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Appendix B
Exemplary Scenarios and Vignettes to
Illustrate Potential Model Uses
T
o support the analysis effort and focus subsequent discussions of
potential model utility, we present here a detailed scenario describ-
ing key operational aspects of a real-life scenario containing many of
the Quadrennial Defense Review (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006) and
Joint Urban Operations (JUO) considerations posed earlier. Researchers
and model developers might believe that there are any number of scenarios
available on which one might build one’s analyses, but this is not the case.
It is very difficult to find one that embraces all of the likely future combat
conditions, since official publications state that realistic scenarios must
include
• modernized industrial age forces with high-tech systems and more
primitive paramilitary and insurgent forces;
• complex terrain and urban environments;
• failed states (the norm) with the internal society fractured and
crime rampant;
• international interest/involvement in the region with nongovernmen-
tal organizations or information operations (IOs) engaged;
• national will at issue;
• use of IOs including media-mediated psychological operations
(PSYOPS) and computer network operations;
• soft influences ongoing in parallel, including diplomatic, infrastruc-
ture, military, and economic activities;
• time criticality; and
• potential for inclusion of diverse missions.
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BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION
gENERAL SETTINg AND
FRIENDLy FORCE ORgANIzATIONAL STRuCTuRE
The scenario elements included here are derivative of the one detailed
in TRADOC PAM 525-3-90 O&O 22 JUL 2002 (U.S. Army, 2002) and
include all these aspects. For purposes of this study, three vignettes have
been extracted and distilled. The three vignettes provide a construct for the
purpose of addressing potential of behavioral models supporting a brigade
combat team (BCT) as part of a joint campaign. As stated in the TRADOC
pamphlet: “They are presented for illustrative purposes only and are cast
incidentally in the trans-Caucasus region to account for the realistic, tough
range of variables and conditions, as well as the difficulty of the tactical
dilemmas presented” (U.S. Army, 2002, p. F-1). The pamphlet, in its seven
sections, provides a very detailed mission operational setting in the trans-
Caucasus region (see Figure B-1). It includes three relevant vignettes:
FIguRE B-1 Trans-Caucasus regionB-1.eps
for TRADOC PAM 525-3-90 scenario.
SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. F-1).
bitmap image uneditable
low resolution
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APPENDIX B
1. tactical operations in entry operation (Entry),
2. operational maneuver by air, combined arms operation for urban
warfare (Transition), and
3. secure portion of a major urban area (JUO).
The design purpose of these vignettes is to develop requirements, seek
new tactical concepts, and seek new organizational design principles. The
pamphlet emphasizes joint operations, and it explicitly describes new tacti-
cal principles based on development of the situation in and out of contact
with the enemy. In addition, the trans-Caucasus region includes long-
standing fault lines of bitter ethnic rivalry dating back millennia and thus
supports strong components of scenario design for purposes of assessing
particular behavioral model applications with religious, political, social,
economic, and cultural impacts.
The nature of these “soft” regional factors emphasizes the need to appre-
ciate and leverage political and informational domains to advantage.
The BCT will be the basic building block of future combat forces (U.S.
Army, 2002). It will have the capability to command and control up to six
maneuver battalions, will be able to employ a range of supporting capabili-
ties, and will be able to perform a variety of missions, including reinforcing
fires, engineers, military police air defense, PSYOPS, civil affairs, etc. The
BCT will not be a fixed organization but “must be absolutely superior in
complex situations where sophisticated political and informational skills
are required in small unit leadership. Adversaries will leverage information,
the media, and ethnic and religious fractures to maximum advantage” (U.S.
Army, 2002, p. 21).
The BCT must have the ability to see, understand and act first, then
finish decisively. Mid-grade and junior leaders must effectively recognize
and solve problems in complex situations with political and informational
dimensions. In the past, uncertainty about enemy and friendly conditions
on the battlefield often dictated cautious movements, expenditure of time
and resources to develop the situation, followed by initiation of decisive
action at times and places not necessarily of the commander’s choosing. The
BCT will not be constrained in this way. Future commanders will develop
the situation before making contact, maneuver to positions of advantage
largely out of contact, and, when ready, initiate decisive action with initia-
tive, speed, and agility.
The supporting 81-person military intelligence (MI) unit, organized as
illustrated in Figure B-2, is an important component of the BCT. It is the
primary focal point for management and analysis of information pulled
from the full spectrum of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) resources. The MI company provides all of the brigade’s timely, rel-
evant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence, emitter mapping, electronic
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4 BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION
MI
Collection &
Analysis &
HQ Integration
Processing
FIguRE B-2 Military intelligence unit organization.
SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. 32). B-2.eps
bitmap image
redrawn with real type
attack, targeting information, and battle damage assessment support dur-
ing the planning and execution of multiple, simultaneous decisive actions
by means of information and intelligence collection, analysis, processing,
integration, and dissemination. The purpose of this organization is analysis,
fusion, and integration of ISR from external sources, organic UA R&S,
combat battalion reconnaissance detachments, and troops in contact.
The MI unit has available to it ISR assets that are either organic (effec-
tively owned and operated by the unit) or nonorganic (loaned to them for
temporary use by sister or higher echelon units). The reliance on these two
classes of assets changes over the course of an engagement, as illustrated
in Figure B-3.
THREE PHASES OF THE SCENARIO
This scenario develops vignettes occurring during three phases of the
scenario:
1. Entry: Combat forces enter the area of operations, Azerbaijan, and
establish Forward Operating Base (FOB) Alpha.
