mulated in close collaboration with area and regional managers and should be flexible enough to distinguish among different situations (Finding 15).

Finding 16: The objectives and operating procedures for law enforcement are different from those for security. The legislation giving Reclamation law enforcement authority does not address issues of antiterrorism or security, nor does it permit Reclamation to directly hire its own law enforcement personnel.

Recommendation 11: Reclamation’s senior executives and security managers should identify the gaps in their authority for creating an effective security program and, if necessary, seek authorizing legislation that will allow implementation of a more robust program (Finding 16).

Finding 17: With its largely decentralized organizational structure and heavy reliance on partnerships and contractors, Reclamation is fundamentally dependent on collaboration within and among organizations to achieve its mission. Imposing a centralized security program on a culture that is accustomed to distributed program management and authority has resulted in tensions and ineffective working relationships between the SSLE staff in Denver and the staff of regional and area offices.

Finding 18: Sound working relationships are based on effective communications and trust. Managerial actions and the behavior of SSLE’s Denver-based staff have in some cases created distrust among the regional and area office staff that is damaging to internal working relationships and that limits the effectiveness of the security program.

Recommendation 12: SSLE managers should recognize and respect the importance that regional and area staff attach to their working relationships with their operators, contractors, and local law enforcement personnel. SSLE should work through the regional directors and area office managers when developing risk-mitigation projects and other activities that require the input of local law enforcement personnel, operators, and other stakeholders. SSLE should also intensify its efforts to communicate the goals, methods, priorities, and budget constraints of the security program through face-to-face meetings with regional and area office managers. To be effective, communication should routinely be two way (Findings 17, 18).

Front Matter (R1-R18)

Summary (1-13)

1 Context (14-28)

2 Description of Reclamation's Security Program (29-49)

3 Assessment of Reclamation's Security-Related Processes (50-70)

4 Future Plans (71-82)

5 Conclusions and Recommendations (83-104)

Appendix A: Biographies of Committee Members (105-113)

Appendix B: Briefings to the Committee and Discussions (114-119)

Appendix C: Two Approaches to Risk Assessment for Dams (120-128)