| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 99
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
4
The Role of the Department of Defense in Cooperative Threat Reduction 2.0
DRAWING ON ESTABLISHED STRENGTHS
The original Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU) focused heavily on military engagement and the destruction and dismantlement of massive weapons systems and the facilities that developed them.1 CTR 2.0 must address much more complex and diverse security threats. Some CTR 2.0 efforts may be able to take advantage of the original DOD CTR programs, but tasks that require the magnitude of effort needed to address the FSU’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal are likely to be the exception. DOD is not the only U.S. government department that is capable of conducting CTR activities, nor may it always be the best choice to undertake certain tasks, but it has core strengths that will make it an indispensable part of CTR 2.0.
DOD CTR has significant experience in implementing complex, multiyear projects and can draw on its base of contractor support. In addition, DOD CTR can draw on DOD resources to provide logistics support. With respect to the latter, an important lesson learned from the Libya experience is that the DOD ability to provide a rapid air or sealift response is tempered by other ongoing priority missions. In the committee’s discussions about the Libya experience, it learned that it would have taken a fairly senior decision maker to reprioritize an airlift because of pressing logistics requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. CTR 2.0 must have immediate access to such a decision maker, one who has sufficient knowledge of all requirements to ensure that critical needs are met. Even though DOD is often the logical source for logistical support in these matters, it may not always be able to respond in the time required. CTR 2.0
1
See Appendix I for a list of current DOD CTR programs.
OCR for page 100
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
strategic plans, therefore, need to take these limitations into account and plan redundancies accordingly.
The application of DOD CTR to CTR 2.0 may also draw on elements of large CTR 1.0 programs. For example, DOD CTR provided environmental monitoring laboratories (and associated training) related to chemical weapons destruction in Russia and biological weapons facility dismantlement in Kazakhstan. DOD CTR’s experience with this kind of project may make it a good candidate for establishing a similar monitoring capability and training program associated with the nuclear dismantlement activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) when conditions exist that would permit engagement there.
CTR 2.0 strategic planners will need to measure where DOD CTR will be welcome as a partner and where it will not. Although some countries may appreciate U.S. military involvement, others may view the inclusion of DOD CTR as an attempt to dismantle military assets, particularly in early stages of engagement. For example, the committee learned that conservative elements in India objected to Section 109 of the Hyde Act2 because it called for the establishment of a CTR program. That was interpreted by some Indians as an attempt to dismantle India’s nuclear capability. Even though the title of the section was changed and the intent was to develop nuclear nonproliferation cooperation with the Department of Energy (DOE), suspicions lingered. As stated elsewhere in this report, the committee believes that establishing the initial point of engagement will be a critical step for any CTR 2.0 activity and careful choices must be made about how to launch an effort most effectively.
Finding 4-1: DOD CTR will be an indispensable part of CTR 2.0, and will take the lead in some programs, while playing an active support role in others.
NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The committee believes that DOD can make major contributions to meeting security challenges in the Middle East, Asia, the DPRK, or other regions and countries through skillful application of its established expertise and the development of new approaches. The 2009 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence characterizes the region from the Middle East to South Asia as an “Arc of Instability” and “the locus for many of the challenges facing the United States in the twenty-first century.”3 This assessment argues in favor of looking closely at what engagement opportunities exist or may be developed under CTR 2.0.
2
U.S. Congress. Public Law 109-401. Available as of March 2009 at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d109:HR05682:@@@L&summ2=m&|TOM:/bss/d109query.html|.
3
Dennis C. Blair. 2009. Testimony at the 2009 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 8 pp.
