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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare Executive Summary INTRODUCTION Since the early 20th century, the United States has been a nation with global responsibility for maritime commerce and power projection. Today the United States is recognized as the sole superpower, with its global reach often dependent on the capability of the U.S. Navy to put ships with bulk capacity offshore of virtually any country. This global reach is threatened, however, by the widespread acquisition of quiet, diesel electric submarines and inexpensive mines that can be very effective weapons in an adversary’s littoral waters, whether shallow or deep. The question then becomes: Can the United States, by implementing distributed remote sensing (DRS) technology, counter this asymmetric threat? This study, which was requested by the former Chief of Naval Operations, addresses the state of the art of and the challenges for DRS and related technologies, assesses current shortfalls, and makes recommendations toward rapidly implementing DRS systems to counter the growing submarine threat as well as problems of countermine warfare.1 Most concepts for DRS are not mature, and there are many challenges in integrating them for use as a military system; neverthe- 1 The essential features of a DRS system for undersea warfare include the following: a sensor field involving a number of fixed and/or moving nodes to conduct surveillance, detection, and localization of submarines or mines; communications links to transmit data from the sensor subsystem to a processing facility or unit; and a communications center to receive results from the processing facility or unit, to combine them with other intelligence for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and, in a time of hostilities, to cue available attack assets to locations where targets can be found more precisely and attacked or neutralized. On the battlefield, all of these systems must carry out their functions for DRS to be effective. Before hostilities, DRS can provide ISR for analysis and archiving.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare less, the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Committee on Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare believes that, as described in this report, there are some selective short-term and many long-term opportunities to develop useful naval systems. The committee emphasizes that much remains to be done—especially for those systems involving significant automation and networking. CHALLENGES OF DISTRIBUTED REMOTE SENSING FOR ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE One of the first observations that became evident to the committee was that DRS has almost as many different interpretations as government program offices supporting efforts in the area. This lack of consensus makes it very difficult to focus on definitive goals. The list below suggests the most important operational components needed to parse a DRS system for the prosecution of antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Cueing. Cueing is the process of achieving sufficiently accurate localization on a target that a commander can successfully carry out a follow-up prosecution of the target. Typically, prosecution, once cued, involves the redetection and refinement of localization. A subtle distinction needs to be made with respect to types of cueing operations: Wide-area search, typically rated in terms of a “sweep rate,” can be used dynamically; in contrast, area coverage such as that provided by the Fixed Distributed System (FDS) or the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) is used over a (relatively) fixed region. The committee did not come across a DRS concept that could change the current methods of cueing and lead to a more speedy and effective prosecution of targets, short of a complete blanket deployment of a large number of fixed arrays. Detection. At face value, the concept of detection by means of a distributed system has many advantages. The diversity of opportunity for detection by widely spaced acoustic sensors seems attractive. Consequently one can ask: How can the observations made from many distributed sensors, each with small gain, be related to that from one large sensor with high-array gains?2 Work has been done recently by Task Force Antisubmarine Warfare on detections by many closely spaced, small, short-range acoustic and combined acoustic and nonacoustic sensors (e.g., Deployable Autonomous Detection System), but these approaches to date have not been successful when placed in realistic environments. Certainly one of the goals of a DRS program should be to gain an understanding of distributed detection by passive and active, acoustic and nonacoustic sensors, both theoretically and practically. 2 Passive detection is fundamentally limited by signature level, noise level, and achievable array and processing gains.