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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

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. "MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES." Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

December 5, 2009, of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)281 and on December 31, 2012 of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).282

THE PROPOSED 123 AGREEMENT

In a joint statement issued on July 3, 2007, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin announced the initialing of a U.S.-Russia agreement designed to meet the legal requirements for transnational cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy which are set forth at Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.283 “We share the view,” said the joint statement, “that this Agreement will provide an essential basis for the expansion of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and expect this document to be signed and brought into force in accordance with existing legal requirements.”284 The U.S.-Russian 123 Agreement was signed on May 6, 2008285 and transmitted to Congress on May 12, 2008286 for the requisite statutory review period. The following sections will describe the requirements of section 123, summarize the agreement’s current status, and provide an overview of the types of cooperative projects that would be made possible by entry into force of such an agreement.

123 Agreement Requirements Under U.S. Law

Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, 42 U.S.C. ­§ 2153, requires that significant nuclear exports from the United States take place only pursuant to an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the recipient. Significant nuclear exports include power reactors, research reactors, nuclear source material (including reactor fuel), and four major components of reactors (pressure vessels, fuel charging and discharging machines, complete control rod drive units, and primary coolant pumps).287 As is typical with agreements

281

To read the text of the START I Treaty, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/index.html; accessed April 6, 2008. START I entered into force on December 5, 1994. Article XVII of the START I Treaty provides that the Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years. START II was signed in January 1993 but never entered into force.

282

The text of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-3.html; accessed April 6, 2008.

283

The text of the pending 123 Agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation can be found in Appendix E.

284

The text of this Joint Statement, which was titled Declaration of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: Joint Actions, can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070703.html; accessed April 8, 2008.

285

The text of the White House announcement of the signing can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/print/20080506-5.html; accessed May 30, 2008.

286

The text of the President’s transmittal letter can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080513-1.html; accessed May 30, 2008.

287

Some types of peaceful nuclear cooperation, including a broad range of technical assistance in such areas as nuclear safety, are possible outside the framework of an agreement for cooperation. Examples include imports of nuclear material and equipment into the United States; exports from the United States of nuclear components (other than the four major reactor components noted above) under licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; nuclear technology (as information) approved for export by the U.S. Department of Energy pursuant to 10 CFR Part 810; and exports of nuclear-related dual-use items such as simulators, detectors, analytic equipment, and many types of pipes, valves and other parts licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Consistent with this, a limited amount of peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia has for many years taken place under

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
OVERVIEW OF U.S. - RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT (1-2)
LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (3-12)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (13-26)
ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS (27-28)
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (29-36)
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING:LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 (37-48)
THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY (49-56)
PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (57-58)
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY (59-68)
FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (69-70)
THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES (71-88)
MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION (89-104)
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE (105-110)
A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES (111-112)
INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION (113-124)
NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START (125-134)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (135-144)
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE (145-150)
CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION (151-152)
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES (153-162)
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (163-178)
U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS (179-202)
MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (203-214)
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (215-216)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (217-228)
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY (229-236)
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA (237-244)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OFEXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (245-246)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (247-254)
LIST OF ACRONYMS (255-260)
APPENDIX A: AGENDA (261-264)
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS LIST (265-266)
APPENDIX C: JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES'/RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES (267-271)
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY (272-298)
APPENDIX E: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (299-309)