OCR for page 101
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Each new engagement will take place in the context of broader U.S. policy, and diplomacy will likely have to lay the groundwork for any new CTR undertakings. Programs will have to be designed against a complex set of political, social, economic, and security conditions. In the Middle East, the level of tension between Israel and the Palestinians and the role that the United States plays in that conflict can affect whether or not countries in the region choose to engage with the United States. Another key element is Iran. Several recent studies4 have concluded that Iran’s nuclear program, should it proceed to a nuclear arsenal, could lead to a cascade of proliferation in the region. Should this situation develop it will provide both a challenge and an opportunity for CTR 2.0. In South Asia, the cycle of wars and crises since the 1949 partition of India has only been heightened by the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. Although the environment is unstable, India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons, chemical and biological industrial capabilities, and missile programs. They may be good candidates for engagement under CTR 2.0, but finding the right place to start and being willing to begin with modest efforts to build trust and confidence may be all that can be expected at the outset. The DPRK presents special challenges because of its authoritarian regime, lack of transparency, isolation, and a history of not living up to international commitments. But the United States and others are actively pursuing nuclear disablement and dismantlement that could lead to a broader set of CTR-type programs. In the following sections, the committee lists some challenges and opportunities for DOD CTR as a contributor to CTR 2.0.
POSSIBLE ROLES FOR DOD CTR IN SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY INITIATIVES
The DOD CTR program played an important role in helping Russia and other countries in the FSU fulfill international nonproliferation treaty obligations, particularly those related to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Once Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine decided to give up their nuclear weapons, the DOD CTR program provided substantial and critical assistance to repatriate nuclear warheads safely and securely to Russia, and worked with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to eliminate WMD, delivery systems and infrastructure. It supported nuclear warhead deactivation, secure storage of the warhead fissile material, and continues its work to destroy Russia’s very substantial stockpile of chemical weapons as a partner in the international program under the Group of Eight Global Partnership (G8 GP). Based on DOD CTR’s successful activities in treaty implementation, it should provide similar support on
4
International Institute for International Studies. 2008. Nuclear Programs in the Middle East – In the Shadow of Iran. 9 pp. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategicdossiers/nuclear-programmes-in-the-middle-east-in-the-shadow-of-iran/.
OCR for page 102
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
a global basis under CTR 2.0 both to traditional arms control treaties and to new international security mechanisms.
The committee identified several opportunities during its deliberations and in its discussions with experts that demonstrate the breadth of global engagement potential under CTR 2.0. Table 4.1 reflects possible engagement areas and suggests partners that could contribute to each activity. Some activities may require sensitive negotiations before program activities can begin, such as chemical weapons stockpile destruction projects; others may be able to begin in the very near term by expanding on existing programs, such as industrial chemical safety and security.
PROMOTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
In the area of traditional arms control treaties, there is significant potential under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) for expanded DOD CTR activity.
Chemical Weapons Destruction
The chemical weapons arsenals in the Middle East could be a prime target area for CTR 2.0. Large stockpiles of chemical weapons are believed to exist
TABLE 4.1 Examples of Possible DOD CTR 2.0 Activities
Region or Country
Activity
Countries
Possible Partners
Middle East
Secure and destroy suspected chemical weapons stockpiles
Egypt
Israel
Syria
DOD
G8 GP
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Eliminate remaining chemical weapons munitions and develop technical capability to eliminate any future chemical weapons
Iraq
DOD
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
OPCW
Promote Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Accession, including
chemical weapons detection and interdiction equipment and training
training for parliamentarians and national technical advisors
Lebanon
Iraq
DOD
Department of State
G8 GP
OPCW
OCR for page 103
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Region or Country
Activity
Countries
Possible Partners
Middle East, Africa, Asia
Promote industrial chemical safety and security
protecting chemical facilities
protecting cargoes of hazardous chemicals in transit
Multiple countries
DOD
Department of State
Department of Homeland Security
G8 GP
OPCW
Industry
Nongovernment Organizations (NGOs)
