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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

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. "FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS." Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

necessary financial assistance.23 Russia was also fully aware of its own responsibility for the safety and security of its nuclear arsenals and took a number of effective steps to ensure this. Specifically, Russia:

  • developed and implemented an up-to-date regulatory regime

  • implemented a government-administered nuclear materials accounting and control system

  • improved physical security at nuclear facilities

  • commissioned storage facilities for nuclear materials and munitions that were built to the most stringent specifications

  • adopted a new export control law and reassessed the dual-purpose item list

  • consolidated nuclear materials at a smaller number of facilities

  • introduced safe containers for transporting and storing special items and materials

  • improved the living standards of nuclear weaponeers

Within the framework of the CTR program, Russia received assistance with:

  • destruction of strategic offensive arms

  • transportation and containers to move nuclear munitions and materials

  • construction at the Mayak site of a modern storage facility for de-weaponized fissile materials

  • provision of equipment to ensure physical protection of storage facilities for nuclear munitions and nuclear materials

  • funding to replace the power-generating capacity of three breeder reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk so that they could be shut down

In addition, hundreds of tons of weapons-grade uranium have been converted for use in commercial power reactors following the 1992 Russian-U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement.24 Activities to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium are still ongoing. Bilateral collaboration has been raised to a new level thanks to the 2002 Global Partnership Initiative.25 Its primary objective is to provide financial assistance—mostly to Russia—to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The initiative has been instrumental in the elimination of chemical weapons, as well as the disposition of nuclear-powered submarines and weapons-grade materials.

Activities continue, and they are becoming increasingly routine in nature. For example, political, technological, and logistical issues in the field of nuclear submarine disposition have been resolved; a wealth of experience has been accumulated; the overall scope and timeline of activities are clearly understood; the completion of this work is near.

23

For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm; accessed April 8, 2008.

24

For further information regarding the HEU Agreement, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/heudeal/heudeal.htm; accessed April 6, 2008.

25

For further information regarding the G8 Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, see http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/gp_stat-en.pdf; accessed on April 6, 2008. See also, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/69124.htm; accessed May 1, 2008.

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
OVERVIEW OF U.S. - RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT (1-2)
LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (3-12)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (13-26)
ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS (27-28)
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (29-36)
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING:LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 (37-48)
THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY (49-56)
PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (57-58)
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY (59-68)
FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (69-70)
THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES (71-88)
MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION (89-104)
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE (105-110)
A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES (111-112)
INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION (113-124)
NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START (125-134)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (135-144)
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE (145-150)
CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION (151-152)
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES (153-162)
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (163-178)
U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS (179-202)
MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (203-214)
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (215-216)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (217-228)
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY (229-236)
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA (237-244)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OFEXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (245-246)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (247-254)
LIST OF ACRONYMS (255-260)
APPENDIX A: AGENDA (261-264)
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS LIST (265-266)
APPENDIX C: JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES'/RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES (267-271)
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY (272-298)
APPENDIX E: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (299-309)