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare Classification and automation. Classification remains the most difficult aspect of passive acoustic ASW, especially in a very noisy and cluttered region such as the western Pacific. Classification is now best done passively by highly skilled acoustic-intelligence (ACINT) operators who have nearly 10 years of training before being ranked in this specialty. A computer algorithm has not yet been found that can mimic a skilled ACINT operator, although more-routine classifications can be off-loaded to computer algorithms. The distributed system should help by providing multiple perspectives and reinforcing features, but many of the key issues of distributed classification and the tactics to exploit such a system remain unresolved and, in some cases, unexplored. Communications. Without communications, no sensor system can operate as a distributed system. Radio frequency (RF), cables, and acoustic communications (ACOMMS) are possible means. One direct undersea approach would use ACOMMS. While such systems are available commercially and can reasonably cover a 35-mile range, they are hardly covert. Minimizing the probability of interception by pointing beams and spread-spectrum coding is possible, but energy detection is still quite likely. Larger-power and lower carrier frequencies can go beyond the 35-mile range, but, again, these frequencies aggravate the covertness problem. With ACOMMS there is also the problem of spectral management, because the available bandwidth is so limited. Routing through a network to ensure reliable coupling among the nodes is also possible. The same issues apply to RF communications, and cables need to be deployed. Distributed network control. In using mobile unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) or gliders, there may be the possibility of closing the range to the target, if there is a forward interception point, to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and exploit lower-level features for classification. Without a low probability of false alarm, however, the UUV or glider would as likely move away from the target as toward it. This implies the need for some form of metric for optimizing the sensor configuration, with significant uncertainties about individual performance measures. Again, good theoretical and practical support is not available at present, and fundamental research is needed. Sensor distribution design versus speed mismatch. Current UUVs run at 3 to 5 knots and can sprint briefly at higher speeds. This low speed is consistent with that of a high-end diesel electric submarine at patrol speed, but the latter requires very little additional speed to exceed that of any component of the network of UUVs. This speed mismatch leads to an issue of how to design clusters of distributed systems in such a way that a patrolling enemy submarine will enter a local network and then be detected and tracked with high probability. The same issue applies to the placement of fixed arrays. Previous work on the optimality of sonobuoy patterns is relevant, but, again, work is needed on better designs for distributed networks. Rules of engagement. How is it determined when to deploy a distributed system during prehostilities in a potential battlespace? Naturally this involves
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare the complexity and cost of the system. Some operations—such as activating a barrier—could be considered hostile. How much tactical advantage is an adversary allowed to accrue before U.S. forces fire the first shot to prevent U.S. ships and sailors from being at unacceptable risk? Guidelines need to be developed for employing these systems, which in the aggregate will be expensive, but they certainly should be used if U.S. ships and sailors will be at risk. Logistics and deployment. Operating the field of sensors for a DRS system as well as deploying them, or putting them in place, requires considerable logistical support. For a fleet of UUVs for DRS, a large component of a ship, or perhaps several modules of a littoral combat ship (LCS), would be required to ferry, deploy, and reseed UUVs as needed, in addition to whatever role the ship might play as a gateway back to command authority. The UUV-ferrying operation would consume substantial volume, whether on deck or below; deployments must be simple and safe in high sea states; reseeding calls for spares and a crew to maintain the UUVs or arrays. None of these requirements is trivial. Concept of operations (CONOPS). One can postulate cueing a deployment in semi-real time or establish a more permanent deployment in a region of opportunity, but the most pressing issue for a DRS system is to develop a viable CONOPS. The challenge is for a DRS network to provide the area coverage, localization, and tracking capabilities that are militarily useful. Assuming that the classification can be resolved and the target put into localization and track, the network must reconfigure to maintain track and trail for as long as possible before passing the target vector onto the next DRS complex. The capabilities are hardly all in hand. Thus, the science and technology (S&T) and the research and development (R&D) needed to enable a DRS concept are extensive. Providing them will require significant funding and a focused effort by the Navy. CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS The committee’s key conclusions are as follows: Today’s distributed remote sensing technology is already adequate for tackling some very specific urgent naval operational needs. The Navy’s approach to employing DRS systems will need to focus on defining and concentrating on one or two pressing problems—not the entire design space. Candidate DRS solutions need to address the entire end-to-end (detection-to-prosecution) system and CONOPS for a given operational task, with appropriate system analysis, architecture, and external interfaces. The Navy needs to focus on the art of the possible and get systems into the field and then improve them—that is, try to fill some technology gaps as testing proceeds.