Promote biological safety, security, and disease surveillance programs
Multiple countries
DOD
Department of State
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
G8 GP
World Health Organization (WHO)
Industry
Promote United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 implementation – countersmuggling, counterpiracy, countertrafficking
Multiple countries
DOD
Department of State
DOE
G8 GP
Countries involved in Proliferation Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Promote Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs in more nations; connect DMC State Partnership Programs with CTR-related activities
Multiple countries
DOD
DMC
Countries involved
Facilitate incident/emergency response training programs
Multiple countries
DOD
DOE
Department of State
HHS
Countries involved
Develop cybersecurity training programs
Multiple countries
DOD
DOE
Countries involved
Strengthen export controls and border security, including maritime security
Multiple countries
DOD
Department of State
DOE
Coast Guard
Countries involved
OCR for page 104
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Region or Country
Activity
Countries
Possible Partners
Asia, Africa, Central Europe
Secure and eliminate excess conventional munitions
Philippines, multiple countries in Africa, Albania
DOD
Department of State
DPRK
Provide environmental monitoring laboratory equipment and training for nuclear contamination assessment and decontamination at Yongbyon (including redirection of former weapons scientists)
DOD
DOE
Department of State
Russia, South Korea, Japan, China
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Provide logistical support for denuclearization
DOD
DOE
Department of State
IAEA
Asia
Promote biological safety, security, and disease surveillance programs
Pakistan
Indonesia
DOD
Department of State
HHS
G8 GP
WHO
Industry
NGOs
Promote chemical safety and security
protecting chemical facilities
protecting cargoes of hazardous chemicals in transit
India
Pakistan
DOD
Department of State
EPA
OPCW
Industry
NGOs
Facilitate incident/emergency response planning and training
Multiple countries
DOD
DHS
DOE
Facilitate scientist-to-scientist exchanges in support of nonproliferation technologies
India
Pakistan
Department of State
DOE
DOD
Academic community
Russia
Complete all current projects with emphasis on sustainability
DOD
DOE
Coidentify lessons learned and best practices as basis of a strategy for application of programs outside the FSU
DOD
Department of State
DOE
G8 GP
Counterpart Russian
agencies
OCR for page 105
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
in Egypt, Israel, and Syria, none of which have joined the CWC. (Israel signed, but did not ratify the convention.) Bringing these three states, along with Iraq and Lebanon, under the disciplines entailed in CWC membership could help reduce tensions in the region.
Despite pledges by Egypt, Israel, and Syria to work toward elimination of WMD in the region,5 it is unlikely that these states will give up their chemical weapons without pressure or incentives from some outside party such as the United Nations, the United States, or the nascent Mediterranean Union (or, in Israel’s case, absent a regionwide resolution of the Middle East conflict). Any initial U.S. government actions with these countries would seem most appropriate for the State Department, perhaps as an initiative under the G8 GP, which has played a strong role in providing assistance to Russia’s chemical weapons destruction effort. DOD CTR might play a role later by providing technical expertise in the destruction of chemical weapons. As part of the chemical weapons destruction process, DOD CTR could establish or strengthen environmental monitoring capabilities for toxic chemicals that could be left in place once the chemical weapons destruction is finished. This could also be supported by the Environmental Protection Agency. DOD CTR could also provide emergency response training and personal protective equipment for units in partner countries that would be called upon to respond to chemical exposure, whether intentional or accidental.
Some 500 chemical weapons munitions escaped destruction in Iraq during the UN-supervised campaign after the first Gulf War.6 These weapons need to be destroyed as part of Iraq’s responsibilities under the CWC, as well as to keep them from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. DOD, through its Chemical Materials Agency and contractors, can provide extensive expertise and assistance in destroying these weapons, if requested by Iraq’s National Authority. DOD CTR can also train Iraqi units in destruction techniques and leave behind a permanent capability in Iraq that can manage any future discovery of additional chemical weapons stockpiles. Such units, when properly trained and with experience working on their own chemical weapons destruction, could also offer similar assistance to other countries in the region. Middle East states may accept assistance from Iraqi experts more readily than from the U.S. or European sources.
Promoting Accession to the CWC
The DOD CTR program can play different but important roles in promoting the accession of Iraq and Lebanon to the CWC, both of which have taken
5
Summit of Mediterranean States, Paris, July 13, 2008.
6
National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). 2006. Unclassified excerpt from NGIC, released to House Intelligence Committee, June 21.
