DISTRIBUTED REMOTE SENSING FOR NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE
ABBREVIATED VERSION
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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This study was supported by Contract No. N00014-05-G-0288, DO #1 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of the Navy. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.
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COMMITTEE ON DISTRIBUTED REMOTE SENSING FOR NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE
ARTHUR B. BAGGEROER,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Co-chair
BRIG “CHIP” ELLIOTT,
BBN Technologies,
Co-chair
JAMES G. BELLINGHAM,
Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute
E. ANN BERMAN,
Tri-Space, Incorporated
D. RICHARD BLIDBERG,
Autonomous Undersea Systems Institute
DANIEL R. BOWLER,
Lockheed Martin Corporation
DAVID L. BRADLEY,
Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University
ALBERT H. KONETZNI, JR.,
Martinez, Georgia
WILLIAM A. LaPLANTE,
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
TERRY P. LEWIS,
Raytheon Company
THOMAS V. McNAMARA,
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
L. DAVID MONTAGUE,
Menlo Park, California
DOUGLAS R. MOOK,
The Aptec Group
JOHN E. RHODES,
Balboa, California
JAMES WARD,
Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
DANA R. YOERGER,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Staff
CHARLES F. DRAPER, Director
ARUL MOZHI, Study Director
IAN M. CAMERON, Associate Program Officer (through May 21, 2007)
SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Coordinator
MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer
AYANNA N. VEST, Senior Program Assistant (through June 9, 2006)
SIDNEY G. REED, JR., Consultant
RAYMOND S. WIDMAYER, Consultant
NAVAL STUDIES BOARD
JOHN F. EGAN,
Nashua, New Hampshire,
Chair
MIRIAM E. JOHN,
Sandia National Laboratories,
Vice Chair
ANTONIO L. ELIAS,
Orbital Sciences Corporation
BRIG “CHIP” ELLIOTT,
BBN Technologies
LEE HAMMARSTROM,
Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University
KERRIE L. HOLLEY,
IBM Global Services
JOHN W. HUTCHINSON,
Harvard University
HARRY W. JENKINS, JR.,
Gainesville, Virginia
EDWARD H. KAPLAN,
Yale University
THOMAS V. McNAMARA,
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
L. DAVID MONTAGUE,
Menlo Park, California
JOHN H. MOXLEY III,
Solvang, California
GENE H. PORTER,
Nashua, New Hampshire
JOHN S. QUILTY,
Oakton, Virginia
J. PAUL REASON,
Washington, D.C.
JOHN P. STENBIT,
Oakton, Virginia
RICHARD L. WADE, Exponent
JAMES WARD,
Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
DAVID A. WHELAN,
The Boeing Company
CINDY WILLIAMS,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ELIHU ZIMET,
Gaithersburg, Maryland
Navy Liaison Representatives
RADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III,
USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (through October 13, 2005)
RDML DAN W. DAVENPORT,
USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (as of October 14, 2005)
RADM JAY M. COHEN,
USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N091 (through January 19, 2006)
RADM WILLIAM E. LANDAY III,
USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N091 (as of January 20, 2006)
Marine Corps Liaison Representative
LTGEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (through August 3, 2006)
LTGEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (as of August 4, 2006)
Staff
CHARLES F. DRAPER, Director
ARUL MOZHI, Senior Program Officer
EUGENE J. CHOI, Program Officer (through May 18, 2007)
IAN M. CAMERON, Associate Program Officer (through May 21, 2007)
SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Coordinator
MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer
AYANNA N. VEST, Senior Program Assistant (through June 9, 2006)
Preface
This study responds to the request from the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Naval Studies Board conduct an assessment of distributed remote sensing (DRS) for naval undersea warfare.1 This request occurs at a time when the overarching guidance from Naval Power 21 articulates the need for the Department of the Navy to ensure access worldwide for military operations.2 Quiet diesel electric submarines and increasingly sophisticated mines available to potential enemies are a threat to such access, especially for missions involving port ingress and egress, rapid transit through choke points, and operations in deep as well as shallow littoral waters.
