. "Appendix B Previous Reports Regarding Science and Security." Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.
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Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities
APPENDIX B Previous Reports Regarding Science and Security
ReportingAgency
Report
RelatedFindings/Recommendations
ReleaseDate
National Academies: Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy
ScientificCommunicationand NationalSecurity; also known as the “Corson Report”
Contributed to the federal policy stated in National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information. NSDD-189 was reaffirmed in 2001 by Dr. Condoleeza Rice.
1982
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
Road Map forNationalSecurity:Imperative forChange; also known as the “Hart-Rudman Report” In the PublicInterest: Reportof the Ad HocFacultyCommittee onAccess to andDisclosure ofScientificInformationDual-UseBiologicalEquipment:Difficulties inDomesticRegulationBiotechnologyand Bioterrorism:AnUnprecedentedWorld
Recommended the creation of Department of Homeland Security, doubling of federal investment in research and development and in increased focus on science education.
2001
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Recommended that no classified research be performed on MIT’s main campus.
2002
Congressional Research Service
Outlined options for regulating dual-use biological equipment, Underscores the difficulties and likely limited impact of such regulations.
2003
Stanford University: Center for International Security and
Recommends the United States limit classified biodefense work and perform such work with transparency to dissuade an increase in global biodefense
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Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities
APPENDIX B
Previous Reports Regarding Science and Security
Reporting Agency
Report
Related Findings/Recommendations
Release Date
National Academies: Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy
Scientific Communication and National Security; also known as the “Corson Report”
Contributed to the federal policy stated in National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information. NSDD-189 was reaffirmed in 2001 by Dr. Condoleeza Rice.
1982
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change; also known as the “Hart-Rudman Report” In the Public Interest: Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information Dual-Use Biological Equipment: Difficulties in Domestic Regulation Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World
Recommended the creation of Department of Homeland Security, doubling of federal investment in research and development and in increased focus on science education.
2001
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Recommended that no classified research be performed on MIT’s main campus.
2002
Congressional Research Service
Outlined options for regulating dual-use biological equipment, Underscores the difficulties and likely limited impact of such regulations.
2003
Stanford University: Center for International Security and
Recommends the United States limit classified biodefense work and perform such work with transparency to dissuade an increase in global biodefense
2004
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Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities
Cooperation
research.
This report led to the creation in 2004 of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which was established under DHHS to advise all federal departments and agencies that conduct or support life sciences research that could potentially be dual use.
National Academies: Development, Security and Cooperation
Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism; also known as the “Fink Report”
2004
Government Accountability Office
Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, But Further Refinements Needed
This report was commissioned because of the delay found in processing visa applications of foreign students and scholars; when released the report found that the delay had been significantly reduced.
2005
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Global Evolution of Dual-Use Biotechnology
Outlined differences between previous warfare equipment regulation with dual-use biological equipment and the difficulty in regulating equipment for dual-use research.
2005
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Security Controls on Scientific Information and the Conduct of Scientific Research Policy Implications of International Graduate Students and Postdoctoral Scholars in the United States Rising Above the Gathering Storm;
Asserted that an open scientific environment is needed for the greatest security of the United States.
2005
National Academies: Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy
Recommended reshaping federal policies that govern the movement and activities of international scientists and engineers, particularly with respect to visa and immigration policy.
2005
National Academies:
America’s economic leadership is being challenged by globalization;
2005
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Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy
also known as the “Gathering Storm”
recommended increasing and strengthening math and science education, as well as science and technology research and development.
Recommended that OSTP initiate dialogue between federal and state governments and research universities on the balance between protecting information vital to national security and the free and open way in which university research is accomplished.
Asserted that the competitiveness of American science and technology enterprises depends on foreign nationals and international collaborations.
Report asserts that the best way to handle future malevolent uses of biotechnology is to have open access to scientific information, broad definitions about potential threats, and increased scientific expertise in the security community.
National Research Council
Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism
2002
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Security Controls on the Access of Foreign Scientists and Engineers to the United States
2005
National Academies: Board on Global Health
Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences
2006