OCR for page 106
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
steps toward joining.7 Program focus would be on providing technical expertise in the detection, handling, and destruction of chemical weapons. In Iraq, the primary role for DOD CTR would be to provide assistance in the destruction of legacy chemical weapons from Saddam Hussein’s regime and related training of Iraqi units.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) can provide training for parliamentarians and technical experts who will be responsible for the ratification of the convention and enacting the necessary implementing legislation. The latter legislation may be critical for Lebanon to prevent the transport of chemical weapons onto its territory.
Lebanon, unlike Iraq, has no known chemical weapons at present. It could, however, become a threat to security in the region if Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon were to acquire chemical warheads for short-range missiles such as the ones that it fired into Israel in the short-lived 2006 war.8 Presumably, the CWC implementing legislation will be structured to prohibit moving chemical weapons onto Lebanese territory. However, enforcement of such prohibitions will require technical expertise and equipment to detect and interdict transfers of chemical weapons material from a neighboring state such as Syria or Iran. In this case, the DOD CTR Proliferation Prevention Initiative, working with other U.S. CTR programs involved in border security, should be able to provide expertise and equipment if requested by Lebanon’s National Authority or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon force in the area.
Overall, DOD CTR should be able to provide significant technical assistance to any nation seeking to join the CWC. The nature of the cooperation will have to be tailored to the needs and sensitivities of each state. Close cooperation with the OPCW will be essential; coordination with the G8 GP will also be necessary and may also lead to opportunities to share the costs of program implementation. The broad partnership that has supported chemical weapons destruction in Russia will ensure broader international commitment of technical and financial resources.
Reducing the Risk of Chemical Attack
Several experts commented to the committee that in their view the risk of chemical attack is underestimated and consequently receives far too little attention. DOD CTR could make significant contributions to the stability of
7
Global Security Newswire. 2008. Lebanon Joins Chemical Weapons Convention. Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative. December 1. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20081201_8457.php.
8
Nissan Ratzlav-Katz and Pinchas Sanderson. 2008. Hizbullah Gears Up for War, Olmert Asks for UN Help. Arutz Sheva. July 14. Available as of March 2009 at www.Israelinternationalnews.com/news/news.aspx/126842.
OCR for page 107
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
countries facing domestic terrorism by preventing terrorist acquisition of toxic industrial chemicals as shown in the examples below.
Potential releases of toxic gases from chemical plants or refineries pose significant risks to the populations of many cities, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia where chemical industries have developed, but without the benefit of rigorous industrial safety standards. Deliberate releases through sabotage, terrorist, or militant attacks could threaten the stability of many nations, which in turn could have a direct impact on U.S. security. The DOD CTR program has technical expertise and experience to help counter such threats in other countries.
Protecting chemical plants or refineries is an area in which the DOD CTR program can draw on its experience acquired in safeguarding nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities in the FSU. Similarly, DOE could contribute by drawing on its relevant experience in protecting nuclear facilities in the United States and internationally. The potential problems are similar to those confronting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in its assessment of the vulnerability of industrial facilities in the United States. DHS, along with the State Department, which has already engaged many international partners on the chemical security issue, can be partners in such an effort.
Protecting cargoes of hazardous chemicals in transit and storage is especially challenging when the materials are being moved on public highways or through ports handling large volumes of commercial cargo. Again, the DOD CTR program should be able to draw on its experience in the FSU to assist partner states in developing technology to safeguard chemical shipments. Likewise, DOE has extensive experience in safeguarding the domestic transportation of nuclear materials. The protection of hazardous materials in storage would bring special challenges for working with commercial, in addition to governmental, facilities. It would require a high degree of flexibility in developing genuine partnership arrangements. Such an effort could be assisted by chemical industry trade associations that have developed best practices for the handling of dangerous materials.
In all these areas, DOD CTR could add its special expertise in the chemical security area to that of the State Department, which launched a Chemical Security Engagement Program in 2007,9 as a companion program to its Biological Security Engagement Program.10 This new effort implements programs in conjunction with host governments to fill critical gaps in chemical security and safety, particularly where there is high potential for terrorist activity.
In August 2007, the State Department teamed with the International Union
9
Chemical Security Engagement Program. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.csp-state.net/dev/contact/index.aspx.
