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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges APPENDIX B WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE Convened by the U.S. National Academies (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) With the support of the International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna, Austria Summary by Rita Guenther, Marc Humphrey, and Micah Lowenthal WORKSHOP − DAY 11 Monday, April 23, 2007 Welcome from Tariq Rauf and Alan McDonald, IAEA, and Co-chairs Dr. John Ahearne and Academician Boris Myasoedov Alan McDonald of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) welcomed participants and noted that workshop deliberations would have some influence on the June 2007 IAEA Board of Governor’s meeting. John Ahearne, chair of the National Academies’ committee, observed that the increased interest in nuclear energy across the world was one motivation for this workshop because the increased use of nuclear energy may lead to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, and therefore increased risk of nuclear proliferation. Ahearne went on to note that there have been several conferences on possible options for guaranteed nuclear fuel supply, and the joint NAS/RAS committees have been examining these various options. The objective of the workshop is to hear from voices outside of the group that has dominated discussions, in particular from voices of experts from key countries, although each participant is acting in a personal capacity and not as a representative of his country. The key questions of the workshop were: How can we increase access to nuclear power? How can we do so while reducing the proliferation risk? Boris Myasoedov, acting chair of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ committee, noted that energy is essential to human development, but fossil resources are limited, even in Russia. As a result, interest in nuclear power is growing quickly. Of course, alternatives such as hydrogen or renewable resources are under investigation. Since the Obninsk reactor was first 1 For a list of participants, please see the end of this Appendix.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges connected to an electrical grid in 1954, nuclear energy has spread to many countries. Facing this increased use, several problems remain including nonproliferation of fissile materials and new, risky technologies. Amidst this fast development, then Russian President Vladmir V. Putin launched an initiative to provide assured access to nuclear services to countries that voluntarily reject the development of some technologies. It offers nuclear resources based on countries having met this requirement, and regardless of political circumstances. Angarsk has been designated as the first international center and in March 2007, the first seminar with IAEA representatives took place in Angarsk at which participants discussed legal aspects of such a center. Recently, Kazakhstan (in a joint presidential meeting) agreed to join this international enrichment center, which will accumulate enriched uranium in gas or solid form and will be the property of the international center. As a commercial enterprise, the center will be open to all countries through intergovernmental agreements. The management and legal aspects of the center are still being discussed. The second stage of the creation of the center will include not only enrichment but the organization of spent fuel return for reprocessing and reuse of the fissile material in nuclear power plants. The U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) proposal also includes reprocessing. Objectives of the workshop are to discuss these various proposals for creating centers, and to hear from those who may wish to use these services. Tariq Rauf, director of the Office of External Affairs at the IAEA, expressed Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s support for this activity. He noted that the Academies’ fuel cycle study is on a longer time frame than the IAEA study of these questions, and that the Director General will provide the IAEA Board of Governors with a new paper on new approaches in June 2007. Rauf noted that to be credible, any plan for assurance of supply must be perceived to be fair and impartial. It was clear at the September 2006 Special Event2 that no state was ready to give up any rights under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In its June paper, the IAEA group needs to reflect this viewpoint, while finding a fair, impartial solution. There is progress, with the visit to Angarsk and the U.S. pledge to downblend over 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use in an assured fuel supply arrangement as well as with former Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s initiative, the six-party proposal, and those from the World Nuclear Association,3 the U.K., and Germany. Rauf expressed his hope that IAEA may be ready for serious movement by the end of 2007. “Bulgaria and the Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Jordan Stamenov (Bulgaria) Bulgaria is a small country with a population of 7.5 million and very limited natural resource reserves. Bulgaria’s experience with nuclear technology began in 1955. In 1956, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, an institution for education and training of nuclear scientists, was created. The first Bulgarian research reactor began operation in 1961. The IRT-2000, a heterogeneous water-water pool-type reactor (thermal capacity 2 MW), is housed at the Nuclear Scientific and Experimental Center of the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (INRNE BAS). From 1990-2002, Bulgaria’s first nuclear 2 For more information on the IAEA Special Event, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/assurancesofsupply.html, accessed on December 13, 2008. 3 The 2006 World Nuclear Association (WNA) Market Report shows the same growth projection constituted by one BN-1800 coming on line in 2023 and light water reactors for the rest of the growth through 2030 (WNA, 2006).
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges power plant, the Kozloduy nuclear power plant (NPP), was constructed and commissioned. It comprised 6 units for a total capacity of 3,760 MW, all of first and second generation Soviet design. Fifteen years ago the Kozloduy units 1 to 4 were considered to be “not economically upgradeable” and were closed to meet European Union ascension demands. The latest IAEA inspection, however, confirmed that this “non-upgradeable” definition is no longer true and perhaps it never was. The radiation dose at this plant lies within international standards. They have worked safely for more than 100 reactor-years. Spent fuel from Kozloduy is stored on site then sent to Russia for reprocessing. Bulgaria has no final spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, and uranium mining was ceased 15 years ago. The main principles of Bulgaria’s energy policy include a transparent and unbiased economic environment and investments in energy efficiency. Regionally, Bulgaria is considered to have a well established energy infrastructure, and very good transmission capacities. It has an opportunity to become a leader in the regional energy market. In 2001, it exported 7 GWh of electricity and 14.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas. By 2010, electricity consumption will meet electricity production, minimizing exports. Bulgaria is one of the most energy intensive countries and one of the most energy import-dependent countries in Europe. Bulgaria has a goal-oriented energy policy, calling for a reliable, efficient, strategic, and socially accepted energy supply. In 2001, nuclear power accounted for 41% of net electricity generation in Bulgaria. The Council of Ministers made a resolution in July 2001 for the reconstruction of the research reactor IRT-2000 into a low-power (200 kW) reactor using low-enriched uranium 235 (LEU) fuel. On June 24, 2004, the government made the decision to begin construction of an NPP in Belene. Numerous reactor types have been considered and one of the VVER1000 designs was selected. Areva is responsible for construction. Education is one objective for human resource development for the Belene project. Russia used to provide much of the education for nuclear experts in Bulgaria, but now Bulgaria must do much more itself. Another objective is the development of new applications, such as boron neutron capture therapy. The U.S. and Russian governments signed a contract in May 2004, for cooperation in transferring Russian-produced research reactor nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation, in the frame of two programs: RERTR − Reduced Enrichment of Research and Test Reactors, and RRRFR − Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return. The IAEA − INRNE BAS initiative has held many meetings with a goal of east-west (VVER-Light Water Reactor) cooperation. In 2007, Bulgaria hosted the 7th International Conference on VVER fuel performance, modeling, and experimental support in cooperation with the IAEA. Discussion Gottemoeller: Based on past collaboration between the BAS and Argonne National Lab, what is the view of multilateral cooperation? Stamenov: We have had scientific connections for more than 35 years. We have also had good cooperation on spent fuel transport.