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necessary financial assistance.23 Russia was also fully aware of its own responsibility for the safety and security of its nuclear arsenals and took a number of effective steps to ensure this. Specifically, Russia:

  • developed and implemented an up-to-date regulatory regime

  • implemented a government-administered nuclear materials accounting and control system

  • improved physical security at nuclear facilities

  • commissioned storage facilities for nuclear materials and munitions that were built to the most stringent specifications

  • adopted a new export control law and reassessed the dual-purpose item list

  • consolidated nuclear materials at a smaller number of facilities

  • introduced safe containers for transporting and storing special items and materials

  • improved the living standards of nuclear weaponeers

Within the framework of the CTR program, Russia received assistance with:

  • destruction of strategic offensive arms

  • transportation and containers to move nuclear munitions and materials

  • construction at the Mayak site of a modern storage facility for de-weaponized fissile materials

  • provision of equipment to ensure physical protection of storage facilities for nuclear munitions and nuclear materials

  • funding to replace the power-generating capacity of three breeder reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk so that they could be shut down

In addition, hundreds of tons of weapons-grade uranium have been converted for use in commercial power reactors following the 1992 Russian-U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement.24 Activities to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium are still ongoing. Bilateral collaboration has been raised to a new level thanks to the 2002 Global Partnership Initiative.25 Its primary objective is to provide financial assistance—mostly to Russia—to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The initiative has been instrumental in the elimination of chemical weapons, as well as the disposition of nuclear-powered submarines and weapons-grade materials.

Activities continue, and they are becoming increasingly routine in nature. For example, political, technological, and logistical issues in the field of nuclear submarine disposition have been resolved; a wealth of experience has been accumulated; the overall scope and timeline of activities are clearly understood; the completion of this work is near.


For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see; accessed April 8, 2008.


For further information regarding the HEU Agreement, see; accessed April 6, 2008.


For further information regarding the G8 Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, see; accessed on April 6, 2008. See also,; accessed May 1, 2008.

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