needs. Associated maritime GWOT planning scenarios should also be developed analogous to the MCOs that guide planning for conventional warfare capabilities and capacities. Again, the support of NWDC and MCCDC should be enlisted. Finding: The Navy is not providing MDA leadership or institutional commitment commensurate with its responsibility—and its unique capabilities—to aggressively support the achievement of national MDA goals. The Navy has interpreted its MDA responsibilities narrowly in terms of responses to intelligence cues about vessels of interest. This has led to a focus on the processing of sensor data, primarily from the National Maritime Intelligence Center, and not on the need for new sensor capabilities as called for in the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.14 The current narrow approach neglects the larger 12 Secretary of Defense (Donald H. Rumsfeld). 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., February 2, p. 38. 13 The identification of specific officers and offices in the Navy with specific recommended actions is intended to reflect those most closely aligned in terms of the existing structures of organizational responsibilities. 14 Department of Homeland Security. 2005. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., October. Available at <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf>. Accessed September 21, 2006.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror challenge of leading the needed international effort to establish an active ocean and foreign port surveillance system that would help identify potential threats in time to permit an effective response. Such an MDA active surveillance capability is much more ambitious than that needed to protect naval forces against terrorists or indeed, to prosecute most major combat operations. Major Recommendation 5: The Chief of Naval Operations should assign clear responsibility and accountability for maritime domain awareness within the Navy and direct the elevation of Navy representation and leadership within the interagency domain—as required in The National Strategy for Maritime Security.15 “Within the Navy” implies the clear designation of resource and planning responsibility within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). More broadly, charting an MDA architecture and roadmap—with specific attention to filling gaps—is essential. The senior Navy officer responsible for interagency representation not only should take an active leadership role within the interagency arena but also should ensure that the Navy input adheres both to its own and to interagency capability and program processes and deliberations.16,17 Strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness Finding: There are serious MDA capability gaps in terms of plausible, difficult maritime scenarios involving WMD threats to the United States and high-consequence threats to its economic infrastructure. These gaps call for considerable effort to explore and prioritize among solution options. Moreover, analytic processes are minimally automated and are challenged by large volumes of information for analysis and fusion. Major Recommendation 6: The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) and the Assistant Secretary of the 15 White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September. 16 A Navy Maritime Domain Awareness–Implementation Team (MDA–IT) was being formed as of this writing, paralleling the interagency MDA–IT and offering the promise of more coordinated and coherent MDA efforts both within the Navy and as input to the interagency effort. 17 The Politics of the Oceans (Edward Wenk, Jr., 1972, University of Washington Press, Seattle) gives the detailed perspective of a key White House participant on how the interagency, national, and international negotiations were conducted that resulted in government reorganization to form NOAA and EPA and in legislation on the status of the sea bottom. During the very active decade of the 1960s, many combinations of scientific, technological, economic, and political interests were orchestrated to generate institutions for investigation, use, and protection of the oceans. Perceptions of the major economic potential of the sea bottom were developed, leading to international political interactions. The book contains accounts of activities successful and unsuccessful, which could be useful to those carrying out this recommendation.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN[RDA]) should co-lead a robust Navy-wide analytic and engineering effort to specify system and capability options to address high-stakes MDA threats. An engineering analysis team should be convened to develop a quantitative analytic methodology that maps MDA attributes to mission effectiveness for GWOT-related reference scenarios. The results should be used as a basis for Navy, Coast Guard, and related interagency decisions and actions. In addition, if successful in forming the MDA architecture and implementation decisions, this methodology should be extended and applied to a full defense-in-depth framework, either the one that is offered in this report or its replacement. There is no single program or technology “silver bullet” solution. The recommended effort would address the MDA enterprise/system-of-systems options and the attendant cost, risk, and schedule considerations, along with the performance of different combinations of sensor/surveillance building blocks. These building blocks would include non-Navy capabilities and assets, both current and programmed or potential. Finding: To yield an integrated national capability, further coherence is needed among the many community initiatives for MDA and MDA-supporting concepts. Major Recommendation 7: The Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commander of the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) should co-sponsor a Navy, Coast Guard, and NORTHCOM effort to address coherence by developing a maritime domain awareness enterprise operational architecture (if this has not already been done by the time this report is issued). Independent of the methodology employed, an operationally driven MDA architecture, national in scope, is needed. Such an architecture can in some sense be viewed as a more fleshed out version of the MDA CONOPS being developed by the interagency MDA–Implementation Team. The recommendation that this be accomplished by a chartered joint but not full interagency effort is based on the pragmatic recognition that the Navy, the Coast Guard, and NORTHCOM are the principal owners of the topic and the principal stakeholders in a coherent outcome. Their joint product would both ensure coherence among their core efforts and help drive the interagency process. Seize Opportunities for Forward Presence Finding: Humanitarian support can have a positive and highly leveraged impact on how the United States and its citizens are viewed by foreign populations, which would help improve the maritime security environment and further GWOT objectives.