10
Department of State. Biosecurity Engagement Program. Available as of March 2009 at http://ironside.sandia.gov/AsiaConference/JasonRao-BEP.pdf.
OCR for page 108
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
for Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), an international scientific association, to organize a 1-day workshop in Kuala Lumpur, “Chemical Safety and Security in the 21st Century.” The objective of the workshop was as follows: “To raise awareness of the chemical threat and to identify gaps in chemical security and chemical safety practices in South and Southeast Asia among practicing chemists, governmental officials, and regional chemical industry representatives.”11 IUPAC was selected as a partner for the effort because of its track record of working with the OPCW on similar issues and its international network.
Information gathered from this and similar conferences could provide the basis on which the DOD CTR program could explore developing initiatives in this area. This could be a fertile ground for new efforts that build on the extensive experience DOD CTR has had in chemical weapons destruction and security. Under CTR 2.0, similar collaborations with other international scientific unions and organizations could also be explored. For example, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which facilitated the link between the State Department and IUPAC, also is a member of the International Council for Science (ICSU) and oversees a network of more than 20 U.S. national committees corresponding to various ICSU scientific member bodies.12
IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1540
The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR) and the reinforcement of those principles in UNSCR 1810 provide a new range of potential DOD CTR activity. For example, UNSCR 1540 addresses the issue of chemical weapons proliferation to nonstate organizations much more directly than does the CWC Article VII, which was negotiated with state players in mind. Both documents dictate implementing legislation that prohibits persons or parties within territory under the control of the member state from possessing or producing chemical weapons. The UNSCR goes beyond the CWC in many ways, particularly because it is binding on all states, not just the signatories of the CWC. One clause is particularly relevant to the current discussion.
11
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). 2007. Project: Chemical Safety and Security in the 21st Century. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.iupac.org/web/ins/2007021-2-020. As stated on the IUPAC Web site, the workshop goals were to “1. Gain understanding about gaps in chemical security and chemical safety as identified by Governmental officials, practicing chemists, industry representatives, and international experts, with a particular focus on South and Southeast Asia; 2. Investigate ways in which IUPAC, other international organizations, and the State Department Chemical Security Engagement Program could develop programming to work with host governments, practicing chemists, local and regional chemical organizations, and chemical industry to begin to fill gaps. Follow on efforts could include best practices training, risk management strategy sharing, and cooperative research and development; and 3. Raise awareness of chemical terrorism threat among practicing chemists and industry in South and Southeast Asia.”
12
For more information, see the National Academies Board on International Scientific Organizations as of March 2009 at www.nas.edu/biso.
OCR for page 109
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
(The UNSCR) recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions.13
In situations like that described for Lebanon, CTR 2.0 has a clear opportunity to assist the local Lebanese National Authority to carry out its responsibilities under UNSCR 1540. DOD CTR can work with the OPCW to provide the technical training, advice, and equipment resources needed to perform the monitoring and interdiction functions of the National Authority.
DOD CTR efforts to increase biological safety and security can also be expanded. The Department of State, working with the Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture, has already started biological safety and security activities in many countries in Asia and Africa. DOD CTR could explore how it can contribute to strengthening and expanding those programs and especially how it can employ its expertise in the biosecurity area that other USG CTR programs lack.
The Departments of Defense and Energy have shared responsibility for nuclear security issues in the FSU for many years. To some extent, there is a tacit division of labor, with DOE responsible for programs that address civil nuclear materials and related issues and DOD responsible for the military side. The responsibilities are not precisely defined, but the two departments appear to be able to divide the work without major dispute or duplication. As DOD and DOE look toward new activities coordinated under CTR 2.0, it may be possible for both to take a role in emerging areas of concern, for example, in limiting nuclear weapons proliferation that may result from the global expansion of nuclear power.
The projects above illustrate that new DOD CTR opportunities will likely be smaller and more varied than CTR 1.0 projects. Chemical security projects in Pakistan may differ widely from those in the Philippines, and each will have to be designed to fit local needs and capabilities.14 The projects will also require the skills of other entities, including other U.S. government agencies, multinational organizations, and even nongovernment organizations. Effectiveness will require thoughtful integration of U.S. and international partners into each project. To bring these partners together as teams will require the hallmark CTR 2.0 characteristics of nimbleness and flexibility.