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges Gottemoeller: What is your view on the potential feasibility of international arrangements in managing international fuel centers, based on your experience with trilateral agreements (U.S., Russia, Bulgaria)? Stamenov: Cooperation with Argonne National Laboratory was a natural extension of existing scientific collaborations. Lowenthal: Were there any important factors leading to the Bulgaria-Russia agreement on a new reactor and fuel? Stamenov: We have had no problems so far. If there are problems with transport, they are due to transportation schemes. There may be other possibilities, perhaps using ships on the Danube to the Sea. Angarsk has not yet been discussed. “Perspectives and Policy Options of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services,” Karyono (Indonesia) Indonesia is an archipelago nation with more than 17,000 islands near the equator, with over 120 million people, and with small uranium reserves. With its high population density and rising electricity consumption, there is now a real need for nuclear power. Indonesia’s nuclear program began in the 1970’s. According to “Act Number 10, Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy,” the executing body (BATAN) has the right to “undertake the nuclear fuel cycle services that could generate the nuclear and common industries.” The main objectives of the nuclear energy program are as follows: short term − statement of nuclear options for long-term planning medium and long term − science and technology foundation, operation of first NPP on the Java-Bali grid, and data collection on uranium reserves There are currently 3 candidate sites for the first NPP at the Muria facility on Java Island. The road map for the first NPP includes a public awareness campaign, site permits, regulation and licensing, and ownership decisions, to be completed by 2007. The next step will be to issue tender. Construction is planned for 2010-2015, and commissioning and operation are set for 2015-2016. Indonesia (BATAN) has a fuel fabrication facility for the research reactor (the Fuel Element Production Installation or FEPI). It is designed to produce fuel elements using imported enriched uranium for research reactors and has operated without significant defect or failure for 20 years. Since May 1996, BATAN transferred all assets of the plant to the state owned company, PT (Batan Teknologi). They plan to develop an experimental fuel fabrication facility. The Experimental Fuel Element Installation (EFEI) will be used for manufacturing and quality control of fuel bundles. Indonesia is currently analyzing the following initiatives to access nuclear fuel cycle services: MNA: Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Initiative of the Director General of the IAEA in 2003, and reported by the Expert Group in February 2005.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges Developing Global Nuclear Infrastructure: Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation, January 25, 2006. GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership): Initiative of the U.S. President, February 2006. RANF: (Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel), initiative of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, May, 2006. NTI: Initiative of a non-governmental organization, Nuclear Threat Initiative, of Washington D.C., September 2006. There are six principle criteria for nuclear fuel cycle services from an Indonesian perspective: Correspondence with the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution: Indonesia will actively promote peace Harmony with the IAEA system: multilateral, integrated safeguard system consisting of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol No contradictions with the NPT Non-discriminatory Indonesia supports the right of the Parties to the NPT to undertake research and development (R&D) for peaceful purposes and to fulfill IAEA integrated safeguards agreements and the NPT International assurance for developing countries (party to the NPT) for long-term, timely access to nuclear fuel cycle services (uranium enrichment and reprocessing), for their NPPs There are several constraints on nuclear fuel cycle services. Fuel cycle services should be easily provided by the market and domestic capabilities for certain countries. If there are no long-term assurances, there will be a need for domestic fuel cycle facilities. The establishment of domestic services would only be justified (technically, economically) if there is a large NPP capacity. The optimal option beyond domestic services may include bilateral agreements between supplier and user countries (perhaps under a memorandum of understanding) or multilateral nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the region. Indonesia’s NPP milestone is to build and operate 4 NPPs by 2025. Indonesia is considering the following policy options for nuclear fuel cycle services: Natural uranium − purchase from diversified producer countries or produce domestically Uranium processing and conversion − purchase from diversified producer countries or produce domestically Uranium enrichment − purchase from diversified producer countries Fuel fabrication − first loading from diversified producer countries, long-term leasing, or domestic production if economically viable Spent fuel storage − store at plant in the short term and at a centralized facility in the medium term Radioactive waste − processed and managed at the plant or a centralized facility
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges Indonesia will adopt a once-through fuel cycle policy In conclusion, nuclear fuel cycle services could generate common industries. The possibility of mutual multilateral cooperation for front and back end facilities in the east Asia region (involving the IAEA and international community) would be an attractive initiative. Discussion Ivanov: Russia is developing a floating NPP. Would this be useful for Indonesia? Russia would supply the plant and 40 years of support (including take back of spent fuel). Have you considered this? Karyono: Indonesia’s regulatory body (BAPETEN) requires all NPPs to be on land. Also, we would only consider proven technology for electricity (at least 3 years demonstrated proof). What would the level of uranium fuel enrichment be for floating reactors? Ivanov: 17% enrichment at the lowest. Karyono: A small NPP is interesting for electricity generation in the remote islands of Indonesia. However, before using a floating NPP, Indonesia should consider if it is also in harmony with the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, ratified in 1997. Rauf: You have said you will rely on the world market, though fuel fabrication may be done domestically. If supply is denied for political reasons, what strategy would you use to deal with it? Karyono: Up to this point we have had only a small nuclear enterprise with LEU for a research reactor. We have contracted out for enrichment services, and so far we have not had any problems. Forrstrom: What happens after interim storage of spent fuel? Karyono: We have a once through fuel cycle policy with interim storage first. We have many uninhabited islands. Prepared Remarks of Mohamed Shaker (Egypt) The IAEA Expert Group studied the question of assurances of supply, which twenty years ago, in 1987, was being discussed in the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which went into abeyance that year. CAS was unable to reach consensus on both the “principles for the international nuclear energy cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation” and on “emergency and back-up mechanisms.” The 1987 United Nation’s Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy also failed to reach agreement on such a set of principles. As president of the conference, I tried hard to achieve consensus on such principles, to no avail. I believe we have a good chance this time, after 20 years, to move forward and tackle this issue in a constructive and creative way. We