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror Finding: Naval forces—especially the Navy—are not yet approaching forward presence as a strategic aspect of the GWOT. The Navy needs to implement a deliberate and comprehensive approach to both planning and engagement to maximize the impact of forward presence in the GWOT. Finding: More effort and resources are needed to build Navy capabilities to contribute fully to enhanced engagement and theater security cooperation (TSC) efforts in support of COCOM requirements with forward-deployed naval forces. Recent priorities have focused on military-to-military relationships to enable TSC operations; they have not leveraged other public agencies or the private sector. (Recent initiatives by the Pacific Fleet are an exception.) Using the Navy, the Coast Guard, or other agencies with the right tools to gain access and then leverage future naval focus is critical to long-term success. Major Recommendation 8: To shape the maritime security environment, in concert with COCOM TSC plans related to forward-deployed naval forces, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) and the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DCMC[PPO]) should coordinate with naval component commanders to draw up regionally focused strategic relationship programs that establish positive, sustained, and objective-driven military, civil, and commercial relationships in emerging and littoral nations. Prioritize Assets for Increased Protection Finding: Protection of all assets in all environments is not possible; naval component commanders therefore need to be able to conduct risk assessments to allow prioritization of protection measures and operational alternatives. Certain critical economic infrastructure represents maritime targets that have strategic consequence. These warrant increased monitoring as part of maritime security. Major Recommendation 9: The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) and the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DCMC[PPO]) should develop a comprehensive and integrated critical infrastructure protection (CIP) assessment and planning process, in cooperation with the naval component commanders, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and other relevant offices in the Department of Homeland Security, to increase the focus on maritime areas of strategic interest or importance. The plan would include training in the identification and risk assessment of strategic maritime infrastructure and expanded surveillance. N3/N5 should take advantage of the assessment approaches that have been screened by the Office of

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy). It should also include the deployment of foreign area officers, civil affairs officers, maritime liaison officers, and regional specialists to ensure that information on critical assets is current and accurate.18 It will also be necessary for N3/N5 to develop a deliberate strategy to strengthen and expand the maritime liaison network, leverage DOD’s commercial partners, and coordinate with the host country maritime community, embassies, the Coast Guard, and other agencies. Operationalize the “National Fleet” Concept Finding: Operationalizing the National Fleet means going beyond purchasing common equipment and cursory integration of training. It means connecting the Navy and the Coast Guard in real time for operations and programs. It means synergizing intelligence, command centers, forward engagement, boardings, small boat operations, tactics, and operations to take advantage of the core competencies and unique characteristics of the two Services. It means using the Coast Guard as an instrument to gain access where the Navy might not be able to engage initially. It means leveraging each Service’s unique relationships with the rest of the maritime community—the Navy with other nations’ naval forces, and the Coast Guard with the commercial, international, and other Coast Guard agencies. It means creating not a bright line between the two, but rather an agreed-upon overlap that will enable both to respond to the full spectrum of events, wherever they might occur. Major Recommendation 10: The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard should reinforce their commitment to the National Fleet. They should direct the Navy and the Coast Guard to train together for GWOT operations to the maximum extent prudent, especially in tactics involving the new expeditionary command and boarding schools, and patrol boat operations. Current discussions proposing a global Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should be linked in terms of a National Fleet. Each Service should provide and be an active conduit for maritime information and intelligence. An expansion and funding of the National Maritime Intelligence Center is critical, as is mutual staffing and interoperability of the two Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers. Finding: As part of the National Fleet strategy, the Navy needs to analyze both the direction of the littoral combat ship (LCS) program and the requirement for additional smaller boat assets. The current relegation of the GWOT to the status of a mission module that includes only special warfare sea-air land teams 18 These assets include, e.g., oil and gas exploration and production facilities, pipelines, cargo and bulk commodity terminals and wharves, sea approaches, anchorages, buoy and navigation systems, and telecommunications cables.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror (SEALS) and equipment is misleading. In fact, most of the planned mission modules, for example, antisurface warfare, which includes helicopters, autonomous vehicles, guns, and mine warfare, should, and do, support GWOT missions—but the GWOT does not appear to be their primary focus. In addition to the LCS, the Navy appears to be supporting the concept of the high-speed vessel and has evaluated with the Army the use of ships to address rapid deployment and sea-basing concepts. The high-speed vessel could also be a force multiplier for the GWOT by contributing to rapid deployment, MDA, and logistical resupply for a dispersed fleet. Continued experimentation and support for this program are needed. Major Recommendation 11: The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop a National Fleet strategy to address the GWOT. As part of this strategy, and recognizing fiscal realities, the Navy and the Coast Guard should determine requirements for the littoral combat ship and for high-speed, small patrol vessels. Attract, Develop, and Retain the Right People Finding: Personnel with the right skills and motivation are by far the most critical success factor for naval forces prosecuting the GWOT, but the committee did not see that GWOT-related personnel issues were being addressed in any coherent manner. Many existing career tracks will contribute, but for the specialized needs embodied in the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, a tailored plan and implementation are called for, especially since many of the specialists important to the GWOT are not ones historically valued by the Navy compared to fleet operational personnel. Major Recommendation 12: The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (N1) should take the following steps: Develop a GWOT personnel support plan that will address end-to-end recruitment/accessions, training, education, assignments, rotations, and promotion opportunities, taking into account what should be complementary staffing in other Services and agencies of both DOD and other government departments and agencies. Initiate and sustain a foreign area officer program by recruiting trained personnel from the Navy, Navy Reserve, and assigned Marine Corps personnel with the desired qualifications, and then expand the program to include enlisted personnel. Initiate and sustain a training and development program for qualifying riverine operators by sourcing training support from Marine Corps and contracted Vietnam War riverine veterans, and other sources, foreign and domestic.

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The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror Define and recruit the civil service talent needed to build an enduring knowledge base for naval forces. N1 should also expand senior officer training to prepare for decision making in the expected complex and ambiguous circumstances of many, if not most, of the anticipated GWOT scenarios. The range of scenarios is wide and far reaching; careful development of a representative set that stresses decision making under uncertainty and time constraints is required.