13
A technical advisor to the UNSCR 1540 Committee confirmed that there currently is no mechanism for responding to technical assistance requests. Although the committee is informed of several activities that support UNSCR 1540 implementation, there is no systemmatic way of documenting these activities or the countries that are providing or receiving technical support.
14
Carson Kuo, State Department, and Nancy Jackson, DOE. 2008. Communication to Committee, October 15.
OCR for page 110
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
One of the key lessons learned from the experiences of chemical weapons destruction in Albania and Libya is that DOD CTR and the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund must work together as a team. This will be even more the case under CTR 2.0. Each program developed specific skills and capabilities that complement those of the other. Together they can move a CTR project forward faster, more smoothly, and more cost-effectively than when acting independently.
DOD CTR also has important potential partners in other DOD programs. For example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has programs in International Counterproliferation, Counternarcotics, Consequence Management, Nuclear Forensics, and Small Arms and Light Weapons. In the broader CTR 2.0 environment, DOD CTR can draw on all of these as program partners. Some of these programs already are active in Unified Combatant Commands, although in a very limited way. In addition, the Department of Defense has about 20 programs that deal with some aspect of health. It would be useful to look at each to see if there is the potential for partnership with DOD CTR.
Even though WMD and their related materials, technologies, expertise, and delivery systems will always be a priority, there are many other threats that CTR 2.0 must address. As early as 1993, Congress recognized that destabilizing conventional weapons should also be covered under DOD CTR. The importance of this threat was highlighted again by the collaboration of Senators Richard Lugar and Barack Obama to pass the Department of State Authorities Act of 2006, under which Section 11 authorizes the secretary of state to secure, remove, or eliminate stocks of conventional weapons.15 Applying security and destruction programs to unguarded stockpiles of conventional munitions may help prevent terrorist acquisition of the raw materials needed for improvised explosive devices, which have taken far more lives in Iraq than any WMD and could appear anywhere else the materials and know-how is available. CTR 2.0 can provide the opportunity for DOD CTR and State Department programs to work together in this area.
Finding 4-2: Full integration of DOD into CTR 2.0, working in concert with other U.S. government departments and within DOD, will enable DOD to make a more effective contribution to U.S. threat reduction efforts.
Recommendation 4-1: As CTR 2.0 engagement opportunities emerge, the White House should determine the agencies and partners that are best suited to execute them, whether by virtue of expertise, implementation capacity, or funding.
15
Public Law 109-472 strengthens U.S. efforts to interdict illicit shipments of weapons or materials of mass destruction and secure vulnerable stockpiles of conventional weapons.
OCR for page 111
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
OPTIMIZING THE DEFENSE AND MILITARY CONTACTS PROGRAM
The Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) program funded under CTR 1.0 was not used historically to advance the DOD CTR program. Although funded by the DOD CTR budget, the DMC program was initially directed by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia, Russia, and Ukraine, which reported to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, with little involvement of the DOD CTR policy office. DMC is well suited to supporting engagements with new partners under CTR 2.0. It includes several activities that could be expanded to have broader application and that also respond to priorities of both Unified Combatant Command and DOD CTR missions. Officers at several Unified Commands expressed a high degree of interest in the following types of existing DMC activities:
Traveling Contact Teams (TCTs) for maritime interdiction and nuclear, biological and chemical warning and detection
Military Police familiarization exchanges and antiterror TCTs
National Guard State Partnership Program familiarizations and contact visits
Regional counterproliferation and counterterrorism exercises
Disaster preparedness and consequence management TCTs
The DMC program could be administered directly as part of the overall DOD CTR program and be used to lay the groundwork for future CTR 2.0 engagements. Future DMC program planning would benefit from direct engagement with the Unified Commands, within an overall strategic framework and in close coordination with diplomatic and other efforts.