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges have a lot of food for thought in the valuable report of the IAEA Expert Group on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. We also have a number of initiatives and proposals put forward by the Director General of the IAEA and a number of leaders, which I hope we have a chance to examine more thoroughly during this workshop. I will begin with a few words on the motivations and prospects for reviving the nuclear power program in Egypt. Twenty years ago, Egypt was about to make its choice of its first nuclear power plant, but failed to do so in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine in 1986. After Egypt’s ratification of the NPT in 1981, it negotiated a number of cooperative agreements with leading supplier states to begin the implementation of an ambitious nuclear power program. Most of these cooperative agreements are of long duration and are still valid. After a long lull, which went beyond 20 years, the nuclear power project is being reconsidered in the context of the energy mix in Egypt for reasons and factors similar to those existing in other countries. Also, one cannot miss today’s renaissance in nuclear energy. There are 29 reactors in 12 developing and developed States being constructed in addition to four units being planned in China alone. This is a great leap forward, which I believe will attract others to do likewise, if their energy needs require such an endeavor. Egypt decided in 1980 to invest in nuclear power before its great discoveries of gas post-Chernobyl, which brought great relief to the energy sector and more particularly to its electricity needs. It was responsible for the uplift of Egypt’s industries and other domestic needs. This was also one reason for the country not to hasten to rekindle its interest in nuclear power. Nowadays, the generation of electricity is mainly dependent on the use of natural gas and oil. In the year 2005-2006, Egypt consumed 17.3 million tons of oil and 541 billion cubic feet of natural gas. Only 12% of electricity is generated by hydro power. Wind energy generates only 1% of electric power. Currently, wind power is of the capacity of 230 megawatts. Next year it is expected to reach 430 megawatts. In 2010, it is expected to generate 3% percent of the total electric power. Egypt is about to establish its first solar energy plant of 150 megawatts. If Egypt were to invest in a nuclear power plant of a capacity of 1000 megawatts, this would save us 1.78 million tons of oil or 69.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year. In a period of 60 years, which is the average life span of a nuclear power plant, the savings in oil would reach 106 million tons of oil, or 4.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This would also spare Egypt the equivalent of 210 million tons of carbon dioxide. It is noteworthy that the reserves in oil and gas are expected to be exhausted in 15 and 34 years respectively. New discoveries in both sources of energy could extend the duration for a few extra years. The average energy demand for electricity in the last ten years was 7% annually. Last year’s demand increased by 10.2%. During 2006, the total demand of electric power was 18,160 megawatts, out of the total capacity of 21,300 megawatts. These figures should indicate the type of studies and comparative analysis that are still being undertaken to determine whether it is justifiable to add nuclear power to the energy mix. Both the Higher Council on Energy and the ruling National Democratic Party are in the midst of assessing and examining the nuclear power potential in Egypt. No final decisions have been made but the Arab Summit in Riyadh last March recommended that members of the Arab League should coordinate and exchange views on Arab cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The prospects for reviving the nuclear power program in Egypt are not yet very clear, but are still being pondered. If a decision is made to go ahead with nuclear power, it will be to face their future electric needs in light of the short life span of Egypt’s oil and gas resources, as well
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges as the limitations on hydro power; only in cooperation with African neighbors on the River Nile, can Egypt double its hydro power sources. With regard to the second question concerning what type of arrangements for nuclear fuel provision would be particularly attractive or unattractive in light of Egypt’s national interests and concern for the nonproliferation regime, the question reminds one of Egypt’s dormant agreement of cooperation with the United States signed in 1982, after ratification of the NPT. According to the agreement, the United States is to provide Egypt with fuel along with a reactor, provided Egypt would return the spent fuel to the United States and compensate them for it. Egypt then had no problem with such an arrangement, which obviously reflected proliferation concerns. Today, however, the guarantee of a fuel supply as a back up measure is a basic requirement, especially in case of interruptions for political reasons. Also, in some cases it will be better to separate between the supply and building of a nuclear power plant, and the fuel needed for it. The latter could be guaranteed through reliable arrangements with the IAEA or regional organizations that would guarantee the fuel supply to its participants in the fuel cycle. This leads to the third question concerning the different proposals and initiatives, whether by the Director General of IAEA or by a number of leaders. I argue that we ought to decide whether the material to be assured or the material to be guaranteed is the nuclear fuel itself or the enriched uranium, or both. Most of the initiatives and proposals are concerned with the supply mechanism. None has dwelt thoroughly on the merits of a multinational or regional nuclear fuel cycle as suggested by the Director General of the IAEA in 2003. I fear that one or two of the initiatives or proposals may accentuate the divide between the haves and the have-nots. It is very important to guarantee that any assurance mechanism would not result in a real or perceived division between those two categories of States. In any future mechanism there should be a role for the recipients of technology and materials together with the suppliers. Any role to be played by the nuclear-weapon States as guarantors of supply would be more effective and credible if these States would also take steps towards nuclear disarmament. Article IV of the NPT, and especially the inalienable right enshrined in it for peaceful uses should be re-emphasized clearly and categorically. There are interpretations and even attempts aiming at diluting the provisions of Article IV. They run counter to the spirit of finding ways and means to guarantee the supply of nuclear material and equipment to all those who abide by the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What is the future of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) in this context or in the new arrangement that would ensue as a result of these proposals and initiatives? On many occasions, I have emphasized the importance of a dialogue between the NSG and the potential recipient States before new guidelines have been set forth by the NSG. I believe we need a fair mechanism, hopefully a transitional one towards the new arrangement. In conclusion, I offer these remarks in all frankness and sincerity. I believe that we are embarking on a very important phase that ought not be wasted and disrupted like other ventures in the past.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges Discussion Walker: At the time it was signed, the 1982 agreement between Egypt and the United States satisfied Egypt’s interests, but today a guaranteed supply is a basic requirement. What has changed? Shaker: We still have a U.S. agreement in force (it is 30 years in duration); and if we were to revive the program and if the U.S. were the first partner, Egypt would not request a change in the agreement unless the United States and Egypt agree that they should reexamine it. In any of our agreements (e.g. with Australia, Canada, France, Germany), it is important to have solid guarantees of supply of fuel. This is a fast-changing world and relationships change quickly. We should have a backup, automatic mechanism in case fuel or equipment supply is disrupted. Rauf: You mentioned an amendment to Article IV. Could you explain what you meant by this? Shaker: Without Article IV, there would be no NPT. Article IV is more important than Article VI. Article IV gives the right to pursue uranium enrichment. For example, Iran has this right, but could defer the right. If Article IV were to be amended it would be for the sole purpose of strengthening the inalienable right rather than weakening it by devious interpretations. Bunn: Could you outline the things that have changed and lead to your optimism? If a regional center were established in the Middle East, would participation by Iran be acceptable? Shaker: I am not “optimistic,” but 20 years ago the focus was only on the principles of cooperation. Today we have bold proposals from the Director General and other leaders. These did not exist in the 1980’s. There has also been some other encouraging work. The question now is whether or not the political will is there (and not just technical know-how). With regard to Iran, for years Egypt has been a proponent of a Mideast weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone. This would extend to all Arab countries, Israel, and Iran. At the Arab summit, we looked for a mechanism to make this 20-year dream a reality. There is now determination to find such a mechanism, which could be revived by reengagement for the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Iran could be brought in. “The Energy Sector of Armenia,” Areg Galstyan (Armenia) Loss of energy security is a subject of great risk for Armenia, which is situated in a difficult geopoilitical zone but is keeping its political and economic stability. The impact of energy security loss on the social-economic life of Armenia can be assessed by the bitter experience gained during the energy crisis of 1993-1995. Armenia is wholly dependent on outside energy sources. The only domestically produced primary energy is electricity from hydroelectric plants and, conditionally the single nuclear plant (nearly 45%). The closure of this NPP in 1989, caused an energy crisis, leading to an increase in demand for hydropower and subsequent ecological harm. Therefore, the second unit (of two) at the NPP was restarted in 1995, allowing Armenia to overcome the crisis. In 2005, a new strategy for the period to 2025 was announced, calling for nuclear and renewable energy. The strategy aims to achieve sustainable economic development in Armenia;