2. Transition: Combat forces depart FOB and maneuver to Baku.
3. Major urban operations: Combat forces attack to seize Baku city
center to facilitate its return to the host nation’s control.
These vignettes are scaled back to depict only one BCT employed in
combat operations. In this scenario, the BCT will conduct tactical opera-
tions in three distinct phases.
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5
APPENDIX B
Non-Organic ISR Capabilities
Organic ISR Capabilities
FIguRE B-3 Reliance on organic and nonorganic ISR assets over time.
SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. 89). B-3.eps
bitmap image
heightened contrast
new vector type for colored labels
Entry operations: The BCT uses military and commercial strategic
lift to arrive in FOB Alpha ready to fight, fully synchronized with other
elements of the joint force. For example, the BCT will have access to net-
worked fires or “NetFires”1 as soon as it touches down in the FOB.
This is a fundamental change in current approaches to deploying forces
to theaters of operation. The future intent is also for intelligence already
available from national and theater assets, as well as information on friendly
forces, weather, and geospatial products provided through the global infor-
mation grid, routed through the combat information centers, to be pushed
directly to the BCT, allowing the commanders to do planning and rehearsals
en route. When the FOB is secure, the BCT will enter the transition phase,
a movement to contact, prior to entering their objective area, Baku.
Transition operations: Until recently, the operational significance of
transition operations was underestimated. This attitude has changed:
“Transitions—going from offense to defense and back again, projecting
power through airheads and beachheads, transitioning from peacekeeping
to warfighting and back again—sap operational momentum. Mastering
transitions is key to winning decisively. Forces that can do so provide
strategic flexibility to the National Command Authorities, who need as
many options as possible in a crisis” (U.S. Army white paper, Concepts
for the Objective Force, [quoted in U.S. Army, 2002, p. 61]). Operational
1 “NetFires will enable the dynamic application of lethal and nonlethal destructive and sup-
pressive effects. It will be integrated fully from the theater level to the tactical platform level,
allowing the commander to establish, alter and terminate linkages between sensors and line-
of-sight (LOS), beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS), non-line-of-sight (NLOS) division/corps and joint
systems to achieve a wide set of lethal and nonlethal effects” (Haithcock, 2006, p. 25).
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BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION
transitions are required as the force shifts from deployment operations, to
smaller scale contingencies, to major combat operations. The transition
from securing the FOB to the movement to contact at Baku will provide
the enemy 304th Brigade with time and space to recover and attempt to
exploit BCT vulnerabilities.
The BCT will plan and rehearse carefully to eliminate these dangerous
transition areas. Because of its ability to keep situational understanding
during a tactical operation, the BCT can transition immediately and aggres-
sively to movement to contact. The BCT will initiate a series of deliberate
attacks against a moving enemy under hasty conditions. Such an operation
is graphically depicted in Figure B-4.
The enemy 304th Brigade will marshal all the resources available in the
locale and use every means possible to disrupt, attrite, and destroy elements
of the BCT. Hasty and deliberate attacks resembling cold war maneuvers,
crowds laced with suicide bombers, attacks by fire, mines, and improvised
explosive devices will be used by the enemy at every possible opportunity.
FIguRE B-4 BCT attack against a moving enemy.
B-4.eps
SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. 63).
bitmap image
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APPENDIX B
During this phase the BCT will use three primary tenets—speed, preci-
sion, and knowledge—to successfully complete the transition in preparation
for major urban operations (MUOs).
Major urban operations: The brigade’s mission is to seize Baku city
center in order to facilitate its return to host nation control. It will have
made some preparation for MUO during the movement to contact and
transition phases, but the less built-up areas encountered en route to Baku
will bear very little resemblance to Baku itself.
Baku is a third-world city of 2 million composed of massed and heavy-
clad framed buildings, which are dispersed in circular street patterns. Cur-
rently, the enemy is occupying company strong point defenses within the
city, and they have activated terrorist cells and other paramilitary units to
control critical areas. The Baku city center with BCT objectives is shown
in Figure B-5.
Insurgent clans and terrorists will move to reinforce elements of the
enemy 304th Brigade. The clans will “pile on” to join in the attrition of
FIguRE B-5 Baku city center. B-5.eps
SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. F-19).
bitmap image
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BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION
the BCT. In accordance with joint doctrine, “Close assault is a central
aspect of urban engagements, both due to the nature of the terrain and
enemy as well as the need to minimize collateral damage and preserve
critical infrastructure. Small unit effectiveness and empowered leadership
are critical to the success of these operations. Close urban assault has a
significant dismounted character, requiring a robust infantry capability to
engage and sustain the urban fight. . . . These units will exploit handheld
and unmanned ISR tools and the common operational picture (COP). Tar-
get acquisition and engagement is difficult in the close confines of the urban
environment. Fleeting targets can be acquired and killed using the BCT ISR
capabilities and advanced weapons systems . . . The BCT must be able to
sustain operational momentum through multiple battles by cycling forces
in and out of contact” (U.S. Army, 2002, pp. E-2–E-3).
REFERENCES
Haithcock, J., Jr. (2006). Networked fires. Field Artillery, Jan–Feb, 22–27.
U.S. Army. (2002). U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlet (Pam)
#55--0, The United States Army objective force operational and organizational
plan for maneuver unit of action. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2006). Quadrennial defense review report. Washington, DC:
Author.