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare Interoperability and open architectures3 will be key to affordability and the quick fielding of new capabilities. The committee’s findings and recommendations are presented below. Finding 1: DRS can provide significant, near-term capabilities for some specific needs such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (including the acquisition of acoustic and environmental data) and for sensor barriers. While DRS is deemed critical to Navy operations in important regions as a force multiplier, cost saver, and means of keeping sailors out of harm’s way, there is no dedicated program-level office responsible for the development and implementation of DRS. The committee notes that DRS systems can be a force multiplier, but it emphasizes very strongly that most of the potential has not been realized, except for the current ASW capability of air-dropped systems such as sonobuoys, including directional command-activated sonobuoy systems and air-deployable active receiver extensions (e.g., the Extended Echo Ranging [EER] family of systems). The committee’s assessment is that the technological capabilities of remote systems have steadily improved—largely driven by micro- and nanoelectronics. Fixed arrays can have more sensors; also, greater in situ processing and memory as well as coupled cables with high-bandwidth fiber optics are available now compared with 5 years ago. UUVs, both propelled and gliders, now have longer mission durations and larger payloads. Clandestine data acquisition is an easier task for DRS than use as a barrier for detection, classification, localization, and tracking (DCLT) and requires minimum distributed-network control. Adaptive sampling algorithms could also be of use. Fixed or portable barriers are more complicated because of the current state of the art in target classification, especially if the barriers are near frequently traversed routes, but one could consider them simply as a distributed collection asset that provides an alert by some means. Depending on the needs and CONOPS, some selected missions in local areas could be accomplished in the short term. Nevertheless, the committee notes the very apparent weakness or even lack of CONOPS for DRS systems, the lack of methodical analyses or systems engineering, the absence of operational and technical architectures, and the general lack of definition of how DRS might be used in practice—that is, how DRS usage maps into the various phases of conflict, logistics, and rules of engagement. In summary, the integration of the technological capabilities and experiments with the very pressing operational needs for which DRS seems to be well suited has been difficult. Like many similar complex warfighting problems, the issue is not 3 Open architectures involve the use of widely accepted and available specifications, standards, products, and design practices to produce systems that are interoperable, easy to modify, and extensible. The committee notes that “open” does not imply being unclassified.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare “operational pull” or “technology push” but the need for the establishment of an iterative dialogue between the two. Therefore, the goal ought to be to bring the technological and the operational communities together to develop CONOPS based on disciplined analysis and experiment. A well-defined vision supported by a program office should help this process significantly. This problem urgently needs the attention of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN[RDA]). The ASN(RDA) needs to assess the management of myriad DRS-related activities in research, development, experimentation, and testing to determine if a new program office is warranted or if a reorganization within an existing program executive office would provide the leadership, cohesiveness, and management to focus on providing near-term DRS capabilities to counter important threats. The near-term DRS capabilities should then be embodied in a prototype DRS system that would be tested, experimented with, and developed and assessed in a spiral and persistent manner with a strong linkage to S&T. Further, spiral development should be organized for a long-term commitment following the example of the Advanced Processor Build/Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) Insertion (APB/ARCI) program. Recommendation 1: In order to bring to fruition distributed remote sensing systems for significant, near-term capabilities, the committee recommends the following: The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) should ensure that all undersea DRS requirements and resources become resident within a single directorate in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, so as to maximize synergy in funding resources, R&D, and systems integration for the achievement of near-term results. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), and the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) should determine the requirements for and the CONOPS and concepts of employment of the several passive and active acoustic and other DRS systems for antisubmarine warfare within the following two areas for near-term promise and deployment: (1) peacetime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (2) fixed and/or portable barriers during hostilities. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition should establish an office chartered to implement these two capabilities. The Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO[IWS]) appears to be a logical location for this office. The PEO(IWS) (or the new office) should ensure that the CONOPS is developed under realistic conditions for both peacetime and hostilities. It should guide program management efforts and schedules and perform disciplined and detailed systems analysis—that is, war games with expected system performance (with less than ideal detection, classification, localization, and tracking as well