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges enhance the energy independence and security of the country including diversification of imported and domestic energy resources; and ensure efficient use of domestic energy resources and the development of renewable energy sources and energy savings. The “Least Cost Generation Plan for 2006” (LCGP) was developed in 2006, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) based on the principles of the “Economic Development of the Republic of Armenia within the Framework of the Energy Sector Development Strategy,” which was approved by the Armenian Government. After considering a number of development scenarios, incorporating gas and oil price changes and environmental impact, they concluded that nuclear energy is the only option for base-load capacity in Armenia. Guided by the implemented analysis, as well as by strategic and economic research, the following recommendations are made in the LCGP: decommission the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) in 2016 or earlier, as soon as the new nuclear energy unit is ready complete funding of ANPP safety upgrade projects and the required investments to ensure safe operation of the nuclear plant before its decommissioning complete a comprehensive safety and environmental assessment of the ANPP site to determine compliance of the site with decommissioning and construction requirements for the new units develop a comprehensive decommissioning plan that shall be implemented five years before the commencement of ANPP decommissioning and shall be based on the provisions of the ANPP Decommissioning Strategy approved by the Armenian Government determine funding sources for ANPP decommissioning, form a decommissioning fund, select the fund’s manager who will manage it until control over the low risk investments is switched to international organizations develop and implement a plan targeted to resolve problems regarding Armenia’s ability to finance and construct a new nuclear plant by including size and allocation issues develop local renewable resources to enhance energy independence and ensure diversity of energy sources develop and implement projects that encourage energy efficiency, making this sector attractive for consumers and contributing to the acquisition of energy efficient equipment and devices establish and implement a project to minimize the impact of tariffs on consumers with regard to the commencement of ANPP decommissioning and new nuclear capacity Any decision about the future status of the Medzamor NPP should consider the following: the government of Armenia confirms its consistent position on NPP decommissioning and at the time of decommissioning, at least 2.5 billion kWh electrical energy generation should be guaranteed by new capacities for covering electricity demand in base-load, which will grow to 5 billion kWh in 10-15 years. Energy generation should provide for social-economic development and long-term energy demand growth, and any abrupt jump in tariffs should be avoided.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges The 2025 strategy calls for a new NPP at the Medzamor site in the near-term. The only way to ensure energy security is to build new NPPs in the republic. Armenia intends to continue investment with its partners. Currently, the NPP produces 2.5 billion kWh of electricity. By 2025, up to 60% of total domestic consumption will be produced by nuclear power. The remaining demand will be covered by renewable (mainly hydro) resources (30% of total demand) and the rest will be covered by thermal resources. To implement new NPP construction, the law can now cancel the state monopoly on ownership of new units (leading to more flexibility and more attractive investment). Specific recommendations include building new units on the same site, continuing investments in maintaining the safety of existing units, and establishing a decommissioning foundation. Funds will come from tariffs on energy from these units. Fresh fuel is supplied by Russia. The development of a wet storage facility is in progress (with help from Areva). The third stage is being developed to store spent fuel at the NPP site. We do not intend to develop enrichment capabilities, so Armenia is very interested in nuclear fuel cycle services, and it welcomes the formation of international fuel centers under the aegis of the IAEA. As a result of the studies conducted by the Ministry of Energy, the following action plan for the nuclear energy sector was accepted: implementation of all necessary steps toward continuous enhancement of safety levels at ANPP until its decommissioning; preparation and implementation of ANPP decommissioning procedures; resolution of the issue of construction of a new nuclear unit to replace the operating unit at the ANPP. Through the initiative of the Armenian Government, amendments were made in the Law of Energy and adopted by the National Assembly of Armenia, abolishing the state monopoly. This will allow investments in the construction of new nuclear units from other financial sources too. In our opinion, the role of new nuclear units for base-load electricity as well as the electricity supply to regional countries also provides an opportunity for special financing. Armenia received an official proposal from the Russian Federation to join the pilot project at the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) at Angarsk. The establishment of the Center was considered by governments of interested countries on the basis of: intergovernmental agreements with respect to the inalienable rights of countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination; the absolute and reliable adherence to nuclear nonproliferation requirements; and mutual benefits and market relations. Armenia declared its principal commitment with regard to the proposal. However, Armenia’s participation largely depends on its Concept of nuclear energy development as well as on the proposed structure and operational functions of the Center. Discussion Rauf: Has Armenia looked into long-term fuel supply? Galstyan: Fuel for the existing NPP will come from Russia until it is decommissioned (under a long-term agreement). For future units, we are only at the feasibility stage. It is too early to discuss this, though the answer may be similar to long-term commitments based on previous experience. We have great interest in long-term supply commitments. Budnitz: Assuming good relations for the next 10 years, could Armenia be brought into the Russia-Kazakhstan Center in Angarsk? This seems logical but not necessary.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges heard of a dormant U.S.-Egyptian agreement, which might be a model. Any new system should not exacerbate the have/have-not divide. Article IV of the NPT gives the right to various fuel cycle elements. We have seen that people are most concerned about electricity, and that nonproliferation concerns (e.g., voiced by the Director General, the U.S., and Vladimir V. Putin) may not be as widespread as believed. If there is a nuclear renaissance, there will be a need for education and a growing number of experts. Nuclear power was a discipline in decline, and a renaissance will bring a need for new knowledgeable people. In terms of uranium, new mines are opening, which is a change from recent years when there was no incentive to explore, and some mines closed. Now uranium is at a high value. There is a need for uranium growth. Our Australian participant voiced concern that uranium-rich countries should have a central voice. An international point: many (if not all) of the proposals have conditions. If there is a political disruption to a contract, and a country is in good standing with the IAEA, then fuel will be assured. But, should this assurance go beyond political disruptions (to include other unforeseen events)? We have seen that fuel is critical (for example, in South Korea). This raised the question of how much fuel should be stored in inventory. If there is a fuel bank, what will it be a bank of? Yellowcake? Enriched uranium (to what level of U-235 enrichment)? Fuel elements? What about spent fuel disposal? Once