The Department of the Navy has reorganized to give undersea warfare (USW) greater prominence and has conducted several experiments to explore the potential of new DRS approaches to improve its capability to counter the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) threat.3 The CNO Guidance for 2006 includes the objective of ensuring the ability to detect and hold at risk adversary submarines and of shortening the detection-to-engagement time line in both deep and shallow waters. The CNO has been encouraging the rapid prototyping of enabling
technologies to accomplish that goal, and CNO Guidance for 2006 emphasizes the key role of improved sensors in meeting that objective.4
For the mine threat, which may require avoidance, rapid detection, and clearance of large numbers of mines, the use of DRS systems for persistent surveillance and cooperative, multiple, mobile sensors is needed to define areas of safe maneuver and safe passage rapidly, as described in the FY07 U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Plan.5
The Naval Transformation Roadmap, which guides these efforts, states that transformational efforts in ASW are “focused on and planned for developing new operational concepts that leverage advanced technologies to improve broad-area surveillance, detection, localization, tracking, and attack capabilities against quiet adversary submarines,”6 and that tranformational countermine warfare efforts will “employ sophisticated, networked unmanned surface, air, and underwater vehicles equipped with advanced technology systems … to quickly avoid or enter and safely clear dangerous mined areas.”7
Previous reports of the Naval Studies Board, such as Mine Countermeasures Technology (U); Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035, Volume 7: Undersea Warfare; and Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces,8 have recommended that high priority be accorded the development of networked, distributed sensor fields, including unmanned platforms for submarine detection and mine countermeasures (MCM), or, more appropriately, countermine warfare.9
The essential features of a DRS system for USW include the following: a sensor field involving a number of fixed and/or moving nodes to conduct sur-
veillance, detection, and localization of submarines or mines; communications links to transmit data from the sensor subsystem to a processing facility or unit; and a communications center to receive results from the processing facility or unit, to combine them with other intelligence for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and in a time of hostilities to cue available attack assets to locations where targets can be found more precisely and attacked or neutralized. On the battlefield, all of these systems must carry out their functions for DRS to be effective. DRS systems can be deployed before or during hostilities and can be fixed, drifting, or propelled. There are now several examples of sensor nodes, but not systems, that have the attributes listed above.
No single type of sensor alone is adequate to the task, although under the surface of the water acoustic sensors dominate the tactical sensors. Acoustic sensors are divided into passive and active categories. All other sensors are included in the category nonacoustic sensors. Multiple independent detections of a target are very effective at providing a high probability of detection at a low false-alarm rate. For that reason and because various sensors have complementary capabilities, multisensor fields can offer advantages in demanding situations, although their use may limit detection ranges, since some sensors excel at greater detection ranges but with less precision. The use of more sensors can help only if each is treated within its performance envelope.
Historically, the Navy has operated a number of distributed remote sensing systems for ASW. Air-dropped sonobuoys have become increasingly sophisticated since their first use in World War II. At first passive, sonobuoy systems can now involve active sources. During the Cold War, the Navy operated the long-range Sound Surveillance System—a passive DRS system.10 Passive acoustic sensor arrays are towed by Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships and submarines, with increased capability for signal processing and networking, specifically in deeper water.
When the Soviets quieted their submarines in the 1980s, the response of the U.S. Navy was to develop short-range passive, acoustic arrays for deployment on the ocean bottom in critical operational areas. The Fixed Distributed System (FDS) connects a number of distributed sensor clusters by cable with one another and to a signal-processing and communications center on land. The FDS’s location is necessarily limited to areas and times in which it is safe to deploy. The follow-on Advanced Deployable System (ADS) has similar technology, is designed to be deployable by ship or submarine in deep or shallow water, and connects (by cable) to a processing and communications buoy on the surface. DRS systems can include nonacoustic sensors able to detect submarine-associated emissions or phenomena.
The question addressed in the present study is this: Can the U.S. Navy use its
advanced distributed remote sensing technology effectively to counter the threats it faces in carrying out its mission? At issue are the technical feasibility, concept of operations, networked-systems definition, processing requirements, cost, and effectiveness measures for DRS in support of specific undersea warfare missions. While all of these are very challenging technically, the deliberations of the NRC’s Committee on Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare led to a positive answer; nevertheless, significant research and development (R&D) as well as training need to be carried out for advanced DRS technology to be used routinely by fleet operators.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
At the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations,11 the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council conducted an assessment of distributed remote sensing for naval undersea warfare. Specifically, the study assessed the following topic areas:
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Undersea (antisubmarine and countermine) warfare missions in future operating areas, including for port access and egress, transit through choke points, and in shallow/sloping harsh acoustic littoral environments.