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare as without pre-staged force levels before the initiation of combat) and realistic rules of engagement from the national command. The goal should be to define and concentrate on the two pressing problems (as suggested above), not the whole design space. The efforts of the PEO(IWS) (or the new office) should lead to a spiral-development cycle modeled on the APB/ARCI program. Attributes of this model are as follows: Basic implementation hardware with more frequent software builds and complex hardware components dropped in during each spiral; A data-driven, robust peer review process to vet and test proposed improvements and algorithms on the basis of available field data; A disciplined and consistently resourced activity, strongly coupled to the science and technology program of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), to serve as input to future DRS systems that focus on key S&T enablers (see Recommendation 4); and Open architectures and well-defined interoperability standards. The PEO(IWS) should consider the capabilities of the Mission Reconfigurable UUV System (MRUUVS), or its equivalent, to be a suitable starting point for each of the peacetime and barrier DRS systems. Final equipment selection should be based on careful systems analysis. For the long term, the goal is a suite of both fixed and mobile assets with appropriate in-node DCLT capability, covertness, bandwidths, persistence, and communications consistent with their location, for example, with or without defense, according to the CONOPS established as recommended above. Finding 2: The Navy’s capability for broad-area search of sufficient accuracy forcueing for antisubmarine warfare has been badly eroded with respect to diesel electric submarines, and especially the newer high-end types. With the exception of the Fixed Distributed System, the committee found no existing capability for broad-area search and cueing. There is an urgent need for such systems in selected deep- and shallow-water regions. The problem is extremely difficult, but the committee believes that the best (available) answer is similar to the objectives that have been stated for the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), with both passive and command-active capability and with long duration and fixed distribution.4 The committee believes that long-duration, fixed distributed assets are key to achieving and maintaining battlespace control over broad areas. Situational awareness comes with a long-term investment in acquiring knowledge of a region, 4 The committee does not challenge the objectives of the ADS, but rather the CONOPS for deployment, its ocean engineering, and the use of an LCS for a gateway.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare including its oceanographic, shipping, and fishing environments. In addition, the committee believes that for specific regions rather than broad areas, a rapidly deployable, combined active and passive system for ASW area search in both shallow and deep water is essential for countering important threats, such as the modern diesel electric submarine. Moreover, such a system is technically and operationally feasible.5 The kinematics and physics of the problem strongly suggest that the only practical way to achieve this capability is with a deployable, multinode passive-plus-command-active system. The Navy’s current path, however, will not provide such capabilities in the foreseeable future. The committee’s concerns with the implementation of the shallow-water ADS program were significant and are addressed in Finding 3, below. The other various distributed system efforts for both deep and shallow water now being prototyped and demonstrated in the Navy S&T program or Task Force Antisubmarine Warfare have shown some promising aspects; however, there is a significant lack of awareness and symbiotic efforts among these programs. Alternatively stated, the Navy’s focus is not cohesive. These programs now lack clear transition paths and have had very limited supporting analysis and system design work for their use as an ASW system. Recommendation 2: The ASN(RDA) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) should commission a design study that will perform a robust analysis of the systems concepts as well as the CONOPS consistent with Recommendation 1, including both acoustic and nonacoustic sensing, for an engineering effort to develop a combined active and passive, rapidly deployable distributed remote system for antisubmarine warfare. Such a system should effectively replicate the expected passive performance of the Advanced Deployable System, but it should be augmented with an active capability. Attributes of such a design study should include the following: Well-staffed, high-profile, and quick turnaround of 6-12 months duration; Comprehensive and quantitative prediction and optimization of the design trade space for important regions of interest, including desired probability of detection/probability of false alarm, area coverage, persistence, and costs; The identification of S&T key enablers and technical barriers; The development of a common architecture in accordance with the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF)—for example, operational and systems architectures as part of a future deliverable; and Conceptual designs with modeled performance. 5 A DRS system for littoral and shallow water will likely be different from a DRS system for deep water in several ways.