fuel is given, who owns it? Will it be linked to a take-back option? Permanent disposal is a problem everywhere. For new nuclear states, what will you do with spent nuclear fuel? We mustn’t forget that reprocessing is also a proliferation risk. And finally, how many different options ought to be provided? Comments by Acting RAS Committee Chair, Academician Boris Myasoedov I agree with all of this, with one exception. The nuclear renaissance will begin soon, so this problem is very timely. Russia has a lot of hydrocarbons, has lived through the Chernobyl disaster, and has experienced a strong “green” anti-nuclear movement. We are now moving to the second stage of nuclear power revival. In 2010, we aim to commission one NPP with two units, and we wish to raise nuclear energy to 25% of our electricity by 2015. This is an historic time, in which mankind will turn to NPPs. Other sources have been discussed, but none are ready yet. So the international community faces a problem. How can we resolve this? We must ensure, without political restrictions, access to nuclear power to all countries. How do we safeguard (in developing countries)? It would be rational to allocate funds not to their own development, but to use experience from other countries. It is important to prevent proliferation of fissionable materials. The NPT plays an important role, but this is just a treaty. Democratic countries abide by this, but can withdraw. In the Soviet Union, our political system was not a democracy. This had many negative elements, but many good things too, including the development of peaceful nuclear power, and an entire system of developing nuclear power in other countries. We had plans to supply nuclear power to other countries; they visited Soviet NPPs, and the U.S.S.R. supplied and took back fuel. We had no problems in this respect. However, this cannot be applied to today’s case. These were bilateral agreements, which could be transformed in light of new circumstances. Today, an understanding should be based on close international cooperation, without conditions, granting access to the development of nuclear energy without spent nuclear fuel
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges treatment concerns. We should remember the spirit of the NPT, which was developed and approved despite differences of opinion. If mankind switches to a broad use of nuclear energy, we should consider a renewable approach based on fast breeder reactors and the use of spent fuel. The Putin Initiative is a decision to create an international center. The decision has been adopted, and implementation is beginning. The following are the main ideas of the center: Creation of an international center in Russia as a pilot project to provide an assured and guaranteed supply of uranium. Established by countries via intergovernmental agreements to support the inalienable right to develop nuclear power without discrimination. Strengthen the international nonproliferation regime using a market approach − joint enterprise (or intergovernmental agreement of other form) including nongovernmental and invited participants with no access to enrichment technologies. Governments of participating states will be the executive bodies. Legislative, financial, and industrial aspects will be based on existing Russian enterprise (secure provision of enrichment services, create stock of LEU). Provides for regulation or access of foreign personnel to monitor quality. Price of products set by co-founders, corresponding to world prices. To guarantee its goals, international status is central (IAEA as an observer, under IAEA guarantees). In conclusion, it is the only way to arrange for an international basis of nuclear energy enlargement. Burns: From a military perspective, this discussion has been interesting and persuasive, and touched on the fundamental problems. The problem with national users of an international commodity is one of assurance. Those with their own capabilities are blessed but few. Others are dependent on shipments, and therefore are at risk of disruption. We need a broad spectrum of willing suppliers, and for users to comply with international standards. I have a concern about the use of sanctions: I believe these are counterproductive after a short period of time. Over the long term, they no longer deprive the target; 20-25 years of sanctions does not work. A regime couched on assurance must give up long-term sanctions. Sanctions meant to punish (e.g., deprive of nuclear energy) cannot be tolerated. Multiple options to nuclear power would not be a bad thing, and a broad spectrum of options would lead to a persuasive argument. Solonin: The further development of nuclear energy is inevitable. Furthermore, the development of fast burner and breeder reactors are necessary preconditions. The development in the near term will face problems of reprocessing. Questions of nonproliferation and the creation of dual use fissile material will be problematic in the medium term. Practically, there are 3 possible groupings: countries with all nuclear fuel cycle elements willing to develop and help with development; countries thinking of developing nuclear fuel cycle elements; countries looking to develop NPPs. All possibilities are acceptable and should be developed. The possibility of international centers is not yet there. We are still working on principles, but have
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges nothing yet in practice. We should take practical steps to convince others to use this possibility, then see if it works or not. This discussion is very useful. Gottemoeller: The previous speaker’s comments were very useful. Developing a more international nuclear fuel cycle requires broad acceptance. We must convince others over time to cooperate. This will require proof of practical utility. We must take measured steps with a pilot program in order to build confidence. Regarding the issue of incentives as opposed to sanctions: How do we provide more incentives? New technologies? The possibility of technical cooperation (new fuel, reactors)? This is now restricted to capital-rich countries, others are left on the margins. In the future, it would be worth considering drawing countries into a new approach on the front or back end? Bezzubtsev: As a representative of radiation security and regulation, I am interested in international requirements for safety and the normative base of development of more nuclear energy. The question of safety is important, and a national base is required to harmonize safety internationally; individual countries will develop their own rules and regulations. Yesterday, most of the discussion was on nuclear fuel centers and enrichment services. Countries interested in nuclear energy are not interested in UO2 or UF6. Rather, they are interested in fuel assemblies. Therefore, they may opt for leasing services through international centers, in order to get the final product (meeting security requirements) and to train staff to use irradiated fuel. Enrichment services and the market will require a normative base, which Russia has. Russia has just passed a law on fissile material ownership. More attractive would be a center intended to handle irradiated fuel. In Russia, nuclear fuel can be repatriated for long-term storage or reprocessing−this is attractive to new countries. There is a legal base for handling of irradiated fuel, and Bulgarian and Ukrainian fuel is sent back for reprocessing or storage. Over the past two years, there has been a joint U.S./Russian repatriation project (for research fuel) under Russian rules for safe handling and addressing ecological problems. The radwaste problem is a big concern. It will be important to take back and store some waste. A law is being prepared to resolve pending issues of radwaste handling as Russia cannot now accept radiological waste from other countries. Levenson: From the U.S. perspective, I cannot speak of ongoing projects. Few if any countries rank proliferation concerns over energy security. Neither the haves nor the have-nots will forego anything in the long term (e.g., the United States first decided against reprocessing then changed its mind). There are two groups (open fuel cycle and closed) with two different time schedules and should be considered separately. In the near term, the focus will be on an open cycle: assured quantity of fuel, timely delivery, and at a good price (the “carrot” system). Countries will occasionally reassess domestic development, therefore an “assured supply” must remain economical, i.e. must remain cheaper than a domestic supply. Energy security is so important that even with an assured supply countries may want alternatives. There are three parts of an assurance of supply: assured quantities, schedule, and price. Price might be the most important. Countries with expanding nuclear programs will assess whether a domestic program is cheaper. The central system should not be so profit driven that they ignore this. Even if a country is a participant in a multinational supply, they will probably also seek other arrangements for security of supply system.
