Appendixes



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Protecting Building Occupants and Operations from Biological and Chemical Airborne Threats: A Framework for Decision Making Appendixes

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Protecting Building Occupants and Operations from Biological and Chemical Airborne Threats: A Framework for Decision Making A Statement of Task At the request of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the National Academies shall conduct a study to assist in DTRA’s capacity to plan, design, construct, and operate future chemical and biological resistant facilities for the Department of Defense (DOD). The study shall give consideration to prior studies from at least the last five years; current operational uses of related systems; and current science and technology development efforts intended to improve upon existing building protection systems. It shall consider work from both defense and civilian sources. At a minimum the Academy shall address the following questions: What metrics of performance are relevant to evaluate existing studies and to use existing facilities as effective test beds for validating tools, testing systems, and facilitating system technology transfer? Where a metric is not relevant to all situations, identify and discuss its appropriate application. Discuss situational use of a combination of all relevant metrics where appropriate. What terms and definitions are required—for example, Tier 1 detector, trigger, high impact response, confirmatory test, etc.—to allow communication and comparison between programs? Consider the current protocols and setup of existing systems in use, including both DOD and non-DOD efforts. What are the general features of existing test bed facilities? Are there significant features in common? Do existing facilities differ in significant ways, and how can these differences be exploited to forward our understanding of building protection?

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Protecting Building Occupants and Operations from Biological and Chemical Airborne Threats: A Framework for Decision Making What collective principles can be derived from current building protection efforts? How can information gained from a test-bed facility be extrapolated to operational buildings with completely different designs? What is the cost-benefit of internal building monitoring? Suggest a tiered approach with varying levels of detection and protection capability, comparing the relative cost-benefit between tiers. Perform this assessment for both new building construction and building retrofit, and correlate to an appropriate metric (lives saved/fraction building exposed). Compare and discuss the relative risks of the possible tiers in a tiered approach to chemical and biological protection efforts, from a baseline of no protection efforts up to and including a fully protected building. Consider risks associated with building retrofitting, extrapolating test data to buildings differing from test bed buildings, possible system degradation over time, etc.