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Range of current approaches of DRS, and their utility in possible concepts of operation for accomplishing specific undersea warfare missions.
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Status and anticipated improvements in underwater sensors and communications for DRS and related platforms for specific undersea warfare missions.
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DRS requirements (sensor numbers, concept of employment, characteristics, target signature exploitation, aperture, connectivity, processing, longevity, latency of reporting, false alarm control measures, covertness/counterdetection, survivability, and reliability) to provide capabilities needed for specific undersea warfare missions.
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Technology for fusion capabilities of information from the underwater and above water sensors, and relationship to network-centric operations (FORCEnet, Global Information Grid).
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Underwater sensors and balance of vehicles to fixed nodes, including technology limitations affecting use of multiple unmanned undersea vehicles.
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Critical technologies, performance measures, and scaling relationships associated with DRS networks for specific undersea warfare missions.
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Expectations for improvements in applicable network technology and wireless connectivity, including information to engaged systems and decision making.
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Other operational factors such as ability for covert and rapid deployment, environmental sensitivity (including biological effects for active sonar systems), system, network and information security, training, and end-to-end logistics.
THE COMMITTEE’S APPROACH
This report aims to provide a clear, near-term path by which useful distributed remote sensing systems can be applied rapidly to pressing naval undersea warfare problems and by which ongoing science and technology efforts can be channeled toward the most useful ends.
The approach of the committee was to create a tentative priority ranking of DRS applications by listing the key missions and matching these missions to the art of the possible. What is possible is a balance of what exists, what has been tried, and what can be operationally deployed in the near term taking into account constraints such as cost, technology maturity, and rules of engagement. The committee’s hypotheses were then tested with strawman concepts and scenarios.
In its approach, the committee considered that DRS systems can be of great near-term use for naval missions, particularly those outlined below:
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Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in hostile littorals;
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Barriers for detection and cueing;
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Support for sea base protection; and
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Scouting and surveillance of high-risk transit routes.
During its assessment of DRS systems for naval undersea warfare, the committee focused on the ASW problem because that threat is growing rapidly and is new as far as the quiet, diesel electric submarines are concerned. Since two prior studies have addressed the countermine warfare topic,12 the committee did not devote extensive attention to this issue. Instead, it concentrated on (1) reviewing the status of the Navy MCM program and comparing it with the recommendations in the two previous studies, and (2) considering briefly how the resulting planned organic MCM systems could be harnessed to compose DRS systems.
The committee (biographies of its members are provided in Appendix A) first convened in June 2005 and held additional meetings over a period of 7 months, both to gather input from the relevant communities and to discuss the committee’s findings and recommendations.13 Summary agendas for these meetings are provided in Appendix B.
The months between the committee’s last meeting and the publication of the report were spent preparing the draft manuscript, gathering additional information, reviewing and responding to the external review comments, editing the report, and conducting the required security/public release review necessary to produce this version of the report that does not disclose information as described
Acknowledgment of Reviewers
National Research Council (NRC) reports are reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published reports as sound as possible and to ensure that the reports meet institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscripts remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. Although the reviewers provide many constructive comments and suggestions, they are not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations nor do they see the final draft of reports before release. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of the draft report:
Curtis G. Callan, Jr., Joseph Henry Laboratories, Princeton University,
Nicholas P. Chotiros, Applied Research Laboratory, University of Texas at Austin,
Henry Cox, Lockheed Martin Corporation,
Douglas J. Katz, VADM, USN (retired), Annapolis, Maryland,
John G. Schuster, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University,
Robert C. Spindel, University of Washington,
Lawrence D. Stone, Metron, Inc., and
William A. Whitlow, MajGen, USMC (retired), Titan Corporation.
The review of the draft report was overseen by Robert J. Hermann, Global Technology Partners, LLC. Appointed by the NRC, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of the draft report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of NRC reports rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.