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges In terms of a closed cycle with advanced technologies, in the past, there has been lots of nuclear power though all was based on Canadian, Russian, or U.S. technology. Domestic technology was not necessary. We should make it clear to users that technology will be shared with “have-nots” wishing to move to a closed fuel cycle. When a country is ready to move to a closed fuel cycle, they should be assisted in doing so. Energy security, nonproliferation, and economics sometimes compete; we need a middle ground. Bychkov: I would like to touch on several parallel issues: supply of fresh fuel and reprocessing; transportation; waste storage; long-term isolation and immobilization; and accidents. There must be an overall system of services not just supplies. Then, an approach to internationalization would not be a copy of current systems, there would be a need for further development. Perhaps we can optimize the development of the nuclear fuel cycle. For example, consider a country with several fast reactors that need the fissile material for operation; that country would undertake reprocessing. Now, the fuel cycle is focused on enrichment, this will shift to joint R&D and joint systems (e.g., fast reactors). In theory, these are components of GNEP, but there is still a long way to go. From practical experience in international initiatives (e.g., INPRO), we have developed new ways to oversee the spread of technology and its transfer. This knowledge would tend to make possible the oversight of certain nonproliferation facilities. A super-national mechanism would work as an incentive to improve technology. Fetter: Growth in nuclear power is not inevitable, but desirable (because it can have no CO2 emissions), but it must grow by a factor of five to make a dent in overall CO2 emissions. If this leads to a number of countries able to enrich and reprocess, there will be many virtual nuclear weapon states and this is not desirable. This latent capability will create tension and distrust, which may outweigh benefits. If there is an expansion, it will be necessary to limit the number of countries with enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The idea of international centers is interesting, but limited. A fuel bank can play a small role. My impression from the presentations is that waste is one of the biggest concerns. Therefore, if there were a central, international option for long-term storage, take back, and disposal, this would be a good incentive. A leasing and take back mechanism may be the most promising. More countries may wish that we consider take back (though not necessarily with reprocessing, at least not until economically necessary). It would be good if more countries were open to hosting an international spent fuel storage or disposal facility. Petrov: There will be a need to train future experts to implement what we are now discussing. We have paid close attention to uranium mining and technologies, but not to the waste (which will be a result of these activities). Access to the knowledge market is not free to developing countries. It will be up to states to resolve these issues. There will soon be a problem with mining training. With respect to training in waste disposal, if problems, obstacles, and difficulties are not resolved, the accumulated spent nuclear fuel will serve as a brake on future development, as is an international center for training in “subsoil sciences” to set up underground repositories. This should be a principle issue. There is a need for a center with international experts of geology, and other fields for a future international spent fuel center (under the IAEA).
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges Budnitz: I am not convinced that the number of countries, whose participation in an assured fuel scheme would be crucial to improved nonproliferation, is sufficient. Consider this “Berkeley metaphor.” The city of Oakland has one of the highest murder rates in the country, and therefore so does Alameda County. However, if I convinced all my friends to sign a pact saying that they will not commit murder, this would have very little effect on the murder rate in Alameda County. Would such a scheme change the behavior of countries that would otherwise misbehave? However, the scheme is worth pursuing, because I may be wrong. My question is this: Does a large number of countries, whose participation would make a difference, exist? Once a country is determined to misbehave, this scheme will be of little help. No country will ever give up an inalienable right. Bunn: If we want to grow nuclear energy (over the next 40-50 years) without increasing proliferation risks, we must limit enrichment and reprocessing technology. We need to provide an incentive to countries to make a sovereign choice to not develop enrichment and reprocessing. The commercial market seems to work well. In this discussion, several classes of countries have been mentioned: Some countries are not interested in enrichment or reprocessing technologies, so this scheme won’t matter to them. Some countries are interested in enrichment, but assurances of supply are not important (e.g., Australia, Brazil). For some countries, enrichment was used to pursue nuclear weapons. There is a set of countries “on the fence.” If more assurance is given than the commercial market, this may affect internal debates. For this last class, the idea is worth pursuing. However, we must not “mess up” the commercial market. There is a distinction between a fuel bank (no sign up) and an international fuel cycle center (sign up and pay). Must a country make a decision right now? Can they do so in 15 years? What are the conditions for assurance or denial of fuel? Forego forever? (Not realistic.) Refrain from enrichment while participating? Good nonproliferation standing? (Who decides? UN Security Council? IAEA? The U.S. cutoff of Brazil is perceived differently in Brazil and the U.S.) If suppliers could overcome the political obstacles to take-back, and we could find a host for an international facility, this would be a major breakthrough for nuclear energy. Fresh fuel supply (front end) works well, but spent nuclear fuel handling (back end) is more problematic. If we could offer a country both services, we would have lots of leverage. We can applaud Russia for doing this with Iran and potentially other countries. Galstyan: During this meeting we have heard a wide range of views, and I respect the different positions. Armenia has a pragmatic position and prospects are assessed realistically. For example, there is no infringement on our pride that commercial airliners are produced by only two companies, Airbus and Boeing. We understand that some technologies are only realistic for certain rich countries. Our big concern is the following: What about spent nuclear fuel? Armenia understands what it means to lose electricity security and to lose NPPs. Despite good fuel contracts, there are no 100% guarantees about hydropower or fossil fuels. Nuclear energy is a “delicate sphere”
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges calling for different fuel schemes (different from those in the common market) taking into account dual use technology. Villagra-Delgado: Article VI of the NPT is important, and should not be put aside. Regarding (bilateral) assurances of supply and multilateral nuclear approaches, we must ask, what is the objective? Enhanced nonproliferation? These approaches will add little as they will apply only to well-behaved countries as the others will not join them. A revival of nuclear energy? This might be useful. We must recognize that the safeguards system is working well. We have had no new problem countries in the NPT regime for more than 20 years. On the other hand, countries outside of the NPT framework, which have developed nuclear weapons are in the process of getting a “clean bill of health.” Is that not a contradiction? I conclude that effective safeguards are the way to go. How are assurances presented? What are the conditions for guarantee of supply? If the safeguards system is not working, if the Additional Protocol is so flawed, why should a country sign onto it? Stating that they are not good enough and that we need something totally new may be self-defeating and weaken the whole regime. Pursuing an assurance of supply may send the wrong message to countries about the functioning of the market. The “haves” telling the “have nots” is too complicated and too expensive; this is unacceptable. Saying that the enrichers are virtually proliferators presumes that the countries want to proliferate instead of just developing civil nuclear energy, which is the reality in most cases. Then there is the question of “breakout.” I disagree entirely that this is unilateral legal option. If a country uses its membership in the NPT to develop nuclear weapons, it would have acted contrary to its obligations under the Treaty and would be in breach of it. Upon declaring its intention to opt out of the Treaty, the matter must be referred to the UN Security Council where action could be taken. Agreement in the Council, particularly among the P5 countries will be needed. If these cannot agree on such a case, there is no multilateral approach that could solve that lack of will to act. Besides, it is clear that an assurance of supply based on a “join and renounce or else” system will terminate the commercial market and could be perceived as an attempt at the cartelization of it. dos Santos Guimarães: I pose the question: What is the problem? It seems there are two routes to nuclear fuel: purchase turnkey fuel assemblies or purchase uranium and fuel services. Fuel assemblies are customized commodities. Even with our cooperative development with Korea and Slovenia, we cannot just ask them to provide us with some assemblies. For turnkey NPPs, an international fuel bank will not provide assurances. For uranium and fuel services, this may be useful (e.g., the Russian proposal) but we still have the problem of fuel fabrication. A country must have its own fuel fabrication facility. Therefore, a take-back option would be very interesting. This should be universalized. Power should be transferred from utilities to fuel providers. This would have a non-marginal impact on nuclear power economics. In regard to reprocessing, Brazil has no interest. In general, the problem lies with research reactors. Reactor grade plutonium is infeasible for use in a weapon, therefore reprocessing of light water reactor fuel is not a problem. The only concern is that if you can reprocess one kind of fuel then you can reprocess any kind. In regard to enrichment technologies, this technology was born in Germany and then escaped (both diffusion and centrifuge). Our experience is that we made some batches of 20% U-235 for
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges research reactors under full safeguards (with lots of inspections). Above 10-12%, we have problems with hexafluoride impurities. Additional purification of hexafluoride is needed to go up to high enrichment, and that additional purification is easily detected by safeguards. Impurities could be introduced for these reasons. We can discuss these issues directly. We should discuss “haves” and “have notes” in the open, why do this implicitly with subterfuge calling it assurance of supply? Throughout history, energy technology has changed mankind (as the level of “energy concentration” increased): first wood for fire, then coal, then oil, then gas, then uranium. The question is who will control uranium? The United Kingdom became predominant as wood turned to coal, and the United States became predominant as coal turned to oil. As oil turns to uranium, who will take control? Consider the question of assuring supply. The 18th century United Kingdom Portugal Agreement assured a supply of manufactured products in exchange for olives and wine, and as a result Portugal is underdeveloped to this day. Ahearne: I have to point out that a past NAS study on plutonium disposition concluded that reactor-grade Pu can be used for a crude but powerful weapon. Smith: Proliferation is a political, not a technical problem. The common market works well for supply. We must separate “multilateral” from “multinational.” The multinational nature of the commercial enrichment market is an important element of assurance of supply. If Australia is to enrich, we should join Urenco. Any mechanism to guarantee enrichment should not interfere with the common market. Reprocessing is a different question: it is more dangerous for proliferation and there is not a broad market. Without this, nuclear power is wasteful (only a small percentage of energy is extracted). There is an opportunity for a multilateral closing of the fuel cycle, in a manner to maximize energy extraction while minimizing waste. I believe we are looking at the wrong end: Enrichment is working, and the true opportunities lie with reprocessing. Shaker: I call attention to the Expert Group’s report. If we want to internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle, this should be done gradually and built on confidence, step-by-step. It cannot be done universally (neither in participation nor in the parts of the fuel cycle being internationalized). Currently, there are no problems in NPP countries, but newcomers may need help with supply. (A history of colonialization and deprivation leads to a desire for assurance.) But, do we guarantee fuel? Enriched uranium? Natural uranium? For example, to an automobile owner, which is more important, guaranteed access a gas station or an oil well? It will be important in the future to have multiple supply centers, ensuring competition and an improvement in quality, delivery, and price. Regarding the NPT: If a country withdraws, why? The UN Security Council is the judge. We should leave the withdrawal clause in place−it is the safety valve. It is important to give newcomers a chance to have their say. They should participate in decision making. We should not divide further into “haves” and “have-nots.” We should give future importers a role. Urenco and Eurodif should allow the participation of others. Brazil and Japan have the potential to become regional centers. Stamenov: On what basis should we draw our conclusions? Do we want to increase energy capacity and diversity while reducing emissions? Do we want to improve conservation? Our
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges 2004 decision for 2 new VVER-1000 units affirms our choice for the next 30-40 years. Taking into account that all experiments to put other kinds of fuel in the VVER were not exactly successful, we are committed to Russian production. The problem seems to lie with spent fuel—transportation, repatriation, and storage. If there would be an international center for spent fuel, Bulgaria would be very interested. If you have limited expert resources (a small country) then you can rely on a larger country to address those nuclear problems and focus on other problems. We have excellent experience in fresh fuel and spent nuclear fuel transportation, and have solved some ecological and social problems. Transportation is a serious problem. Bulgaria is interested in an international spent nuclear fuel solution. From a legal point of view, there is a difference in view: is spent nuclear fuel “waste” or “material?” Experience with international centers suggests that if they start on a commercial basis, there are many potential problems. It is better to begin work from a budget basis from the participating countries. Yang: How would an international center be managed? Would it be multinational, or be managed by the IAEA? What kinds of contracts? Commercial or intergovernmental? What about