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare The DASN(IWS) should support the PEO(IWS) to execute this passive and active distributed remote system modeled on the APB/ARCI program referred to in Recommendation 1. Note that this does not imply that there needs to be a single system, but rather a suite of systems that covers the Navy’s needs in areas of interest. The goal should be to focus initially on the art of the possible and then to make improvements. Finding 3: The Advanced Deployable System program was intended to provide the rapidly deployable regional search capability discussed in Finding 2. The committee is concerned about the current implementation, CONOPS, and execution of the ADS program.6 The ADS program was begun in the early 1990s. The underlying concept of ADS has been shown to work against high-end threats. However, the system has undergone no less than three major design changes—some because of technological advances and some because of decisions to change the delivery platform from submarine to ship. An original requirement for air delivery was abandoned for funding reasons. These multiple redirections of the ADS program have affected the development of the CONOPS and concept of employment and, of course, the budget and schedule. The history of requirements changes and creep, delivery-platform changes, oversight management changes, and inconsistent funding levels, and the lack of consensus and coordination among the requirements, acquisition, and operational communities—involving both delivery-platform and program developers—have tainted a concept and program so valuable and needed. Recommendation 3: The ASN(RDA) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) should conduct a zero baseline review of the Advanced Deployable System program and requirements for a deployable system suitable for specific regions. This review should include at least the following: An assessment, led by the Director of Naval Intelligence, of the counter-detection of such a system from the adversary’s perspective; An N8 assessment of re-establishing the submarine—for example, a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) or a nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarine (SSGN)—as the delivery platform; An assessment by PEO(IWS) of the feasibility of delivery by a “heavy lift” unmanned undersea vehicle such as the large-diameter UUV Seahorse or by other heavy-lift air assets including those of the U.S. Air Force; 6 As of this writing, the Navy plans major changes to the ADS program.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare An assessment by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ships) (DASN [Ships]) and the Director, Surface Warfare (N86), of the two designs of the Littoral Combat Ship to deploy and operate the system mission module with attention to sea-state capability vis-à-vis safety, counterdetection of both the module and attending LCS in unprotected areas, system reliability of undersea arrays, manning requirements, logistics, and storage. If the capability provided by a deployable system such as the ADS is considered essential as an ASW mission package module, the size, manning requirements, organic shipboard data link and processing requirements, launching, handling, logistics, and stowage requirements and systems need to be reviewed, revalidated, and, if necessary, rebaselined. An assessment of other surface ships as delivery platforms should be included; and An assessment by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6) and the Naval Network Warfare Command of the command, control, and communications aspects (specifically satellite communications) of the ADS. Finding 4: DRS S&T efforts will bring incremental, and perhaps new, capabilities over the next 5 to 10 years or more. This is an area of much technical ferment in both the naval and scientific communities. Significant obstacles do remain concerning both the theory and the implementation of DRS systems. Additionally, there is no clear transition path from potentially useful S&T experiments into fielded naval warfare capability. Certain technologies critical to future, broadly based DRS systems are not yet mature enough for routine operational use. Those with the highest potential payoff are automated DCLT algorithms for operator support for both fixed and mobile sensor fields, acoustic communications and undersea networks, autonomous operations and distributed autonomy for UUVs so that they can both close on a target and set up projected DCLT based on target course and speed, energy sources and their efficient use for both propulsion and electronics, and improved and possibly alternative sensors. The committee also notes that technologies useful to DRS capabilities come from a large and diverse set of disciplines and vendors. While many are motivated by a range of naval needs, much of the expertise is not so specific; consequently, the technology base is fragmented. For a successful DRS S&T effort, there needs to be a continual awareness of relevant technologies. Therefore, the Department of the Navy needs to foster the growth of a DRS community that does the following: brings together outstanding technologists from relevant disciplines from both within and outside the department, including academia and industry; educates non-naval experts on naval needs; and encourages approaches to solving naval problems.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare Recommendation 4: To ensure that DRS system capabilities continuously evolve and transition from potentially useful S&T experiments into fielded naval warfare capability, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) and the Chief of Naval Research (CNR) should: Maintain and, if possible, increase 6.1 and 6.2 funding for DRS-related efforts; and Align relevant 6.2 and 6.3 funding to provide for technology insertion into the DRS program office advocated in Recommendation 1. This DRS program office should establish very close links between the S&T technologists and the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems to provide both technology push and operational pull, and together with the CNR, it should coordinate efforts at the fundamental and applied level for the desired evolution of DRS systems. Finding 5: Open architectures and an approach to interface standards that accommodates changes