Finding 4-3: The Defense and Military Contacts Program, funded by DOD CTR, is a relatively small, but potentially important, element of the DOD CTR 2.0 effort and could be better focused to support specific DOD CTR relationship-building opportunities that lead to program development in new geographic areas.
A ROLE FOR THE UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS
The Unified Combatant Commands,16 particularly those with geographic responsibility, are well positioned to help identify potential CTR 2.0 activities.
16
The Unified Commands include U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
OCR for page 112
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Because the focus of CTR 1.0 was on Russia and the FSU, the commands, other than the European Command, have not been involved in CTR programs, are not part of the planning process, and even are unaware of many CTR 1.0 activities in their areas of responsibility. The commands, however, already have aspects of CTR 2.0 in their operations plans and even in some projects they support. For example, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) participates in a joint avian influenza surveillance project with the U.S. Agency for International Development as part of its biodefense effort and had sponsored a biological security workshop in Malaysia. At the time of the committee’s conversation at PACOM, officers there were unaware of the DOD CTR Biological Threat Reduction Program or that the Department of State was engaged in biosecurity activities in the Pacific area.
As the newest regional command, the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) presents a particularly interesting opportunity to build on existing relationships that might be a model for other commands. AFRICOM faces the daunting task of balancing demands to prevent global terrorism from taking hold in an environment of poverty, poor education, massive population growth, and health challenges. Many African nations and international organizations are reluctant to encourage further militarization of the continent. Africa holds a significant portion of the world’s natural resources, including vast untapped reservoirs of oil, making it a focal point of global interests as energy demands rise, driven especially by countries with rapidly increasing standards of living such as China and India.
DOD could build on its long-standing presence in Africa established by the medical research units of the U.S. Navy in Cairo, Egypt, and the U.S. Army in Nairobi, Kenya.
How the “face” of AFRICOM is developed now will influence how successful it will be in the years to come. Fortunately, DOD has a long-standing presence in Africa established in large part by the medical research units of the U.S. Navy in Cairo, Egypt, and the U.S. Army in Nairobi, Kenya. Both of these programs have been in place for decades, have built solid foundations of collaboration and mutual respect between their respective organizations and their host governments, and in many cases these facilities have served as launch sites for outreach activities and outbreak investigation into other countries in Africa and beyond, including into the central Asian states of the former Soviet Union.
The focus of activities at the medical research laboratories has been on
U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Strategic Command. The Unified Commands are referred to collectively in the report as “Commands.”
OCR for page 113
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
endemic diseases that are also of military concern, such as malaria, leishmaniasis, and others, and have extended on occasion to work on pathogens with bioterrorism potential, such as anthrax, plague, and Ebola. Over the years, strong partnerships have developed between U.S. military and civilian scientists and physicians with their local collaborators, resulting in shared authorship of scientific publications and the establishment of life-long friendships. As measured by most metrics of productivity, transparency, and engagement, these laboratories have been highly successful.
Some of the diseases studied at these facilities are now the focus of large global initiatives that involve important NGOs such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.17 The DOD overseas laboratories have also worked closely with the World Health Organization in responding to outbreaks of global importance that have occurred in the region, and in other international collaborations such as the global surveillance of seasonal and avian influenza. The DOD overseas medical research laboratories are also closely linked to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) international activities, with CDC staff members frequently assigned to the DOD overseas laboratories. In Kenya, the CDC has staffed its own medical research laboratory with its headquarters in Nairobi and a robust field site in Kisumu in western Kenya. The CDC laboratory has been present in Kenya for about three decades and is very well regarded. Other smaller profile activities under CDC’s direction are in place in Tanzania, Uganda, and until recently in Cote d’Ivoire, and CDC staff members can be found in many African nations assisting with childhood immunization programs, the global eradication of polio campaign, and other global health initiatives. Collectively, these activities present the United States in a very positive light locally, and could offer AFRICOM a foundation to build upon that could both help address important global health challenges and provide access to critical local information and early warning of disease problems. An important challenge to AFRICOM will be to make certain that their mission of terrorism prevention does not negate the longstanding good will established by these highly successful resident programs.
The committee consulted with several commands to explore how aware they are of existing DOD CTR and U.S. government CTR efforts and the extent to which a CTR 2.0 might be integrated into command strategies. The level of interest was high, as was the potential relevance of CTR 2.0 to command missions. DTRA currently has liaison officers stationed at each of the commands who could provide a ready link between DOD CTR and command interests. In addition to keeping commands informed of DOD CTR programs, these liaisons, if incorporated into the broader flow of information from all U.S. government participants in CTR 2.0, could share that information as well.
17
See http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/.
OCR for page 114
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Finding 4-4: Combatant commands currently engage regionally at many levels and with a broad group of interlocutors, but too little with DOD CTR or other U.S. government departments implementing cooperative threat reduction programs. DOD-DTRA cultivation of relationships with the combatant commands creates mutual benefits.
Recommendation 4-2: The secretary of defense should direct the review and reformulation of the DOD CTR program in support of CTR 2.0 and work with the White House, secretary of state, secretary of energy, and other cabinet and agency officers to ensure full coordination and effective implementation of DOD programs in CTR 2.0. The review should also include broader military components, including the Unified Combatant Commands, the full set of programs in DTRA, DOD health and research programs, and other DOD assets.
The substantial changes in form and function proposed for CTR 2.0 will not be implemented overnight. Many existing program commitments must be fulfilled, and fundamental changes in how U.S. government agencies relate to each other and how the U.S. government relates to its domestic and international partners will take time. Many lessons have been learned from the CTR 1.0 experience in the FSU that need to be remembered; best practices need to be applied while new ones are developed. The White House, working across agencies and with Congress, needs to devise a plan that will allow CTR 2.0 to be constructed while the United States completes its commitments under CTR 1.0. There may be some programs in CTR 1.0 that can evolve earlier than others, and these should be encouraged. There may be examples from the G8 GP that can be held up as an example to other nations as a model. The key is to begin the process and not wait for the next emergency, then wish that CTR 2.0 was there to respond.
Recommendation 4-3: A plan for the evolution of CTR 1.0 to CTR 2.0 should take into account the congressional principles enumerated in the legislation authorizing this report, as well as existing USG CTR initiatives. The White House should review National Security Council–Homeland Security Council coordination in bioengagement as a possible model for other programs as it develops a transition plan.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Finding 4-1: DOD CTR will be an indispensable part of CTR 2.0, and will take the lead in some programs, while playing an active support role in others.
OCR for page 115
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Finding 4-2: Full integration of DOD into CTR 2.0, working in concert with other U.S. government departments and within DOD, will enable DOD to make a more effective contribution to U.S. threat reduction efforts.
Recommendation 4-1: As CTR 2.0 engagement opportunities emerge, the White House should determine the agencies and partners that are best suited to execute them, whether by virtue of expertise, implementation capacity, or funding.
Finding 4-3: The Defense and Military Contacts Program funded by DOD CTR, is a relatively small, but potentially important, element of the DOD CTR 2.0 effort and could be better focused to support specific DOD CTR relationship-building opportunities that lead to program development in new geographic areas.
Finding 4-4: Combatant commands currently engage regionally at many levels and with a broad group of interlocutors, but too little with DOD CTR or other U.S. government departments implementing cooperative threat reduction programs. DOD-DTRA cultivation of relationships with the combatant commands creates mutual benefits.
Recommendation 4-2: The secretary of defense should direct the review and reformulation of the DOD CTR program in support of CTR 2.0 and work with the White House, secretary of state, secretary of energy, and other cabinet and agency officers to ensure full coordination and effective implementation of DOD programs in CTR 2.0. The review should also include broader military components, including the Unified Combatant Commands, the full set of programs in DTRA, DOD health and research programs, and other DOD assets.
Recommendation 4-3: A plan for the evolution of CTR 1.0 to CTR 2.0 should take into account the congressional principles enumerated in the legislation authorizing this report, as well as existing USG CTR initiatives. The White House should review National Security Council–Homeland Security Council coordination in bioengagement as a possible model for other programs as it develops a transition plan.
OCR for page 116
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
This page intentionally left blank.