export regulations? There is not much difference between government contracts and commercial arrangements because everyone needs an export license from the government. Karyono: In Indonesia, we have no experience with NPP operation, only with fuel fabrication and research reactors. We believe that the R&D industry has a duty. What is the optimum solution? Regarding a safeguards system, would this be multinational, IAEA, or based on bilateral MOUs? McDonald: First, I believe there is a semantic confusion, between “assurance of supply” and “assurance against interruption.” There is a general question of assurance—international mechanism to facilitate the nuclear renaissance—against political or commercial interruptions. The IAEA will restrict our attention to political interruptions only. No mechanism should disrupt the commercial market. Second, I’d like to call for an “upbeat intervention.” We must be careful to respect everybody’s rights. Nobody wants to give up any rights. But consider the Dutch/German/U.K. proposal for “enrichment bonds:” a guarantee to produce, enrich, and provide export licensing for uranium. This is a big step. They are ceding some of their sovereign rights to the IAEA for the greater good. This proposal was voluntarily put forth, and is a big step. Our opinion from the Angarsk visit, is that this is a very pragmatic approach. Third, I pose the following “stumper.” Consider a country like Australia. It is not worried about political risk, and considering commercial activities. The IAEA assurance mechanism is not a priority, but they certainly have no objection. In the end, it may even help them. Article IV of the NPT requires us to act in a non-discriminatory manner. But, Australian export controls are deliberately discriminatory. If Australia signs on, then the IAEA plan becomes discriminatory. Would it be better not to include Australia? Starz: (A) Why now? These ideas have been around for a long time. Yet, some things are more obvious now (highlighted by the nuclear renaissance). There is a new concern for the proliferation of sensitive technologies (and so called “latent” capabilities). Now, momentum is building (from suppliers and proposals). Will it lead to something this time? (B) What is the rush? The goal is to reduce the incentives for domestic nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Do we
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges have time to do so? If not, why not? (C) It seems that the beneficiary pays. What will be the conditions? Will they stick? Those with the highest benefits should have the least cost in giving up their rights. This may help sort out different options. Kelly: I am interested in the idea of incentives, and a focus on the back end. This could free countries from their own regulations. We should have a system to incorporate storage of spent nuclear fuel into these front-end discussions. We also need training in final spent nuclear fuel management. How could this benefit from an international partnership? Shalabi: What seems to be missing are political options for take-back and leasing. Going back to Ambassador Shaker’s automobile analogy, why not put a fuel cell right in the car? Finally, what is meant by “discriminatory?” This is a regulatory decision and not something else. McDonald: Australians have explained that a discriminatory process (the right is ultimately reserved to say no) is distinct from a criteria-based approach (if all criteria are met, ok). In Russia, for example, if Russia is a supplier and the IAEA agrees to supply, does Russia have to agree? Shouldn’t we just combine Russian and IAEA criteria from the beginning? Berriman: In Australia, our policy is not “discriminatory,” but “selective.” Closing Remarks by Acting RAS Committee Chair, Academician Boris Myasoedov: During this workshop we have worked interactively, which has been very important. Of course we didn’t solve all problems, and more seminars are needed. We have heard some controversial opinions, which should be studied. If international centers are created, should there be many? Few? What about geographical considerations? We should work together to avoid conflicts. These centers should deal not only with enrichment approaches, and it should be a gradual process. We should not use a natural uranium bank, and we should consider spent nuclear fuel storage problems. All steps should be voluntary. We shouldn’t push the process and put all countries together into “one small room.” Russia has made some practical steps. The Russian system was developed independently, but there is a need for cooperation. An international system is not needed for Russia alone, we have good experience in all steps of the nuclear fuel cycle, including fast reactors. Instead, we need to combine our efforts. LIST OF WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS Argentina Villagra Delgado, Pedro Raul, Embassy of Argentina to Australia Wilkinson, Moira, Permanent Mission of Argentina to the IAEA Armenia Galstyan, Areg, Ministry of Energy of Armenia
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges Australia Berriman, Annette, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia Hutchings, Ronald, Permanent Mission of Austria to the IAEA Smith, Ian, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization Walker, Martin, Permanent Mission of Australia to the IAEA Brazil Guimarães, Leonam dos Santos, Eletronuclear Vallim Guerreiro, Antonio José, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the IAEA Bulgaria Stamenov, Jordan, BAS, Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy Canada Shalabi, Ahmed, Permanent Mission of Canada to the IAEA Egypt Shaker, Mohamed, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs Indonesia Hiswara, Eri, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the IAEA Karyono, H.S., National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) Korea, Republic of Cho, Chang-Sok, Korea Nuclear Fuel Company, Ltd. Yang, Chang-Kook, Korea Nuclear Fuel Company, Ltd. Russian Federation Bezzubtsev, Valery S., Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Atomic Supervision of the Russian Federation Bychkov, Alexander V., Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Scientific Center of Russian Federation”; Research Institute of Atomic Reactors Ivanov, Valentin B., Member of the State Duma Russian Parliament Lushnikova, Liudmila, Institute of Biochemical Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences Myasoedov, Boris F., Russian Academy of Sciences Petrov, Vladislav A., Institute for Ore Deposits Geology, Petrography, Minerology and Geochemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences Shiyan, Yuri K., Russian Academy of Sciences Solonin, Michael I., TVEL Corporation Zmeyevsky, A., Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Switzerland Kelly, Julian, Association for Regional and International Underground Storage (ARIUS)
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Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges United States of America Ahearne, John, Scientific Research Society (SIGMA XI) Budnitz, Robert J., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Bunn, Matthew, Harvard University Burns, William F., Major General (USA, retired) Fetter, Steve, University of Maryland Gottemoeller, Rose, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Guenther, Rita, The National Academies Humphrey, Marc, The National Academies Levenson, Milton, Bechtel International (retired) Lowenthal, Micah, The National Academies Starz, Anne, Permanent Mission of the USA to the UN Organizations in Vienna International Atomic Energy Agency Forrstroem, Hans, Department of Nuclear Energy McDonald, Alan, Department of Nuclear Energy Planning and Economic Studies Rauf, Tariq, EXPO —Verification & Security Policy Coordination Simpson, Fiona, EXPO—Verification & Security Policy Coordination