will significantly reduce the time and costs required for fielding DRS systems. Instead of fixing the problems retroactively, some forethought on these issues leads to cost savings as well as increased reliability. The following systems need to be made open and interoperable: planning, monitoring, control, sensor, communications, undersea situational awareness, network, and data representation. In addition, provision for operations with multiple levels of classification for system capabilities and data security are to be anticipated. Virtually every large-scale-systems engineer has encountered the problems associated with closed software, incompatible operating systems, and data protocols. It is a bona fide and costly situation that leads to delays and degraded reliability and can be avoided by forward thinking. Inevitably there will be resistance from those who already have some stake in existing DRS systems, since these systems have been developed independently. Nevertheless, one of the tasks of the DRS program office advocated in Recommendation 1 should be the promulgation of open architectures and interoperability standards so that all will know that eventually these architectures and standards will be adopted to be part of the Department of the Navy’s efforts. Open and interoperable systems also pave the way toward more rapid fusion of underwater and above-water information: for example, surveillance and identification of ship tracks to eliminate potential submarine DCLT for a DRS system by aircraft or satellites, clarification of the common battlefield environment status, and the routing of important environmental data are all well-known attributes.
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare Recommendation 5: Since open architectures and interface standards are an important topic that becomes more difficult as different systems evolve, the ASN(RDA) should: Direct the CNR and the PEO(IWS) (or the new office) to Establish standards for open architectures and interoperability for the planning of emerging DRS systems; and Ensure that the S&T and R&D communities associated with networks, communications, command, and control start with simple systems and capabilities and develop them spirally rather than creating them under a large-system framework. Direct the PEO(IWS) (or the new office) to Mandate open architectures for all DRS systems, including command and control; Adopt Joint Unmanned Systems Common Control (JUSC2) as the framework for the monitoring and control of DRS systems; and Adopt interoperable standards for acoustic communications and networking. Finding 6: Efforts toward developing DRS systems for countermine warfare are important and, at the present time, are adequately implemented within the constraints of available technology and funding. Much remains to be done, however, to capture the Department of the Navy’s future vision of countermine warfare. As articulated by the Department of the Navy7 and in the FY07 U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Plan8 by the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, the future vision of countermine warfare involves coordinated, cooperative activity by distributed, networked, and cooperative sensors and platforms to increase the speed and effectiveness of mine countermeasures. Previous reports of the Naval Studies Board9 have suggested the use of DRS systems to detect and track mining operations in shallow-water areas eligible for amphibious landings. Existing programs for mine countermeasures (MCM) organic capabilities 7 VADM Michael Bucchi, USN; and VADM Michael Mullen, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part II: Sea Shield: Projecting Global Defensive Assurance,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 58. 8 Department of the Navy. 2006. FY07 U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Plan: Vision, Roadmap, and Program, Washington, D.C., February. 9 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2001, Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges to Naval Forces, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 1997, Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force, Volume 7: Undersea Warfare, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 1994, Mine Countermeasures Technology, Volume II: Task Force Report (U), National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. (classified).
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Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare involving unmanned surface vehicles and UUVs can be harnessed to provide components and near-term DRS systems to speed up MCM operations. Also, ADS-type systems deployed for ASW in deeper-water areas may be able to detect and track submarine mining operations. Recommendation 6: In its efforts to bring to fruition DRS systems for significant, near-term capabilities (see Recommendation 1), the Department of the Navy should examine the potential application of ASW DRS systems for countermine missions. Specifically, The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8) should accelerate support toward achieving an organic MCM capability, and experiments and simulations should be performed to see how organic MCM components integrated into DRS configurations could speed up MCM operations; and The Program Executive Office for Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO[LMW]) should review the 2001 Naval Studies Board report entitled Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces and the 2002 U.S. Fleet Forces Command report entitled Mine Warfare—The Way Ahead: Long Range Planning and Concepts to assess the implementation of the recommendations in these reports.
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Representative terms from entire chapter: