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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Appendix J
Congressional Guidelines and Corresponding Findings and Recommendations
Congressional Guidelines
Corresponding Findings and Recommendations
1. Programs should be well coordinated with the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and any other relevant United States Government agency or department.
Findings 1-2; 2-5; 2-10; 3-2; 3-4; 4-2
Recommendations 1-1; 2-1; 3-1; 3-1a; 4-1
2. Programs will include appropriate transparency and accountability mechanisms, and legal frameworks and agreements between the United States and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) partner countries.
Findings 1-5; 2-6; 3-1; 3-3; 3-5; 3-7
Recommendations 3-1b; 3-3; 3-3a; 3-3b; 3-3c
3. Programs should reflect engagement with nongovernment experts on possible new options for the CTR program.
Findings 2-7; 2-8; 2-9; 2-10; 2-11; 3-3; 3-4; 3-7
Recommendations 3-1a; 3-2; 4-1
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
4. Programs should include work with the Russian Federation and other countries to establish strong CTR partnerships. Among other things, these partnerships should:
Findings 1-2; 1-4; 2-4; 2-5; 2-6; 2-12; 3-4; 3-6; 3-8
Recommendations 3-1b; 3-2; 3-3b
(i) increase the role of scientists and government officials of CTR partner countries in designing CTR programs and projects;
(ii) increase financial contributions and additional commitments to CTR programs and projects from Russia and other partner countries, as appropriate, as evidence that the programs and projects reflect national priorities and will be sustainable.
5. Programs should include broader international cooperation and partnerships, and increased international contributions.
Findings 1-2; 1-4; 1-6; 2-2; 2-3; 2-4; 2-8; 2-11; 2-12; 3-3; 3-4; 3-6; 3-7
Recommendations 1-1; 3-1b
6. Programs should incorporate a strong focus on national programs and sustainability, which includes actions to address concerns raised and recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office, in its report of February 2007, titled “Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-Term Sustainability of U.S. Funded Security Upgrades is Uncertain,” which pertain to the Department of Defense.
Findings 1-4; 2-3; 2-4; 2-12; 3-3; 3-4; 4-3
Recommendations 2-1; 3-3; 3-3c
7. Efforts should continue to focus on the development of CTR programs and projects that secure nuclear weapons; secure and eliminate chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related materials; and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons-related delivery vehicles and infrastructure at the source.
Chapter 4
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8. There should be efforts to develop new CTR programs and projects in Russia and the former Soviet Union, and in countries and regions outside the former Soviet Union, as appropriate and in the interest of United States national security.
Findings 1-1; 1-2; 1-3; 1-4; 1-6; 2-2; 2-3; 2-4; 2-8; 2-11; 2-12; 3-3; 3-4; 3-6; 3-7; 4-3
Recommendations 1-1; 3-1b
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